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Summary
The enquiry described in thesis arose because of the difficulties 
being experienced by a manager in a hospital who was attempting to 
relate orthodox management teaching, largely based on neo-human 
relations theory, to the process of achieving change with staff while 
maintaining, and hopefully enhancing, the industrial relations climate. 
Such theory implies that the introduction or extension of participation 
may help to achieve such goals. The study examined whether this was 
the case or whether it might increase the range of issues potentially 
available for negotiation and generate further conflict.
Assumptions about the nature of the employing relationship are 
made explicit and an affinity identified with an interactionist 
perspective and, more specifically, with negotiated order theory. 
Conceptual understandings are similarly clarified and the significance 
of the exercise of authority, as well as power, is emphasised.
The research design involved qualitative research by an internal 
researcher i.e. someone who was an established element of the context 
under investigation. There was thus a degree of action research.
Data is presented from interviews with staff representatives, 
from records of day-to-day industrial relations interaction, and from 
other commentators and research. It describes and analyses perceptions 
of the management function and the methods already used by the repres­
entatives to exercise influence over it. Attitudes to the various 
forms and processes of participation are considered and the potential 
for participation examined by assessing areas of interest and the
inclination and ability of both staff and their representatives.
Confirmation is obtained that the study of participation cannot 
be isolated from the other characteristics of the employing relation­
ship and it is also demonstrated that the nature of the constructs of 
the employing relationship can be revealed by such a study. An analytic 
framework is derived from the data that relates the potential for 
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As one would expect, I have entitled this thesis 'The nature and 
influence of constructs of the employing relationship in a general 
hospital revealed by a study of participation' in the hope that this 
phrase will concisely, if only approximately, describe the subject 
matter of the research from which the thesis derives. But one might be 
forgiven for suspecting that the two elements of the study were almost 
dichotomous or that the more empirical enquiry had been deliberately 
manipulated in order to provide insights into a more general, conceptual 
framework of industrial relations behaviour. In this introduction, I 
can only contend that such suspicions are unfounded; the remainder of 
the thesis, particularly those chapters concerned with the development 
of the research design and subjects of enquiry, will, I trust, prove 
this contention to be true. The original research intent was to 
investigate the practical consequences of implementing participation, 
and was not particularly concerned with locating this activity within a 
wider or more theoretical framework, but as the literature review and 
field activity proceeded, it became obvious that little of value could 
be discovered about participation without simultaneous regard for other 
features of industrial relations character and activity. Reciprocally, 
pursuit of the empirical research into participation inevitably 
revealed more about the nature of the components of industrial 
relations behaviour and their inter-relation and inter-action, and as 
the research progressed the inevitability of the mutual relevance was 
strengthened.
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The original outline research design could almost be said to 
describe a problem-solving exercise and althoug^h it was subsequently 
gradually but substantially revised, the intention has remained that 
the outcome of the research should be of practical value. The 
commitment to this objective arose frcxn the personal experience 
which initiated the desire to research into the practical implications 
of participation.
Management Education
Hospital administrators often have direct managerial authority 
for large numbers of staff, and yet in the early years of my career 
in hospital administration I had virtually no guidance about how to 
discharge this responsibility other than from material contained in 
the syllabuses of the qualifying examinations of two professional 
bodies. I studied for the examinations of the Institute of Health 
Service Administrators and Institute of Personnel Management from the 
material supplied in, and recommended by, two correspondence courses 
provided by different organisations. However, I found it impossible 
to achieve a satisfactory synthesis of the content of these courses 
with the problems of staff management that I was seeking to avoid or 
resolve, and this has not been a problem peculiar to myself.
Steven Barker joined Pilkingtons as a graduate management trainee 
in 1980 and studied for Stage I of the I.P.M. examination by attending 
evening classes twice a week. In his assessment of the course (1983) 
he wrote, "Much of the material seemed irrelevant to the work I was 
doing - salivating dogs, standard deviation and self-actualisation 
did little to help me with the problems of a busy personnel department."
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Barker clearly expected his management training to be prescriptive,
but states, "I felt that it had done little to help me towards
'professional competence'". That this is a deficiency of a wider
part of the spectrum of management training is indicated by Wills
(1983:25), who resigned as Professor of Customer Policy at the
Cranfield School of Management to establish a new, private management
school. Writing as the Principal Designate of the new school, the
University of Management Centre, Buckingham, Wills explained why he
felt there was a need for another centre of management education:
"Instead of aiming resolutely to make managers more effective, 
we have tended complacently to assume that our business is to 
go on making the product we have always made, especially 
classroom-based degree courses. We have done so regardless of 
steadily mounting evidence over the years that neither the 
graduates themselves, nor their employers, have been impressed 
by the contribution such studies have made to workplace 
performance.".
When I studied for the I.H.S.A. and I.P.M. examinations, the 
syllabuses largely consisted of elements of traditional academic 
disciplines, such as economics, psychology, sociology and statistics, 
and a minor proportion consisted of more applied subjects, such as 
general management and industrial relations. As a hospital 
administrator, one of my central concerns was to maintain good 
industrial relations, as an end in itself, but at the same time to 
achieve managerial objectives affecting, or requiring the co-operation 
of, other staff, with the minimum of disruption to the industrial 
relations climate. Even the I.P.M. industrial relations syllabus 
material was of little value as a source of practical guidance. The 
correspondence course (NALGO 1978 : (i)) summarised it thus:
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"1. SYLLABUS
Candidates will be expected to demonstrate that they have 
acquired a knowledge of:
(a) The purposes, structures, composition and activities 
of :
(i) worker organisations, including trade unions and 
professional associations;
(ii) employers and employers' associations and 
federations ;
(iii) departments of State and Statutory bodies having 
an involvement in industrial relations affairs;
(b) (i) the institutions, procedures and methods of
collective bargaining between employers and 
employees;
(ii) the nature and form of third party inter­
ventions in the process; and
(iii) the consequences of these activities.
Candidates will be expected to be able to conceptualise 
and analyse industrial relations situations and processes 
with a sufficient degree of rigour as to produce a 
convincing explanation.".
The emphasis of the course content appeared to be on the formal, 
ideological, general, and, essentially, structural and yet the 
concluding sentence indicates that it should be applicable to 
"industrial relations situations", implying all, or the majority of 
all, industrial relation situations, and "processes". This sentence 
also implicitly declares the exclusion of practical competence as an 
objective of the syllabus. It is only seeking to achieve "a 
convincing explanation" and is not concerned with the student as a 
participant in "industrial relations situations".
Consequently, the course did not provide the means for the 
student to appreciate, assess and justify their assessment of the
“5“
structures, processes and other participants in industrial relations 
activity in which he/she may be involved and neither did it enable 
the student to examine his/her own function in that activity. This 
second exercise would provide explicit identification of managerial 
objectives, cultures and ideologies; establish personal criteria 
of managerial effectiveness; promote the formulation or choice of 
an industrial relations philosophy or strategy; and confront the 
student with the operational industrial relations problems or 
inconsistencies arising from these characteristics or choices. These 
are all issues which I was trying to resolve during ray formal 
management education, or had to resolve relatively shortly after its 
completion, but the I.P.M. industrial relations syllabus seemed to 
offer little assistance.
A Workplace Industrial Relations Problem
Compare, for example, the content of the syllabus with some of 
the issues which may arise from just one problem that may be 
experienced during a common industrial relations exercise - the 
formal negotiations between management and trade union representatives 
of the introduction or review of an incentive bonus scheme. Product­
ivity schemes have been introduced widely in workplace enterprises 
and although they can take an enormous variety of forms, there are 
a number of negotiating concerns common to the implementation of 
many of them. In the N.H.S., the major stimulus to introduce 
productivity schemes was two reports of the National Board for 
Prices and Incomes (1967, 1971). These stated that there was a low 
level of productivity among hospital ancillary staff and that in 
spite of a reasonable basic rate their total earnings were low in
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comparison with similar staff in the private sector because of the 
absence of an opportunity to earn a productivity-related bonus. 
Essentially, N.H.S. incentive bonus schemes rely on reductions in 
staffing levels, while usually maintaining the quality and level of 
service, to finance an increase in basic pay for the remaining staff 
and provide the employing authority with budgetary savings. Staffing 
levels are usually adjusted by natural wastage, and not by redundancy, 
dismissal or compulsory transfer.
Imagine, therefore, that management, i.e. the local administrator, 
work study officers and health authority personnel officer, and staff 
representatives i.e. full-time trade union official and relevant shop 
stewards, have fairly amicably reached an agreement about which staff 
duties are to be included in a bonus scheme, the accuracy of the 
detailed analysis of workload undertaken by the work study officers, 
the size of the bonus to be paid, the number of staff to be allocated 
for relief purposes and the security of the jobs for the staff 
already employed. It appears that the bonus scheme negotiations have 
been virtually completed, and without serious disagreement, but then 
the full-time trade union officer makes it plain that he will only 
accept the scheme if the allocation of staff to cover the measured 
workload is increased by one.
In formulating his response to this requirement, the adminstrator 
may first seek to find his own explanation of this unexpected develop­
ment that severely threatens the successful completion of the 
negotiation process. The most straightforward explanation is that 
the full-time officer is expressing a genuine concern of the shop 
stewards and/or staff that, regardless of the work study officers'
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figures, the proposed staffing level will not be adequate to cover 
the work. But there are several other explanations. It could be 
that the demand arises from the nature of the relationship between 
the full-time officer and the shop stewards. After a relatively 
uneventful negotiation process the full-time officer may feel obliged 
to demonstrate to them the value of having him present, by deliber­
ately creating a negotiating difficulty. Or the shop stewards them­
selves may feel that the full-time officer has been inadequate and 
conceded too easily and have therefore insisted that he seek a clear 
concession for them from management. Equally, the demand may have 
been generated by the trade union representatives' perception of 
management's response to the previous negotiating issues, and if it 
has seemed weak, sensitive or conciliatory, they may wish to exploit 
it and seek a further, unexpected gain. And although there may be 
many more explanations, it could finally be suggested that the 
staff side wish to obtain confirmation that all that has been agreed 
previously really is the limit of what is available to them, and 
that despite the strength of their advocacy for an extra member of 
staff they do not expect to be successful.
The management's response would obviously be influenced by its 
assessment of why the late negotiating issue has arisen but will also 
similarly be affected by internal conflicts of personality, department 
and objective. The managers may indeed wish to single-mindedly obtain 
the greatest tangible and quantifiable efficiency and achieve an 
adequate level of service at the minimum of cost and therefore refuse 
the request for one more member of staff. Similarly, it may be their 
opinion that staffing levels are ultimately solely management's 
responsibility and so reject a trade union attempt to diminish its
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control. At the other extreme, the negotiating team may be under 
pressure from higher management simply to complete the negotiations 
or may be so anxious to maintain trade union goodwill and ensure 
agreement about the bonus scheme that it readily concedes the request, 
even if it is considered to be unnecessary. Alternatively, the 
management team may be influenced by a sense that it is morally 
right or pragmatically desirable to design the bonus scheme in some 
sort of context of co-determination. On the basis that both negot­
iating groups have an interest in implementing the bonus scheme and 
that managerial 'reasonableness* would be reciprocated, the managers 
may reconsider the staffing levels and agree with the request, or they 
may confirm that the previous staffing level was adequate and expect 
the staff side to agree when it can be shown why this decision is 
'fair'. Conversely, the management team might decide that the trade 
union representatives are presenting a genuine concern and that it 
would be reasonable for it to be met. At yet another level, the 
managers may consider their response to the request with a more 
tactical emphasis on its implications for the future nature of the 
industrial relations climate, and in particular the way in which it 
contributes towards the alteration, refinement or further definition 
of the relationship between management and the trade unions, trade 
union representatives and staff.
This example may seem unduly protracted, but I have not sought 
to describe the complete range of negotiating options available and 
their origins and consequences. In fact, only a small proportion of 
such considerations have been presented, but it demonstrates the 
enormous gulf between the content of professional management education 
and the nature of practical managerial problems. It also indicates
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that there need not be an inevitable schism between theoretical 
concerns and practical advice and that in the right context they are 
inevitably inter-related to mutual advantage. This may seem to be a 
statement of the obvious, but as a student of management the nature 
of the relationship was not clear, but tenuous and elusive.
Managerial Prescriptions
The managerial approach most readily received from the I.H.S.A. 
and I.P.M. learning material is an amalgam of the implications of 
the human relations and neo-human relations schools. At the most 
fundamental level of analysis, these schools postulate a unitary 
framework for the structure of workplace relations, a belief that all 
the members of a work enterprise ultimately have the same goals and 
the same interests; conflict is not envisaged as an intrinsic 
feature of industrial relations. Analogies are commonly made with the 
activity of a team, since it has a unity of purpose, it requires 
equality of effort and its members are mutually interdependent. The 
analogy is further pursued to explain why, just as there is always 
a captain, chairman or leader of a team, so there must be those in 
a work enterprise who exercise the function of leadership, or 
management. This leadership will almost certainly determine the 
nature of the endeavour for which the enterprise is established or 
maintained and those who exercise it can assume that all the other 
members of the enterprise will seek to maximise the mutual benefit 
that can be derived from achieving the purpose of the enterprise.
The manager will wish to reinforce this desire by the style of 
management used and the method of the organisation of the work. The
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inference from the neo-human relations writers has been that managers 
should pursue McGregor's Theory Y philosophy of the nature of working 
man and should therefore organise work in a way which provides the 
maximum opportunity for staff to achieve self-actualisation. They 
should exercise leadership in a manner which seeks to achieve the 
highest quality of human relations, or, to use the various labels, 
imitates Lippitt and White's 'democratic' style, is located at the 
democratic, relationship-orientated end of Tannenbaum's continuum, 
achieves Blake and Mouton's 9:9 management, and produces Likert's 
participative workplace system. The suggestion is that there is no 
intrinsic conflict between the interests of staff and management, 
that those who work are adult, mature people who wish to be able to 
exercise some degree of freedom and responsibility and gain 
satisfaction from it, and that if the managerial style provides an 
opportunity to do this, the workers will act responsibly, be more 
productive and share the goals established by the leadership.
This approach emphasises the value of effective, regular two- 
way communication between management and staff. In particular it 
requires management to keep them fully informed about the organisa­
tion's activities, to encourage them to express their opinions about 
the information received and, in addition to giving each worker the 
greatest possible control over the performance of their own duties, 
to allow the staff involvement in the organisation's decision-making 
system. This decision-making involvement and flow of information 
may be justified on moral grounds and may be envisaged as an 
important means of increasing the exercise of individual responsibility 
and control, but it may also be seen as a method of further intensi­
fying the identification of the staff with the interests of the
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enterprise.
This compound of human relations and neo-human relations 
industrial relations philosophy is attractive to the student of 
management for several clear reasons. Perhaps most fundamentally, 
its concern is universal and provides an analysis which can apply to 
apparently all workplace situations, in a way in which material about 
socio-technical systems, 'complex man' and orientations to work, for 
example, does not. Secondly, but also crucially, it provides 
prescriptions for managerial behaviour which are capable of simple 
interpretation, confirm the validity of managerial objectives and 
can be readily incorporated into a feasible, practical managerial 
strategy. . In addition, although the philosophy can be interpreted 
not as the outcome of objective study but as a description of one 
particular managerial ideology, which incorporates a means for 
manipulating workforces, management students can console thanselves 
with the thought that the philosophy can be alternatively regarded 
as one embodying important 'liberal' moral principles. Finally, 
there is strong and consistent support from the management 
'establishment' for what appears to be the same amalgam of human 
and neo-human relations philoso^y, to the extent that it can be 
said to constitute a management orthodoxy, which provides regular 
reinforcement of the students' inferences from the management 
learning material.
In a book largely written for management practitioners, Warr 
and Wall (1975) devote a chapter to theories of work attitudes, under 
the following sub-headings: 'Scientific Man', 'The Hawthorne Studies',
'Maslow's Theory of Human Nature' (\diich also includes references to
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Argyris, Likert and McGregor) and 'Herzberg's two-factor theory'.
In the conclusion to this chapter, the authors (p.38) comment, "We 
have briefly described some of the more important theoretical 
influences on both attitude research and management practices." and 
that, "Following this historical summary we may now turn to look at 
some of the major aspects of work which influence psychological 
well-being.". These aspects of work are described as pay, 
interpersonal relations, participation, job design and work stress.
In the final chapter, the two authors declare their commitment 
(p.165). "Stated in these general terms a value system favouring 
change in the direction of greater well-being is unlikely to be 
disputed. Granting that most readers will support the general 
principle, we may ask them what they are doing towards its application."
The British Institute of Management can be even more candidly
exhortational, as demonstrated in a commentry on a BIM survey about
participation (1981:73,74):
"Voluntary employee participation is mainly concerned with 
willingness to change both our approach and our attitudes, to 
share responsibilities and to pull together as a team. From 
this should spring benefits, acknowledged by those who 
contributed to BIM's survey, that will have a positive role in 
re-invigorating the inherent strengths of British industry.... 
Perhaps the most difficult benefit to quantify, but one that is 
nevertheless present, is on a personal level. Participation 
will give many people a strength and feeling of personal 
responsibility, accountability and commitment, and these we 
venture to suggest could lead in turn to a restoration of pride 
in the products of our industries. If employee participation 
is the key to unlocking our competitive spirit and to restoring 
pride in our achievements, and if the turning of that key 
demands participative efforts of all who contribute to our 
enterprises, we should bend every sinew to turning that key."
These sentiments are shared by the IPM (1982:9):
"Unless British management takes a positive initiative and 
pursues it with conviction, Britain's industry and commercial 
decline relative to the rest of the world will continue. Our 
problems are fundamentally the need to achieve a common purpose 
within our companies' employee participation and involvement 
plans. Strategies should therefore take as their starting 
point a high degree of common interest and mutual interdependence
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which must exist in any successful organisation.".
These are only examples of the projected management orthodoxy, but 
it could be detailed considerably further and it also routinely 
appears in the professional management press and, to a lesser extent, 
in the national media.
But just as the received wisdom selects human relations and neo­
human relations theory from the entire body of knowledge about 
management, and from that theory selects themes which are mutually 
consistent, and prescriptive, so the student management practitioner 
is likely to perform a further distillation through the decisions 
he/she makes about how the amalgam of themes applies to their 
particular job and through the ways in which they attempt to act in 
accordance with their perception of the appropriate application. My 
personal interpretation was extremely simple. As a hospital 
administrator, my principle objective was to run a health care 
institution as effectively and efficiently as possible and since it 
is commonly recognised that the NHS always requires additional 
finance for direct patient care purposes I could not envisage that 
this would not also be a major objective of the hospital staff, 
although I was also aware that administrators are not popular. My 
task even seemed ideologically unassailable. The NHS operates on 
fundamental socialist principles in many respects, particularly in 
its methods of funding, access and accountability, and I was merely 
anxious to provide a service of the highest standard for present 
and future patients. The team analogy therefore seemed extremely 
appropriate. Each occupational group in the hospital would have its 
particular functional duties and concerns but these would be directed
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towards a common purpose and the administrator would simply undertake 
another function, that of co-ordinator of the other functions, and in 
addition provide some element of leadership.
This formulation, in conjunction with other parts of the manage­
ment orthodoxy, provided a clear indication of how that element of 
leadership should be exercised. In a service enterprise bound by 
nationally-determined terms and conditions of service it was virtually 
impossible to contemplate job redesign, or other structural altera­
tions to work organisation, but it did appear that conflict could 
be avoided and a sense of common purpose enhanced by the style of 
inter-personal relations. If one could be seen to be sensitive to 
the needs of the staff, in the context of pursuing 'reasonable' 
managerial goals consistent with the enterprise's ultimate objectives, 
the mutuality of interest would be self-evident. This working 
rapport would be established by informal consultation, and a 
willingness to discuss and appreciate alternative opinions, and 
openness, frankness and sincerity in these exchanges. Thus in some 
objective manner either one would recognise the merit of an opinion 
presented by the staff or the staff would accord with the 
'reasonableness' of the management reaction or proposal, and 
industrial relations harmony would be maintained.
This conclusion may, in isolation, seem immensely naive but I 
hope that I have demonstrated that there was some logic in its 
development from the body of management theory that appeared to 
offer the greatest practical assistance. Nevertheless, the approach 
was neither adequate nor successful and some of the consequences 
will be described in Chapter Three. It was still essential, however.
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to gain an appreciation of what constituted good industrial relations
and how they could be achieved and there was inevitably some
reappraisal of the received wisdom. Even the inventor of the Theory
Y concept, McGregor, seems to have passed through a similar period
of trauma, described by Handy (1976:91):
"Douglas McGregor, on leaving Antioch College, of which he had 
been president, said,
I believed for example, that a leader could operate successfully 
as a kind of advisor to his organisation. I thought I could 
avoid being a "boss' ... I thought that maybe I could operate so
that everyone would like me - that 'good human relations' would
eliminate all discord and disagreement. I couldn't have been 
more wrong. It took a couple of years, but I finally began to 
realize that a leader cannot avoid the exercise of authority any 
more than he can avoid the responsibility of what happens to his 
organisation.".
My own reaction was to seek a more precise method of validating 
human relations theory. I had concentrated on what seemed to be its 
implications for managerial 'style' but I might have either mis­
interpreted the theory or ineptly implemented it. A more obvious 
and more formal requirement of human relations theorists is that 
staff should be involved in the management of their organisation and 
in particular should contribute to the decision-making processes.
In short, management should accept the responsibility to introduce 
participation and to ensure its success. It was the desire to 
ascertain whether or not this was possible, and, even if it was, 
whether it would influence the nature of industrial relations that 
stimulated the research described in this thesis.
The design of the thesis is such that it presents the impression 
of an academically logical, apparently chronological, development of 
the research, its data and interpretation. The management of the 
research by no means followed this sequential pattern, however, and
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it has been adopted for clarity of reading, rather than accuracy of 
procedure. Whilst there were some fairly distinct stages in the 
research process, there was extensive overlap and interaction 
between them. This cannot be represented in the thesis design, but 
it provided some of the most enlightening and creative elements of 




PARTICIPATION - BOUNDARIES AND BEYOND
Meanings
Schregle's (1970:121) advice about how studies of participation 
should commence is simple and logical. "Any discussion about "workers 
participation* should be preceded by a clear definition of the 
terminology used.". However, this is his conclusion after briefly 
surveying the complexity of participative systems and theories around 
the world which he himself admits is incapable of comprehensive 
definition. Many writers have avoided the definitional difficulties 
and implicity assumed that their understanding of the term 
'participation* will become clear in context, although this can 
create confusion sometimes about whether the context is only 
illustrating an example, or examples of types, of participation, or 
whether it is providing a description of the author's perception of 
the entire concept. Even those who have attempted to clarify their 
meaning of the term have met with only limited success. Perhaps in 
an anxious endeavour to avoid vague, superficial and unhelpful 'catch­
alls', some writers have achieved a precision which is no more helpful, 
since it excludes activities which are included and important in other 
analyses of participation. Such restrictions are evident, for example, 
in the work of Strauss and Rosenstein (1970:198), Morley (1979:259) 
and Butteriss (1971:6). Another approach has been to avoid any 
attempt at definition, but to list, or give examples of, types of 
participation (e.g. Ramsay 1976a:128).
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Given the range of applications of the term participation, it is 
hardly surprising that attempts to provide a universal definition 
fail. They are so all-embracing as to be too vague for practical 
significance, or can be shown to include activities beyond particip­
ation, or solve one semantic problem by using terms which only raise 
others. These characteristics are apparent, respectively, in French, 
Israel and As (1960:3), Globeson (1970:252) and Warr and Wall 
(1975:86,87).
Doubt must be cast, however, on the value of quests for linguist­
ically precise, conceptually comprehensive formulae to define partici­
pation, for two reasons. The first is that of feasibility. In a 
report of an International Labour Organisation technical meeting 
(ILO 1969:153) to discuss the definition of participation, quoted 
(edited and with additional parenthesis) in a subsequent I.L.O. 
publication (1981:6) it was recorded that;
"The meeting considered ... whether it was possible to arrive at 
an internationally agreed definition of the term 'participation*, 
in order to elucidate what was meant by 'participation of 
workers in decisions within undertakings'. It was found that it 
was not possible to arrive at such a definition, as the term 
'participation' was interpreted differently by different 
categories of people in different countries and at different 
times ... However, the expression 'participation of workers in 
decisions within undertakings' allowed a comparison of the 
influence of workers on the preparation, making and follow-up of 
decisions taken at the undertaking level in various matters (such 
as ... wages and conditions of work, ... discipline and employment, 
vocational training ... technological change and organisation of 
production as well as their social consequences, investment and 
planning, etc.,) [by] methods as different as joint consultation 
and communications, collective bargaining, representation of 
workers [on] managerial [bodies] and workers' self-management.
... The meeting emphasised that the expression 'participation of 
workers in decisions within undertakings' was distinct from and 
therefore wider than the concept of workers participation in 
management.".
This conclusion has been reproduced at length not only because it 
contains an authoratitive indication that is impossible to define
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participation, but also because it demonstrates the semantically 
tortuous nature of the problem, both in its general tone and by the 
fineness of its final distinction. Such pursuit of definitional 
precision is probably subject to almost exponentially diminishing 
returns and one must wonder what marginal value remains to be 
obtained from further attention to the definition of participation, 
particularly since, in this instance at least, semantic exactitude 
appears to be inversely related to useful meaning.
The report of the I.L.O. meeting also provides an example of the 
second reason for doubting the value of trying to define participation, 
which is that it can be considered to be a fundamental conceptual 
misconstruction. To describe participation as a category of one 
particular type of activity or as a collection of categories of 
activity e.g. joint consultation or productivity bargaining, is to 
suggest a conceptual absoluteness that may not exist. Merely 
establishing an employer-employee relationship can be construed as 
entering into a participative arrangement, since it creates a mutual 
inter-dependence and requires reciprocal co-operation. This may not 
only influence and/or be manifest in any systematic, or informal, 
arrangements explicitly recognised as 'participation*, and neither 
just affect the nature of the formal industrial relations in the 
enterprise or the systems of job regulation, but will possibly 
permeate every aspect of workplace activity, including the nature of 
the work itself.
This analysis has been partially expressed by Poole (1978:1):
"the subordinate majority have, by consequence of their task- 
based expertise, acquired a measure of control over the actual 
performance of work and this, together with other workplace
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practices designed to extend their frontier of control over 
decisions at shop floor level, has guaranteed the maintenance 
of rudimentary expressions of participation in most industrial 
milieux.
Hyman’s description is more forceful (Goodrich 1975:XL);
"The strength of spontaneous and immediate shop-floor organisation 
derives from the employers’ dependence on workers * active co­
operation, ingenuity and initiative. ... A thoroughly disaffected 
workforce can find a thousand ways to sabotage management's 
objectives; and this is all the easier the more sophisticated 
or the more strategic the role of the particular work group. 
Capitalist industry can only function because of a constant 
process of give-and-take at the point of production, in which 
the agents of management concede part of their formal prerogatives 
in order to gain a measure of goodwill from the workforce.".
This imbues a sense of the reality of workplace relations and organis­
ation that is in stark contrast to the abstraction of many 'pure' 
definitions of participation and by not trying to conceptually 
isolate participation, Hyman stimulates an awareness of aspects of 
workplace interaction that are conventionally under-rated or ignored. 
He emphasises the unstructured, informal and dynamic, and introduces 
staff goodwill and managerial prerogatives as central issues in the 
discussion of participation, and together these considerations 
generate an authentic vitality about the nature of participation.
These are the very same issues as those to which the thesis field 
research became drawn and hopefully its account similarly conveys 
the life and vibrancy of participation.
Aims and Advocates
Walker emphasises the, "importance of congruent objectives and 
expectations" (1974:24) but it is very difficult in much of the 
discussion about participation to even identify common conceptual 
understandings, let alone objectives and expectations. The different 
interested parties adopt completely different stances and it is also
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interesting to note that levels of enthusiasm are enormously varied. 
All the major political parties support some form of participation, 
as does a significant body of academic commentators. Its attraction 
is rather more patchy amongst practising managers and there is only 
limited support from trade unions on a national basis for certain 
types of participation. Perversely, it is those who would probably 
be most affected by participation i.e. ordinary workers and lower and 
middle managers, who have not had, or made, the opportunity to 
articulate their opinion. Many who advocate participation do so with 
an objective, rational clarity that for some deliberately, and others 
unknowingly, camouflages a complexity of differing and conflicting 
meanings and interests. One of the greatest sources of confusion is 
that it is not clear whether participation is an end in itself or a 
means to achieving other objectives.
Some of the purposes of participation, such as the defence and 
promotion of workers* interests, internal democracy and the promotion 
of personal fulfilment, may be said in a very vague manner to have 
emanated from certain ideological/ethical/moral orientations and lend 
credence to the espousal of participation as an end in itself because 
their achievement will be automatically concomitant with the success 
of participation. The distinction that Chell (1983:488) has drawn 
is that, "Participation per se is only a means not an end, whereas 
establishing industrial democracy is an end.". In the same way, the 
process of introducing participation may radically alter the nature 
of interaction at the workplace. Fatchett (1979:245) observes that, 
"what is apparent so far is that whatever the purpose of participation, 
the need for a new relationship between worker and employer is 
recognised.", and more sweepingly Ramsay (1977:498) asserts that.
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"the whole political-economic environment will have, after all, to 
be transformed if a genuine industrial democracy is to prevail,".
But such predictions must be either inaccurate or unrealistic 
because if they were true, and perceived to be true by workers, 
promoting participation would have an emotional appeal of such force 
that it would rank as one of the most significant political issues. 
Workers do not take to the streets, however, demanding greater 
involvement or participation, or industrial democracy, waving banners, 
lobbying and demonstrating that industrial power will be used to 
achieve it. Instead, such activity relates to issues such as 
unemployment, trade union rights, pay awards, industrial contraction 
and so on. It may be more realistic, therefore, to reappraise whether 
these purposes of participation are genuine goals in themselves or the 
overt legitimisation by interested parties of an interest in 
participation to be used for other purposes.
The assessment of participation as a vehicle for achieving other 
industrial relations objectives is even more complex. The majority 
of the purposes of participation cast it as a catalyst for maintaining 
or enhancing the performance of the enterprise, defined in managerial 
terms. Ramsay (1977, 1983) has highlighted the way in which this may 
mean that interest in participation fluctuates, reflecting the pattern 
of power within the industrial relations context. But although the 
terms are rather sweeping, such an approach to participation can be 
fairly accurately described as structural, correlational, prescriptive 
and manipulative. It suggests that the structural input, participation, 
will have an affect upon workers which in turn will improve organisa­
tional effectiveness. The logical inference is, then, that if these
-23-
aims are desired they can be achieved by implementing participation 
and if these aims are designed to meet just one sectional interest 
then the process becomes manipulative. But regardless of ethical and 
ideological considerations, such reasoning is profoundly erroneous 
because of the dubious strength, if there is any, of the basic 
correlational relationships.
S. Clegg (1983:8) believes that:
"While not opposing the value of greater participation one can 
oppose the somewhat suspect grounds on which such 'needs* as 
'self-actualisation* have been advanced and recognize that the 
interests of labour may be better served by something other than 
a humanistically inclined but still basically manipulative 
psychology. There is little real empirical support for the 
supposition that people have an innate need for self-actualisation. 
Indeed, the whole argument is highly suspect.".
In fact, there are at least two correlations involved, one that
increased participation leads to increased satisfaction, and another
that increased satisfaction leads to increased performance. Studies
have tested this second hypothesis but Tannenbaum (1966:35,36)/ reports
that:
"Approximately thirty years and as many research studies later, 
however, psychologists must admit that the results of these 
studies are disappointingly tenuous. Some studies did show a 
positive association between the morale of workers and their 
level of productivity; but it is not always clear that positive 
attitudes caused the high productivity rather than vice versa. 
Moreover, the relationships found in many of these studies are 
weak, a number of the studies show no relationship at all, and 
a few even suggest a negative association.".
As an alternative, Tannenbaum suggests (1966:36) a more realistic
and fertile perspective:
"Although job satisfaction may sometimes be associated with high 
productivity, as it evidently was in the Hawthorne test room, 
both of these variables are likely to be part of a more complex 
set of relationships.".
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The dilemma of the many different classifications of participation 
is that while they help to provide some framework by which to identify 
its variety of forms they also almost invariably convey a strong sense 
of participation as a discrete activity, isolated from other workplace 
and industrial relations interaction. They fail to project the reality 
of the context of participation, in which, for example, as Marchington 
(1980:11-13) illustrates, decision-making processes vary over time and 
with different decisions, it is not often very clear when and how a 
decision has taken place, and there will be widely different perceptions 
of what degree, range and level of participation does and should exist.
Conceptual Understandings
One of the deficiencies of previous studies of participation, 
particularly those that have employed attitude surveys, is that they 
assume a common level of conceptual ability, and, within that level, 
common conceptual understandings. This is clearly unrealistic and 
while this creates a problem that is central to the validity of 
attitude studies it is also likely to be encountered to some degree 
in any kind of research into participation. This is not only because 
the concept of "participation* is so nebulous, but also because its 
manifestations can only be defined very imprecisely and, most 
fundamentally, because it interacts with concepts that are the 
foundations of all industrial relations analysis. Ultimately, these 
can be distilled into the issues of power, authority and control, with 
consequences for understandings of the nature of conflict. These will 
not be dwelt upon in detail here but an indication will be given of 
some of the conceptual confusions and of the emphases that will apply 
in this thesis.
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The exercise of power is often associated with achieving a goal 
not consistent with the wishes of others involved, by the use of 
overwhelming resources or pressures to conform. As Fox (1971:37) 
describes:
"sanctions are used to impose upon others norms of both 
substantive and procedural kinds which they do not legitimise, 
and since this behaviour is forced upon them without their 
"consent* they are more likely to experience this pressure or 
coercion as power.". .  ̂ .
Smith (1979:7) portrays this in practical terms :
""Power* has an objective quality to it: the employer may have
the power to terminate employment by closing the plant, or the 
union may have power to prevent production, irrespective of 
whether the other recognises or accepts the facts.".
The relevance of power in workplace organisation is underestimated
by Armstrong et al (1981:38) but they do remind us of one of its
important features:
"although power is clearly important in determining the outcome 
of any attempt to change workplace rules, it does not, by itself, 
determine which rule changes are in question. Power is a general­
ised resource and the fact that it is exercised does not determine 
the issues on which it is exercised. It is at this level that 
questions of legitimisation become important.".
A concern with legitimisation is certainly relevant to the examination
of the use of power but it is misleading to suggest that it is a
separate category of activity. Legitimisation involves the use of
power and is a manifestation of it. Power describes the totality of
means by which individuals or collectivities achieve their goals
through decision-making processes or by motivating others, either with
or without their willing agreement. Thus power should be no more
precisely defined than as the, "capacity to influence the behaviour
of other persons" (Walker 1974:13).
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The relationship between power and authority is also subject to
alternative interpretation. A definition from Tannenbaum (1966:4)
is that, "Authority is the formal right of a person, by virtue of his
position or rank in an organisation, to decide, determine, or influence
what others in the organisation will do,". It is difficult to concur
with Walker's (1974:13) description that authority is, "the right
attached to a position in an organisation to perform certain
activities, including the exercise of power", since it is more
realistic to subsume the first under the latter, to regard authority
as one aspect of power. This is accepted by O'Donnell, who asserts that
(1952:578), "Authority is the right to command or to act. It implies
the possession of the power to coerce", but he refutes ideas that
authority is the manifestation of power that is tacitly tolerated and
even encouraged by those over whom it is exercised. He argues that:
"It is anarchistic to imagine that subordinates can confer 
authority on their superiors. This teaching is perilous because 
it provides a philosophical basis for the direct action of 
subordinates, for unilateral action, for the complete control of 
the enterprise by organised workers, for power without respons­
ibility.",
and he concludes that:
"The source of managerial authority cannot be conferred upon a 
manager by an employee; nor is it derived from property rights.
It rests ultimately in the nature of man." (p 588).
But the compliance of those subject to authority is central to 
the analysis of both Fox (1971) and Hyman (1975) and they also accept 
the validity of the consequences identified by O'Donnell if consent 
is withdrawn. Authority exists because (Fox 1971:37), "subordinates 
legitimise the order-giving role of the superior and although 
sanctions are deemed necessary to deter or punish transgression, 
these too are legitimised.". There are numerous methods by which
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this legitimacy of the exercise of power is maintained and enhanced
and they are largely self-perpetuating.
"The ability to call on certain generally accepted beliefs and 
values - the 'rights of management', for example, or the belief 
that 'there will always be masters and men' - is likewise a 
source of power, since it entails that certain challenges to 
managerial control are unlikely to occur. This indicates an 
important aspect of power: the ability to overcome opposition
is one sign of power; but a more subtle yet perhaps even more 
significant form of power is the ability to preclude opposition 
from even arising - simply because, for example, those subject 
to a particular type of control do not question its legitimacy 
or can see no alternative." (Hyman 1975:26).
Such an analysis is intrinsically appealing but it also focusses
upon the concept which is the object of power and authority, however
defined and differentiated, which is control. That the possession
of control is the essence of any industrial relations system is
supported by Smith (1979:2), who states that to understand them,
"also involves a consideration of the derivation of authority and its
legitimation, of power to influence both agreements and formal and
informal roles: in short, the control of work.". He explains that
(p 4), "'Control' means the ability to promote one's own desired
objectives, or alternatively the power to resist undesirable ones.
All parties in industrial relations ... set out to exert control.".
For Dimmock (1977:124) the amount of participation and the amount of
control vary in direct proportion. "Participation in the Health
Service, therefore, will be examined in relation to the degree of
control it allows the workers to affect management decision-taking.".
A formal definition is again available from Tannenbaum (1966:84):
"Control is any process through which a person or group of 
persons determines (i.e. intentionally affects) what another 
person or group of persons will do. Essentially it means 
creating an intended change in the behavior of others - getting 
them to do something they might otherwise not have done.".
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But this indicates a clarity that may be inaccurate. Goodrich
(1975:18,19) warns that:
"Control is no 'simple central objective,' no one clear-cut 
thing which people either know they want or know they don't 
want. The demand cannot be put glibly into a single phrase or 
a single resolution - too many diverse motives are blended and 
crossed into the strivings of many workers for the complicated 
set of things called control. The demand for control is not the 
unified expression of some single specific impulse. ... But 
instead, the elements of the demand must be hunted for in the 
whole jungle of the reactions of workers to the industrial 
situation.".
More succinctly, Marchington (1979:134) explains that:
"control will be taken as the possible end-result of a process 
which involves the usage of power : in other words, power
refers to the process of achieving control. Control will be 
used as a relative term, that is, a comparison of the degree of 
influence exercised by the shopfloor and management over the 
final outcome of any rule-making process.".
The impossibility of separating participation research from the
issue of control is reiterated by Dimmock (1977:124):
"The notion of power is fundamental to the concept of participa­
tion as it determines its nature, i.e. the degree of control 
that each side can exercise over the actions of the other. The 
work-force may only exercise control when it is aware both of 
the power context in which participation takes place and of its 
power to exercise control over management actions.".
Research into participation needs to take cognizance of these
analyses because they postulate tensions within the industrial
relations system from which participation cannot be immune.
Industrial relations virtually becomes defined as the sum of the
processes used to maintain, enhance or diminish control, in potential
or actual opposition to other parties in the interaction. Thus:
"Conflict is the motive force of an industrial relations system, 
all the processes of the systems being driving by the necessity 
of accommodating conflict. The potentially conflictual nature 
of an industrial relations system, and the necessity for 
processes inside the system to accommodate conflict, can be 
illustrated from several examples. For example, efforts 
directed towards suppressing conflict rather than managing it 
have generally been doomed to failure." (Faucheux and Rojot 
1979:36).
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Consequently, the study of participation must recognise that:
"Institutionalization involves the setting up of organisations 
and procedures to handle conflict through such means as 
collective bargaining or codetermination. ... However, it should 
be stressed that such bodies do not resolve conflicts; rather 
they regulate it. The continued existence of these institutions 
implies a recognition of the continuation of conflict." (Batstone 
et al 1979:62).
It is proposed that in this thesis a concern with the issue of 
control is more appropriate than an analysis of power, since this 
will enable proper emphasis to be given to the concept of authority, 
which is commonly only fleetingly and disparagingly referred to in 
works that concentrate on the wider concept. It is agreed that 
authority only exists to the extent that a type of power is legitimised 
and that indeed this is how authority is defined but, to complete the 
circle, if it is legitimised, it does exist and becomes one of the 
most crucial mediating factors in industrial relations, obviating 
the necessity to use other forms of power. Neither is this to deny 
the place of conflict in the study of participation. At the simplest 
level, conflict exists in conjunction with authority, but at another 
level further enquiry is needed to investigate how authority avoids 
conflict and, conversely, how conflict reflects challenges to authority
Theoretical Affinities
Hyman (1975:2) has warned that those who, "insist that they are 
immune from theory are simply unaware of their own preconceptions 
and presuppositions.". What is required is, "explicit theoretical 
discussion and argument which seeks to locate individual happenings 
in their broader context" in order to proved information and insight.
—30—
The requirement to be explicit is also expressed by Fox (1971:v):
"Since we can scarcely think at all about a subject without some 
kind of framework, however crude, fragmented, and internally 
inconsistent, the choice is not between using a framework and 
not using one, but between using one that is implicit and 
unconsidered and one that has at least the virtue of being 
explicit and thus susceptible to conscious thought and 
challenge.".
An attempt has been made to supply a conceptual framework, but although 
Fox's challenge is accepted the endeavour to describe the theoretical 
framework was considerably more tortuous. Full licence will be made, 
therefore, of the generous latitude that Fox allows for in the 
quality of its articulation. This necessity has two sources. The 
first derives from the fact that as a researcher my origins were in 
practice rather than academic study and my awareness of my own 
theoretical framework was limited. Secondly, although my perceptions 
about participation and industrial relations generally rapidly sharpened 
through the course of the literature and field research, this was in 
conjunction with alterations in their orientation. Consequently, all 
I now seek to achieve is to record some of the elements of theory for 
which I had an affiliation and to indicate those that remained, or 
became, valued.
It must already be self-evident that one approach which had an 
almost instinctive appeal before the research began and which was 
sustained and strengthened until its conclusion was that the study 
of participation can only be achieved successfully by adopting a 
holistic perspective. This was inevitable because the interest in 
participation had been stimulated by a context of much wider 
industrial relations activity and the intention always was that the 
research outcome should relate directly to this more general context. 
Berg (1979) uses the same approach but balances some of its value
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with its deficiencies:
"The organisation must be treated as a whole. Although the term 
'organisation* in itself implies something holistic, the research 
process often involves reducing organisations to structures, 
variables, processes, etc. I do not want to argue that this 
reduction is wrong (it is in fact necessary in order to handle 
complicated phenomena), but rather that there are alternative 
modes of reduction, where the holistic character of the 
organisation is maintained. What I am proposing is a reduction 
that produces a 'gestalt' , i.e. an image of what is happening 
in and with the organisation 'as a whole'. ... Evidently a 
'gestalt' model of organisation will lack the conceptual precision 
and strength of models that cover only a few-defined variables.
... Another aspect of the holistic perspective is the implication 
that activities and events in the organisation cannot be under­
stood and explained unless they can be related to the organisation 
at large." (pp 17,18).
Within this holistic orientation, there were at the beginning of 
the research muddled theoretical affiliations confused with guilt 
about what seemed to be a lack of ability to distinguish which 
provided the 'best fit' with reality and with a concern for how some 
of the affiliations would be interpreted by others in terms of a 
management profile. For example, when the research commenced it seemed 
relatively straightforward that relations between staff and management 
could either be described by a unitary framework or by one that was 
pluralist and that the research into participation would be a 
powerful analytic tool for establishing which was correct. From the 
thoughts that have emerged in Chapter One, it may be assumed that 
tacitly I held originally to a unitary frame, partly encouraged by 
management education that had emphasised human relations school 
theorists and partly by my own perceptions of the implications for 
staff-management relations in an organisation of impeccable ideolog­
ical soundness. As the research progressed, the pluralist analysis 
seemed more and more appropriate but since, put crudely, this could 
be viewed as a 'them and us' attitude to industrial relations, it
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carried connotations of adhering to management principles of some of 
the most reactionery and simplistic kind. Inevitably, it is now 
possible to discern with hindsight, the research finished with 
neither analysis being accommodated to the exclusion of the other and 
the nature of the balance that was perceived to exist forms an 
important theme throughout the thesis.
The research similarly provided a catalyst for clarifying 
attitudes to industrial relations analyses that differentiated 
between structure and process. In the beginning, there was a strong 
attachment to the concept that industrial relations could only be 
understood in terms of processes and that attempts to provide insight 
in structural terms were suggestive of rigidity in time and place, 
conceptual simplicity and an insensitivity to the subjective. There 
has since been a realisation that this criticism was misplaced and 
that embracing the study of industrial relations entirely by its 
processes as the only way to obtain realism was in fact a reaction 
not against structural analyses but institutional analyses. A new 
understanding of structural analysis was reached with the recognition 
that patterns of industrial relations organisation, activity and 
themes could indeed be identified and that, taking the analysis one 
stage further, these patterns were not merely descriptive summations 
but themselves powerful forces shaping the nature of industrial 
relations. This is not to suggest that the abandonment to process 
analysis was unconstruetive and on the contrary it is hoped that it 
has introduced a freshness, coupled undoubtedly with some naivity, 
into the structural analysis.
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These developments in theoretical appreciation were partly 
instigated by the data from the fieldwork but they also owe a lot to 
the discovery of interactionists' frames of reference and of 
negotiated order theory, with which theoretical allegiance currently 
resides. The work of Blumer (1965), Coffman (1970), Mangham (1978) 
and Strauss (1978) and elaborations by Meltzer et al (1975) and Lauer 
and Handel (1977) have supplied an analysis of human behaviour that
can relate to the most general, to any manifestation of social inter­
action, and yet conveys a real sensitivity to the minutiae of day-to- 
day interpersonal relationships.
There are subtle differences between symbolic, social and
strategic interaction. The latter is defined by Coffman (1970:100,101)
"Two or more parties must find themselves in a well-structured 
situation of mutual impingement where each party must make a 
move and where every possible move carries fateful implications 
for all of the parties. In this situation, each player must 
influence his own decision by his knowing that the other players
are likely to try to dope out his decision in advance, and may
even appreciate that he knows that this is likely. Courses of 
action or moves will then be made in the light of one's thoughts 
about the other's thoughts about oneself. An exchange of moves 
made on the basis of this kind of orientation to self and others 
can be called strategic interaction.".
The same term is used by Mangham to describe interaction when it is
undertaken consciously, where:
"interaction, the basis of social life, consists in the act of 
forging temporary working agreements with other actors as to the 
nature of the situation and the appropriateness of the various 
performances open to them.".
Symbolic interaction, the term used by Blumei; involves:
'Hnterpretat'Con, or ascertaining the meaning of the actions or 
remarks of the other person, and definition, or conveying 
indications to another person as to how he is to act. Human 
association consists of a process of such interpretation and 
definition. Through this process the participants fit their own 
acts to the ongoing acts of one another and guide others in 
doing so." (1965:537,538).
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Mangham’s strategic interaction is in fact only one of three 
different types of behaviour which he regards as contributing towards 
social interaction. The strategic has already been noted to be 
defined by conscious awareness, in which, "The performance has an 
element of planning and even of manipulation but is not found in 
either situational scripts or personal scripts." (pp 35,36). His 
description of personal scripts (p 35) is that they, "consist of 
performances which lead to satisfaction on the part of the main actor; 
the actor may not be conscious of his personal script, but it is nearly 
always something he has sought to act out repeatedly.". Situational 
scripts are the routines by which much of everyday, probably 
unappreciated interaction proceeds and which may be defined as, 
"relatively predetermined and stereotyped sequences of action which 
are called into play by particular and well-recognised cues or 
circumstances, of which we acquire knowledge through the processes of 
socialisation." (p 33).
Whether one chooses to focus upon interaction as the mutual 
delivery of, and response to, cues or the more secure activity of 
adopting scripts, one of the major goals of the processes is the same, 
namely that through it the individuals interacting know that there is 
tacit agreement about the nature of their interaction, or the 
definition of the situation. The definition of the situation is/one of 
the, most important parts t)f all interaction. "For if people define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences." (Thomas 1923) .
The force of the definition is so strong that, "In fact, the situation 
may even be wrongly defined in terms of an objective appraisal, but 
the consequences will be real nonetheless." (Lauer and Handel 1977:86).
-35-
The force of the consequences of having a situational definition
accepted by others means that obtaining and maintaining definitions
advantageous to oneself becomes a crucial method of obtaining control.
"This control is achieved largely by influencing the definition 
of the situation which the others care to formulate, and he can 
influence this definition by expressing himself in such a way 
as to give them the kind of impression that will lead them to 
act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan." (Coffman 1959 
quoted in Mangham 1978:23).
What this means is that if a person or collectivity can get its
definition tolerated or agreed all their actions that are consistent
with it are accepted as legitimate, or as if the definition was not
a subjective construct but objective reality.
There are of course criticisms of the interactionist perspective
and of these Meltzer et al (1975:120) assess that, "two stand forth
as the most crucial: (1) limited consideration of human emotions,
and (2) unconcern with social structure.". The relationship between
interaction and structure does display some weakness but it is
certainly not denied. Blumer declares that to reject the existence
of structures in human society (1965:543), "would be ridiculous.
... [but] they are important only as they enter into the process of
interpretation and definition out of which joint actions are formed.",
and the second of Blumer*s (1969:2-6) three basic premises regarding
interactionism, as described by Meltzer et al (1975:1), reiterates the
value of structure as a mediating factor:
"First, human beings act towards things on the basis of the 
meanings that the things have for them. Secondly, these 
meanings are a product of social interaction in human society. 
Thirdly, these meanings are modified and handled through an 
interpretive process that is used by each individual in dealing 
with the signs he/she encounters.".
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Mangham’s emphasis upon the nature of interactionist ’scripts’ 
may be misleading about the degree of dynamism recognised in inter­
actionist analysis. He observes that (1978:27):
"In many circumstances, perhaps even in most, the social actor 
is constrained by the scripts available to him, but in many, if 
not in most, he has the possibility of choice, the potential to 
create or revise his scripts.".
Perhaps conscious of the hint of predetermination that his analogy
implies, Mangham (pp 130,131) reasserts:
"Nonetheless there are few situational scripts which so 
thoroughly constrain the social actor that he is reduced to the 
status of a pawn. Many scripts appear to leave some opportunities 
for strategic interaction on the part of the participants, and a 
number of them leave considerable room. At the point of selection 
of scripts and at the point of movement from one script to 
another, considerable opportunities for strategic interaction 
appear to be open to social actors.".
That dynamism is intrinsic to the analysis is stressed by Lauer and
Handel:
"It is important to note that, as with other concepts, the 
definition of a situation is processual in the sense of being 
more or less fluid. That is, one does not continue to define 
situations in a similar fashion throughout one’s life and may 
not do so throughout a specific situation. ....
Definitions change in the course of interaction both by design 
and as an unanticipated consequence of the interaction. When we 
say ’by design’ we mean that one or more of the interactants 
strives to change the definition maintained by one or more of the 
interactants." (1977:87).
The authors also address the problems that arise when definitions of
a situation are not mutually compatible. They describe three options
(1977:116,117), which are that, "one may terminate the interaction",
"the person may simply accept the definition of the situation
preferred by the other people involved", or "the person may attempt to
impose his or her definition of the situation on the other participants."
An interactionist perspective, therefore, properly encompasses 
the existence of conflict in interaction. Mangham identifies two
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types of change in patterns of social interaction, one of which is 
mutually stimulated and accommodated by the social actors, but the 
other, "is marked by either the social actors stepping outside the 
situational scripts and radically revising them or the script being 
rewritten by one or more social actors without the cooperation of 
the others." (1978:76). In essence, his dramaturgical model, 
"stresses that there are likely to be competing definitions of the 
situation, competing needs and competing repertoires. It assumes, 
that is, pluralism rather than unitarism." (1978:132), and his model 
assumes that, "differences are inevitable and are enforced by 
differing interpretations, that processes of collaboration (however 
temporary) and competition (however covert) do occur, and that 
coercion, dialogue, and negotiation may exist side by side within 
the same situational script." (1978:133).
The relationship between interactionism and negotiated order 
theory is now quite obvious. The latter describes the structure 
obtained by the totality of definitions of the situation; the means 
by which definitions are achieved, maintained and revised; and the 
processes by which changes or conflicts in definition are resolved. 
Strauss (1978:14) confirms that, "One of the intellectual traditions 
that would logically seem more hospitable to considering negotiations 
as among the central processes is that known as ’interactionism’." 
and he regards negotiated order theory as strengthening the bridge 
between structure and process. The increase in the interest in 
negotiated order, "is explainable largely in terms of the heightened 
search by some interactionists for a joining of social structural and 
social interactional considerations but with the antideterministic 
stance still intact" (1978:16) and he adds that his own theoretical
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position is a variant of the interactionist approach. He argues that 
(1978:253):
"larger structural considerations need to be explicitly linked 
with microscopic analyses of negotiation processes. Negotiations 
always take place within social settings. The various structural 
conditions of the settings affect the actions of the negotiating 
parties, the aims they pursue through negotiation and alternative 
modes of action, their tactics during the negotiations, and, 
undoubtedly, the outcomes of the negotiations themselves - which 
in turn may affect not only future courses of action but also 
the social settings themselves.".
Mangham (1978:27) recognises the place of negotiation in an inter­
actionist perspective. "Meanings, identities, definitions, purposes, 
and intentions are, indeed given, institutionalized, and shared, but 
are modified by negotiation and through interaction.". Reciprocally, 
Strauss (1978:23) almost reiterates an interactionist analysis:
"Furthermore, negotiation takes place in specific relationships 
with other modes of action, in accordance with how the actors 
perceive current situations. But what modes are judged as 
possible, impossible, probable, improbable, are linked not only 
with their perceived efficacy but also with the actors’ views of 
how change can be effected, given what they believe is the nature 
of history and society and of negotiation.".
Negotiation is also a feature for the work of Goffman. In particular,
when situational definitions are not compatible and one does not gain
supremacy at the expense of the total rejection of the others, a
compromise needs to be achieved, to which Goffman gave the label of a
"working consensus". Lauer and Handel (1977:119) consequently note
that, "The achievement of a working consensus requires negotiation,
not merely as a metaphor, but in the full, literal sense of that term.",
One of the benefits of Strauss’s work is that it provides a 
mechanism for analysing negotiation but he has to emphasise, "that 
its study brings us to the heart of studying social orders" (1978:235) 
because of a concern that it may only be used where negotiation that
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might otherwise be termed pragmatic bargaining is apparent, as in 
industrial relations. However, this more limited context is 
providing practical verification of the value of the concept of a 
negotiated order and the processes used to achieve it. It has been 
central to a number of studies, including, for example, those by 
Partridge (1976) and Armstrong et al (1981) and it is supported by, 
and provides explanation for, much that was discovered in the 
Llandough data.
Conclusion
It is interesting to note that two very disparate commentaries
about research into participation, one at an international level and
the other specific to the NHS, present the same signposts for future
research. The I.L.O. has stated (1981:38) that:
"workers’ participation in decision-making is not something that 
can be set once and for all in a particular pattern; it is 
rather a general trend which seems likely to become gradually 
more pronounced. It is essentially a dynamic process. Any 
definition of workers’ participation can only be provisional 
because the practical circumstances in which it is to operate 
are subject to changes, social and cultural as well as economic 
and technical. ... Generalisation would therefore seem to be 
very hazardous. It is noticeable that the advocates of reforms 
leading to greater workers’ participation in decisions are 
increasingly aware of the diversity of situations and hence of 
the need for a corresponding diversity of method.’’.
Sethi and Dimmock (1982:364) urge that;
"it is important to commence investigations into the dynamic of 
collective bargaining. Hitherto examinations of health sector 
industrial relations have been carried out largely by official 
enquiries, sponsored by government or governmental agencies. 
Moreover these have generally been occasioned by untypical 
events, e.g. strikes, the demands of income policy, etc.. As 
such these enquiries tend to be post facto, and their underlying 
aim has often been to provide a ’politically’ feasible solution 
to a perceived problem: the provision of a temporary modus
vivendi for the parties involved. The principle requirement is 
for studies concerned with the day-to-day conduct of industrial 
relations in the health sector.".
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This was the intention, at least, of the research and it is hoped 
that the remainder of the thesis will provide some small contribution 




It has been said that the National Health Service is the tenth 
largest organisation in the world and that three of the few that 
exceed it are the U.S. Army, the Russian Army and the Chinese Army. 
This may be apocryphal but it can be confidently estimated that 
almost one million people work in the Health Service in Great Britain. 
In England alone there were 664,000 people employed in the NHS in 1971 
and by 1981 the number had risen to 822,000 (DHSS 1983). Although the 
number employed in the NHS as a proportion of the total population is 
lower than those employed in comparable Western European health 
systems, it still equates to 5% of Britain’s working population. As 
an employing organisation it is also exceptional in that it is so 
labour intensive that staff costs account for approximately 80% of 
total NHS expenditure, which itself is about 6% of the country’s gross 
national product.
The Sacred Cow
Most of the other countries of Western Europe spend more of their 
gross national product than Britain on health care services and in 
countries such as West Germany and Sweden the proportion rises to 
10%, but the efficiency of the NHS is still under constant scrutiny. 
This is because 6% of GNP is still a lot of money and secondly, but 
probably more importantly, the NHS is both funded almost entirely by 
taxation and administered by the state, thus avoiding the profit nexus 
This means that the service is largely free at the point of use but
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also that there are strong financial temptations to encourage
challenging competition from private health care enterprises and to
develop them so that they can take over the most costly elements of
NHS facilities. The Times has reported (17.6.82.):
"Ministers come and go, but the National Health Service continues 
to roll on its way like some ancient liner, whose dusky saloons 
may receive a degree of superficial refurbishment now and then, 
but whose replacement by a new superliner or a fleet of high 
performance privateers is beyond its owners* resources of energy 
and imagination. For rival vessels in the private sector which 
had hoped for its retirement or at least some kind of coordination 
of sailing schedules, the unchangeability of the old Leviathan is 
frustrating.".
The Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, Mr Norman
Fowler, is described as one of several Conservative health ministers
who would like to see a substantial alteration in the method of
funding health services but an explanation is provided about why he
has failed to do so;
"Mr Fowler’s zeal remains great, but ministers do not sit in his 
chair long without realising that for all its flaws the NHS is 
still one of the few genuine sacred cows of British politics, 
fundamentally trusted and cherished, and that any government 
which tampers with it does so at its peril.".
As an employing organisation, the NHS has an exceptionally high
profile that attracts political and social controversy combined with
highly articulate and profoundly emotional support. "The NHS is the
principal embodiment in Britain of a particular ideal of social
provision: the strong tang of ideology constantly attracts the flies
of debate." (Times Leader 2.10.82.). In the Sunday Times Review
(24.7.83. p 37) Angela Neustatter reports that:
"yet increasingly the NHS is under fire because it is not run as 
a business, concerned with balancing the books, producing 
tangible proof of efficiency, spurred on by the threat of 
competition.",
and she continues by describing a nurse’s complaint that because of
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inadequate staffing she cannot provide for her patientsV psychological 
comfort.
"In that comment I believe she hit the reason why we must 
cherish and support the NHS, why we must stop assuming it should 
be answerable to rigorous business standards and recognise that 
it is one of the few remaining representations of true ideology 
left in today's profit oriented, self-seeking way of life. The 
NHS, warts and all (and I know there are plenty of those) is 
about society being prepared to care for its members whatever 
their circumstances, virtues, vices, race, creed, when they are 
sick. It is the hallmark of civilisation that we are prepared 
to pay a remarkably small amount of our wealth into caring for 
each other, to exercise a communal compassion.".
There can be few employing organisations in the world required to meet, 
or which generate, claims such as these.
However, there are others who suggest that the lack of significant 
competition in the field of health care and the sensitivity with which 
the NHS is regarded by the public have led to waste and to exploitation 
by trade unions. When Secretary of State for Employment, Mr Norman 
Tebbit was quoted (South Wales Echo 21.7.82.) as stating that:
"You will have noticed that our industrial problems are generally 
concentrated in the monopolies of the public sector. It is 
perhaps not surprising that those areas which are least 
protected from economic reality by lack of competition and vast 
sums of taxpayers * money are also those areas which have the 
greatest inefficiencies, the greatest waste and the greatest 
industrial unrest.".
The NHS is undoubtedly a unique enterprise in Britain but it also 
takes its place in the collection of state-run enterprises labelled 
as the public sector. This sector has always had tremendous 
political and economic significance and Taylor (1982b:58) has 
recorded that the Government has sought to act upon the sentiments 
expressed by Mr Tebbit:
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"There are growing signs that the Government, somewhat nervously, 
is edging towards an attempt to wrestle with the unions 
dominating public sector employment.
The impetus comes from the fact that the public sector raises a 
formidable obstacle to the accomplishment of the Government's 
wider economic plan. Just over seven million people are 
estimated to have jobs in the public sector, over 30% of the 
entire labour force. Of these, getting on for 90%, it has been 
calculated, belong to trade unions - a far higher proportion 
than the numbers unionised in private employment. In the TUG, 
just over half the members are now in the public domain; their 
unions, too, have become increasingly influential in recent
years The National and Local Government Officers'
Association (NALGO) and the National Union of Public Employees 
(NUPE) carry far more weight inside the TUG than in the past, 
and the TUG, in response, has become a more effective voice for
the interests of organised labour in public employment.....
As the layers of administration in the Health Service and 
elsewhere have enlarged and increased, so the power of public 
service unionism has strengthened.".
With tensions like these at national level, which themselves 
largely reflect changes and tensions at local level, it is not 
surprising that industrial relations in the National Health Service 
have been an issue of major national concern during the last ten 
years. In its evidence to the Royal Gommission on the National 
Health Service, the Advisory, Gonciliation and Arbitration Service 
(AGAS) went so far as to warn that:
"In our view the NHS has reached a stage where it should review 
its IR policies and practices. Unless effective remedies are 
introduced urgently, we can see little prospect of avoiding 
continued deterioration in IR with associated frustration of 
management and staff, increased labour turnover, and noticeably 
poorer quality patient care." (1978:24).
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There is general agreement that 1972/3 saw the transformation
of industrial relations activity in the NHS. Until then it had
rarely been in evidence and what Bosanquet (1979:1) has termed the,
"old colonial system" of industrial relations operated. Dimmock
(1977:131) explains why this was:
"The extended period of industrial peace from 1948 to 1973 
fostered and reinforced two basic beliefs about labour relations 
in the Health Service. One, that its objectives, the care of 
the sick, served to unify the workforce and to discourage 
industrial action which could be seen as being detrimental to 
the patients. Two, that the Whitley system had the ability to 
regulate effectively almost all aspects of the employment 
relationship. These two beliefs taken together, could, it was 
felt, explain the absence of conflict and the seeming difference 
in the substance and form of the Health Service industrial 
relations from that of industry.".
The nature of the influences responsible for the metamorphosis have
been discussed elsewhere (eg. Bosanquet 1979, TUG Health Services
Committee 1981, Fewtrell 1983, Clegg 1979:35-38) and there must still
be some uncertainty about which were cause and which effect but it is
relevant to identify some of the characteristics of NHS industrial
relations following the 1972/3 campaign of industrial action by
ancillary staffs in support of the national pay claim.
Two of the most fundamental changes are described by Dimmock 
(1977:132):
"The uniqueness of the ancillary workers* dispute lay rather in 
its scale and its public challenge to the taboo of not overtly 
jeopardising patient care. At a deeper level, it marked a 
change of direction in workplace relationships in that it presented 
opportunities to the ancillary workers to participate in areas of 
decision-making which had hitherto been the prerogative of medical 
and administrative staff.".
Initially, the staff became involved in, or took over, decisions
about what services were required in order to provide emergency cover
during industrial disputes, but they also developed an awareness of
their ability to exercise control over more general management
concerns.
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Involvement in the management function was further encouraged by 
the introduction of incentive bonus schemes for ancillary staff 
recommended in two reports of the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes (1967, 1971). The spread of these schemes was rather slower 
than it sometimes suggested but they produced a distinct re-alignment 
of the employing relationship. There was a formal requirement to 
involve staff and trade union representatives; it became possible to 
negotiate pay enhancement on a local basis; departmental rather than 
inter-departmental affiliation was encouraged; and demarcation lines 
between jobs had to be identified which stimulated the creation of 
great inflexibility.
The extent of industrial action never returned to its previous 
low levels and in fact increased. Comparing activity in the 1970s 
to that of the 1950s Baker and Caldwell (1981:46) calculate that the 
number of days lost in stoppages was on average four times higher, 
the number of workers involved in disputes increased threefold and 
individual strikers lost an average of eight days per year compared 
to a previous average of five. Membership of NUPE, COHSE and NALGO 
has nearly quadrupled since 1949 and in the four years alone between 
1974 and 1978 both NUPE and COHSE increased their membership by one 
third and together had almost half a million members. NUPE authorised 
the election of shop stewards for the first time in 1970 and the 
Health Service did not recognise shop stewards until the following 
year.
Management had to rapidly orientate itself to the new industrial 
relations climate among its staff and to radical new employment 
legislation. Personnel departments were established or strengthened
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and formal procedures were produced for handling issues such as 
discipline, grievances and disputes. The Whitley Council system of 
nationally determining terms and conditions of service was both 
formally reviewed (McCarthy 1976) and came under pragmatic pressure 
for reform during industrial disputes, and by 1985 pay determination 
for medical staff, nurses and midwives, works craftsmen and 
professions supplementary to medicine had been removed from the 
Whitley arenas and passed to pay review bodies.
Serious discontent has persisted about NHS pay, in absolute 
terms, in comparison with other industries and in terms of internal 
differentials. Public opinion is usually ambivalent about NHS pay 
and industrial disputes, since it particularly has sympathy with 
direct patient care staff and has some sympathy for the lower paid 
ancillary staff but objects to the disruption to patient services 
that trade unions generate as part of pay campaigns. One consequence 
of this has been an attempt by the trade unions to create a fusion in 
the public mind between the welfare of their members and the future 
and quality of the Health Service. Nationally at least this has 
become increasingly difficult. 1979 was the worse year for industrial 
conflict in the history of the NHS, with almost half of the staff 
involved in stoppages and the loss of more than half a million 
working days. The number of days lost per one thousand employees in 
the NHS in recent years has usually been less than a tenth of the 
corresponding figure for Britain as a whole, but in the 1960s it was 
often a hundredth or less (Times 27.4.82.). During the 1982 national 
pay dispute another Times Leader (10.8.82.) rigorously attacked the 
lack of conscience of Health Service workers:
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"Nothing illustrates more cogently the way mass movements 
destroy the individual’s sense of responsibility and morality 
than the comments of leaders of the Health Service strikers,
and the actions they require of their followers.".
It concluded:
"Would any of those strikers, acting without the comforting but 
corrupting embrace of trade union rhetoric, feel the same 
inclination, as individuals, to withdraw their services 
unilaterally and then accuse somebody else of blackmailing them 
into it by a refusal to advance them more money?
It is their decision, each one of them, and nobody else can
be blamed for it.".
Bosanquet is more charitable and urges the necessity of further
analysis:
"The record suggested that the NHS has had about the IR it 
deserved and about what might have been expected, given the 
backwardness of the system. Press comment and public policy 
have, again and again, dealt with the symptoms rather than the 
causes." (1979:22).
Another symptom rather than cause of the transformation in NHS 
industrial relations has been the way that participation by staff in 
the management of the NHS has evolved. As Dimmock (1977:122) 
suggests, "two vehicles for worker participation - collective 
bargaining and joint consultation - have been operated in the Service 
since its inception in 1948.", but, because until 1970 collective 
bargaining was almost entirely concerned with national negotiations 
about terms and conditions of service, for most of the life of the 
NHS participation has been synonymous with joint consultation.
Section XXIV of the Handbook of the General Whitley Council was 
issued in 1950 to recommend and advise on the establishment of joint 
consultative committees of management and staff. The guidance was 
that the committees* functions should be to promote the closest 
co-operation, to give the staffs a wider interest in and a greater 
responsibility for the conditions under which their work was
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performed, to prevent friction and misunderstanding, to consider 
locally determined hospital rules and to deal with matters such as 
the distribution of working hours, holiday arrangements and questions 
of physical welfare, but the limitations and examples described 
indicate that the scope for discussion was seriously restricted.
The consequences were virtually inevitable. Miles and Smith
surveyed 197 JCCs in the mid-1960s and concluded (1969:80), "what has
long been an open secret, namely that, so far, consultation in the
hospital service must, with few exceptions, be pronounced a failure."
They suggested that the reasons for this were a general lack of
commitment among hospital managers, a complete absence of training
for representatives in the concepts and skills of consultation, the
reluctance of the General Whitley Council to respond to enquiries
for further guidance and the refusal of doctors to participate. An
additional handicap identified by McCarthy (1976) was the inadequate,
inappropriate and unco-ordinated composition of the staff side.
ACAS observed (1978:20) that:
"In the past, NHS JCCs have foundered regularly and we conclude 
that one reason for this has often been the unrealistic 
limitations on their terms of reference which fell short of 
employee expectations.".
It notes that :
"Some JCCs exercise considerable influence over major policy 
decisions, while others are limited to the discussion of 
inconsequential issues and used as a rubber stamp for unilateral 
management decisions",
and it recommends that:
"If JCCs are to be credible they must perform a significant role 
in the decision making process, and if this is to be their 
purpose it is clear that the constitution of many JCCs is 
inadequate for the demands which unions place upon them.".
Its advice is that one of the most crucial determinants of the
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success of joint consultation is the subject matter which management 
is prepared to include in it.
Section XXIV of the General Council Handbook was replaced in 
1980 by far more flexible guidance about joint consultation machinery 
in the NHS but by this time interest had been developed in how to 
exercise participation in other ways. When Mrs Barbara Castle was 
Secretary of State for Health and Social Services she was particularly 
enthusiastic that there should be staff representatives on the 
statutory health authorities at regional and area level, in addition 
to the two doctors and one nurse that were already obligatory. In 
her second consultative paper, Mrs Castle stated her intention that 
the representatives should be elected and invited comments on how this 
should be arranged. The purpose of the change was that the represent­
atives, "will be aware of the view of their fellow workers and so 
help to ensure that authorities are fully responsive to the importance 
of staff relations in all aspects of their work." (quoted in Dimmock 
1977:136). The TUC Health Services Committee keenly supported the 
idea in principle but wished to see the number of staff representatives 
increased to 50% of each authority and ironically it was probably the 
delay caused by this pressure that meant that, because Mrs Castle was 
replaced by Mr David Ennals and a general election was looming, the 
proposals for any staff representatives at all were dropped completely.
The other alternative development in participation has not only 
survived but also eclipsed or mutated joint consultation. Local 
collective bargaining is now recognised as legitimate throughout the 
Health Service and is accommodated both formally and informally. 
Furthermore, shop stewards have not readily responded to attempts to
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channel them into joint consultation arrangements. A number of 
health authorities have concluded that if joint consultative arrange­
ments will either be ignored by the shop stewards or exploited for 
collective bargaining purposes it is preferable for new structures 
and systems to be established which explicitly and formally recognise 
the inevitability of negotiation within any consultative arrangement. 
Sethi et al (1982:224) have described that:
"First, these structures have usually been established jointly 
by local managements and trade union representatives in the 
absence of guidance from either the Whitley Councils or the 
government Health Departments. Secondly, the need for hospital 
managements to create and maintain a dialogue with locally 
militant ancillary staffs has been a major reason for their 
introduction. Thirdly, although local managements generally 
maintain that these committees are only used for the purpose 
of 'consulting* staff it can be suggested that some aspects of 
their business are conducted by straightforward collective 
bargaining. Fourthly, while there is no clear picture of items 
normally under consideration it can be suggested that management 
inspired innovations to established working practices tend to 
be accompanied by concessions on matters deemed important by 
the staffs* representatives.".
With this change from the joint consultation of the old colonial 
system to local collective bargaining of an industrial model has come 
a reassessment of the relationships between the different trade 
unions and staff organisations representing Health Service staff. 
Greater rivalry for membership has developed between the major trade 
unions and also in many locations the main trade unions, representing 
large numbers of members but in a small number of departments, began 
to resent the alleged influence of representatives from the great 
many professional and staff organisations, with most only represent­
ing a small number of members in one department. There has therefore 
often been a split between the trade unions and staff organisations 
affiliated to the TUC and those which are not and the first have 
refused to attend meetings with the second. Health authorities
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responded to this in different ways but they have largely either met 
the wish for separate consultation/negotiation machinery or have 
maintained the existing formal consultation systems, which have only 
been used by the TUC non-affiliates, and met representatives of TUC- 
affiliated organisations either informally or on an ad hoc basis.
In addition, separate arrangements for consultation have been 
made to meet one of the obligations of the 1974 Health and Safety at 
Work Act. Employers are statutorily bound to instigate health and 
safety committees where two or more health and safety representatives 
of trade unions or staff organisations request them to do so. These 
committees are now commonplace in the Health Service and include 
representatives from both TUC-affiliated and non-affiliated 
organisations.
South Glamorgan
Nearly all of these national characteristics of NHS industrial 
relations are present in South Glamorgan Health Authority but in a 
number of other respects it is quite exceptional. South Glamorgan 
Health Authority (Teaching) was established in 1974 to serve Cardiff 
and the coastal and rural locations of the Vale of Glamorgan. In 
1982 the designation *Teaching* was dropped but the health authority 
remains the only teaching authority in Wales and there is extensive 
collaboration with the University of Wales College of Medicine.
Unlike England, there is no regional health authority and political 
accountability is not through the Department of Health and Social 
Security. It relates directly to the Welsh Office and is funded from 
the Welsh vote rather than the health vote. Its budget, which in
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1974/5 was approximately £120 million, is one of the largest of any 
health authority in Great Britain and it employs approximately 12,500 
staff. It serves a population of 390,000 for general medical services, 
420,000 for mental illness services, 530,000 for mental handicap 
services, and there are many regional and sub-regional specialties.
It has a large number of hospitals of all types, organised into five 
groups called sectors until 1982 and health units afterwards, and of 
these three are for acute general services with over six hundred beds 
each.
During the course of the research the management arrangements 
for the health authority changed both in terms of structure and 
personality. As well as describing the entire organisation, the 
term 'health authority* also refers to the statutory body of members 
responsible for its management. Some members are nominated by the 
Secretary of State for Wales, others by local councils and others 
are representative of interested bodies, such as the medical and 
nursing professions, the College of Medicine and the TUC. The 
Chairman of the health authority is a part-time appointment made by 
the Secretary of State. The administrative structure immediately 
below this level that related most directly to the management of 











Health Authority Administrative Struction 1974-1982 (simplified)
In practice this structure was rather more fluid than it has 
been represented. There were several occasions when the Area 
Administrator was absent either because of annual leave or sickness 
and at these times the Operational Services Administrator, Personnel 
Officer and another administrator on a similar grade took it in turns 
to act up.
In 1982 the Health Service was reorganised again and the Area 
Operational Services Administrator gained a Chief Administrator's 
post in another Welsh health authority. The structure became that 
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Health Authority Administrative Structure 1982-1984 (simplified)
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The Chief Administrator's periods of sickness continued and the 
District Personnel Officer acted up on alternate occasions. Once the 
Chief Administrator made it known that he wished to retire early on 
the grounds of ill health, the District Personnel Officer was 
appointed as the acting Chief Administrator and he subsequently 
obtained the substantive post. In November 1984, at the beginning 
of the next NHS reorganisation, he was appointed as the health 
authority's General Manager. He is referred to as H. in the thesis.
The sectors/units were subject to some revision both in response 
to changes in personnel and as part of the formal 1982 reorganisation. 
The research was undertaken in Llandough Hospital and in 1979 it was 
in a sector which consisted only of itself and a nearby, longer-stay 
general hospital of 150 beds. By 1982 the sector had been enlarged 
by the inclusion of the regional spinal injuries hospital and three 
small hospitals for general practice, geriatrics and out-patients in 
a nearby town. During the 1982 reorganisation the regional spinal 
injury unit was returned to its original unit and replaced by the 
Blood Transfusion Service, but essentially the new health unit 
contained the hospitals serving the west of Cardiff and the Vale of 
Glamorgan, a total of 660 beds. During the course of the research 
the health authority proposed to close a specialist orthopaedic 
hospital in another unit but this decision was reversed by the 
Secretary of State for Wales after a public campaign mainly orchestrated 
by the bodies representing the interests of the staff in the hospital.
All the major health service trade unions and staff organisations 
are represented in South Glamorgan Health Authority but while some 
full-time officials, officers and members, particularly those in NUPE,
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COHSE and GMBATU, are regarded as especially active and willing to 
use industrial action, the health authority has not experienced the 
degree of aggression or disruption that has been experienced in other 
urban or South Wales health authorities. The only significant causes 
of industrial action across the health authority have been disputes 
during national pay negotiations. Strong campaigns have been waged, 
so far successfully, against hospital closures and competitive 
tendering but these have involved little industrial action affecting 
patient services. Even when, in 1982, the health authority rescinded 
its policy of never making staff redundant and actually declared 
that redundancies would be required, no industrial action was forth­
coming then or during the redundancy process.
In the general hospitals the most active trade union is NUPE.
The full-time officer changed in 1981 and in 1982 its structure was 
modified to match that of the revised health units. A branch, with 
a Chairman, Secretary and Assistant Secretary, was established for 
each health unit. They are co-ordinated by the full-time officer 
and at monthly meetings of the Branch District Health Committee. 
Inter-union co-ordination is minimal and largely restricted to 
specific campaigns. An Area-based joint consultative committee has 
existed for many years but for approximately the last five years the 
TUC-affiliated organisations have refused to participate while it 
still includes non-affiliated organisations. The format has been 
retained but the committee is now known as the Meeting of District 
Officers and Staff Organisations in recognition that the TUC 
affiliates will not attend. There are local consultative committees 
in some hospitals and the TUC-affiliated organisations appear to be 
involved in some of them and not others. A number of hospitals have
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local health and safety committees in which there has never been any 
difficulty in combining the interests of both affiliates and non­
affiliates .
Llandough Hospital
The researcher was the administrator of Llandough Hospital.
This is a teaching hospital of 420 beds and provides most of the 
district general hospital functions for the west of Cardiff and the 
Vale of Glamorgan. It also contains more specialised services, such 
as sub-regional thoracic surgery and paediatric oncology. The 
budget allocated to the administrator in 1984/5 i.e. for all items 
except works, medical and nursing staff, was approximately 
£6 million. Unlike most of the other hospitals in South Glamorgan 
Health Authority, it has a readily-discernible, local catchment 
population for both patients and staff.
During the research period the management structure for 
administrative, ancillary and professional and technical staff in 









Heads of Ancillary Departments
Clerical/secretarial
Supervisors
Llandough Hospital Administrative Structure 1979-1983
The Sector/Health Unit Administrator and Personnel Officer 
arrived towards the end of 1978 and the researcher took up post as 
Hospital Administrator for Llandough Hospital and Deputy Sector 
Administrator in the summer of 1979. Since then, the heads of the 
professional and technical departments have remained relatively stable 
but there have been substantial changes amongst the administrative 
supervisors and ancillary departments. The Domestic Services 
Manager, who was also a NALGO representative, retired in 1983 and her 
duties taken over by the Personnel Officer, with enhanced responsibility 
upon the domestic supervisors. All three senior porters retired 
between 1980 and 1984 and in 1985 the Head Porter was retired early 
on the grounds of redundancy and three new posts of a 'working* Head 
Porter and two deputies were created. The Catering Manager left at 
the beginning of 1984 to have a baby and to move to another part of
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the country. The Hospital Cashier left in 1980 for personal reasons, 
the Out-patient Manager left in 1982 for promotion within the health 
authority and the Supervisor of Medical Secretaries in 1983 to work 
outside the Health Service. This last departure was particularly 
significant since the supervisor had acted as an unofficial shop 
steward for NALGO members affected by management proposals to increase 
the flexibility of the medical secretaries.
The representation of the staff changed equally dramatically 
during the research period and at the end of the four years between 
1981 and 1985 only three of the staff representatives interviewed 
still held office. In 1980 virtually 100% of the ancillary staff 
belonged to NUPE. The Branch Chairman and Secretary were both 
porters who originated from the South Wales valleys and were over 
fifty and had held office for several years. Just before the field­
work began the Branch Secretary, who was also one of the senior 
porters, retired. The Chairman (Paul) wished to be formally appointed 
as senior shop steward and another porter in his fifties (Sam) was 
elected in his place. To maintain a representation of two from the 
portering staff another, younger porter (Colin) was also appointed 
as a shop steward, and a relatively young man (Bernard) was elected 
as shop steward for the operating department assistants (ODAs).
There was another shop steward (Carol) for the catering staff and one 
for the evening housekeepers (Mary).
These arrangements were relatively short-lived. Unseen tensions 
within the union came to a head during the 1982 national pay dispute. 
Dissatisfaction with the extent to which the union wished to involve
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the members in industrial action led to losses of members and 
officers to two new unions in the hospital. Approximately half of 
the porters, including Paul and Colin,transferred to the Transport 
and General Workers' Union (TGWU) and Colin and another porter were 
elected as shop stewards. After approximately a year Colin was able 
to persuade someone to take his place and he was able to stand down. 
The 1982 dispute also split the evening housekeepers and approximately 
half left to join COHSE and elected their own shop steward. There 
were still TGWU and COHSE members and representatives in the 
hospital in 1985 but they have shown little signs of activity and 
there is a belief that some of their members have drifted back to 
NUPE.
Following the 1982 dispute NUPE had to reconstruct its represent­
ation. It did this very efficiently and in doing so altered its 
image, style, affiliations and concerns quite radically. A house­
keeping shop steward became Chairman and although Bernard stood down 
another ODA in his twenties was elected as Secretary. Two new, 
relatively young shop stewards were elected to represent the porters 
and housekeepers. In 1984 the catering shop steward (Carol) resigned 
from the post and two female kitchen staff in their twenties were 
appointed to replace her. At the end of the same year Dilys reverted 
to her duties as a shop steward for the housekeeping staff and 
another ODA in his twenties was elected as Chairman.
This was unusual for two reasons. Firstly, it meant that of the 
six basic grade ODAs one was the NUPE Branch Chairman and the other 
the NUPE Branch Secretary. Secondly, and more surprisingly, on 
1 April 1984 the negotiation of the terms and conditions of service
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of ODAs had transferred from the Ancillary Staff Whitley Council to 
one of the Professional and Technical Whitley Councils, which meant 
that in 1985 what was still by far the largest trade union for 
ancillary staff in the hospital had officers from the professional 
and technical staff. In addition to these changes in personalities, 
the union became more aggressive in its recruiting, more formal, more 
adept at using procedures, more cohesive within the hospital, enhanced 
its affiliation with the union in the health authority as a whole, 
and was more unashamedly prepared to use the media and personal 
attack as means of defending its members'interests.
Less traumatic but nevertheless important changes occurred in 
other trade unions and staff organisations in the hospital. One of 
the two NALGO representatives retired in 1983 and was not replaced 
and at the same time the remaining representative (Graham) wished to 
concentrate more on his career as one of the technical staff and 
wished to relinquish his union duties if a substitute could be found. 
This was not possible and gradually he has begun to resume some of 
the formal functions, such as distributing the NALGO newspaper, but 
he has not entered into industrial relations issues. The Society of 
Radiographers' representative (Meryl) continued with her responsibili­
ties until the beginning of 1985 but then gained promotion in her 
department and resigned from her Society role. A recently qualified, 
male radiographer was elected to replace her. Finally, both AS IMS 
representatives (Eric and Bob) resigned from their office. They had 
been involved in trade union activity for many years and led the 
industrial action in support of a national pay claim in 1982 but Bob 
resigned from the union post shortly afterwards. Another man in his 
twenties was appointed as his successor and he and Eric led the
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negotiations with local management about its proposals, which were 
subsequently implemented, to abolish overtime working on Saturday 
mornings. However, Eric relinquished his interest in trade union 
activities shortly afterwards.
Other features of the hospital also reflected and bore upon the 
nature of its industrial relations. There was no formal consultative 
committee but information of interest to staff was either sent to 
their head of department or relayed at heads of department meetings, 
and it was expected that they in turn would convey it to their staff. 
Meetings between management and representatives from more than one 
department have only been held in exceptional circumstances, such as 
\dien it became necessary to identify staff to be made redundant, but 
extensive consultation and negotiation took place on an informal 
basis between heads of departments, or administrators, and local 
trade union representatives. A health and safety committee was 
instigated at the end of 1979 and this has been actively supported by 
all trade unions and staff organisations represented in the hospital. 
It has also been deliberately allowed to provide a forum for wider 
debate in some circumstances. More formal discussion has also taken 
place with representatives of ancillary staff because almost every 
member of the ancillary staff is on an incentive bonus scheme that 
has either been introduced or advised since 1979. The porters' bonus 
scheme has been revised twice in this period but some of the porters 
still recall that their bonus scheme was introduced in 1970 and was 
therefore one of the very first in the Health Service and that 
because of their inexperience of negotiating such schemes at the 




It was in fact the experience of attempting to exercise influence 
over the portering department and to modify its working practices that 
was mainly responsible for questioning the received wisdom regarding 
management theory described in Chapter One. There were four local 
incidents of industrial action, each lasting less than twenty four 
hours, between 1979 and 1981 and this caused concern, but an even 
more fundamental dilemma was what appeared to be the virtual impossi­
bility of achieving change however much one discussed it informally 
and in an unthreatening manner with the NUPE representatives. Two 
of the disputes showed that all was not well generally but the other 
two were specific manifestations of this problem.
One of the first type of dispute arose out of the case of a 
porter who was believed had gone to the local pub whilst he was 
supposed to be on duty. He went off sick immediately after this 
allegation was reported and informed the Head Porter that he would 
be absent for one week. During this time information was being 
collated about the incident so that on the first day that he returned 
a disciplinary .-hearing could be convened. Unfortunately, without 
warning, he appeared at work two days earlier than expected and 
since the case was not entirely ready he had to be suspended until 
the incident had been fully investigated and his case could be heard. 
The suspension was not formal disciplinary action but the NUPE Branch 
Chairman and Secretary considered that I had been quite unreasonable. 
It was not only disappointing not to be able to convince them of the 
fairness of the action but even more perplexing that as a result of 
this disagreement they straight-away organised the withdrawal of the
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porters * labour for several hours. The porter was, incidentally, 
interviewed the following week and dismissed, without appeal.
The second general incident occurred when the regional spinal 
injuries unit was part of the same sector. The sector administrator 
had become involved in a dispute there about the flexibility of the 
porters and eventually the porters went on strike. When this 
happened the word went around the health authority that all other 
ancillary staff would come out in sympathy. With my permission, the 
NUPE Branch Secretary and Chairman held a meeting of the ancillary 
staff in Llandough Hospital. I asked if I could address the meeting 
as well but was refused entry into the room. The staff took 
industrial action but then realised that no other hospital in the 
health authority had followed suit and so returned to work. Again, 
though, it revealed that the staff at Llandough had a propensity to 
industrial action that was not evident elsewhere in the health authority 
and this generated a concern about why this was and what management 
could do about it. With hindsight, it is likely that this dispute 
stimulated the first serious dissent within NUPE that manifest itself 
later in the year during the national pay negotiations when staff 
joined other trade unions.
The disputes about working practices were more straightforward.
On one occasion a large lorry arrived at one of the pharmacy 
departments and needed to be unloaded. This was usually done by two 
ancillary staff but neither was available and there was a danger that 
if there was a delay in unloading the lorry the driver would not wait 
and supplies to the wards would be affected. The porters on duty at
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the time could be spared from other duties and were asked by the 
Head Porter if they would help out. None of them volunteered and I 
then discussed the problem with the NUPE Branch Chairman. He was 
adamant that the job was not one that a porter should do and 
eventually, with time running out, I had to instruct him to unload 
the lorry and as a consequence the porters went on strike. The 
second dispute occurred after many weeks had been spent at attempting 
to incorporate the collection and delivery of pathology specimens, 
and an additional person to do it, into the portering department. 
Again, the porters' NUPE representatives were adamant that this was 
not a job for porters, although it involved only routine fetching 
and carrying, and therefore when the individual doing the job went on 
sick leave, in the absence of agreement an instruction had to be 
issued for the work to be covered and industrial action by the porters 
followed.
These problems have now all been overcome and the porters at 
Llandough Hospital are of a high standard, providing a flexible 
service that meets the hospitals' needs and at near minimum cost.
The number of staff and the amount of overtime worked have been 
reduced but the target bonus has been increased and the supervisory 
arrangements have been modified so that they more appropriately meet 
the needs of both the portering staff and management. At the 
inception of the research, however, there was little indication that 
these goals would be achieved or that if they were that it would not 
be without a succession of incidents of industrial action that would 
bring both the staff of the hospital and the management into disrepute, 
The research enquiry sought to identify whether staff participation
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in the management function might provide one of the mechanisms for 
achieving these objectives without organisational disruption.
The Representatives
One of the issues to be addressed in this thesis is that of 
dynamism in industrial relations and there can be no better way of 
representing it from the data than of summarising the points at 
which the individuals who represented the staff of Llandough Hospital 
in 1981 found themselves four years later.





















Society of Radiographers' 
representative
Senior NUPE Shop Steward, 
formally Branch Chairman










Promoted and resigned as 
representative
Retired early on the grounds 
of ill health 1985
Retired early on the grounds 
of ill health 1985
Retired 1983
For better of for worse, the administrative structure and personalities 




Candidates who sat the Personnel Management paper in the IHSA 
final examination in 1976 had the opportunity to answer the following 
question:
What is 'participative management', and how do you see it 
working in the NHS?
At most the answer could obtain 20% of the total marks of the paper
and, as a proportion of the time available, approximately 35 minutes
was allowed for an answer. Several years later, reviewing my period
of research into participation reveals, ironically, that I am probably
less able to respond to the question than I would have been then. I
am now aware of its full enormity and of what is required to minimally
meet it satisfactorily, which could certainly not be done within the
time limit. Secondly, I have leamt that how the answer is obtained
is almost as important as what it consists of. The methodology of
the research must be an integral part of the thesis but it is also
offered here as the description of a learning process of value both
to myself and to those who wish to contemplate their naval while the
body it is part of carries on with its normal day-to-day activity.
The research lasted for four years and was undertaken whilst 
maintaining a full-time, demanding management post in Llandough 
Hospital. Its progress was at times erratic, confusing and unpredict­
able but an attempt has been made to emulate the discipline 
demonstrated by Berg (1979). He asks that:
"It should be noted that even though the layout of the 
dissertation follows the logical development of the research 
work, it is in no way an accurate description of the research
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process." (p 21) 
but nevertheless he is able to describe the development of his 
dissertation with remarkable clarity. The different elements of the 
thesis research, with an indication of chronological order, can be 
isolated as follows:
1. Interested in management theory and experiencing industrial 
relations difficulties.
2. Identified participation as possibly relevant to industrial 
relations problems.
3. Outlined research objectives and method.
4. Began literature search.
5. Research procedure developed in greater detail.
6. Negotiated access.
7. Began collecting field data.
8. Substantially reduced research objectives and field data target
9. Began processing and evaluating data.
10. Research modification and data-handling generated key issues.




14. Theoretical framework produced.
Each of these will be considered in turn.
1. The Theoretical/Practical Dichotomy
The pre-research history has been described in Chapters One and 
Three. Chapter One explained the professional training, theoretical 
antecedence to the research and Chapter Three portrayed some of the 
industrial relations problems that were being experienced before it 
began. Industrial relations were very time-consuming, it was 
exceptionally difficult to gain consent for change and there was a 
demonstrated readiness to use industrial action of all sorts, including 
striking. Professional training as a hospital administrator and as a 
personnel officer tended to emphasise the neo-human relations school 
of management theory, with the suggestion that staff treated as 
reasonable, responsible and concerned will act as such. It was my 
belief that this was what I was doing but yet it did not appear to 
be improving the industrial relations climate in the hospital.
2. The Relevance of Participation
The tensions between theory and practice were so strong that I 
felt that I was almost in a void between the two, keenly seeking 
practical validation of the theory, or practical or theoretical
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remedies for the operational problem. I wanted to find out, for 
example, why it was that local trade union representatives felt that 
nationally agreed terms and conditions of service could be bargained 
locally. I was particularly interested in examining the place of 
ideology in the NHS since I found it difficult to accept that an 
adversarious relationship should exist between staff and management 
in an organisation founded on the highest principles of egalitarianism. 
It was research into participation, however, that seemed to provide 
the best opportunity for resolving the theory/practice dilemma. On 
the one hand, the success or failure of participation seemed to supply 
an almost structural test of neo-human relations theory, and on the 
other, it was possibly true that participation would improve the 
industrial relations climate, especially if it meant that staff would 
accept that they could only operate within the constraints imposed 
upon management, such as budgets and government policy.
3. Outline of Research Objectives and Method
With hindsight, the endeavour to resolve these issues is still
laudable but naive, over-ambitious and confused and this is evident
from the summary of research intent produced before the formal
research process commenced. In just one sentence I recognised that
the research would raise:
"crucial problems of the definition of participative management, 
the form of alternative models of participative management and 
the quantification of industrial relations character and 
intensity."!
I continued by stating that I would seek to define the continuum of
participation and its limits, and would do so by:
"examining previous theoretical constructs; attempting to 
differentiate between consultation, participation and socialist
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management or worker control; and examining the role in the 
management process in the NHS of those currently considered to 
be participating in it e.g. doctors and GPs.".
I was going to look at what was the most suitable level of partici­
pation in the Health Service and in doing this I was going to analyse 
the issues in which staff would be involved if participation was 
practised beyond hospital level. It was proposed to examine how 
participation could be formally structured, whether a representative 
system would be required, and if so on what basis representatives 
should be selected.
The existing nature of staff involvement at hospital level was 
going to be established and this was going to be achieved by obtaining, 
"a basically descriptive, formal objective assessment" and by, "the 
subjective assessment of both managers and staff representatives.". 
Staff aspirations were to be investigated and in particular I 
intended to see how the desire for participative management related 
to various features of work, such as the nature of the work, the type 
of work organisation, the perceived management style, and present 
access to the management process. I was also anxious to determine 
whether staff would rather co-operate in a participative structure, 
with an explicit understanding that they share the constraints upon 
management, or would rather maintain their collective bargaining 
activities, which I described as, "less intellectually rigorous, more 
emotionally satisfying and more liable to maintain and increase 
staff cohesion.". It was recognised that there might be strong 
organisational constraints upon the development of participation, 
especially because of the anxiety of managers about its implications.
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The proposed research was to involve staff, trade union repres­
entatives and managers in several hospitals, and not only in South 
Glamorgan but also in West and Mid Glamorgan. Full-time trade union 
officials throughout these areas would be included as well. In 
addition to this field research, there would be statistical analysis 
of industrial relations activity and managers would need to self­
record informal industrial relations approaches. Although an 
essentially qualititive approach to the research was to be adopted, 
one of the research purposes was to identify the effect of enhanced 
participation upon the general industrial relations climate, which 
suggested affinity with a pseudo-scientific approach. And although 
it did not even feature in the summary of research intent, another 
objective was to attempt to assess the impact of myself as an internal 
researcher by comparing the data I derived from other hospitals with 
that I obtained from my own.
Sufficient realism was retained to at least briefly record that 
one of the things that the method of research would essentially 
depend upon was the time available from work. These research 
objectives and methods, described, it must be reiterated, before the 
formal research process began, were inevitably impossible to translate 
into action but they contain key themes that were maintained as 
central to the research even when it was rather more pragmatically 
defined.
The conviction remained that the research should holistic. Even 
if no attempt was to be made to establish the nature of the relation­
ship between participation and the industrial relations climate 
generally, it still seemed inconceivable that issues relating to
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participation could be considered in isolation from other features of 
workplace industrial relations activity and relationships. This may 
appear self-evident but in fact has not been regarded as such by 
other commentators. Bartlett (1982), for example, has reported how 
he obtained the verdicts of managers and staff in four companies 
about the potential usefulness and actual success of a wide range of 
participative practices. He did so by using an audit approach, one 
which related solely to categories of participation that he had 
predetermined and classified according to four different degrees of 
influence. There is no assessment at all of how the managers* and 
staff's concepts of participation related to or were determined by 
the wider industrial relations forum and it appears to have been 
assumed that participation is an end in itself and not something 
which other participants in the industrial relations system may use 
as a means to other ends.
However, at this stage of the thesis research design the idea 
of auditing not just participative practices but industrial relations 
activity and relationships generally was an attractive one. Taking 
an holistic approach to the study of participation not only meant 
that a distinction of pure artificiality would be avoided but also 
that it would be related to a context of high trade union membership 
and frequent activity. This has been unusual in previous research 
about participation and it is interesting to note that when Bate and 
Mangham were discussing with representatives of a company which of 
its three sites should be chosen for an experiment in worker involve­
ment :
"Glasgow was ruled out on the grounds that it was unionised and
'we already have more than enough problems with their involve­
ment as it is.'" (1981:15).
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The desire to relate attitudes to participation with attitudes
to work was largely sustained but substantially modified. Initially,
there was almost an inclination to pursue the method described by
Warr and Wall (1975:92);
"The most common approach to the study of participative 
leadership has been based upon a correlational research design. 
.... Typically, investigators have looked for differences in 
leadership styles across different work situations and have 
examined the relationship at one point in time between a 
manager's style and the attitudes of his subordinates.".
Part of the attraction of this approach was that practical experience
as a manager indicated that the orthodox association of participation
and well-being at work was not accurate and could be refuted by the
very means that had been used to achieve this conclusion. Warr and
Wall (p 103) recognise that:
"Taken together, these experimental studies are no more than 
suggestive of a positive causal relationship between immediate 
participation and employee satisfaction. Given the widely held 
belief that such a causal link is well substantiated .... it is 
worth elaborating on the major weaknesses in the available 
evidence.".
These they describe as statistical inadequacy, a bias of female 
employees in much of the evidence and the small number of employees 
involved in the experiments. Without being aware of it, this is the 
point at which my interest in relating attitudes to participation 
with attitudes to work and industrial relations behaviour generally 
deviated from that of others who have sought to establish the 
correlation. All three of Warr and Wall's criticisms of previous 
surveys are pseudo-scientific and it becomes apparent that this is 
the type of research they wish to see continued, but more rigorously.
From the outset, this type of approach, or what I later came to 
recognise as a systems theory orientation, was rejected. I brought 
to the research a heightened awareness of the significance of the
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subjective interpretation of the participants in industrial relations,
of unpredictability, of misunderstanding, of manipulation and of
irrationality. The error of attempting to segregate independent and
dependent variables in group activity and then measuring their effect
upon each other has been well demonstrated by Mangham (1978). One
example that he is particularly critical of is the work of Kahn (1974)
"The idea that the independent variable automatically exercises 
its influence upon the dependent variables, apparent though this 
may be in the physical sciences, is, a fallacy in the social 
sciences. The process of definition by the social actors 
involved appears to me to be absolutely crucial. Kahn's workers 
must define 'participation' for it to have any effect upon their 
productivity and their satisfaction. One group of workers may 
define participation as 'manipulation' and behave in a particular 
way while another group define it as 'freedom' and behave in a 
different way. The intervening interpretation is crucial to the 
outcome. It provides the meaning which sets the response and as 
such it should be necessary to incorporate it into the account 
of the research. Kahn's proposal, and the work of many others 
involved in research into organisations, assumes a fixity of 
meaning for the chosen variables which in most cases is 
unwarranted." (p 9),
So it was never part of the original research intent to use 
methods of such comparative sterility. The research was to be about 
the subjective assessments or, to use the cliche, the 'perceptions' 
of the participants in the industrial relations forum. Even so, it 
was not proposed to make any substantial use of the most obvious way 
of doing this, particularly in view of the original scope of the 
research, which was to assess attitudes by questionnaire. The 
original research intent referred to questionnaires but it was 
anticipated that these would only be used as a way of helping to 
structure the data, which would largely be derived from interviews.
The methodological problems of questionnaires have been well-rehearsed 
and are readily apparently in studies of participation. G Strauss 
(1977:387) has observed that:
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"The kinds of participation workers say they want may be very
different from what they realty want...... what forms of
participation people say they want will, of course, be influenced 
by the rhetoric of their leaders, the values of their peers, or 
even by the way the question is worded."
and he continues:
"Even among workers, responses to questions as to participation 
may differ depending upon the context in which they are asked, 
.... Even more dramatically, Ramsay (1976a) asked four different 
versions of essentially the same question regarding the 
desirability of participation at the company wide level and got 
seemingly very different responses.".
Examining just one of Ramsay's set of responses (1976b:694) also 
illustrates another severe limitation of the method. If one asks for 
the meaning in practical terms of the statements that, for example,
14% of the workers had "quite a lot" of "influence" in the "organisa­
tion" of their "own work" as opposed to 32% who had "some", it is 
difficult to go beyond merely reiterating the mechanical process of 
how the questionnaire was completed. Ramsay appears to be sensitive 
to this and can therefore only draw conclusions at a most generalised 
level.
The problem is that there is an ambivalence about questionnaires. 
At the same time as enabling sense to be obtained from a confusing 
mass of individual inclinations, they present a barrier between the 
real data, which the confusing mass of individual inclinations, 
and the analysis. Questionnaire data is not original data, but data 
that has been filtered and categorised. Partridge (1976:12) confirms 
that :
"The assumption that .... attitudes can be articulated in one of 
a limited range of standardised forms in the course of a fixed 
choice questionnaire strains the credibility of such findings.
If on the contrary it is assumed that such values are ambiguous 
or only partly articulated then such a research method is biased 
towards collecting the conventional responses which give little 
or no indication of how strongly such opinions are held, how
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consistent they are with other opinions held or how they relate 
to action in any specific context. Such an approach is more 
likely to tap the social values which legitimise action than those 
which determine it." (p 14).
Conventional approaches to industrial relations also tend to 
ignore their dynamism and are heavily weighted towards an implication 
that workplace relations are static, to the detriment of considerations 
of the significance of change and of unpredictability. This lapse has 
applied not only to the individuals involved in the industrial 
relations system but to the system itself and to the organisations 
within which it is located. There is often an inference that there 
is a clear managerial structure and that the decision-making 
procedure is equally-readily apparent, when in fact there is little 
evidence to support that this is the case.
Anslem Strauss is aware of the confusing practicality of
decision-making and is able to encapsulate it within a world that
might be recognisable to participants in industrial relations:
"Such generalized processes as role taking, 'verstehen* 
(understanding), or the kinds of rational processes itemized 
under decision making scarcely give the flavor of what 'really* 
happens when people are working or living in organisations.
What happens involves negotiation, but it also involves coercion, 
threats of coercion, attempts to persuade, and appeals to 
authority. The appearances of those processes and their 
relationships are certainly not fortuitous." (1978:105,106).
Unfortunately, it is true that much of the industrial relations
literature fails to convey a feel for its day-to-day reality and the
processes that Strauss identifies were certainly evident in the
industrial relations behaviour in Llandough Hospital before the
research began.
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Furthermore, with these few words Strauss also provides another 
component of the context that is often missing when participation 
comes under scrutiny, which is a sense of proportion. Participation 
requires time and energy from all those it concerns and if it can 
achieve the ambitious aims of staff or management or both that many 
writers imply it can, one would anticipate that it would attract one 
of the highest priorities as a call upon these resources. What 
Strauss succeeds in doing is conveying a sense of participation's 
place amongst all the other processes that are competing with it and 
an awareness that in reality its priority may be substantially 
diminished. Identifying the true significance of participation 
amongst all the other industrial relations processes was one of the 
objectives featured in the original research intention and it was 
one which was not lost sight of during the remainder of the research.
Therefore, both by a process of implicit elimination and an 
intuitive sense of what was right, the original statement of the 
research method emphasised a desire to obtain the perceptions of 
others and to do so largely by interviews. I subsequently realised 
that in other words I was confirming Mangham's (1978:10) contention 
that :
"What is needed is an alternative or complimentary conceptual 
scheme which acknowledges the central importance of the actors' 
interpretation of events and situations, and an alternative or 
complimentary methodology which acknowledges the nature of 
research into social as opposed to physical reality and which 
is concerned with the qualitative rather than the quantitative 
aspect of that reality.".
At the time, I was unaware that what I was proposing was in fact
qualitative research and that what I was hoping to achieve was
analysis 'grounded' (Glaser and Strauss 1967) in my data; I simply
wished to understand the industrial relations world and participation's
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place in it as perceived by others involved in industrial relations 
and could think of no better way of doing this than of allowing them 
to convey it to me as accurately as possible in person.
Qualitative Research
Qualitative research is not simply another means of deriving the 
research data. It is the research method derived from certain 
assumptions about the way that human behaviour can be characterised, 
such as that described by symbolic interactionism (Blumer) or social 
interactionism (Mangham) ; the data it generates is not the same as 
that produced by other research methods; and the purpose of the data 
is also different. The very fact that the method is specific to the 
study of human behaviour immediately differentiates it from 
positivistic approaches to research, which advocate that the same 
scientific method can be used regardless of discipline. Positivism 
seeks to use precise analysis to test prepositional knowledge so that 
universal predictions of social conduct may be obtained. In contrast, 
"Blumer strives simply 'to make modern society intelligible,"'
(Meltzer et al 1975:57) and qualitative research seeks more to 
discover ideas, which may then provide relevant understanding. An 
important means of achieving this is the use of 'sensitising concepts', 
concepts that should make one sensitive to the task of, "working with 
and through the distinctive nature of the empirical instance, instead 
of casting the unique nature aside" (Blumer 1954:8).
But while qualitative research not only accommodates the 
ideographic, the idiosyncratic and the unique but regards them as 
central features of the data, this does not mean that it is simply
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concerned with describing and collecting the entirely subjective and
anecdotal. It is about relating the individual to the world or
organisation around them and the mediating factors working in both
directions between the two and therefore it is about generating
theory from what should be the most direct and accurate data. In
Mangham*s words (1978:15):
"An empirical science is not to be brought into being by endless 
debate and disputation about concepts with the weakest of 
empirical referents; it is constructed out of the interplay of 
data and speculation that generates the concepts and at the same 
time grounds them in a context of empirical materials.".
Mangham*s own idiosyncrasy is the cult of a dramaturgically informed
analysis, which is a qualitative approach with a rather tested
theatrical analogy and he declares that,
"Such an analysis is very difficult to undertake at a distance 
or by a means of questionnaires and structured interviews."
(p 88).
In summary :
"organisations are to be understood in terms of the individuals 
who participate in them and individuals are to be understood in 
terms of the organisations of which they are members. Such 
'understanding* can only arise from an intimate familiarity with 
the processes occurring within organisations, a familiarity which 
is at the heart of qualititive research which aims to go beyond 
the ideographic without doing violence to the complexity of its 
subject matter." (p 18).
These thoughts are detailed here not because they shaped the 
development of the thesis research methodology (terms such as 
qualitative research, interactionism and positivism were actually not 
known before the research began) but because they articulate the 
implicit choices that were made when the outline research intent was 
prepared. The naive enthusiasm for this approach was also subsequently 
tempered by an increasing awareness that, while a qualitative approach 
was still the most appropriate, it had flaws that would need to be
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addressed, Meltzer et al (1975:59) summarise some of the criticisms:
"These techniques are subjective and, hence, unsuited to the 
development of scientific knowledge; information gathered 
through their use is too variable and unique for comparison and 
generalization; they tend to be too time-consuming for convenient 
use; it is not known how we can teach the subtle skills required 
in their use; and they do not, typically, lend themselves to the 
conventional testing of explicitly formulated theories by 
procedures subject to independent validation.".
Concern about these problems is shared and to some extent borne 
out in the description by Armstrong et al (1981) of their own empirical, 
qualitative research, but they are self-depricating to a degree that 
reveals just how nebulous the standards are by which they judge 
themselves. They certainly confirm that the approach can be 
immensely time-consuming. In their study researchers worked five-day 
weeks of shifts in each of four factories over a continuous period of 
four months. Neither can the authors prove that their subjectivity 
and level of skill did not significantly affect the research outcome. 
They state frankly that, "All that can be said is that the researchers 
were aware of these limitations and have sought to overcome them."
(p 28).
What must be challenged, however, is their admission that one of 
the well-known limitations that their work suffers from is that, "the 
studies are of particular factories, and this obviously limits claims 
to typicality.". The challenge is immediate and obvious. How can a 
claim to typicality be expanded? There is not one single enterprise 
which could be studied on the basis that it is 'typical* of all, or 
a group of, enterprises and it is not feasible to devise a sufficiently 
diverse selection of organisations that could be regarded as typically 
representative, and even if it was attempted and an approximation
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achieved it would only derive a compound typicality. This is 
qualitative research that still cannot abandon the criteria of value 
of positivistic research.
It is unrealistic to seek universal laws of organisational
behaviour and Walker (1977:1) acknowledges this specifically in the
context of research into participation:
"Further progress is required in clarifying the causal relations 
involved in participation, .... It is time to abandon global 
thinking about participation and move to a more discriminating 
approach which does not seek final solutions but recognises that 
participation is a living, evolving process, the outcome of 
which cannot be predicted in detail.".
This sentiment was applied far more comprehensively by Lord Rothschild
in his 'Report on the Social Science Research Council' (reported in
The Times 16.7.82.). One of his conclusions was that, "even the work
commonly described as 'applied' social science research is directed
towards an 'end-product' only in a metaphorical sense .... The main
purpose of applied social research is to provide the material on
which it may be possible to conduct a more informed debate and make
better decisions.". It is unreasonable, the report seems to be
confirming, to expect applied social research to produce hard facts,
verifiable hypotheses or quantifiable dependent variables of human
organisation.
The qualitative methodology implicitly appropriated in the 
original thesis research design is doubly fertile. It is adventurous 
and involves risk-taking, but if it is successful it generates both 
further data about the complexity of social interaction and the themes 
that pattern its vitality. The work of Terry (1977) provides an 
excellent example. From three detailed case studies of the entire
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range of shop floor industrial relations activity, including, for
instance, anecdotal evidence about incidents of lateness, Terry has
both added to the body of knowledge about the dynamics of workplace
industrial relations and derived an analysis of the significance of
informality that combines theoretical and practical value. As Berg
affirms (1979:271):
"describing the process of change in qualitative rather than 
quantitative terms and in wholes, rather than in parts, enables 
us to see and explain activities and events that would other­
wise have been difficult to grasp.".
Partridge (1977:41,42) illustrates that one of the positive
advantages of quantitative research is its great concentration upon
the subjective and unique. Ramsay (1977:498) comments that:
"it is precisely at the level of individual experiments, gaining 
information on the perceptions and expectations of those involved 
in them, that further research can greatly clarify the detailed 
processes at work.".
But the worth of case studies as tools of analysis has yet to be 
adequately established. Part of the dilemma appears to be that even 
those researchers who have produced case studies are uncertain of the 
criteria by which their validity should be judged. Armstrong et al 
have already been noted to be apologetic for the limitations upon 
generalising from case studies and Partridge too, in another study, 
generates a plethora of validation problems when expressing reserva­
tions about his methodology. He describes three case histories and 
then declares that (1976:26):
"Unfortunately not enough incidents occurred during the course 
of the study to test any overall pattern. However, these few 
examples demonstrate some general features about defining and 
articulating 'the grievance'.".
Once again, questions must be thrown back. How many incidents would
have been enough? What criteria should be used for 'testing'? What
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constitutes a 'pattern*? Are the features really 'general' or are they 
in fact specific to a certain context, or just three contexts at the 
most? In addition. Partridge's summary of his study raises questions 
about the purpose of qualitative research. "This paper has highlighted 
four facets which the steward should ideally take into account when 
defining a grievance." (p 35), he states, but without explanation he 
has moved from description to prescription and interjected a value 
judgement of uncertain origin.
In a skilled exposition of the value of the case study approach, 
Berg (1979) resolves many of these types of concern. His attitude is 
that (p 265):
"findings derived from the study of one case do not easily lend 
themselves to validation in a traditional sense, and this has 
been one of the major criticisms of the case method as such.
This does not mean that the theories cannot be judged, but 
rather that the validation must take a different form, oriented 
more to the credibility of the research process.".
He reasons that the relationship between the research method and the
analysis can be examined on three different levels, by the accuracy
of the case description, the credibility of the interpretation and
the validity of the theoretical framework. This logical dissection
of the accuracy of the research process is continued in the guidance
about how to assess the accuracy of the case description:
"First, the case study can be correct in the sense that the 
activities and events that are accounted for not only took 
place, but took place at the time and in the manner described. 
Second, the description of the meaning ascribed by various 
actors to activities and events can be a fair description of 
what they try to convey in the interview, or of what I was able 
to extract from the written documentation." (p 265).
In his own research, Berg established an elaborate control system for
maintaining the first category of accuracy. The data was checked
and then double-checked, clarification of previous statements was
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sought, further documentation was requested and two feedback seminars 
were organised. This last method is regarded by Berg as one of the 
most important control mechanisms. However, he recognises that the 
second type of accuracy is far more difficult to measure. It 
apparently depends upon the participants' assessment of what has been 
derived and Berg is only able to comment (p 266) that, in his own 
work, "no criticism was forthcoming .... of the description of the 
viewpoints of the different actors and groups.".
When addressing the issue of how the findings from case studies 
can be transferred to other organisations and situations, Berg 
confirms that there appears to be general agreement that case studies 
can be used to generate theoretical frameworks, but is still anxious 
to emphasise the value of the individual character of the organisation 
he studied. This is a reiteration of one of the basic tenets of 
qualitative research, which is that it is about generating data about 
what 'really' goes on, which in turn often means focusing upon the 
particular, the unique, the idiosyncratic and the distinctive. It 
does not attempt to obtain typicality, or representation, or to 
identify the behaviour of one variable while all others are kept 
constant. But ironically and conversely, it is also more concerned 
with the creative act of producing theory rather than with the almost 
mechanical act of testing hypotheses. Case studies may do no more 
than describe, analyse and explain specific contexts, which is 
itself no mean feat, but each one of them is also a potential 
catalyst for the derivation of theory.
Nonetheless, this process causes concern to many commentators, 
largely because there is no intervening, seemingly objective analytic
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tool between the data and the researcher. There can be no comparisons 
of answers to standard, identical tests; it is impossible to present 
tables of findings; there are no figures that can be statistically 
manipulated to obtain tests of significance; and so on. Those who 
are sceptical about the method can emphasise the number of different 
levels in which the researcher is personally involved and which can 
therefore be subject to grossly distorting error. In some of the 
qualitative research processes, such as interviewing, the researcher 
is actually responsible for creating the data and then, whatever the 
process, the researcher exercises judgement about how to divide the 
data available into that which is relevant to the study and that which 
is not. Further judgement is exercised in deciding how the relevant 
data should be structured, associated, sequenced and weighted. And 
ultimately, any theory that is produced is that which, in the 
researcher's opinion, appears to most accurately reflect the circum­
stances being studied.
This does not mean the method is invalid, or worse than 
positivism, and neither does it even mean that the researcher must do 
their best to minimise these influences, which will be considered 
further later. At a simple level, some of the alleged weaknesses can 
be met by arguments that subjectivity is always present, whatever the 
research design, and that most researchers take notice if study 
'subjects' say something interesting and informative.
The work of Wall and Lischeron (1977) illustrates both. They 
describe that their approach included a concern with "scientific 
rigour", but they admit that:
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"Sometimes the constraints inherent in the work situation were 
such that we could not gather the evidence in the objective way 
which we felt would be most compatible with the scientific aims 
of our study. At other times our scientific requirements served 
to inhibit the documentation of evidence which, whilst of 
considerable practical relevance, was not easily available 
through the methods of data collection we had chosen, or which 
was not covered by the questions we had initially set out to 
answer. In these cases we relied upon our own observations and 
interpretations of the situation which we obtained through our 
extensive contact with all those concerned with the research - 
workers, supervisors, trade union officials and managers alike." 
(p 9).
At a higher level of generality, those who criticise qualitative 
research for its subjectivity appear to be unaware of the dichotomous 
approach they appear to be advocating towards the study of the way in 
which individuals behave in groups and organisations. They are 
attempting to analyse the processes of social or symbolic interaction 
while subjecting themselves to the deceipt that they can somehow 
remove themselves from the very things they are studying. If there 
is an appreciation that there is an interaction between the research 
and the researched, there may be an attempt to eliminate or at least 
minimise the impact the interaction has upon the research objective. 
This, too, perpetuates a fallacy, which is the widely-held, tacit 
assumption that the quantity of interaction is closely correlated with 
the strength of interaction. The very act of initiating research 
creates an interaction and attempts to formally eliminate it may 
merely mean that its nature and consequences take another form.
Friedlander (1968) is one of those who has recognised that a 
relationship exists between the research and the researched, regard­
less of the method used, and that attempts to eliminate its effects 
will only produce their displacement. This applies to any behavioural 
research and Friedlander explains that the purpose of his paper is :
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"to explore the quality of the research results and of the ongoing 
researcher/subject relationship as a function of the interacting 
needs and perceptions of both parties in the sequence of 
transactions within this relationship," (p 369).
He reminds us of experimental studies that have manifest the force of
the pressures upon research subjects to be obedient and to meet the
researcher's perceived wishes:
"the limited but important research in this area indicates that 
supposedly inert subjects go to great lengths to be obedient, 
co-operative, 'good subjects', thereby exhibiting behavior which 
is irrational and out of the context of the rules of the 
experimental situation.
These issues are not restricted to any one set of methodologies, 
values, or philosophies, but are endemic to all endeavors in 
which the purpose is to study human behavior." (p 370).
Subjectivity will be apparent in any research design and the
greater the 'objectivity' that it seeks to achieve the greater the
restrictions will be upon the subject's responses and the artificiality
of the data obtained:
"Objectivity then takes the form of more austere constraints 
upon the responses of subjects or of attempts to neutralize 
spurious background and situational factors. These measures are 
intended to ensure that the subjects will not respond freely to 
the experimental situation or to the experimenter. That is, 
they will not respond in a way which encompasses natural human 
relationships and environmental presses." (p 371).
Thus research methods which seek to avoid the biases of subjectivity
themselves produced data, and consequently interpretation, which is
distorted, just as much influenced by the researcher and possibly
more so, and often consistent only with circumstances that are so
esoteric that is to make them virtually worthless. This is because,
as Friedlander summarises :
"To varying extents, fragmentation, standardization, and 
neutralization techniques reduce the potential capacity of the 
communication and feedback channels between researcher and 
subject, bias it with two-way distrust, and reduce opportunities 
for further understanding in the relationship." (p 371).
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Qualitative research techniques seek to minimise not the inter­
action but the communication interference between the conceptual or 
practical issue that is the subject of the study and the data that the 
researcher obtains about it. Although it may be academically naive, 
the study of social behaviour by simply watching it and receiving the 
participants' opinions about it, has justifiable appeal. Friedlander 
refers to, "The rich understanding and knowledge that we might gain" 
if we do not, "exclude the subject from explorations and implementa­
tions meaningful to him." (p 376). Indeed, since social interaction 
is not an abstract construct such as mathematics, the very definition 
of the research topic and the desciption of its contents must be in 
terms of what is seen and heard. Many studies confirm that the 
results of qualitative research are of a greatly superior calibre 
than that of quantitative research, both in terms of the accuracy 
with which the data reflects the issue under study and the power it 
provides to generate insight.
Simple examples exist within the specific context of research
into participation. Cressey et al (1981) used both quantitative and
qualitative techniques. The first produced paradoxes about attitudes
to participation, so they report that (p 120):
"It was therefore to the qualitative material that we turned in 
search of a clue to understanding these paradoxes. The effort 
put into the survey to gain qualitative information on respondants' 
perceptions of industrial democracy and participation paid 
dividends in that we discovered more useful information about 
the frames of reference of managers and representatives in their 
approach to their subject.".
Similarly, Marchington (1980) used unstructured, spontaneous interviews
and discussions and confirms that this produced data of a totally
different value:
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"It was during such sessions that I became more aware of the 
intricacies of the Plan, and industrial relations management in 
general, and more critical of the traditional reliance that 
researchers place on questionnaires of relatively standardised 
interviews; the richness of the data gathered by 'living within 
a culture' is so much greater." (p 182).
Qualitative research's obsession with discovering 'reality' by using
methods that do not seek to standardise the data is illustrated in
another study, by Dowling et al (1981:186):
"Prior to discussing the subjects with respondents we were of 
course conscious of the variety of meanings and interpretations 
which people place on the terms 'employee participation' and 
'industrial democracy'. Neither term has a precise and 
established meaning, and we did not direct the discussions 
around any strict definitions of these terms. We wanted 
respondents to talk about the subjects 'in their own words', and 
from their accounts we hoped to gain impressions of their 
conceptions of, and thinking about, this important area of 
industrial relations.".
While this type of enquiry is the very crux of qualitative
research, it also presents a very real methodological dilemma,
particularly in interviews between the researcher and respondent.
The propensity of respondents to conform may be just as strong in
qualitative research as in quantitative and considerable skill is
required to avoid the presentation of opportunities to respondents
to perceive what they may regard as cues to expected responses.
Cressey et al (1981:117) touch upon this problem and also reiterate
that other, quantitative methods may be more inaccurate:
"We wished to develop a greater understanding of the nature of 
attitudes to the subject. We vere acutely aware of problems 
posed by the variety of ideas, definitions and terms used by 
those we were researching. We therefore paid considerable 
attention to the use of open-ended questions and qualitative 
data designed to explore respondents' interpretations of the 
subject in greater detail than a fixed choice attitude survey 
can reveal.".
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Unfortunately, the sensitivities and skills that qualitative 
researchers require when interviewing are much more complex than those 
of remembering to ask open-ended questions. The process is also more 
complicated than that of personnel selection interviews. Before the 
interviews, for example, the respondents will need to know how they 
have been selected, what the subject of the interviews will be, how 
the information will be used and what authority he has obtained to 
allow the interviews to proceed. The researcher then needs to 
adequately consider the implications of where the interview is held, 
since some locations will be more conducive to informal discussion 
than others but different locations will also attract a range of 
associations in the respondent's mind. During the interviews, the 
orthodox range of interviewing skills will certainly be required, but 
supplementary abilities will also be necessary. Respondents must be 
put at their ease, they must be helped to understand that there are 
no right and wrong answers, the questions should indeed be open-ended 
and largely value-free and the degree of conversational flow should 
be much greater than that obtained even in selection interviews, in 
which all participants appreciate that the process should flow but 
in essence consist of questions and answers.
Two major dilemmas remain - how to avoid linguistic imperialism 
and superficiality. The first may sound melodramatic but accurately 
conveys the process by which the conceptual understanding and articul­
ation of respondents can be swept aside by the respondents' 
acquiescence to the use of the researcher's terms and meanings. This 
may be easily done and it defeats the object of the exercise. 
Researchers may assume that the core of the major conceptual under­
standings are common and that they are therefore only concerned with
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the interpretations at the margin, or they may simply assume a shared 
sense of meaning about common concepts. In addition, during the 
course of the interviews they may find themselves subconsciously more 
comfortable when respondents refer to terms or concepts with which 
they are familiar and so provide reinforcement for these issues to be 
elaborated and concentrated upon, rather than those which appear to 
be disjunctive to a researcher's frame of reference.
Armstrong et al are well aware of the impact of linguistics in
qualitative research and draw attention to the likelihood that within
the field of industrial relations they are not neutral but biased,
and researchers may unwittingly perpetuate this in their interviews:
"Whilst .... there are linguistic resources available to workers, 
those available to managers perhaps predominate. After all, if 
the presuppositions of the dominant ideology favour the interests 
of capital and management, it is scarcely a matter for surprise 
that the same should be true of language." (1981:160).
However, if there is an explicit awareness of it there is much that
can be done to reduce linguistic distortion. Researchers can, for
example, use vague and general phrases and in return gain an
appreciation of the terms and understandings that the respondents
attach to them. In fact, one of the more important requirements of
a qualitative researcher in an interview is to be able to rapidly
discern at its outset the terminology and phrasing that the respondent
uses and feels comfortable with in exchange. This is not impossible
but it is certainly an indication of the much more demanding and
complex interpersonal skills required of qualitative researchers
rather than those using quantitative methods.
Even with an awareness of this requirement and some experience 
of using the appropriate techniques, it is still possible to have
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lapses. Towards the end of the research period I made arrangements 
to discuss with the Chairman of the NUPE branch and the portering shop 
steward a possible disciplinary problem with one of the porters.
During the course of the discussion, I stated, in what I imagined to 
be good empathetic style, that the porter was, "hypothetically 
putting two fingers up to management". I thought nothing more of this 
until two days later when the Head Porter explained to me that the 
NUPE shop steward had passed this comment on to the porter in question 
who had instantly rushed around to see the Deputy Head Porter, to deny 
that he had ever put two fingers up to a member of management and 
demanded to know who had made the accusation. Since the Deputy Head 
Porter had not been involved he had to contact the NUPE shop steward 
to find out how this reference had been made. The shop steward 
confirmed that he had told the porter that I had said that he had put 
two fingers up to management. He also explained that he had not told 
the porter that I had said he was doing this hypothetically, because 
the shop steward did not know what the word meant.
The objectives of the qualitative researcher, gained through this
great assortment of procedural sensitivities and interpersonal skills,
are distinguished particularly clearly by both Mangham and Blumer.
The first identifies that, "Only by close attention, by deep immersion
in his material, can the observer hope to apprehend the nature of
particular situational scripts." (1978:88). Blumer advocates a special
methodology that :
"lays heavy stress upon the need for insightfully 'feeling one's 
way inside the experience of the actor'. The student of human 
conduct, he contends, must get inside the actor's world and must 
see the world as the actor sees it, for the actor's behavior 
takes place on the basis of his/her own particular meanings. 
Through some form of sympathetic introspection, the student must
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take the standpoint of the acting unit (person or group) whose 
behavior he/she is studying and must attempt to use each actor's 
own categories in capturing that actor's world of meaning."
(Meltzer et al 1975:57,58).
Mangham's emphasis, in the context of the work of organisational
development consultants, is more practical:
"His behaviour should be such as to cast others into behaving 
'normally', performing their scripts with little regard for him. 
During interviews his altercastingand self-presentation should 
be such as to facilitate the client's exposition and 
exploration of issues. Such behaviour is facilitated by the 
skills of the consultant in displaying empathy, showing that he 
is able to come close to seeing things the way that the client 
sees them - showing, that is, that he can accurately take the role of 
the other, displaying overtly the mental processes of interpret­
ation and reflecting to the client what he takes the client to 
be saying." (1978:135).
Such sentiments are entirely 1audible but must be bound by two 
conditions. The first, widely acknowledged, is that there are 
practical limitations to the degree of assimilation that can be 
achieved between the researcher and researched, and the second is 
that the easy option of achieving close affiliation by dwelling only 
on the superficial must be avoided. Mangham recognises both of 
these:
"It is impossible to become completely identified with the 
perspective of particular social actors, but it is possible to 
seek to understand what features the actor takes into account 
in forming his action and, by interview and observation, to 
make some preliminary assessment of the nature of his previous 
dispositions and the likelihood that he will seek to perform 
certain parts rather than others." (p 88).
If obtaining understanding and assessment is to be feasible it 
will rarely be sufficient to take all the statements of a respondent 
at face value. They may conceal, for example, that the respondent 
has never previously considered the issue that they have been asked 
to respond to or that the genuine origin of an opinion or attitude
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is emotional rather than rational. The justification of opinion is
generally more revealing than the opinion itself and can furthermore
assist in verifying whether the opinions expressed are genuine or
facades for what the respondent perceives the researcher to expect or
which the respondent feels obliged to project as a consequence of
their position in the social network e.g. as a shop steward.
Qualitative research interviews therefore require an element of
probing and challenging but of course the process is as delicate as
glass-blowing. If too much effort is exerted, nothing will be
achieved. Respondents must not be made to feel inhibited because of
the fear that they will be required to justify anything they say, with
an intellectual rigour. Many attitudes are held with nothing to
substantiate them but their derivation and the motivating force they
provide can still be of enormous significance. The balance to be
obtained, as Mangham (1978:137) describes it, is that:
"the interventionists must employ a judicious mix of confronting 
and supporting behaviour. Too much confrontation, too sharp an 
encounter with threatening material, may bring about a retreat; 
too much support may lead to a cosy collusion to avoid any 
meaningful exploration.".
Surprisingly perhaps, the combination of undertaking qualitative 
research and as an internal researcher meant that this element of 
tension was probably the greatest source of creativity in the whole 
research process. The special characteristics of acting as an 
internal researcher will be discussed in further detail but it is 
worth noting here that "judicious" challenging did not renew the 
management/representative divide sometimes evident in the day-to-day 
industrial relations, as many might have anticipated, but in fact 
encouraged the representatives to be honest and frank since they 
knew that posturing would be recognised and confronted, and it also
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mean t that the representatives could not conceal themselves behind 
organisational stances or slogans.
Nevertheless, qualitative research requires its practitioners to 
make personal judgements at all stages of the research process and to 
exercise highly sophisticated interpersonal skills and yet it appears 
impossible to establish by what criteria and with what degree of skill 
these tasks were undertaken. With this ignorance it appears 
impossible to know with what confidence one can regard the research 
outcome. In fact, although the validity of qualitative methods is 
still not established whole-heartedly, there are a number of ready 
defences.
To begin with, as some of the previous discussion has noted, the 
validity of much, allegedly methodologically superior, quantitative 
work is itself highly dubious. To suggest that the study of human 
behaviour is amenable to scientific methods is to assert sweeping a 
priori assumptions about human behaviour, both generally and in the 
context of the study, most of which are never made explicit. These 
assumptions may therefore not be assessed but if unreasonable they 
may substantially invalidate the subsequent data. This in turn means 
that the very criteria by which quantitative research assesses its 
validity may be invalid. This is because they are grounded in an 
abstract research design rather than the subjects under enquiry. 
Recognition has also already been made the way in which deriving and 
marshalling data by quantitative techniques can substantially distort 
it and introduce the researcher's subjectivity. Neither, as most 
quantitative techniques seem to assume, can the relationship between 
the researcher and subject and its consequences be eliminated from
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the study. If it maintains the discipline of its internal logic its 
ambitions are extremely limited. It can only produce a series of 
statements about how individual 'variables ' react in certain very 
specific circumstances. The most it can suggest is that the same 
reaction of the variable will be achieved under the same circumstances, 
but even replicated 'experiments' have often failed to duplicate the 
findings of previous, supposedly identical studies. Finally, more 
broadly based researchers who do not feel absolutely bound by the 
logic of the scientific method are prepared to admit that the most 
fertile data and that which provides the greatest insight is obtained 
by qualitative methods.
Conversely, some qualitative researchers have felt obliged to 
validate their studies in almost quantitative terms when in fact it 
is quite reasonable to propose that the validity of qualitative data 
may be legitimately assessed by other criteria. The contentious 
concerns are exactly what criteria these should be and what methods 
are available by which a particular study can be assessed against 
them. A number of proposed criteria have already been referred to.
In general terms, they are inevitably vague but central considerations 
would be whether the research participants confirm the accuracy of the 
research data; whether the researcher's subjectivity was used 
creatively and enlighteningly or in a way that produced restriction 
and distortion; whether the researcher's method and skills elicited 
the highest quality research data in the particular research context; 
whether the data manages to convey a sense that what was being studied 
was 'real life', in all its vitality, inconsistency, peculiarities, 
uneventfulness and so on; whether the researcher is able to obtain 
an analysis of the data presented from which he can derive an
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explanation of it that is at least reasonably consistent with the 
data; and whether the data and researcher have been able to generate 
insight that may be of value to researchers and practitioners in 
other contexts.
Such criteria are obviously not capable of 'objective* or
quantitative assessment and much will therefore depend upon the
subjective orientation towards the research of those wishing to
evaluate it. They will need to exercise their own judgement to decide,
for example, whether there is adequate data, whether it conveys a
'feel' of the organisation being studied and whether the insights are
of more extensive value. This assessment is considerably facilitated,
however, if the evaluator has some confirmation of the rigour with
which the method was employed. The quality of the data may speak for
itself but otherwise, or in support, it is important that those not
party to the research process are informed of the researcher's
propensities, have an indication of the level of skills displayed and
are aware of the major judgements that were made and the reasons for
them. This is emphasised by Berg (1979:265):
"The task of the researcher is therefore not to show whether his 
findings, models or hypotheses are right or wrong, but to convince 
the reader that they are reasonable conclusions, drawn from a 
material, which has been processed by methods which can be 
explicitly described.".
But ultimately one has to recognise that in research into social
interaction one can do no more than sub-optimise the validity. As
Batstone et al (1977:17) recognise:
"Our understanding is far from total and in some cases we cannot 
provide convincing proof of our statements. But absolute proof 
is an impossibility in sociology. We can claim, however, that 
we gave the actors the courtesy of letting them explain things 
in their own terms, and seriously attempted to understand both
their statements and their actions........From what they taught
us we have attempted to develop a more general analysis. The
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result does not totally explain the situations we observed - far 
from it.".
The existence of inadequacies and vagueness such as these authors
describe, and indeed even the presentation of research data that
requires these limitations to be declared, would be anathema to
quantitative researchers, but it is possible to maintain a healthy
sense of proportion. In reporting the retirement of Mr Michael Posner
as the Chairman of the Social Science Research Council, Hennessy
(1983) reports that:
"He likes to tell a morality story, the authorship of which he 
attributed to Sir Hermann Bondi, the former chief scientific 
advisor at the Ministry of Defence.
*If God applied for a research grant he would be turned down on 
the grounds that his last public work was a long time ago, that 
it was in book form rather than a refereed journal, and the 
persistent attempts to replicate his results had been disappointed.*"
The Internal Researcher
"Academic research in fields such as management or industrial 
relations is often deprecated as having little practical relevance 
to real world problems. The Social Science Research Council 
(SSRC) is well aware of such criticism, and runs a scheme which 
throws back a challenge to industry. Their 'Open Door* scheme 
finances research into topics selected by practising managers, 
professional institutes and trade unionists.".
This report in Personnel Management (February 1982:21) continues:
"The idea of the scheme is to involve potential users of research 
at a stage when research proposals are formulated. In this way, 
research projects acquire more immediate relevance to their needs 
and concerns. Researchers, for their part, are given unusually 
good access to data and are brought into a closer and more 
fruitful relationship with the world of practice.".
Mangham sympathises but anticipates a problem:
"Ian Mangham advocates as the way ahead a form of collaborative 
action research which might enhance mutual learning and provide 
benefits to organisations and to organisational psychology. 
However he asserts pessimistically that 'few of those who purport 
to be organisational psychologists have anything to return for 
access and few of those who have something to offer have
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interests in the development of organisational psychology'." 
(Guest 1982).
Warr and Wall (1975:preface) identify the same symptoms but recommend
a different remedy:
"Our own professional activities as research and development 
workers in applied psychology makes quite clear the difficulties 
of bridging the gap between theory and practice. The day-to-day 
requirements of meeting production targets, avoiding backlogs or 
reducing expenditure are very pressing. So too are the 
traditional ways of thinking and feeling which characterise 
managements, trade unions and individual employees. These 
various factors are typically in multiple conflict with each 
other, leading to immense difficulties in the introduction of 
change. The research worker needs to become more involved in 
these ongoing practical problems if his impact is to be 
widespread. This means a greater emphasis on what has been 
called 'action research', extending sometimes into development 
studies whose emphasis on innovation perhaps justifies the 
label 'research action'.".
But of course there is an alternative, or rather a complimentary 
arrangement, that can also bridge the gap. Those involved in the 
"ongoing practical problems" can become more involved in research and 
this raises the possibility that the practitioner who becomes involved 
in research can arrive at the same point on the theory/practice 
spectrum as the researcher who becomes involved in action. Their 
origins, however, will still substantially differentiate their 
effectiveness. The external researcher may be able to provide 
greater innovative thought and stimulus for change but the level of 
acceptance and commitment to maintaining the change may rapidly 
diminish once he disassociates himself from the organisation. The 
internal researcher may experience the very opposite difficulty, 
which is that the consequences of his research may be theoretically 
more restricted but possibly more realistic and therefore attractive 
to others within the organisation and this in turn may generate 
expectations that the researcher personally may have to accommodate
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because of his continued presence in the organisation.
Elden (1977:2,3) suggests that participation experiments in
Norway did not succeed as anticipated because of the restricted
effectiveness of external agents:
"Researchers ware heavily involved in diagnosing problems, 
suggesting alternatives, running interference, and in generally 
managing the change process in the early experiments. The theory 
is that such a heavy involvement by outside "experts' may have 
impeded the people themselves from taking initiative and 
responsibility and learning how to manage the change process 
itself independent of the researchers and other specialists. 
Ironically, the very role of researcher as 'expert-in-charge- 
of-change' may have contributed both to the success of the 
demonstration phase and to the failure of the diffusion phase.".
Of course, another crucial handicap of external research is that it
has no chance of being of value unless the researchers are able to
effectively sensitise themselves to the research context. Armstrong
et al describe how they overcame this by extensive and taxing periods
of observation and explain that (1981:21):
"This approach was adopted partly to overcome the 'distance' 
experienced in some casework when the researcher attends inter­
mittently and risks achieving a status no higher than that of 
occasional visitor in the eyes of those he is studying.".
As one who had the power to initiate change and who was at the 
core of industrial relations activity my research was unlikely to 
attract these deficiencies. Because I was part of the research 
context and had a central role within it I had an immediate awareness 
of much about the organisation that had an important bearing upon the 
research and yet would barely come to the attention of an external 
researcher. Not only did I know what the formal relationships were, 
such as the organisational structure, nature of different staff 
duties, and formal inter-relationships, but also I had an awareness of 
the. identity and nature of the relationships and processes that were
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significant in practice, an understanding of the place of the 
informal in the organisation and a sensitivity to, and knowledge of, 
some specific organisational problems.
This does not mean that no element of 'distance* was experienced, 
Even as an internal researcher I sometimes found it difficult to be 
aware of how different departments ticked and to demonstrate a 
sensitivity for the culture of a particular workgroup. There were 
also times when preconceived images of the organisation of other 
departments were applied inappropriately. For example, in the inter­
view with one of the ASTMS stewards I referred to 'supervisors' 
several times and while the concept may be identifiable in the 
pathology laboratories, the word itself is never used. I was still 
employing the language and organisational elements which had occurred 
in the previous interviews, which were all with ancillary shop 
stewards. Nevertheless, the example demonstrates that, if even as an 
internal researcher I found it difficult to project an understanding 
of the organisation of the work-group, it must be an overwhelmingly 
difficult task for an independent researcher to demonstrate organisa­
tional empathy, with correspondingly far more certain and significant 
effects upon the quantity, quality and accuracy of the. data.
There can also be no doubt that as an internal researcher I was 
far less gullible. On numerous occasions, the shop stewards and 
staff representatives made statements that I knew were completely 
inconsistent with the people involved or with incidents that had 
occurred, and not only additional data but data of a much richer 
quality was obtained by articulating this awareness and, in an 
unthreatening manner, compelling the representatives to analyse the
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inconsistency. This was particularly pertinent when it was obvious 
to me that the representatives were projecting an image, giving a 
presentation, of their reasonableness, which management abused to 
produce industrial relations problems. Good-natured probing of such 
statements confirmed that there were indeed occasions when the 
representatives and staff genuinely perceived management to be 
unreasonable but also revealed far more of the reality of the 
attitudes and positions presented in industrial relations.
A hint of the much more profound insight available to an internal
as opposed to an external researcher is possible in the Llandough
research context because, by coincidence, during the course of the
thesis research a postgraduate student from a university Department
of Industrial Relations and Management Studies undertook a project in
the catering department as part of his Ph.D. research. He gave the
hospital a copy of his report (Rose 1981). After describing his first
impressions of the kitchen he asks:
"How was I, as a student of industrial relations, to make any 
sense of all this, let alone discover anything to do with my 
real interest? I was there to study the managerial control of 
work and the way in which employees respond to this, but first 
I had to understand what was going on in front of me.".
The bulk of the report conveys what he learned about the daily
activity cycle of the kitchens in Llandough and another hospital,
but then he comments :
"From an industrial relations point of view both kitchens were 
on the whole uneventful. Strikes and other forms of industrial 
action, such as working to rule, are virtually unknown.".
He refers to the national organisation of negotiation of terms and
conditions of service and his assessment is that:
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"At the level of the catering department the residue of employee 
relations involves the maintenance of certain standards of work 
and discipline.".
He reports that:
"Despite the pressure of having to work to a schedule, often 
understaffed, relations in the kitchens are generally harmonious. 
Maintaining a good working atmosphere depends upon the actions 
of supervisors as well as the general working conditions.
However it must be said that a situation of apparent day-to-day 
co-operation does not automatically imply positive satisfaction 
and should never be taken for granted. It is always possible 
that a kind of passive acceptance exists as expressed in comments 
about work like, 'There are worse places'.".
He concludes that :
"Overall the staff in both kitchens could be described as non­
militant. Some of the reasons for this are probably to be found 
in the general level of satisfaction with the money and conditions 
of work. It may also be that, as was suggested in one kitchen, 
they were non-militant from the top down. Nevertheless, as I 
have suggested, such a state of affairs should never be seen as 
automatic and taken for granted.".
This account contrasts starkly with that obtained in the thesis
research interview with the catering shop steward. She reveals a
department with strong tensions among its staff, and particularly with
those who are regarded as not pulling their weight, with numerous
niggles that have apparently no opportunity to be heard let alone
resolved, with serious criticisms of and differences with the NUPE
branch officers, and with some of the more obvious examples of the way
in which staff can informally usurp the managerial control of work,
which was, after all, Rose's main research concern.
The claim that internal researchers can obtain the most incisive 
data may be countered by allegations that it is also much more likely 
to be affected by the researcher's subjectivity and to inhibit the 
research participants, with whom the researcher has a non-research 
relationship which may be part of the subject of the research. Hyman
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(1977:preface) is critical about the necessity to have regard for 
the influence of subjectivity:
"It is virtually obligatory for any academic writing on an
acutely controversial topic to make ritual genuflections in the
direction of objectivity. I am sceptical of such moralistics.".
Recognition has already been made that an element of subjectivity is 
almost inevitable in any research process, whether qualitative or 
quantitative, and Hyman's concern is simply that it should be made 
explicit.
As an internal researcher, this is largely self-evident but 
every effort has also been made in the preparation of the thesis to 
be scrupulously honest and open about the preconceptions, most of 
which were naturally managerially-orientated, that I have brought to 
the study. I quickly became conscious, for example, that when 
refering to 'strength' in workplace industrial relations I used the 
word 'authority' if it was managerial and 'power' if it was 
associated with a trade union. This suggested a very obvious 
subjective discrimination. Authority has connotations of 'rightness', 
tradition, accepted superiority, and obedience based upon respect 
and not on strength, whereas power suggests aggression, self-interest 
and the success of force over reason. This in turn implied that I 
possessed my own sense of what constituted the 'natural order'.
Some researchers might regard such an admission as totally debili­
tating when in fact it more resembles a research cathartic. All 
researchers possess a set of meanings that they associate with words, 
which may or may not be shared by those with which they are under­
taking the research, but only rarely is this recognised so therefore 
only rarely can it be accommodated in the evaluation of the data.
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Of course I had my own linguistic traits and meanings and my 
own understandings of order in the world but what was important was 
that I recognised that these should not interfere with the very 
same features that I wished to elicit from the research respondents. 
Some of the methods for doing this have already been described and 
one of the most important ones was to use terms that were as vague 
and general as possible. Even more crucial, however, was that when 
potentially contentious words such as 'authority* and 'power' were 
used, either by myself or a respondent, I was conscious of the 
obligation to allow the expression of the respondent's own under­
standings of such terms, and there were occasions when the use of 
such words was an important trigger to the elaboration of respondents' 
attitudes.
Hyman (1977:159) believes that most industrial relations
researchers have a management bias anyway. He states that :
"The intimate attachment between academic research and managerial 
preoccupations receives powerful ideological and practical 
support. The use of academic techniques and theories to 
facilitate managerial manipulation is sanctified by such 
descriptions as 'a fruitful exercise in applied social science'.",
Bate and Mangham (1981:208) admit to colluding with the senior
managers who facilitated their study but deny that they were
managerially orientated. They are completely open that they did
possess orientations and that they worked to advance the interests of
some groups to the disadvantage of others, but the groups they
sympathised with varied during the course of their study, from the
workers to the supervisors and then to both vis-a-vis management.
In my own mind, the disadvantages of undertaking internal 
research were heavily outweighed by the advantages and even if it
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had been possible an important creative element would have been lost 
if I had attempted to shed ny managerial affiliations. In practice, 
it was taken as a compliment if during the course of a frank and 
revealing discussion about their perceptions of industrial relations, 
a staff representative made explicit reference to my function as an 
administrator. A simple example arose in response to a question that 
was put to a NUPE housekeeping shop steward.
Question: Why do you think there should be staff representatives who
. . question what managers do?
Mary: Oh well, lots of these people who are managers have never
worked on a floor as such, have they? They don't know about - 
Question: What difference does that make?
Mary: Oh come off it. I mean, you've never been a housekeeper then,
have you?
But although it was inevitable and fruitful that as a researcher 
I was still perceived as a manager and that when tape recording, for 
example, informal negotiations I was accepted as a manager also 
undertaking research, a sensitivity was essential to ensure that a 
distinction was maintained between when it was appropriate and condoned 
that the two roles were blurred and the occasions when the two had to 
be kept apart, for fear that otherwise the entire research would be 
jeopardised. This may sound a grave responsibility requiring the 
exercise of subtlety and skill, but it was not actually a problem 
because I was able to abide by a cardinal research rule, which was 
that none of the information received during the research interviews 
was disclosed to anybody else or seen to make any difference to the 
current course of day-to-day industrial relations. I was also 
apparently able to instill a confidence in the representatives that
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I was not using the research process as a management tool.
The obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the interviews 
was a great frustration on occasions, particularly when representatives 
expressed dissatisfaction about issues which I knew that I could 
resolve. These largely had to go unheeded, since I did not wish the 
respondents to begin worrying that they might be talking about the 
’wrong* issues, but on one occasion I explicitly agreed with a NUPE 
shop steward the practical action that I would take in response to the 
points he had made, but only on the understanding that it was with his 
consent that I was stepping outside the research context with inform­
ation received within it, and this worked successfully.
As an internal researcher it was possible that ray managerial 
standing could have inhibited the flow of data from the representatives, 
but in fact a remarkable degree of candour was forthcoming. They 
clearly appreciated that the constraint of confidentiality would be 
maintained, as the following exchanges illustrate. A NALGO represent­
ative discussing the union’s response to management-initiated changes 
in hours of work commented that:
"We’ve only got two possibilities, you see, really and - I 
wouldn’t say this to you usually - I wouldn’t say it if you were 
management. I wouldn’t take this tack, you see. But we’ve got 
to show from the regulations .... "
and he continued by describing the tactics that he thought his union
ought to adopt. Similarly, one of the NUPE shop stewards was talking
about why some of her members had recently left to join COHSE and in
particular why they had refused to obey the last strike call, when
she suddenly stated, "I don’t know if I should be talking about this
really, but no, I did ask over that and they wouldn’t give an answer."
and she continued her analysis of her membership problem.
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This second example also touches upon another significant 
indication of the honesty of the research exchanges, which is the 
degree to which the representatives were prepared to voice criticism 
of the trade union organisations. Several of the representatives 
actually expressed quite strong criticisms of their members and/or 
other shop stewards and a particular example was provided by a NUPE 
shop steward who was quite open during at least two points in the 
interview that she would not take a problem to another, specific branch 
officer because she thought that he was incompetent. Another 
indication of the licence Wiich the condition of confidentiality 
appears to have given the representatives was the vivid contrast 
between the representatives’ energetic and enthusiastic fluency during 
the interviews and the embarrassing reticence of the great majority of 
them at the feedback meeting and the belligerence of one of them. The 
feedback meeting will be discussed in greater detail but it is 
pertinent at this stage to note that one explanation for this 
difference was that the representatives did not wish to be associated 
with information or opinions in a group that they had volunteered 
individually in interviews.
Undertaking research internally generates another source of
emphasis which is different from that in research by external agents,
namely that the expectations of those in the research may be altered
and heightened. The outcome of the research becomes another influence
upon the process of day-to-day industrial relations and Gorz (1970),
referred to in Partridge (1976:13), demonstrates how forceful the
effect of this can be, even with research undertaken by external
agents. He drew attention to:
"the behaviour of the ’satisfied’ Luton workers who went on strike 
when a copy of Godthorpe et al’s analysis attached to a statement 
of the company’s profits was circulated amongst them.".
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At the inception of the research process and during its first phases 
I was willing to accept the responsibility of adjusting to altered 
expectations, as an act of faith. Although I was a manager, and 
the respondents were aware of it, I was also genuinely anxious to 
enhance staff-management relationships, and I believed that this was 
understood by the representatives, so I could not anticipate proposals 
would be forthcoming with which I could disagree. In any event, ray 
commitment was greater as a manager than as a researcher, as the 
staff were also aware, and consequently ultimately any expectations 
I could not willingly accommodate would become subject to the usual 
negotiating processes, in which I would have to naturally protect the 
management interest.
What was considerably more difficult to handle, and actually 
modified the research process, was the relationship between the 
research process and the conduct of industrial relations that was 
continuing outside it. One of the orthodoxies of qualitative 
validation is that respondents should be provided with a resume of 
the data obtained from their interviews and it was my intention to do 
this, but shortly after the shop steward and staff representative 
interviews were completed a national pay award dispute began and 
relationships became strained. I noted at the time that it was best 
not to give the representatives their summaries until the research 
process had been completed because some of the conclusions might have 
been unpalatable to them and because of the industrial action 
relationships were particularly valuable and sensitive. This brought 
an awareness that co-operation with the research could at any stage 
be withdrawn as a consequence of a deterioration in the relationships 
relating to the normal workplace issues, or even as a novel form of
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sanction during the pay dispute, and that also this was not a problem 
that an outside researcher might have to cope with, but was peculiar 
to a mangerially-orientated internal researcher who had to be 
sensitive to the work environment and pace and shape the research 
accordingly.
In summary, the purpose of striving to achieve research within
one’s own organisation was to obtain the uniquely rewarding outcomes
of what Friedlander has termed "an inclusive research process"
(1968:377), which can be characterised as follows:
"1. Communication An inclusive research process is fostered by 
open and honest communication of relevant information between 
researcher and subject. Each is interested in informing as well
as being informed 2. Attitudes Toward One Another An
inclusive research process is aided by a trusting, friendly
attitude and a willingness to respond helpfully to the other’s
needs and requests........3. Concern With Issues An inclusive
research process is fostered by definition of the conflicting 
interests between research and subject as a mutual problem to be
solved by collaborative effort. It is facilitated by the
recognition of the legitimacy of each other’s interest and of the 
need for a solution which is responsive to the needs of both 
researcher and subject.".
In this last paragraph is an encapsulation of the research intent.
Differences of interest were not to be ignored or minimised but were
to be central to the study, examined in a co-operative endeavour by
representatives of the different interests.
4. Literature Review Commenced
Equipped with some practical and theoretical problems, an 
exceptionally broad research intent and an attraction to qualitative 
and internal research, the research process continued by the 
initiation of a review of relevant literature and attendance at 
methodological seminars. This may sound mechanical and uneventful
-112-
but in reality two major mistakes were made. The first was that the
literature scan reflected the original research intent - it was too
wide and too vague. However, it is doubtful whether any research
could be criticised for possessing foundations in a literature
survey that was excessively rich and varied. The error was that
within the time constraint of the thesis period and the normal
commitments at work and at home, obtaining such a foundation would
not have been a consciously-derived priority. The other mistake was
far more fundamental and might have been avoided if an item in The
Times (29.4.85.) about postgraduate research had appeared when I
commenced my own study. It advised that:
"The researcher also needs to acquire one or two skills that the 
undergraduates can happily do without: learning to type, possibly
mastering the skills of word processing, learning to keep records 
in order, especially learning to use to best advantage that 
Pandora’s Box of every researcher, the filing card system.
Research at its least glamorous is three years spent filling out 
little cards, one per book, per article, or even per idea.’’.
Little did I know when I decided to use a filing card system that I
was merely rediscovering the wheel but a far more serious consequence
was the fact that I had already surveyed over fifty references and had
stored the information in book form. This subsequently rendered the
information I had obtained of very restricted value because once I
had begun to structure the thesis in filing card form it was not
feasible to devote further considerable time and effort to
transferring information from one store to another. The works
reviewed included those by Hespe and Wall (1976), Emery and Thorsrud
(1969), Sadler (1970), Blumberg (1968), Richbell (1976), Clegg
(1955, 1963), Guest and Knight (1979) and Pateman (1970), but none
of these references are used in the thesis. Nevertheless, they
-113-
obviously all contributed to the understanding that was essential in 
order to undertake the research and which guided the analysis of the 
data.
In a slight departure from normal research methods I decided 
from the outset that the study should reflect the dynamism of industrial 
relations and some of the external influences upon managers and staff. 
Accordingly, I was keen that the literature survey should accommodate 
relevant items in the professional management press and in national 
and local newspapers.
5. Research Design Refined
An increasing awareness of the reality of the research process 
and the march of time led to the first modification of the research 
intent. The somewhat nebulous notions of undertaking research in Mid 
and West Glamorgan were dropped and even within South Glamorgan I 
decided that rather than assess participation in several hospitals I 
would only compare Llandough with another, similar general hospital.
I still proposed, therefore, to base my research upon the management, 
staff and their representatives within the hospitals and upon the 
senior management of the health authority and full time trade union 
officials. I would largely rely upon interviews but wished this 
method to be supplemented by tape recordings of industrial relations 
interactions, by feedback analysis and by the use of diaries.
Anecdotes or intuition may be of little intrinsic analytic value 
but the use of practical examples in the research thesis could invaluably 
indicate a ’feel* for the industrial relations context. It was hoped
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that this would become particularly apparent in the diary exercises. 
Previous studies that have incorporated this technique (e.g. Partridge 
1977, Marchington 1980) appear to have simply sought a factual record 
of the events in which the research participants were involved. My 
aim was to obtain similar records, but ones which were enhanced by 
the participants’ observations about the events. I began to complete 
ny own diary on this basis and I subsequently approached representatives 
of the trade unions and staff organisations to do the same and even 
offered a small financial incentive to the NUPE branch secretary, who 
had by then retired from work as a senior porter.
6. Access Negotiated
My Sector Administrator, the Area Operational Services Administrator 
and the Area Personnel Officer all very willingly gave their agreement 
to my research proposals and although the Area Administrator was 
supportive he highlighted a number of important issues. He was worried 
about the subjectivity involved; pleased about the involvement of the 
other hospital; expressed his doubt about the value to the health 
authority of previous research but felt that mine was of more promising 
worth; raised the issues of the problems of shop stewards in manage­
ment positions and of management attitudes to higher decision-making 
processes outside the hospital; emphasised the need to set a target 
date since otherwise the study would be over-extended; tactfully 
expressed his unwillingness to receive feedback directly during the 
study and emphasised the importance of feeding information "up the 
line"; and he believed that the lack of information about how staff 
react to decisions was a particularly interesting area of enquiry on 
its own.
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Infonnal approaches were made to some of the trade union repres­
entatives in the hospital and they subsequently all agreed in principle 
at a meeting that they would co-operate with the research. The NUPE 
and NALGO representatives agreed to keep diaries. The only major 
problem of access came when the NUPE officers presented and supported 
my proposals at the NUPE branch Annual General Meeting. The members 
were apparently particularly suspicious that information I would 
receive in the course of my interviews might be used against them, 
although I had assured the officials that this would not be the case. 
There was evidently uproar when mention was made of tape recording and 
eventually one of the officers had to suggest that a vote was taken, 
which went heavily against me among the thirty or so people present. 
When this was conveyed to me I suggested that it might help if I 
attended the next meeting of the branch and the officers agreed. On 
this occasion there was a debate about whether I should be allowed to 
attend but eventually I was invited to join them. I presented my 
proposals and there was considerable discussion about them, with strong 
suspicions still evident among a number of the members present. I was 
asked to leave while they decided whether or not my research should 
be allowed to proceed. At the end of the meeting I was informed 
that consent had been given and from then on no difficulties at all 
were experience with respondents or participating organisations.
7. Data Collection
The tape recording of day-to-day industrial relations quickly 
became established as relatively routine and appeared to present no 
impediment to normal interaction. For the first phase of the interview 
programme I decided to meet with each of the shop stewards and staff
-116-
representatives in the hospital. Where possible, the interviews took 
place in a location within the respondent’s department, where they 
felt comfortable, would not be interrupted and believed that confid­
entiality would be maintained. Where this was not possible a small 
sitting room was used which was in a very quiet area, although central 
to the hospital. The interviews lasted between one and two hours 
and were completed in one session, except for a protracted discussion 
with one respondent which took place over two sessions.
8. Research Design Revised
The practical implications of research rapidly became apparent. 
The activity of arranging the interviews, completing them, typing 
them, identifying the more important data, and collating it was time- 
consuming to a degree that was out of all proportion to that which 
had been anticipated and consequently much more of the original 
research intent had to be jettisoned. Plans to study the other 
hospital were deleted completely, as were interviews with the heads 
of department in my own hospital. In essence, I reached the stage 
where just completing the representative’s interviews, interviewing 
a cross-section of the hospital staff and feeding back the data to 
the interviewees, heads of departments and senior managers was the 
most optimistic that I could achieve. In terms of objectives this 
meant that I lost the ability to obtain an indication of the influence 
of my involvement in the hospital upon the data and to assess 
managerial responses to participation.
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9. Data Analysis
The phase of processing and evaluating data ran largely concurr­
ently with the interview phase and reference has already been made to 
some of the stages involved. By this time, the information from the 
literature survey was being stored on filing cards and the interviews 
and tape recorded industrial relations interactions were being typed 
in full before being evaluated and the most important data transferred 
onto cards. Categories within the research data quickly became 
readily discernible and these created a structure for the filing card 
system. Unfortunately, the staff representatives did not maintain 
diaries and therefore no data was available from this source.
I completed a diary for approximately a year but ironically I did 
so with a degree of conscientiousness that was ultimately self- 
defeating, for a quite unpredictable reason. The major stimulus to 
the research enquiry was a genuine anxiety about how to improve 
workplace industrial relations and to engender change without destruct­
ive conflict. Completing a diary, I found, meant that I was dwelling 
even more in my own time upon the industrial relations difficulties 
that I was trying to accommodate and it became an activity that 
sustained and generated high levels of introspection, anxiety and 
uncertainty and this became counter-productive in the exercise of my 
managerial function. The penultimate entry largely refers to a 
conversation with two NUPE shop stewards. One (Paul) had previously 
been exceptionally militant and resistant to change but had recently 
agreed to a proposal of mine. The other steward (Sam) had been more 
moderate but during the course of the conversation he refused to 
accept the proposal that I had discussed and agreed with the other.
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Writing that evening I described the day’s events and noted;
"Busy for the rest of the afternoon, but in the evening once 
again depressed about the porters, and tempted to take hard line 
Realise I must exercise patience and particularly conscious that 
my industrial relations management will be interview subject at 
Reorganisation. Clearly Paul is being kept in check and much 
more answerable, but this time it has rebounded against me. 
Pessimistic about Monday’s meeting of the porters. May see Paul 
and/or Sam tomorrow.".
10. Further Research Modification
The scope of the research was substantially diminished by this
stage and so were the research objectives, although this was not
entirely due to the same overwhelming pragmatic pressures. The review
of the literature and the initial interviews with the representatives
began to isolate industrial relations characteristics that were
intimately associated with participation but had apparently received
inadequate attention in the past in this context. This concentration
of the research endeavour was largely influenced by the desire to
relate it to the understanding, if not the resolution, of the very
real industrial relations difficulties being experienced at the same
time. As Mangham (1978:136) observes:
"In the process of collecting these data, but more particularly 
in the process of sifting, the interventionist’s interpretations 
become important features. The data are organized, are structured, 
and are put in a form which reflect the values and ideas the 
interventionist brings to the situation. It is impossible to 
make a neutral presentation; the interventionist has attended 
to certain features of the interaction and has ignored others.
His predispositions have entered into the review and coloured 
it.".
The emphasis I was bringing to bear was that described by Brannen in 
his account of work undertaken on behalf of the Department of 
Employment (1981). The Department wished to pursue two research
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approaches, the second of which:
"would involve more detailed analysis of the processes of inter­
action between the parties to collective employment relationships 
both within formal procedures and more generally, with a view to 
understanding how they come to be as they are, how they operate, 
how the parties themselves judge their operation, and what the 
outcomes are." (p 78).
Brannen comments that another interest of the Department is further
research:
"on the relationship between participation and collective 
bargaining and the experiences of parties seeking to introduce 
new participative systems in areas of high trade union density;".
The progress of my own research was very similar to that
described by Armstrong et al in the preface to the report of their
study (1981:9), which:
"originated in an interest in ’custom and practice’ (C and P) as 
both a source and a form of workplace industrial relations rules. 
Our initial intention was to explore this concept through in- 
depth observational studies in three locations. As our research 
progressed, however, it became clear that this formed a somewhat 
limited element of the legitimising arguments found in the 
interplay between workers and managers in the three factories, 
and consequently the scope of the research was broadened into a 
fuller examination of workers’ and managers’ notions of 
legitimacy which seemed to us to be central to the process of 
workplace rule making. C and P was only one element of this, 
and by no means the dominant one.".
My interest in participation was comparable to these authors’ interest
in custom and practice and in the same way I centred upon the nature
of staff and management legitimacy, which I translated into the
practical manifestations of the exercise of managerial authority and
trade union initiative. These two issues combined in a concern to
understand how and why issues become negotiable.
This was both directly relevant to the industrial relations 
context of the study and an area apparently in need of further 
theoretical development. Armstrong et al contend, for example, that
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(1981:35), "it is surely common that the impulse to campaign for rule
changes springs from a spontaneous sense and injustice" and
Partridge (1976:7) emphasises that:
"the focus of industrial relations has been on grievance 
resolution rather than on grievance formulation. The implication 
that the progress of a grievance may be studied without reference 
to the way it was generated, is that the process of generation is 
unimportant to the process of resolving that grievance. This 
assumption has neither been made explicit or defended in the 
literature.".
One means of assessing the subjects that should be part of a particip­
ative system is to study the issues which give rise to a sense of 
grievance.
The emergence of these key issues influenced the way the research 
was organised, and suggested further development. When the interviews 
with the shop stewards and staff organisation representatives began, 
the strategy was that they should be as informal and unstructured as 
possible, allowing their characters to be developed by the respondents, 
This strategy was maintained throughout the first interviewing phase 
but as it progressed an awareness of the way in which key issues were 
detaching themselves from the general discussion led to the formation 
of a minimum core to the interviews, to ensure that the key issues 
were considered in each of them. It was also suggested that there 
would be advantages in the second interview phase, the one with the 
staff themselves, in developing the core into a much more structured 
interview format that would concentrate upon the ideas that needed to 
be examined in depth, and that it might even be helpful to design a 
questionnaire on the same basis. There were definitely advantages 
to this, since it would make the research process more ’efficient* 
and it would help to achieve some consistency within the data.
However, this would require other interesting issues that had been
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raised to be abandoned, would create the risk of disassociating my 
data from the general industrial relations context in a way that it 
was one of my prime objectives to avoid, and would create the 
potential for the quality of the data to be considerably diminished 
because of the possibility of greatly increased pressure upon the 
respondents in the interviews.
But the very fact that I was considering how to approach research 
activity involving staff themselves is another indication of the 
dynamism in the research design. One of the issues I had discussed 
with the staff representatives as a group after their interviews was 
that time constraints were unlikely to make this possible and it was 
only as a result of their response that I endeavoured to meet my 
original commitment.
Heller (1969) has enthusiastically reported the value of group 
feedback analysis and it has already been noted that a number of 
writers view this mechanism to be one of the most crucial methods of 
validating qualititive research. An attempt was made to enable the 
shop stewards and representatives to respond to the data but it 
achieved only moderate success. With hindsight, it is possible to 
suggest that it is erroneous to try to both validate previous data and 
generate new data and it may also be unrealistic to seek the validation 
of interpretation through the perceptions of the research respondents.
Much of the feedback was received in virtual silence. I began 
by explaining the procedure I was using and the way in which I was 
processing the data I obtained, stressing that I felt that it was 
important they should have some idea of the information I had received
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and the proposals for future stages of the research. An explanation 
was provided about why two new shop stewards had not been interviewed 
and an assurance given that they would be included, but it subsequently 
proved impossible to match the interviewing process to the changes in 
staff representation. In a manner which I attempted to ensure was not 
academic, I briefly described the issues which had become central to 
the research and then stated that I wished not only to let them know 
what I had learnt but that, "I also want to make sure I am accurate 
in picking up what you have said, so if you want to disagree or if I 
miss anything out please let me know." and paused, but no response was 
received. Some interest was shown when one of the representatives 
referred to the way in which redundancies had been declared and this 
led on to a very brief discussion about whether or not management 
cared for its staff. The form that participation should take and who 
should be involved in it provoked two of the representatives to argue 
that trade union representation could provide the only means of 
participation.
But the most vigorous reaction came when I announced that lack 
of time would not allow me to interview other members of staff and that 
instead I was intending to interview a few supervisors. There was 
general consternation and the ensuing discussion is enlightening about 
the genuine desire of the representatives to encourage the research 
and the confidence they had that they had been able to present them­
selves accurately in their own interviews. One exchange was initiated 
by a NUPE shop steward :
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Colin: You're only interviewing us as union officials so therefore
obviously you're going to get a biased answer - answers to your 
questions. But by excluding the ordinary member - I mean you 
might ask them, 'Did you join the union because you wanted and 
you needed them or is it because unionism is within the hospital?' 
Those type of answers from them, I think, would paint a different 
picture altogether on what your thesis is about.
Meryl: Yes. Or does a lot depend on the steward? You know, his
character.
Colin: Exactly.
Graham: And you'd find out whether the ordinary member - whether he
really feels that his grievances, or his problems, are dealt 
with by the union.
Me: You want me to do some research for you? (Laughter from
representatives).
The force of their enthusiasm made me reconsider:
Me: What if I do thirty members of staff? (Several representatives
expressed approval).
Paul: I think it is warranted, sir.
Graham: If you do the ordinary staff it would be very useful for your ■
it's a bit one-sided now. Heavily biased, isn't it, really.
Me: Which way?
Four representatives unanimously: Trade unions.
Later I reiterated my intentions:
Me: All right. I'll reconsider interviewing the staff, but I think
thirty out of the number of people I am considering is not very
many.
Susan: Couldn't you take their names out of a hat?
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Me: Well I will do that. It will be entirely at random, but even so
thirty is nothing out of probably three or four hundred.
Susan: But I feel it’s better than nothing.
Several voices: Yes, that’s right.
Colin: I think you’re starting your thesis a certain degree up, instead
of at ground level. You know, in other words you should start off 
with the members of staff first of all to see why they want the 
union.
Graham: Yes, and to see whether they think that there's means other
than the union where they can communicate with management and 
management communicate with them.
Meryl: Yes.
Graham: Participation - where they can participate. They may be very
strong, or they may feel that - the only way they feel is their 
union, you know.
These conversations demonstrate that the representatives were 
enthusiastic and committed and that they exhibited no anxiety about 
the method of interviewing or the issues discussed. They reveal their 
candour about the research topics and the sincerity of their desire 
to obtain a 'factual' picture of staff attitudes to representation and 
participation. Their agreement about the bias of the research to date 
also shows an enormous amount of trust in my interpretation of their 
interviews, and must additionally demonstrate their satisfaction with 
the general tenor of their own interviews.
Thus the research process continued, albeit reluctantly, with the 
instigation of interviews with ordinary staff. It was hoped that 
approximately fifty staff could be interviewed, who would be drawn 
from all of the staff of the hospital, except doctors, nurses and
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works staff (who had no line relationship with the researcher), as 
listed in the hospital's establishment list. Great pains were taken 
to ensure that the respondents were chosen randomly yet properly 
reflected characteristics such as the wide diversity of occupational 
groups and the in-balance of full-time to part-time staff between the 
different occupational groups. Eventually, once the three administ­
rators, heads of departments and supervisors, and shop stewards and 
representatives of staff organisations were removed from the 
establishment list, the decision was made that the best way to derive 
the sample was to obtain the sum of the total number of hours worked 
and divide by fifty. This obtained a distance expressed in terms of 
hours worked to be used to separate the staff chosen from the list, 
with the first point within the range chosen by random sampling.
Most of the staff were interviewed in the same sitting room used 
for some of the representatives' interviews but not unexpectedly this 
second phase of interviewing was rather more difficult. Although 
arrangements had been made through heads of departments and an 
explanation given about what the interviews would be for, this had 
rarely been conveyed to the staff themselves. The area of the 
hospital where the interviews took place was unknown to many of the 
staff and this initially appeared to have an unsettling effect. Most 
significantly, and this is probably a research finding in itself, it 
became obvious that the individual members of staff were totally 
unaccustomed to articulating their attitudes to work and their 
opinions about workplace industrial relations. Each interview lasted 
for approximately one hour and was intended to concentrate upon the 
key issues that had been identified in the previous research, but the 
greater inhibition of the members of staff meant that most of the
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interviews were characterised by a first half in which the interviewee 
was allowed to relax and talk generally about their specific duties 
and relationships and a second half in which an attempt was made to 
move on imperceptibly from the respondent's concerns to those central 
to the research. This was successfully achieved in the great majority 
of the interviews.
11. Research Design Final Revision
Due to problems such as annual leave and sickness, it was not 
possible to interview the whole sample of fifty members of staff, but 
about forty-five interviews were undertaken within a period of a very 
small number of weeks. The result was what in modern parlance might 
be described as data overload. It was virtually impossible to 
undertake any of the research work, apart from the interviews them­
selves, during normal working hours and the task of processing and 
evaluating this sudden and substantial supply of data was once again 
overwhelming. The decision had to be made that although the interviews 
were tape recorded it would simply not be feasible to transfer the data 
from the tapes into the filecard system. The thesis therefore makes 
no reference to this body of data but the very process of completing 
the staff interviews contributed to the conceptual development of the 
work.
12. Data Presentation
The research process described so far may appear to emphasise the 
increasing restrictions placed upon its scope and objectives, but in 
fact by this stage a great deal of field and literature data had been
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accumulated, It had been organised so that it conformed to a 
rudimentary structure but largely only under tentative chapter headings 
and major sub-divisions. No attempt was made to refine this arrange­
ment until work began on producing the thesis itself. It was thus 
the requirement to present the data that compelled it to be given 
comprehensible form, but by structuring the data through this process 
it was hoped that the narrative would be as sensitively grounded as 
possible in the fieldwork and literature review.
13. Interpretation
The meanings within the data were similarly not specified in any 
great detail until it was required to be presented, although it has 
already been noted that a number of issues had seemed to be particul­
arly pertinent at a general level well before the research was 
completed. The presentation of the data and its interpretation can 
logically be identified as two distinct activities but in practice 
therefore they were inseparable. It was never intended that the data 
should merely represent a factual account of one particular case study. 
It was anticipated, correctly, that the data would generate some common 
themes and that the field data would need to be related to the 
conceptual and theoretical research context. No systematic method 
existed for doing this and it required the exercise of judgements 
reflecting the researcher's own values and meanings, which it has 
already been observed Mangham has explicitly defended.
This is not considered to be a weakness of the research but a 
strength. Hyman warns that (1977:72):
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"The current emphasis upon the 'action frame of reference' is not, 
however, without its dangers: for some sociologists, in their
reaction against positivism, have neglected the structural 
influences of which the actors themselves may be unconscious. In 
effect, the views and definitions of the actors are treated as 
a sufficient explanation of the social situation being 
investigated.".
Instead, he believes that there is:
"a complex two^ay process in which men's goals, ideas and beliefs 
influence and are influenced by the social structure. To do 
justice to its complexity, industrial sociologists must be attuned 
to this dynamic interaction between structure and consciousness.
A static or a one-way analysis necessarily distorts social reality, 
and is therefore an inadequate basis for understanding industrial 
behaviour or predicting its development." (p 73).
The process of interpretation, therefore, was one of developing a
fusion between the key themes in the data; the formal, conceptual
and cultural order in which they were manifest; and the associated
body of theoretical and practical work.
This fusion was achieved but it has already been noted that the 
process of interpretation and the presentation of the research data 
coalesced into one activity. Consequently the description of the 
fusion is not a separate element of the thesis but an integral part 
of the assessment of the field data. This has been arranged into four 
broad subject areas, namely perceptions of the management function, 
the nature of trade union initiative, attitudes to participative 
processes and the propensity of staff and their representatives to 
participate. The discussion of each therefore draws not only upon the 
Llandough data but also upon all the other relevant sources examined 
during the. research process.
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14. Theoretical Framework
The dynamism between the field data, the other manifestations of 
the social order and the external body of theory is not, however, one 
way. While it is unrealistic to consider the field data in isolation 
from its contexts, equally the data should be able to generate theory 
or at least provide a contribution towards it. Mangham (1978:16) 
urges that:
"working from the observed situation or from the perceptions of 
those involved in that situation, the qualitative researcher 
should be able to draw out a number of inferences which have 
wider application and to present these inferences at an 
appropriate level of abstraction. The best work in this 
developing tradition presents both concepts and the concrete 
instances which embody or illustrate them."
Qualitative studies should contribute to the knowledge of the field 
and present opportunities for further research. It is Berg's judge­
ment that (1979:269):
"From an overall perspective, the value of a theoretical frame­
work is ultimately determined by its utility. No matter how 
rigorous the research design or how general the findings, a 
theory is judged by its contributions to theory and to practice. 
The value of these contributions is dependent on the way in 
which the theoretical framework relates to existing knowledge in 
the field, i.e. whether it validates or invalidates other 
theories and to what extent it opens up new perspectives for 
future research.".
In the research process described in this thesis the derivation 
of theory and a general, analytic framework was not strained or 
contrived, but thoroughly grounded in the data. Just as it revealed 
key themes, so it suggested relationships between them and it is 
these relationships that have been developed to generate a commentary 
of more universal application.
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Conclusion
Some explanation has been provided about how the data was
evaluated to achieve an interpretation and a theoretical framework
and now consideration needs to be given to what criteria exist to
evaluate the. evaluation. Berg (1979:267) indicates just how radically
the criteria relating to qualitative research may diverge from those
applicable to other research:
"There are several reasons why the criteria of accuracy should
not be used to evaluate the interpretation......
Thus, the valuation is to be based on concepts that are more 
attuned to its explanatory character of the interpretation. One 
such concept is the 'credibility* of the interpretation. There 
are at least two ways in which credibility can be estimated.
The first involves the extent to which the interpretation 'makes 
sense', i.e. provides a meaningful explanation of the phenomenon 
under study.".
His second way of estimating credibility, "is to determine the extent 
to which the interpretation is supported by the data.". Some of the 
criteria by which it would be appropriate to evaluate this study have 
been referred to previously in the description of the research 
process, but in summary emphasis would be upon values of pragmatism. 
These would include whether it displayed the uniqueness of the context 
of the study, whether it provided a proper sense of 'life in the raw', 
whether it generated data that seemed pertinent to the context, 
whether its conclusions seem to 'reasonably' fit the data, whether it 
generated theoretical development, and whether it would be of value 
to participants in similar industrial relations contexts.
There is no doubt that the original research design was grossly 
flawed but an attempt has been made to be open about the dynamism of 
the research design, and in particular about its necessity to respond 
to pragmatic pressures. This has been made available to assist the
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evaluation of the study but also to demonstrate the spectrum of 
learning that can be derived from research activity. The purpose of 
research is to gain knowledge and insight and in this particular study 
this goal was met not only in relation to the purpose of the study but also 
to the method of achieving it. The quotation from Robert Louis 
Stevenson is rarely completed but no more apt judgement could be made 
about this study than by doing so. "To travel hopefully is a better 
thing than to arrive, and the true success is to labour" (Virginibus 
Puerisque VI El Dorado).
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Chapter Five
MANAGEMENT - PERCEPTIONS OF PURPOSE, PEOPLE AND PREROGATIVES
"I think they would all like a say in these menus and I would 
definitely like to sit in on these menus, but they couldn't tell 
her about her menus, because she's the boss.".
This comment made by a NUPE shop steward in the Catering Department 
must to many epitomise some of the most fundamental justifications 
for promoting increased participation. It manifests the latent desire 
for participation, indicates that there are managerial functions in 
which both staff and their trade union representatives could construct­
ively engage and suggests that the initiative to release this potential 
lies with the manager, by adopting a more open style.
The simple logic makes it very tempting to accept this conclusion 
and unfortunately rarely is it recognised that it is almost entirely 
superficial. There is a further, deeper level of analysis that 
involves discovering the full subtlety of workplace perceptions and 
relationships, and in particular identifying their mutual dependence 
and definition and realising that far more conq>lex considerations 
apply if genuinely effective change is to be achieved. Furthermore, 
it is necessary to develop a much greater realism about how workplace 
perceptions and relationships vary multi-dimensionally, e.g. across 
time, with different individuals, with different issues and in 
different places.
For example, the Society of Radiographers* representative was very 
complimentary about how approachable the Superintendent Radiographer 
was :
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"People can say to her, 'Look, this is ridiculous how this rota 
is running' or this, that and the other, that she's just worked 
out, and if she thinks you're right, she'll alter it.".
The superficial inference would be that the Catering Manager could 
quickly enhance the involvement of her staff by being as accessible 
and willing to change as the Superintendent Radiographer but the 
inadequacy of such a conclusion can be demonstrated by posing just two 
relatively simple questions - why did the two managers have different 
styles and what do the two comments reveal about the two represent­
atives' perceptions of the subordinate/ manager relationship?
Personal variables, such as personality, competence and knowledge,
may provide a large part of the answer to the first, but so may the
characteristics of the two different departments. The Catering 
Manager had a quasi-professional training quite different from that 
of her staff, who were all ancillary workers. She had an office on 
the other side of a corridor from her department, which was geograph­
ically large and physically divided into different sections, e.g. 
kitchen, wash-up and dining room. Her staff worked shifts covering a 
24-hour day seven days a week and consisted of part-timers as well as 
full-timers, on a number of different grades, with different degrees 
of training, separate types of work and limited interaction between 
the members of the different sections or shifts. On the other hand, 
the radiographers were all professional staff and had all received
the same training as the Superintendent. The department was geograph­
ically small and consisted of considerably fewer members of staff, who 
were all full-time and essentially worked normal weekday hours. The 
Superintendent had no office at all, shared the same rest room as her 
staff and the managerial content of her job was so considerably less 
than that of the Catering Manager that she spent the great majority
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of her time undertaking the same duties as her staff, working next to 
them. One must wonder, therefore, to what extent either head of 
department had freedom to exercise their managerial function in any 
other manner.
Examining the two representatives* perceptions of the subordinate/ 
manager relationship reveals particularly interesting similarities and 
differences. Both, for example, were able to identify aspects of the 
managerial function, aspects which both saw as significantly affecting 
the nature of their job and both felt the wish to influence. Neither 
contested the ability of the manager to make the decisions, one 
because "she's the boss" and the other because it was accepted that 
changes would only be made "if she thinks you're right", and neither 
suggested that the head of department either formally or informally 
positively encouraged involvement. The essential difference was that 
the radiographers felt able to exercise initiative in commenting upon 
and influencing a managerial function whereas the catering staff did 
not. Again, one must wonder to what extent the cause of this lay 
with the individual managers. An important question that the research 
sought to answer was to what degree it may arise from the staffs' own 
constructs of the authority relationship.
Extremes of authority structures are easily found. One example
is described in a relatively recent newspaper report (Sunday Times
Business News 31.1.82.):
"This is what a director of one Birmingham engineering company 
had to say about what amounts to a revolution in relations with 
the shop floor. 'The initiative has switched. Before, union 
power had to be seen to be believed. The shop stewards had 
petrified the previous management into signing agreements that 
there would be no visits to the shop floor by management without 
prior notice. When I arrived it was near anarchy. When I went
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down to the shop floor, three shop stewards pressed around me 
wanting to know what I wanted.*"
One of the hospital's ASTMS representatives articulated a fear of the
kind of power employers can exercise:
"Because management have always had the right of dismissal, within 
the terms of contracts and all the rest of it, people always view 
management as a potential threat to their security. I mean, it's 
just like a sort of large bear and a small monkey in a forest.".
Even allowing for artistic licence, an employee, and a trade union 
representative in particular, who makes such a comparison clearly has 
a different view of the subordinate/manager relationship, or at the 
very least has a quite different confidence about the ability to 
resist or alter managerial control, from a member of a workforce which 
considers it reasonable, and is able, to prevent management visiting 
the shop floor. And what would the distance be between their views on 
participation? Would it even have any relevance to either of them?
And if it did, would it for one enhance the sense of personal security 
or achieve any greater constructive liaison for the other, or might it 
simply obtain for the other workforce further means of restricting 
management? The hypothetical questions could continue at length but 
the point is surely already made. The effect of trying to introduce 
or inçrove participation can substantially depend upon the nature of 
the current workplace relationship between staff and management, both 
defined formally and by the subjective assessment of the participants, 
and equally the staff-management relationship can be substantially 
altered by participation. Consequently, an attempt was made in the 
research to identify staff perceptions of the management function.
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The Management Task
A TUC document (1983:5) provides an exceptionally concise
description of the management task:
"The principal objective of management is to control and direct 
the use of resources at its disposal at the maximum efficiency 
possible. These resources will be materials, labour, equipment, 
land and building.".
Chamberlain describes the management function in organisational terms
(1967:218):
"An impasse has no place in a healthy business. Varieties of 
opinion may be represented, and indeed their expression may be 
encouraged by frequent resort to committee action, but a process 
of refining opinion into decision and for translating decision 
into action cannot be avoided. This is true not only of final 
authority, but of management in all its frames and centers of 
co-ordination. In each frame, at each center of co-ordination, 
authority for decision and action must reside.".
This view is open to challenge and Marchington describes the response
(1980:5,6):
"Management is attempting to legitimise its function by reference 
to the idea that managers have an expertise indispensable to the 
efficient organisation of the industry".
and:
"There is a strong feeling that managers, by virtue of their 
experience, training or innate.ability, are the only ones capable 
of making decisions of a highly technical or complicated nature."
In their discussion of the sources of the legitimacy of the 
management function, Armstrong et al (1981:64) emphasise the signifi­
cance of the law and one detects echoes of the large bear and small 
monkey analogy:
"the initial and in some senses residual presumptions of the 
employment contract are of the legally supported power of the 
employer to determine the what, where, when and how of employment.".
The same authors also point out that amongst workers there is, "little
systematic, across-the-board rejection of managerial ideology" (p 41)
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but they recognise that (p 66):
"the day to day exercise of management rule making is subject to 
restrictions. On a number of issues the power of the employer is 
regulated by the law (e.g. 'protective* legislation on unfair 
dismissal, prescribed period of notice, hours of work and safety) 
and is also - in a restricted field - limited by union organisation 
and the possible risk of facing collective industrial action. 
Further, aside from the generalised duty of obedience on employees, 
the contract of employment itself often fails to define and 
regulate a multiplicity of detailed issues.".
This paradox is just one of several revealed either by similarity 
or omission when the research data was compared with the descriptions 
of the purpose and justification of the management function cited 
above. In contrast to the TUC document, the staff found it impossible 
to generalise about the practical purposes of management and neither 
did the legitimising qualities of managers portrayed by Marchington 
appear to be of any great relevance to them. Nevertheless, the 
legitimacy of the management function was not only rarely questioned 
but in fact was most earnestly supported and as Armstrong et al 
indicate the strongly asserted contention that management must and 
will be challenged, particularly by trade unions and staff organisations, 
was not intended to detract from this support.
The staff seemed to particularly identify and value the purpose 
of the management function described in organisational terms similar 
to those of Chamberlain. The purpose of management was described in 
the sense of "to take responsibility", "to supervise - to supervise 
the whole thing" and, "the manager's got to decide" but there was no 
explicit acknowledgement that this may require the exercise of special 
expertise. On the contrary, if anything the assumption was that 
managers lacked sufficient or any experience of the day-to-day 
practical work of their staff. One shop steward provided a particul-
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arly precise yardstick. "What work did you do in a hospital? Now 
you've got it theoretically from A to Z, but practically what work 
have you done in a hospital such as our own? Have you seen a post 
mortem?".
There was considerable concern about management's power if it 
was unchecked:
"Major problems would come along when you get - unfortunately 
fall into the difficulty of a dictatorial attitude. There won't 
be much really you can do then, as the person who is receiving
the dictatorial attitude. The only thing you can do is become
a little bit belligerent, and still do it.".
"Things have altered for the better now, but years ago in the 
Health Service you used to get a lot of the old school and the 
bullying tactics of "You do this', 'You do that' and 'I know 
best', and they would literally push you about.".
The shop stewards were clear about why the worst excesses of
management no longer existed:
"years ago when the trade unions weren't as active as they are 
now, the manager would come out to you and say, "You do that'.
You didn't question him. You had to do it the way he'd said
it, although you might think there's an easier way to do it.
But you had to do it his way.".
But the same shop steward, who so clearly valued the protection
against management provided by active trade unions, was in no doubt
that it did not undermine the managerial function. There was, however,
a point at which he could foresee this happening. When asked at what
stage he thought loss of managerial power had gone too far, he replied:
"When you get the ordinary person telling the manager what to do, 
not a union representative or anything like that, but the 
ordinary person - say walking down the corridor comes over to 
you and says, 'Look, I'm not doing this or not doing some other.'.
To me, that would be going too far, but it is just one, the person
representing, that can go in and represent the men, and speak to 
that man, to me that's O.K..".
He also tellingly described the dilemma caused by the enthusiasm of
his support both for the management function and for the right to
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challenge it:
"I don't care what anybody say, there's always got to be one 
person there to be looked up to, and you know that man is in 
charge, even though you turn around and say, 'That man is my
Earnest but easy distinctions such as these appeared often in 
the conversations with the shop stewards. In discussing examples of 
contentious issues, they commonly displayed what could only be 
described as a simplistic analysis of the managerial problems involved 
or piously explained that if only a more honest/considerate/less 
sudden approach had been adopted issues could have been resolved very 
amicably. Nevertheless, there were points in the interviews when 
they indicated that managers had a difficult job which was obviously 
important in the organisation and which involved skillfully balancing 
demands within and upon the organisation. There were certainly no 
comments such as, "I could do their job." or "What makes them special?" 
or "We all know what we're doing, so why have managers?". In other 
words, the shop stewards' image of the job of management varied, 
almost between extremes, depending upon whether they looked at it in 
abstract or in the context of practical examples.
The fear of unrestrained managerial power, however, was a
recurrent theme. As one shop steward stated:
"If it came to pass that there wasn't a union here at all you'd
dictate - Mark Rees, Miss Davenport or any administrative staff - 
would dictate to the point that the person's life, the ancillary 
staff's life, would be hell. It would be hell.".
What is additionally interesting about this judgement is that it says
something both about the individuals involved and the constraints




"I find there is a much more cohesive uniformity about managers 
than there is about trade union representatives. Most managers 
appear to be articulate, highly skilled, they seem to know what 
they're doing, they're very good at being managers, most of the 
time, and I suspect most of them would be better if they were 
left alone to get on with it.".
The conclusion alone of this assessment by an ASTMS representative of
managers as individuals is unexpected but it has other features that
make the judgement even more exceptional. The level of articulation
is obviously impressive and it is used to complement managers on their
ability. But more significantly, the representative seems able to
conceptualise managerial performance and to use several quite clear
criteria by which to judge it. Other staff were only able to talk
about specific individuals or about one facet of the behaviour or
image of managers.
One quality that emerged as particularly pertinent in the data 
was respect. Even the majority of shop stewards not only expressed 
or implied the importance of being able to respect their head of 
department, but also clearly did so. This seemed inconsistent with 
many of their other comments about how the managerial function was 
exercised and it appears that it is largely impossible to explain 
rationally. On the few occasions when representatives considered the 
source of respect, the results were identical and probably for 
managers, rather perverse. Respect was seen to arise from a willing­
ness to accommodate the opinions of the staff. Representatives of the 
Society of Radiographers and NUPE expressed it thus :
"I think a lot of your authority is backed up by the amount of 
respect you can command. If people can see that you're a 
reasonable sort of person, who can appreciate when you haven't
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got all the facts and we can give you a bit more, and you say 
*I didn't quite realise that. Yes, I'll think that one out 
again.' and, 'You might be right there.' or, 'We'll come halfway 
along there.'".
"And, to my way of thinking, she'd be shown more respect because 
she is willing to negotiate and sit down and talk and try and get 
the best way to do the whole thing.".
But there were indications that the possession of respect could 
be to the detriment of other qualities, that more 'dictatorial' 
managers could still retain respect and that managers could be excess­
ively amenable. One of the NUPE officers who believe that willingness 
to negotiate increased respect when asked about the effect on the 
manager's power replied:
"Now that's a different thing. You're talking about power in the 
manager, which is a different thing altogether. You asked me, 
'Could he hold his respect?'. Of course he could, but he would 
have no power, not as great a power as he did have, as you say, 
in the sixties and seventies.".
This officer had also been the person who described how some 
staff saw the people in charge of them as their enemy and would do 
anything to oppose them, but he had then continued, "But in the long 
run, he still looks up to him.". Many managers would probably be able 
to comprehend the existence of this possession of the dual emotions of 
conflict and respect in workplace relations, but they would probably 
be surprised at the strength of the distinction between respect and 
power. It is also relevant to the general participation debate. It 
may be that the staff in fact appreciate a balance being maintained' 
between management by direction and management by consultation/ 
negotiation and would like neither to predominate. There are 
certainly times when management is regarded as insufficiently 
vigorous :
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"But sometimes I think J. is soft to a point, when I've taken 
staff in there. I don't think she's hard enough with the staff, 
because if I've got taken in to be disciplined over something I 
don't feel that she is hard enough. I don't know if it's 
because she is always smiling - the fact that she's always got 
a smile on her face - that she is not serious and stern enough 
and she always seems to be making light of it.".
One feature of the participation debate is the belief of its
advocates that participation is an invaluable means of tapping the
wealth of knowledge of those at the point of production or service.
The staff identified the same situation, but from the other end of the
telescope. Levels of management beyond the hospital were remote and
unaware of its day-to-day activity:
"I feel sometimes that the Health Authority is very far removed 
from the grass roots and they don't really know what is going 
on.".
"As far as Area level is concerned, there is very little that 
can be done, I think, very little, because it is far too far 
removed from what's actually happening.".
"The likes of C. [Health Authority Chairman], I don't think 
they've got any idea what goes on.... They've got no interest in 
the hospitals. Oh, they go to their meeting once a month, or
whatever it is, and that's it.......They don't know what's
going on until they come to you, whereas to me they're the
people who decide in the end, aren't they And these are
the people that you've got to bow to.".
Of course, what such comments reveal is not only a set of perceptions
about managers as individuals at higher levels but also a set of
perceptions about their function. The purpose of the Health Authority
is largely viewed as simply to manage its institutions on a day-to-day
basis and there is no recognition of its non-institutional or strategic
objectives. What the data leaves unresolved is the issue of whether
participation should achieve a reduction solely in the perception of
distance between the activities of the ordinary staff and higher
management or whether it should educate staff into an awareness of,
and involvement in, higher management's more strategic concerns.
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An even greater challenge is how to modify the perceived distance 
between ordinary staff and their immediate manager. Because of the 
relatively shorter distance involved, at least when measured in formal 
hierarchical terms, and the much greater degree of frequency and 
intensity of interaction, it might appear that this problem is simpler 
to resolve. What introduces the complexity is the greater strength 
with which the perceptions are held and their practical influence 
upon the experience of work, and therefore their ability to hinder,
possibly even to jeopardise, the maintenance of the service or
production funtion.
This was demonstrated when I asked a NUPE shop steward if he
thought I was simply trying to put as much work as possible on to the
porters:
"Not consciously, because it's spread over a period. I mean, 
it's not like you walking in and adding on another twelve jobs, 
like that in one day, but today you might get another little job 
added on. All right, in itself it's not much, but then in a 
couple of days' time there's another little job added on, but 
it's going to be a continuous thing, it's not a one-off affair. 
I'm not worried about the one-offs, it's the things that's got 
to be done on a regular basis. And this goes on week after week, 
another little thing. In itself it's only a little thing, but 
when you accumulate months of these added together, then it adds 
up to rather a lot, and the portering staff who are actually 
doing this work, they see these things being added on because 
they're the ones actually doing it. Whereby you might issue out 
this little job and wonder what all the fuss is about, but that's 
another little kind of thorn gone in again, which perhaps a 
fortnight ago there was another little job added on.... Now I'm 
not talking about patients coming in or emergency things, so 
when the routine jobs are creeping up, so the aggro creeps up 
with it and it's to stop this build up of the little jobs I 
think is why they're contested so strongly when someone's told 
to do it.".
It seemed that the attitudes conveyed in comments such as these 
related to more general perceptions of whether or not managers 'cared' 
and this was pursued in the research, with interesting results. The
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assumption was false. Nearly all of those interviewed had no 
preconceived ideas of whether or not managers cared and most of them 
even found it difficult to imagine what it was that managers could
care about. One NUPE shop steward kindly asserted, "Surely the
management within this hospital must care about the patients. They've 
got to have the patients' interests at heart as well, here.". Asked 
if that was what he believed, he replied, "Oh, yes, they've got to do, 
otherwise why would they work in the Health Service?". Some stewards 
tried to respond to questions about whether managers were caring, but 
they only showed in their replies that they had never previously 
considered the issue:
Researcher: Do you think managers care about the standards?
Dilys: Well it depends on the person, (pause) I mean, do you care
about the standard of the hospital, if it's kept up to standard?
Researcher: Well what's interesting is that you have to ask that.
Dilys: It depends on the person, doesn't it, a lot, whether a manager's
interested or not.
Some stewards put the ability to care in a context of other 
managerial objectives. One NUPE shop steward when asked whether he 
thought managers cared about the NHS replied, "Well they should.". 
Researcher: But do you believe they do?
Paul: Yes, I think they do, but they're bound within certain
reservations.
Another NUPE shop steward admitted:
"I will get a bit exasperated, and think, 'Oh, gosh, we're doing 
our best.', but I suppose at the end of the day when you sit 
down, you think, 'Well they're doing their job, the same as 
we're doing our job, and they got not only to consider the 
patient but they've got to consider a lot of other things - cost, 
finance, that all comes into it.'.".
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Sometimes pursuit of management’s other objectives appeared to simply
obstruct the care others were trying to exercise:
"So the majority of them feel we’re working here because we want 
to, and they’d like to give a good service, and then when 
somethings comes along which they think is hindering them to 
give that service, then you get this kind of comment - ’We’re 
trying to do our best for the patients, whereby perhaps 
management are only thinking about things which don’t count.’.".
Some representatives thought that management positively did not
care :
Graham: I don’t think managers really care, as far as I can see.
Researcher: Care about what?
Graham: Care about the staff.
This NALGO representative felt strongly about the issue:
"You get someone like H. [then Area Personnel OfficeiQ , ’Four 
hundred posts have to go. Sorry boys, that’s it.’.".
"Really, the manager - he’s not really interested in people, I
don’t think. He wants to do his job well and that’s that.’’.
"See, whatever your feelings you can’t really - you mustn’t really -
care, because you’ve got to do things.".
In this sense it was his opinion that managers in the NHS were compar­
able to those in commerce and industry.
When reviewing the interview from which these extracts were taken, 
a note was made that this representative did not appear to credit 
management with any concern about either achieving the highest
standard of patient care possible or the personnel implications of indiv­
idual managers decisions , but a subsequent event showed that such clear 
and concise conclusions can be misleading. Almost six months after 
the interview, Graham came to see me about arranging a meeting to 
discuss the implications of computer Visual Display Units for staff.
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As an aside, he referred to his previous comments that managers do not 
care and then declared, "It’s true, you know.". This was followed by 
a complaint about how long it was taking to provide railings to prevent 
cars from parking on the hospital pavements. I could only reiterate 
that I sympathised with his sense of frustration and entirely agreed 
with the arrangements he was seeking, but had to explain that I was 
not managerially in charge of the Works Department and therefore was 
powerless to directly instruct the work to proceed. He was justifiably 
aggrieved and I agreed with him but I am sure that he left my office no 
more convinced that managers cared than when he had walked in. When I 
examined why, I could only conclude that he little understood, or had 
little sympathy for, the problems of organisational constraints, or 
that the lack of response from the Works Department merely confirmed 
that management as a whole, including the Works managers, did not care.
At a further extreme, the lack of care exhibited by management 
was seen as expressing positive disregard for the interests of the 
staff. "I mean they’re just not interested are they. Their word is 
God, and that’s it, they think." commented a NUPE shop steward. One 
of the NALGO representatives cited the provision of a trade union 
office as an example of how, "It is very hard to get things out of 
management.". The sentiment was also voiced that the Health Authority 
is far from charitable with trade unions:
Researcher: Do you think that the Health Authority adopts a certain
policy towards trade unions and says to all its managers ....
Mary: Oh yeah, you mean as regards the ones that are members and the
ones that are not.
The Society of Radiographers’ representative ; w/as unsure of whether 
or not there was a Health Authority ’line’ with trade unions but felt
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chat, "they like to have a bash (laughing) at certain unions.".
To conclude the summary of the data about staff perceptions of 
managers as individuals, it may be particularly pertinent to quote 
one NUPE shop steward who turned the issue round. "I’d like to see 
.... management having the faith that the worker has got interest in 
his field, which management doesn’t.".
Management Styles
In the literature, little significance is given to the part
management style plays in shaping workplace relations and yet in the
research interviews staff could often not think about what managers
did without thinking about the way they did it. For example, the
complete answer of a NUPE official to the question of what the job
of manager was, previously quoted in part, was:
"Well the job of a manager, to my way of thinking, is to supervise 
the whole thing right at the beginning and get everybody to try 
and work with him. Whereas with some people, they come in and 
they straightaway get your back up and you’re going to be in 
trouble with him all the time. You know everything he does and 
everything you do is going to be wrong.".
A similar sentiment came from an ASTMS representative:
"What I’m trying to say is that managers can manage affairs - I 
mean they ought to be able to get what they want, which ought, to 
be the most efficient running of the enterprise, basically, right, 
they ought to be able to get that without appearing to be - what 
can you say - a large dark cloud on the horizon.".
The NUPE catering shop steward put it more practically:
"We did feel strongly that we didn’t want flexibility, where we 
could be moved from department to department. I mean everybody 
in the kitchen will. They will go out to the veg. kitchen, they 
will go into the pot wash, and they will help on the belt if 
they’re needed. But they resent being told they’ve got to do it.",
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Once again, there was a very real fear about the exercise of
authoritarian management and the word ’dictatorial* appeared often.
But for the representatives, the panacea was straightforward;
"their position of management must be respected, but I don’t 
believe a manager, in my concept anyhow, should turn round and 
if he is properly communicating, should not have to do any
dictation And society has gone on to decree that the
situation is such that you have now got to manage, not necess­
arily all the time, by consent, and certainly by communication.".
A NALGO representative emphasised that the communication should be two-
way;
"He’s got to decide the best way of doing the service. But I 
think there is no reason why he can’t get the views of the people 
who will be affected and then modify his views. Now that’s the 
secret, to modify his views.".
A NUPE officer emphasised that dictatorial management could only
be avoided by forms of compromise with trade union representatives and
made his point by using comparisons:
"Everybody got to compromise. Even the union men have got to 
compromise. Even the union official got to compromise. Everybody 
got to be able to compromise, otherwise it would be - if they 
can’t compromise they might not as well be in a job at all.".
Asked if this still meant that the manager was in charge, he replied:
"Of course it does, yes, and it makes him a better manager if he’s 
able to compromise. Otherwise he’s only dictatorial, isn’t he.’’.
When given a hypothetical situation, he elaborated:
"All right, so she wants to allocate jobs, different jobs, she 
wants so-and-so to have their leave at such-and-such a time, and 
things like that. She wouldn’t be able to do it all at the same 
time, but she’d get some of it, and then she’d have to see the
point of view of others that there might be a better way of doing
it.".
One of the ASTMS representatives also advocated the use of trade unions
as a means of achieving managerial objectives without the exercise of
authoritarian management:
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"There are and have been situations where if the management 
instead of coming in sort of very headlong, high profile fashion 
to get something implemented that wasn’t going to be popular, if 
instead they come in in a low profile fashion and use the symp­
athetic offices of the unions concerned, they could have achieved 
the same objective with hardly any hassle at all.’’.
But what is the dictatorial style of management these staff were 
anxious should be avoided? Armstrong et al (1981:66-71) provide a 
sample of quotations describing authoritarian management in private 
enterprises :
"Thus the works manager at Pennine: ’They can start the extra
duties on Monday, Mike. If they refuse, put ’em through the 
disciplinary procedure.’".
"Thus an MoFol foreman terminated a discussion on working methods 
with one of his operatives: ’I don’t give a monkey’s toss what
Sam Austin told you, I^m your boss and J ’m telling you to do it 
this way.’".
"Thus at LEF, ’You change tools when I tell you, not when Ken 
tells you. I’m responsible for production and he’s not.”'
"Another instance of rule making proceeding from this wider 
assumption of managerial prerogative was a Pennine plant manager’s,
’I take ny f ing holidays when I want to. You take yours when
you’re f ing told.’".
"’It says here that you’ve got to perform reasonable alternative 
work and if you don’t like it, you can get out.’ The MoFol 
personnel manager was citing the national union/employer agreement 
against a girl who complained.".
These few quotations con^iled by Armstrong et al when compared to 
the attitude of the staff at Llandough are a fertile source of further 
enquiry. The Llandough staff described no incidents at all comparable 
to those, or the climate of workplace relations, described by Armstrong 
et al. There was no hint at all that this was the kind of management 
behaviour they envisaged when they described the possibility of 
individual managers being dictatorial. If it is true that this is not 
the kind of authoritarian management that they experienced, then their
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conception of 'dictatorial’ management is not an absolute but one 
extreme of their own, individual constructs of the spectrum of staff- 
management relationships. And yet the spectrums are not known and 
although it is tempting to say that they exist implicitly in the minds 
of the staff, if not explicitly, even this would not be true. Staff 
undoubtedly make judgements about whether staff-management relationships 
or managerial behaviour are reasonable, but they use a number of both 
explicit and implicit criteria, of which some are unknown and will 
include past experience or present experience in another sphere. But 
however amorphous the constructs are, they give real substance to the 
nature of staff-management relationships and therefore must be central 
to any discussions about participation.
Alternatively, it could be that the Llandough staff experience the 
same kind of authoritarian and insensitive management as that described 
by Armstrong et al, but failed to give examples or any such impression. 
If this was the case, one must wonder, as one does anyway with the 
companies described by Armstrong et al, whether any system of partici­
pation could improve either their involvement in the decision-making 
processes or the manner in which they are managed. It might mainly 
provide an additional forum for management to further antagonize the 
staff and enforce its dictates. A fundamental change in the position 
of the staff could only be achieved, with or without the introduction 
of any formal participative structure or process, by a metamorphosis 
in the general management style (although, returning to the previous 
hypothesis, it could be argued that the perception of having achieved 
a better position might last only as long as ’the bad old days’ could 
be remembered). In other words, participation in such a context could 
almost be an irrelevancy.
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Fur ther evidence of the complexity of staff constructs about
staff management relationships, and in particular their variability
and unpredictability, is provided by Taylor’s description of Michael
Edwardes as the head of British Leyland (1982a:136);
"Clearly, Edwardes has provided a firm sense of direction to a 
company which seemed beyond repair. He has created a climate 
which made it possible to press through long overdue industrial 
relations reforms without major union resistance.
As Edwards told his audience in Oxford in May 1981, his aim was 
to create ’a framework of stability’ based on a style of manage­
ment starting at the top and permeating the organisation, which 
provided ’consistency of decision-making, which makes managers 
and employees feel that there will be a higjily predictable 
response to the myriad of problems and situations that arise’.".
Taylor’s description of the former head of the British Steel Corporation
is similar (1982b:53):
"Indeed, MacGregor’s arrival did not herald any sudden or rapid 
change of strategy. For the most part, the new man endorsed 
the policies of his predecessor. But he brou^t a new style to 
the job, a vigorous, refreshing no-nonsense approach which won 
immediate sympathy from managers and workers alike.".
The key features of these descriptions seem to be the crucial 
significance of managerial style, identification of an ability to 
create the nature of workplace relations, the alleged merit in not 
maintaining an open-mindedness about individual problems that could 
affect the staff-management relationship, and the indication that the 
staff at least acquiesced with, and perhaps even supported, the new 
manner of exercising the managerial function. Subsequent events have 
only enhanced the sense of unpredictability and variability about staff- 
management relationships. But what Taylor’s comments make clear is that 
for at least two short periods the staff’s constructs of workplace 
relations in two different enterprises with two different managers 
regarded managerial behaviour as reasonable which might at other times 
or in other places be regarded as at or beyond the extreme.
-152-
The Management Hierarchy
In the literature about how to 'achieve* participation, the 
impression is often given e.g. Hebden and Shaw 1977, that there is a 
readily discernable decision-making structure and one of the issues 
that management has to resolve is at what point or points in the 
structure should the participative arrangements be integrated. Not 
only does this seem an unrealistic assumption about the nature of 
decision-making, but it also means that managers are led to believe 
that the authority system can be almost objectively defined, and this 
in turn means that they impose upon the staff their own perceptions of 
where decision-making ability or, for those more concerned with the 
cosmetic or manipulative, inability lies. One intention of the 
research, therefore, was to identify the staff's perception of who it 
was that made the decisions that were important to them.
The non-existence of the well-defined decision-making systems
assumed by so many is emphasised by Loveridge (1976:5);
"Organisational decisions are rarely taken, they usually emerge. 
There is of course a formal point at which somebody or some 
committee activates the formal process of implementation but even
then what comes out at the end of this process is rarely what
'the decision-maker* had in mind. Asking where is the decisive 
action taken in this process may be possible but it is not often 
politic. Formally, however, there is an organisational hierarchy 
of some sort.".
But although this fair reeks of ozone and pollution that is the messy 
mixture of reality, the data rather surprisingly indicated that the 
existence of a formal hierarchy was of much greater significance to
the staff than the few words in the last sentence might suggest.
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I refer to it as rather surprising both in my capacity as a 
researcher and as a practising manager. As the first, I had antici­
pated that the staff's loci of decision-making would be highly 
subjective, confused and inconsistent, and as a manager I expected 
that the staff would perceive the decision-making ability that most 
affected them as the one existing within the hospital. The NHS 
management structure is commonly purported to be one of bureaucracy 
but in South Glamorgan at least, this certainly seemed to be untrue.
By fairly objective criteria, such as budgetary freedom and disciplin­
ing power, management authority was considerably delegated. Further­
more, the size of the Health Authority meant that it was hardly feasible 
for it to be run centrally, even if that was the wish. Finally, on a 
personal level', one of the clearest principles governing the work of 
myself and the other administrators in the hospital was that we should 
not be seen to require any significant assistance from outside the 
Health Unit and that, conversely, central departments should not feel 
that their influence should be exercised directly with staff, but 
largely with us as administrators. But the existence and force of the 
management hierarchy were plainly in evidence as far as the staff were 
concerned. As an ASTMS representative observed:
"Most of us, the bulk of us, and certainly myself, we take the 
view that there are distinct differences between various types of 
management and we consider or do not consider that some or all of 
them have got anything to do with us. We're not saying we agree 
with it as it is, not by a long way, but that's the way we see it.",
The staff's opinions about how the hierarchy operated were fairly 
consistent. It appeared to them that there was a high degree of central 
direction, and at a level with which liaison with staff representatives 
seemed paralysingly daunting. The local managers were the ones that 
the staff representatives felt able to relate to but they appeared to
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lack sufficient authority. The same ASTMS representative explained the 
effect of what appeared to be a lack of sufficient authority at even 
quite a senior level, in this instance the Personnel team that met 
regularly with trade unions and staff organisations for formal 
consultation:
"And they're quite prepared to tell us to our face that, 'Yes, we 
agree with this, yes we will agree to this, subject to the 
approval of the Area Team. '. That makes iis feel that we should 
be talking to the Area Team.".
But in fact this is the reverse of the movement that the representative
would like to see:
"The further up the tree you go, the less room there appears to 
be [for managers] to manoeuvre.... The further up I go, the more 
rigid it becomes.".
More specifically, he considered it "a bad thing" that the Health Unit
Administrator appeared to have little involvement in the management of
the pathology laboratories, and the significance of this post in
defining the limit of local management was reinforced by a NUPE shop
s teward:
"I see it (managerial decision-making possibly getting lost once 
it gets out of the hospital. I mean there's Mr Rees, who's the 
Sector Administrator, and I feel that once it's got to go beyond 
that for a decision - you're going on to Personnel and higher 
management levels - and I think then things start to get lost.".
When asked how often this happened, he gave one of the replies that was
contrary to my managerial intention and my research expectation. He
thought that it happened with a lot of concerns and gave as an example
the involvement of the Central Personnel and Management Services
Departments in local bargaining issues.
Other staff had an even more limited sense of the levels of manage­
ment in which it was appropriate for them to get involved and this 
difference in outlook appeared to originate from, or be symptomatic of.
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their attitudes about the nature of the supervisory function. As the
NUPE catering shop steward explained:
"If it can't be solved by the union, or the shop steward, and it's 
going further, then they get a little bit scared. So they would 
sooner sort it out with a shop steward, in the kitchen, and do it 
there than take it higher and fetch in management, because you are 
the hospital really, aren't you. I mean you're the hospital more 
so than the union, as far as staff is concerned.".
Whereas the first NUPE shop steward had stated, "I wouldn't personally 
consider my supervisor as management." because, "He can't make manage­
ment decisions.", the second steward, when asked if she had ever said 
anything about candidates who were being interviewed for jobs in her 
department, but who seemed unsuitable, replied:
"Well no, because I don't think it's my place to, is it. I mean, 
the appointments are really between J. (head of department] and 
T. [most senior ancillary supervisor].".
Thus not only did she regard her supervisor as involved in managerial
decision-making but in doing so also used a phrase that to many would
appear anachronistic but to her quite simply and genuinely expressed
her belief in management structured as a hierarchy and the reality it
has for her, both in the way her actions are determined by it and the
way she contributes to its determination.
A more perverse conception of the role of the supervisors was 
portrayed by one of the NALGO representatives. When asked who had the 
most power to influence industrial relations within the hospital he
replied, "Well it's really the local managers a lot They may say,
'This is all wrong.' and the others will agree." and the examples he 
gave of the local managers he was referring to were all clerical super­
visors. The use of the word manager instead of supervisor is interesting 
but what is of greater significance is that the NALGO representative was 
not describing the supervisors as the individuals who may actively 
generate good industrial relations, but those \dio may actively initiate 
discontent.
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The fact that adequate managerial authority did not rest at a 
sufficiently local level was also borne out by those who compared the 
existing management arrangements with those of several years previously. 
One NUPE shop steward placed the change in an even wider context:
Paul: Management is not like management years ago, insomuch as so long
as you had your three 'R's - reading, 'rithmetic, you know, and 
your matriculation then, it wasn't your eleven plus and your 'O' 
levels and university then - a manager was a manager. There were 
three men in the Valleys; it was the manager of the colliery, the 
doctor and the minister. You took your hat off to them, perhaps 
the agent of the company, the coal company. You took your hat 
off to them because they were respected. They were men that held 
office perhaps in local government, which was a big thing then, 
and every man and women, 'Oh, it's Mr Jones.', or Mr Evans, or 
Dr Brown, or whatever it is.
There had also apparently been a similarly clear structure of authority 
in the hospital:
Paul: Now in this hospital, now, there again you revert to the old days
one secretary that had the power. You had one doctor, I forget his 
name, but in Sully it was Foamer, Medical er...
Researcher: Dr Morgan it was here. Dr David Morgan.
Paul: Yeah, and he dictated too, him. Now we could have settled our
differences without going to the Authority then, because he had the 
power to do so. You lack that power today. He can't make a 
decision. Why? Because he's got to refer to the Temple of Peace 
(Authority central office].
He went on to comment that, "This hospital was a much better hospital
when we were dealing direct with the Welsh Office.".
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An ASTMS representative similarly wished for the return of the time 
when within the pathology laboratory one consultant pathologist and the 
most senior technician were in charge and the hospital was run by a 
secretary, matron and medical superintendent:
Eric: Nothing ever happened. We didn't have industrial disputes and
we didn't have union meetings as such There wasn't any
bother. Any problems were sorted out on the spot, within the Unit, 
and we never had to go outside the Unit to sort a problem, no 
matter how big it was. So everybody felt close to the decision­
making. They all felt that the people on site had the authority 
to deal with anything, which they apparently did.
Researcher: So what changed?
Eric: What changed, so far as we're concerned, is that the people who
made the decisions lost their ability, or their authority, to make 
those decisions, and the decision-making process moved further 
away, essentially.
Some staff shed light on where they envisaged that authority now
lay. One NUPE shop steward was asked how much he thought was felt in
the hospital of what went on higher up. Once again, the perception of
a management hierarchy was evident not only in the answer but in the
anachronistic terminology used:
"Oh you feel it, you feel it. I know what's going on higher up, 
even though you don't admit it to me, but you'd admit it to 
another man in your station.".
This was the same NUPE official as the one who had described the clear
authority structure in the Valleys and the following extracts from his
replies to questions about the location of authority within South
Glamorgan Health Authority demonstrate just how much that simple
clarity is now missing:
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"H. is the spokesman for the Authority. The Authority themselves 
know nothing at all about the problems.".
"H. will do what he's told, like every other person underneath 
the Health Authority.".
"A certain amount of decisions H. can wield, yes, but when it 
comes down to the nitty-gritty, he's a man that's controlled like 
everybody else in the Health Authority.".
"You never get a satisfactory answer from the Authority. They 
beat about the bush; it's handed down pillar to post.".
"Myself, I think the Authority's too big, because this is an 
industrial belt. You've got too many hospitals under the one 
authority, too many departments, and they're all getting so mixed 
up in the administration, in the higher administration of it, and 
it's just a lot of humph, that it's just getting thrown down the 
drain.".
"I'll speak now, and this is just with us now. You've got 
councillors now, and I know them. I was on the Council before. 
They know nothing at all about it, and yet those are the people 
that sit on the Health Authority. I know more about it than them. 
They've got to be guided, and if the fellow that's guiding them 
is a bit underhanded, he can force any situation to be brou^it 
about.".
When asked if he had any sympathy for H. he replied:
"Well he asked for it, sir, that's the job he wanted, and he's got 
it. We don't trust H, from here to there, and I'm not ashamed to 
admit that.".
A NALGO representative was clearer in her mind about where real 
authority lay, but equally powerfully, albeit more succinctly, demon­
strated the distance between senior managers and the ordinary staff:
"I would have said the Area Team was the top management, not the 
Health Authority.".
"I think of the Health Authority as something up there that more 
or less goes its own way. Just a decision-making body and we just 
have to follow.".
Two fundamental features of the hierarchal system were particularly 
apparent to the representatives. These were the need to accept instruct­
ions and to be accountable :
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"he [a manager] has to do what his superiors ask him to do. I 
mean it's all built up and you have to obey, don't you. That's 
the point.".
"you're dictated to by policies. Even our Authority is dictated 
to to a certain extent. Let them over-spend and who clamps 
down on them? A higher authority.".
"They've got to obey the higher-ups again, who in their wisdom 
dictate a policy from a higher realm again.".
"I feel that really speaking, you - no disrespect to you yourself 
but you're given a brief, and invariably that can be summed up, 
'No, Ian.', and that you've got to dress up to tell these guys.".
The constraints perceived to be imposed by higher management 
seemed to relate entirely to finance. An ASTMS representative, for 
example, assumed that all managers had been told to stop all overtime 
and a NUPE shop steward more accurately commented that instructions 
had been received to reduce staffing levels through redundancies, and 
he continued:
Colin: Oh, I believe you must have some kind of instructions, on
industrial relations. I think you are bound to have, ri^t back 
to courses, I mean er...
Researcher: I just wondered if you felt that there might be some* sort
of almost a Health Authority line about certain things ?
Colin: Personally, I think there must be. It's never come to light,
but I think there must be some kind of guidelines laid down to 
administrators.
The eloquence of the NUPE official from the Valleys was especially 
evident when he talked about the effect on management of financial 
constraints:
Researcher: Is there is anything you think can be done to actually
narrow the gap between staff and management?
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Paul; No, not really, because you're restricted to dictates from a 
higher field.
Researcher; What sort of dictates do you think we're under?
Paul: Economy. You'd be a decent bloke if you didn't have that cloud
over your head. Now because you've got to scheme, sir, and don't 
tell me you haven't, you've got to scheme ways and means of saving 
money. It's thrust at you every day, every meeting you go to, 'Oh, 
we can't have that, it's got to wait. We can't have this, that's 
got to wait.', and you're trying to appease the consultants here 
in their demands, the laboratories in their demands. They all want 
They want because they've got a need. Now, if the need was excess­
ive, you'd clamp down and that's your excuse, 'No, you can't have 
it. You had so-and-so last year, and somebody else wants it.'.
But that doesn't happen, and you're getting these departments that 
are keeping on to you, keeping on to you, making you in a kind of 
aggressive attitude when you're dealing with people now that you 
can control. That's us, the ancillary staff. We don't need 
anything, just a basic way of life. We're just the peasants of 
the Health Service. And it's true, we're the ones with straw in 
our mouths and a silly cap on our heads, and driving a cow up the 
streets, and if you could give us a bag of potatoes, you'd give us 
a bag of potatoes.".
The significance of the financial imperative compared to any others
was highlighted by another NUPE shop steward:
Carol: Well you sit in on meetings where you discuss sort of things
and they're bound to say that your hospital is not running as it 
should be run. Or, "Can't you do so-and-so.'.
Researcher: Who do you think says that?
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Carol: Well I don't know.
Researcher: You seem to be implying that we have to explain the way
we're running the hospital.
Carol: No, no, I didn't mean the running like that. I meant costings
for the hospital.
Another NUPE shop steward concluded:
"We look at it in one way - we want to give a good service to the 
patients. End. Whereby you've got to give a service and be able 
to afford it.".
Managerial Prerogative
This chapter has so far considered some staff perceptions of 
managers and the management function, but to what extent does manage­
ment actually take account of staff attitudes towards what it tries to 
do? Is the exercise of managerial prerogative possible, perhaps in 
the form of dictatorial management that concerns staff representatives 
so much, and if it is not, by what means can management attain its 
goals? These issues bear substantially both on the conduct of 
industrial relations generally and participation in particular. Walker, 
for example, has identified that one,of the principal perspectives in 
which participation may be regarded is as, "an illegitimate intrusion 
upon managerial prerogatives" (1974:7). Indeed, in its proposals for 
extending participation at work the Confederation of British Industry 
is anxious to emphasise the necessity of retaining managerial rights 
and authority:
"it is important to remember that where joint agreement has been 
sought, but not achieved, management's duty to take a decision, 
in the interests of the business, remains unimpaired." (1977:36).
"The arrangements agreed must not interfere with the executive 
function of management and must recognise that management has the 
ultimate legal responsibility for discharging its third party 
obligations." (p 32).
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And the notion of managerial prerogative is not merely an obsolete
inheritance from an age when the employing relationship was like that
described by the Webbs:
"it being always implied in the engagement that the workman 
accepts the conditions existing in the employer's establishment, 
and obeys all his lawful commands." (1898:658).
It is a concept with vitality and relevance. During a national railway
dispute. Tether (1982) reported that:
"The Board it seems, had 'reached the end of the road on 
prevarication'. Accordingly, negotiations were out. The issue 
now - or so we were informed - was about 'management's right to 
manage.'".
He calls this a "god" and refers to, "British Rail's decision to invoke
this deity". More parochially, at the time when new district health
authorities were being established throughout the NHS, the Association
of Health Service Treasurers (1982) advocated that the opportunity
should be taken to review the most important personnel procedures, "in
order to enable managers to manage effectively.". The Association was
particularly concerned that procedures for resolving grievances should
be re-examined:
"But the next question to be answered is what constitutes a 
grievance? Should we not specifically exclude certain matters? 
There should certainly be areas of 'management prerogative'".
Furthermore, the Association has a very clear picture of what this
implies in practice:
"i.e. certain areas in which management should be free to operate 
unfettered by staff questioning and which should clearly be 
referred to in the grievance procedure. One such area is the way 
in which an employee is to carry out his or her job, i.e. an 
employee should not be given the right of appeal against the 
manager's decision that task A should be performed before task B 
or against a decision that these tasks are to be performed using 
certain prescribed methods (except, of course, on any grounds of 
health and safety).".
—163—
The exercise of managerial prerogative where there can be no
property rights i.e. in a public enterprise, has been defended by
O'Donnell (1952:587):
"What is the authority relationship of managers and subordinates 
in this activity? All subordinates have a duty to obey the lawful 
commands of their superior managers because the right to issue such 
orders descends from the people as a whole through the Constitution 
to the federal government which has approved the project. The use 
of coercive methods to secure acceptance of orders is the manager's 
right. The recalcitrant subordinate can and should be deprived of 
employment in this enterprise if he disobeys commands, for he not 
only endangers the success of the firm in achieving its objectives 
but he may not, as an individual, decide issues which are the 
prerogative of the collective will.".
Unfortunately, the absoluteness of the managerial power supposedly 
deriving from the collective will obscures a more general and fertile 
insight into the nature of public service management which was touched 
upon in the description of the research initiative. It was suggested 
there not that greater power might accrue to managers acting as the 
agents of the collective will but that the staff - management relation­
ship might be more amicable because management would be exercising its 
function solely for the common good, although in practice it appears 
that this correlation may be totally unfounded.
Young (1963) describes how management's right to manage has legal
authority derived from property rights, when in fact he personally
regards this assertion as spurious. What is more important for him is
the validation of managerial prerogatives in organisational terms, to
provide direction and leadership:
"And yet the managerial assertion that it has the ri^t to run 
the organisation contains a certain economic logic. In the large 
independent business firm which hires many employees, it would be 
inefficient and impractical if the manager and employee had to 
achieve a meeting of minds over every decision before it could be 
implemented." (p 245).
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More generally, there is a strong argument that the managers of an 
enterprise hold the responsibility for its success, whether on behalf 
of owners or another collectivity or even if only to justify their 
employment as its co-ordinators and leaders, and that the responsibility 
must be accompanied by authority. This can alternatively be described 
as management requiring the authority to meet its commitment to the 
organisation, or its identification with its objectives, or obligation 
to act in its interests.
To advance the necessity for managerial authority in this way may 
seem non-ideological and common sense but in fact there are critics, 
such as Marcuse, who has argued (1969) that such authority is a rational 
necessity where there is division of labour and it is used to further 
the general good but that it otherwise constitutes domination of an 
ideological kind. However, the greatest pertinence of this argument 
appears to be its corollary i.e. that some co-ordinating, supervising 
and directing function is required within any organisation, however 
politically, socially or morally laudible its aims may be, and indeed 
it appears to be impossible to think of any forms of human society in 
which these functions have not been necessary.
There is actually some agreement that in practice management 
prerogatives are still considerably intact, although there is dispute 
about their limits, both at the workplace and between commentators, 
and neither is there agreement about how the limits are formed. For 
example, the contention that managerial authority had been reduced 
very little is supported by Armstrong et al and one particularly 
important reason for this is the strength of its force in strategic 
decision-making, which (1981:40), "ensures that any ensuing negotiations
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take place within perameters which have already been unilaterally
determined.". Chamberlain uses a different analysis (1967:198):
"industrial jurisprudence, which consists of all the collective 
bargaining agreements and its interpretations, accepted practices 
which are not subject to unilateral change, and understandings 
which are jointly respected, thus constitutes part of the frame­
work defining management prerogatives. Within that framework, 
management retains freedom of operation.".
This conveys more of the complexity of workplace organisation and 
the suggestion that consequently managerial prerogatives are mutually 
defined, even if only by tacit acquiescence, but in fact both commentries 
suggest a clarity that does not exist. Armstrong et al are right to 
remind us that employer-employee relationships at the workplace can be 
strongly influenced by the characteristics of a wider context, but they 
are wrong to suggest that just one issue, namely strategic decision­
making, is the dominant influence, or that this activity can be concept­
ually isolated. It may be possible to identify strategic decisions and 
non-strategic decisions but there can be no decisions which are solely 
strategic. They nearly always have ramifications at several levels 
and thus become operational decisions or decisions which have operational 
consequences. The decision to replace real ale by keg beer is one which 
Armstrong et al would presumably describe as strategic and it was 
certainly one in which the consumer was not involved, but it has now 
been reversed, both by the action of individual consumers and the 
activity of the most successful consumer organisation ever.
Chamberlain's error is of giving the impression that the features 
of workplace organisation not determined solely by managerial prero­
gatives can be so clearly identified that they could almost be 
topographically represented and the area still subject to managerial
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prerogative printed in a different colour. He assumes that there would 
be agreement about all the items that would fall within the three main 
categories he describes, that the interpretations, accepted practices 
and understandings relating to specific topics would be equally mutually 
agreed, and that the organisation of workplace relationships is static, 
and these are all obviously false assumptions. Management may maintain 
a belief in certain prerogatives only to find that they do not exist 
when tested or they may find that one type of action unchallenged on 
one occasion is contested on another. There may be losses and gains by 
both staff and management which neither is aware of. Managerial or 
working practices may exist which the other side is prepared to tolerate 
informally but which it could not concede on a formal basis. There 
will also be differences within the different levels of management and 
trade union organisations about the prerogatives that management may or 
may not exercise.
Such considerations mean that summarising the areas of managerial 
prerogative creates not merely a semantic problem but a conceptual one 
as well. Nevertheless, prerogatives do exist and have sometimes been 
very publically demonstrated to exist. It has also been argued that 
managerial power is little diminished if the owners or management have 
the ability to end the existence of the employing enterprise, particul­
arly if it is despite or because of staff and trade union opposition.
It has been commonplace to hear of companies ceasing production, often 
in the face of short-lived and unsuccessful opposition from their 
workforces, and there have been a number of highly publicised occasions 
when employees of some of the largest companies have been given a choice 
of accepting unattractive changes in their terms and conditions of 
service or forcing the closure of the company. In at least two instances.
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at Odhams Press and AnselIs Brewery, production has permanently 
ceased during the middle of industrial action about terms and conditions 
of service.
Although deprived of such extreme options, the local research
data indicated that the shop stewards felt that the Health Authority's
senior management wielded considerable power without opposition.
Referring to Area officers generally, one NUPE shop steward explained,
"They just don't want to listen, do they. I mean H. is noted for it,
isn't he.". In the more specific context of how H. handled the exercise
of losing four hundred posts, which necessitated some redundancies, a
NALGO representative described how:
"He did it so that he wouldn't have any long discussions. He 
wouldn't have a drawn out discussion and perhaps a weakening of 
his position by consultation. Just presented it as a fait accompli, 
'That's it.', and the unions either had to accept it or get together 
and make some action. So it was a sort of blunderbuss approach that 
worked very well. I think his approach was sort of to blunderbuss 
it through, which he did, and the unions weren't organised enough 
really, or concerted enough in their actions. It was just such a 
surprise.".
The Society of Radiographers' representative referred to a NUPE
representative who had walked out of the meeting at which H. had
announced the redundancies to the shop stewards and staff representatives:
"He wouldn't discuss matters with H., which I thought was really 
silly, because if you don't discuss it how d'you know what he is 
going to do, because he said straight, 'Well whether you stay or 
not. I'm going to do it'.".
Another NALGO representative commented:
"There seems to be, as far as I can understand from what we're 
told at the executive meetings, that major policies are announced 
by South Glamorgan and really NALGO don't have much say. I don't 
know whether there is a lot of negotiating going on that we don't 
know about.".
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When asked if there was consultation she replied, "Well is it consulta­
tion when you're sort of taken to a meeting and just told?". An 
identical sentiment was expressed by one of the NUPE shop stewards 
but this time it related to her head of department, who was in fact 
the same NALGO representative:
"When we have the changeover in the beginning of the year, I would 
like to sort of be - I won't say involved in it, because obviously 
she's going to put the girls where she wants - but it would be nice 
to be able to know what is happening before you're actually told 
it in a meeting.".
However, the greatest significance of this statement is that in 
it a senior shop steward affirms the head of department's ability to 
allocate staff to duties without questioning or opposition. Other 
representatives gave further examples of managerial decision-making 
they would obey even if they did not agree with it. One NUPE shop 
steward explained that she would always do as she was told by the 
administrator, which was why she had cooked meals to be given free to 
members of staff working in the hospital while it was snowbound, 
although she disagreed with the instruction. The same steward also 
declared that she would never challenge the appointment of a member of 
staff, however strongly she felt that a wrong decision was being made, 
and an ASTMS representative similarly believed that, "It is management's 
undoubted and absolute right to decide who they employ.", although he 
could think of no other absolute managerial prerogative.
Some managements have attempted to obtain ratification of their 
right to manage in formal agreements with trade unions. Reference has 
already been made to the desire of the Association of Health Service 
Treasurers to formally identify the areas of managerial prerogatives 
and Goodrich (1975:56-9) provides examples of written statements of
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managerial authority that have actually been introduced. But such
statements and agreements appear to be of little force in their own
right. Clegg (1979:121) confirms that:
"a great many agreements, especially in recent years, specify 
rules governing particular aspects of work, and the obligations 
of employees to accept managerial decisions on specific matters. 
In practice, these rules are sometimes repudiated by trade 
unionists even though they have been signed by their unions. But 
much more commonly the rules are circumvented.".
Such restrictions on managerial authority will usually arise from 
the pragmatic concerns of staff but the research data reveals that they 
also originate from the need to protect what are regarded as the minimal
rights of employees and to achieve a reasonable return on the goodwill
exercised by staff which is to management's benefit. An ASTMS repres­
entative explained the first:
"It seemed to be that because there was no organised representation 
there was a gradual drift, from agreement about things to dictation 
about things. But I couldn't find a valid reason to explain it 
except the fact that there was no longer any organised opposition. 
And that's a bad word, 'opposition' - I don't like the word - but 
that's what seemed to be the case. Because we had no organisation 
at all, or no representation at all, no central points of contact 
between the staff as a group and the management as a group, the 
management began to expand their sphere of influence, to the point 
where they began to forget that they were maybe eroding some of 
the ri^ts that members of staff had.".
A NALGO representative saw clearly the value of goodwill as industrial 
relations currency and mentioned how it may have influenced the intro­
duction of rostered Saturday morning working:
"I think that, for instance, they may have thought twice about
introducing it, just unilaterally about this, because they may 
have felt there would be a backlash. And obviously, you also 
want the goodwill of people, because lots of things go on in this 
hospital, the service I mean, which is all goodwill. I mean, for 
instance, we separate specimens on call, we answer queries. If 
we said, "Right, we're only going to do what we're called in for.', 
well the service suffers.".
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But while it may seem reasonable that absolute managerial prero­
gatives have gone the way of the divine right of kings and management 
is apparently now by consent, it could mean that industrial relations 
power is confused. At the extremes this could produce managerial 
paralysis or constant industrial guerilla warfare, and this was 
recognised in the report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employeees* Associations (1968 para 390):
"there is considerable confusion as to what management does and 
does not have the right to do; or, where it is conceded to have 
the right, whether it is or is not making reasonable use of it.".
It seemed essential to try and resolve this confusion if any insight
was to be gained into how the managerial function could be exercised
with increased participation. Should participation supplement, replace
or defer to all the other ways in which staff affect the exercise of
the managerial function, and in any case what authority does management
have left if it is subject to successful challenges? The data showed
that staff attitudes to managerial authority were ambiguous and the
methodological lesson was learned that if one presupposes that a
consistent conclusion is available to be discovered there is then a
very strong possibility that it leads the research participants to
either become confused about their own ideas or reach logical
conclusions which do not accurately reflect their own beliefs.
On a general level, it did indeed seem that industrial chaos could 
not be far away because the trade union and staff organisation repres­
entatives described little restriction on the managerial activity that 
they were prepared to challenge. To one NUPE official it was simple - 
"your're in a position to dictate, and its in other people's position 
whether to accept or not." - as it was for another NUPE shop steward:
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"There again, why should she make all the decisions, perhaps be 
wrong against the girls from what the girls can see, and just let 
her get away with it? Why shouldn't the girls have somebody to 
stand for them if they feel they should?".
Neither would consultation reduce her inclination to challenge manage­
ment if she felt strongly enough. She had commented;
"Well it's her decision isn't it, at the end of the day, unless 
it was something I felt was radically wrong. It would still be 
her decision, althou^ you've discussed it."
and when asked what she would do if she thought it was radically wrong,
she replied;
"Well then I wouldn't agree with it - and take it from there.". 
Other shop stewards and staff representatives expressed similar views 
and could not think of any managerial decisions that they would not 
challenge if necessary. Yet these were the very same people that 
appeared to be genuinely convinced of the existence of 'the right to 
manage'. The contradiction became even more obvious when they were 
subsequently asked if they would ever challenge the appointment of a 
new member of staff by management and none of them said that they would.
The full ambiguity of the belief of staff in the right to manage 
and the right to challenge the right to manage is best illustrated by 
extracts at length from individual interviews. One NUPE shop steward 
was initially defensive about questioning managerial decisions;
Bernard; If you didn't have the right to challenge what was being said, 
sometimes, then management could just go away - they could just do 
what they liked.".
"They can challenge it but they aren't necessarily going to win 
it, are they".
"I think that surely the unions really only challenge where manage­
ment oversteps that mark, that law. (long pause) So from my point
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of view I wouldn't challenge a manager's right to manage, as 
long as they managed in accordance with the law.".
He then recognised that in fact there was much else that he would 
dispute, such as staffing levels, terms and conditions of service and 
the level of overtime, as the following extract shows;
Researcher; I might decide as a manager that we only need - I can't 
even remember off-hand how many ODAs there are - but supposing 
I as a manager said, 'We only need five ODAs.' and you disagree 
with me?
Bernard; Right. So as the right to manage, you make a decision to
say that you only need five, then I would say that the union
side have got a right to argue with management if they think
that they want more than five. But then it's a question of
negotiation, isn't it. You have put the case forward, both sides
have to put the case forward.
Even after this he asserted;
"I've never disputed the fact that the manager's got the right to 
manage."
But when pushed further he qualified his stance;
"The managers have the right to manage but if we're not happy with 
what's being done, then no, I think we have the right to challenge 
them."
One of the ASTMS representatives was similarly led into recognising 
the apparent contradiction in his beliefs;
Eric; I accept that the manager, first of all he has the right to 
manage.
Researcher; What does that mean?
Eric; To me that means he has the right, in the end, to go his own way. 
Researcher; You say 'a right', but in fact if he decided to go his own 
way you might still oppose him.
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Eric: Oh, yes.
Researcher: So does that mean it is a right?
Eric: Well what I mean is that he has the ability to decide in which
direction he will go and having decided that, he can go in that 
direction.
Researcher: If you're going to oppose him, how can he achieve it?
Eric: Well, if we're going to oppose him then, as I say, he can try
to go in that direction. If he docsn't achieve it, it simply 
means that in that particular issue at that particular point in 
time we had better arguments than he did - or we had better guns 
that he did. Right?
Another NUPE shop steward resisted the influence to achieve a 
logically consistent conclusion and in doing so demonstrated that the 
ambiguity about managerial authority has real meaning:
Researcher: If you are prepared to challenge her if you feel strongly
enough about it, what authority has she got to make decisions 
then? In other words, aren't you saying she has only got authority 
to make decisions if you agree with her?
Dilys: No, I think you're taking that wrong really. If S. makes a
decision, she makes a decision. Say for example, the girls can 
only have a week's holiday a year in the summer, in the peak period, 
well wouldn't you - I mean any trade union - well I would personally, 
I would challenge that. Because I would have felt in that case 
that the girls should have had two weeks. But I mean it's not 
taking S.'s authority away from her at all.
Researcher: If you say it's not challenging her authority, what does
her authority mean?
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Dilys: Well it is challenging her authority on one particular point,
but it's not challenging her authority in general, is it.
This shop steward had an obvious respect for her head of department and
a number of times emphasised that she was:
"not challenging S.'s authority at all, but perhaps just one 
particular decision that she's made, which I wouldn't say was her 
authority anyway.".
When asked if her authority was undermined if she was challenged
frequently, she replied:
"Well if it happened very frequently it wouldn't be a very good 
manager, would it, because a good manager isn't going to make 
decisions that people have got to challenge all the time, is she."
The same shop steward also urged that trade union involvement in
management should be seen in proper proportion:
"Well I mean, do you ask the trade union for every decision you
make, for everything you say, do you go to the trade unions? Of
course you don't. It's only certain things, isn't it, that you 
have to go to trade unions, so your authority's here in this 
hospital, isn't it.".
Nevertheless her propensity to challenge was unfettered:
"I don't see that it should be all management's say and, "Right, 
the girls do this and this and this.', without any representation 
from the staff to say what they feel.".
Researcher: Are there any things which you would never challenge?
Dilys: Well if I think management's got the right, I say to the girls,
'I think they've got the right.'.
Researcher: What sort of things then?
Dilys: Well there again I haven't really come up against that.
Researcher: No, what I mean is, are there some things, nor necessarily
where you might just agree with management, but where you actually 
think, 'It's not appropriate for a trade union to say anything. 
That is management's right to do that, whether I agree with it or 
not. That is management's prerogative.'? Is there anything like 
that?
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Dilys: Well I haven't come across it. I don't say I won't (laughing),
but I haven't so far.
Armstrong et al are among the few commentators who have addressed
themselves to the ambiguity contained in these interviews, and they
summarise it accurately:
"Few of them nowadays would accept managerial power or the pursuit 
of profit without qualification - although it is important to 
stress that qualification is not the same thing as rejection." 
(1981:42).
They add (1981:66):
"It is important to note that workers frequently find it necessary 
and consider it legitimate to distinguish between their generalised 
'duty to obey' and their 'duty to obey' specific managerial 
instructions in specific situations. Thus a generalised acceptance 
of management's prerogative to discipline individual workers seldom 
extends to an acceptance of each and every instance of that 
prerogative being exercised. When unconvinced, well-organised 
workers are perfectly capable of resisting managers' 'legal rights'. 
Even at the individual level workers may resist the right of 
managers to decide the content of their work.".
The inability of the representatives to articulate this distinction is
not surprising, particularly since, as Goodrich identifies (1975:56),
the issues that staff and trade unions feel that it is appropriate to
influence or challenge are, "more a matter of accepted custom than of
precisely stated principle.".
One NALGO representative summarised the situation very pithily:
"I think that if management's fair, that's all right. You just 
decide that you're fair and you say, "Oh, well I'm - that will 
have to be.'. But of course in lots of circumstances you've got 
to give and take.".
Unfortunately, what is equally obvious is that participants in industrial
relations often do not share the same perceptions of when those different
circumstances exist or of what it is that is giveable and what it is that
is takeable. Paster (1954:115) touches on this dilemma within the
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context of formal negotiations;
"The management representative has in mind the limits to which he 
will go and beyond which he will not go, even if it means a 
strike. The union representative has in mind concessions from 
management which he regards as essential if the negotiations are 
not to end in a strike. Neither negotiator knows what the true 
limits of the other are.".
The NALGO representative's statement that there are some issues
about which management must exercise some give and take has two
important consequences. One of them has been identified by Armstrong
et al (1981:64);
"Thus it needs to be re-asserted that rule making begins as a 
management process and that it becomes material for 'industrial 
relations' only as an 'exception' and by way of reaction to the 
background process of management rule-making."
i.e. the initiative lies with management. The other significant feature 
of this arrangement is that there may be a high degree of unpredicta­
bility about what workers are prepared to tolerate without question.
However, this spontaneity not only occurs in response to what is 
essentially a managerially-determined rule-making process but also from 
within relationships very much governed by workers' beliefs in the 
legitimacy of the authority of management, as the research interviews 
clearly illustrated. This in turn means that management can indeed 
exercise prerogative power, or prerogatives which may be called 'as i f  
prerogatives. That is, there may be no absolute prerogatives but if 
management acts as if they do exist the response from the staff will 
often be confirmatory, and again this was well demonstrated by the 
research data. The notion of 'as i f  prerogatives is also of course 
readily inferred from an interactionist analysis and consistent with 
the distinction previously stated between the concepts of power and 
authority.
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Marchington (1980:169) relates the strength of the effects of the
exercise of as if prerogatives with workers' desire to participate:
"we can again draw attention to employees' apathy towards partici­
pation in management decision-making and argue that it may be 
precisely because they feel it to be a prerogative of management 
that their propensity to participate is so low.".
It is therefore misleading for Daniel and McIntosh (1972:198) to argue
that :
"Any management prerogative to manage is ultimately based on the 
agreement of the managed and increasingly management will have to 
earn and will that agreement rather than claim it as of right by 
virtue of its position.".
There can be an enormous difference between "agreement" in the sense of
having considered an issue and decided not to oppose it, and uncritical
acquiescence. It would thus be wrong to suggest that when there is no
disagreement there is agreement, and pragmatic management may be as
much if not more concerned with maintaining this pacifity and so prevent
issues becoming ones of potential conflict, rather than positively
seeking to reach agreement on issues which have already generated
conflict.
This distinction between acquiescence with, rather than agreement 
on, the exercise of as if prerogatives becomes very apparent when there 
is a major challenge to managerial decision-making and management 
articulates the belief that ultimately it is defending the right to 
manage. It never provokes a sympathetic response from the trade unions 
or staff and even those who identify with managerial objectives, 
e.g. Tether (1982), may denigrate such a defence for the imposition of 
the management will.
In practice, there can be large areas of workplace activity governed 
by the exercise of as if prerogatives but it is extremely unlikely that
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they will govern every aspect and there has been an increase in the 
number and type of issues about which workers are no longer prepared 
to acquiesce. Management has been more concerned with the pragmatic 
rather than principled exercise of its function and this has meant 
that :
"Since the 1960s this confusion over the rights of management has 
been resolved, at least in part, by the gradual extension of 
collective bargaining over issues of substance which were once 
determined unilaterally by employers. This trend, though gradual 
and uneven, has been positively encouraged by public policy." 
(Hawkins 1979:161).
For a number of reasons, decision-making became increasingly not only
about what to achieve but also how to achieve it:
"The distinction between negotiation and consultation had f<2cto 
become obsolete, and management had recognized that to get the 
right decisions taken, accepted and implemented was more important 
than prerogatives; that they could not get change unless all 
parties accepted change and were prepared to play their part, 
which required reaching agreement across the whole range of 
issues."
(Daniel and McIntosh 1972:81).
The point at which it is no longer possible to successfully 
exercise as if prerogatives, and either joint agreement is necessary 
or unilateral action by workers is possible, is often called the 
frontier of control. As a description, this phrase is misleading but 
it provides a label for a very useful concept. It should now be 
obvious that there are not just two types of control, that which manage­
ment exercises and that which management does not or shares, each on one 
side of a solid, fixed line or definition. In reality, the distinction 
is sometimes very clear and sometimes a barely perceptible gradation of 
influence. The extent of control also differs with individuals, over 
issues, with time and in the perceptions of both individuals and 
interested collectivities. It may often be unknown or even located in
-179-
different places by different individuals, with the differing definition 
of each unknown to the others. Batstone et al (1977:241) recognised that, 
"the frontier of control is not stable." and this is emphasised by 
Hyman (1975:25):
"in every workplace there exists an invisible frontier of control, 
reducing some of the formal powers of the employer: a frontier 
which is defined and re-defined in a oont'tnuous process of pressure 
and counter-pressure, conflict and accommodation, overt and tacit 
struggle.".
But there is scepticism about whether the diminution in the power
of management is of any real significance and whether workers are
prepared to alter the balance of power so substantially anyway. Indeed,
it would appear that this is the orientation supported by the research
data, and once again Hyman accurately anticipates it (1977:97):
"The employer continues to make the fundamental policy decisions, 
while the control which workers have carved out impinges only on 
the implementation of this policy. Indeed, management is normally 
able to tolerate this situation precisely because the workers 
themselves - or at least their shop floor representatives - 
realise that their restrictions on management must not go 'too 
far'.".
However, both the participants in the research and Hyman under­
estimate two of the characteristics of workplace organisations. One is 
that for management the means of implementation are just as important 
as the decision-making process itself, and secondly, staff may have no 
overt wish to fundamentally threaten management's authority yet have 
no regard for what may be the logical consequences of constantly 
challenging management on a pragmatic basis. What becomes clear is 
that the definition of what is negotiable is itself negotiable, can be 
manipulated, and is subject to change by a whole host of industrial 
relation factors. On a practical level, it may be possible to subsume 
collective bargaining and the ever-dynamic process of accommodation at
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the workplace under the category of industrial relations activity 
labelled 'participation*. On a more general level, the definition of 
what is negotiable will strongly influence the content of participation 
systems at the same time as participation contributes to the definition; 
the participation can be used by all of those involved in it to maintain 
or alter their definition of what is negotiable; and participation is 




TRADE UNIONS - PERCEPTIONS OF MOTIVATION AND METHODS
The relationship between participation and trade union activity is 
one of some considerable ambivalence. On the one hand, for many 
managers one of the key objectives of participation is to reduce or 
circumvent trade union activity, and on the other hand trade union 
activity can be a fundamental form of participation in action. For 
managers who wish to improve their participative systems this in turn 
raises the problem of whether to do so by involving staff directly or 
by using the existing trade union structure. Many commentators 
(e.g. Daniel and McIntosh 1972, Purcell 1979, TUC 1979) have argued 
that where a trade union organisation already exists any participative 
arrangements which do not give it a substantial function could not, 
and would not be allowed to, compete successfully. Lately, however, 
it has been argued (e.g. Institute of Directors 1983, SDP 1982) that 
the alleged decline in the state of industrial relations in Britain in 
recent years has been partly attributable to management relying 
exclusively on its liaison with trade unions to communicate with its 
workforce.
The exercise of trade union initiative would be worthy of 
investigation within the context of research into participation if it 
did nothing other than contribute to the analysis of these conflicting 
opinions, but such enquiries can also reveal important loc'al data with 
a bearing on arrangements for participation. They can reveal examples 
of specific issues that cause concern to individual members, or groups.
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of staff or their representatives; they may reveal features of the 
way in which the management function is undertaken that the staff 
find unsatisfactory; and they may be a further means of establishing 
the nature of the staff's general constructs of the employing 
relationship.
The extent of trade union membership and activity in the NHS is 
typical of much of that in the public sector generally. The proportion 
of staff belonging to a staff organisation or trade union is high, 
there is a comprehensive system of local representatives, and the 
trade unions representing the ancillary or manual staff are amongst 
those known to be the most active in the trade union movement nationally 
Llandough Hospital is no exception to this description.
Affiliation
The NTIPE shop stewards in particular had a strong belief in the 
ability and strength of their union. At the beginning of an interview 
with one NUPE shop steward, for example, some very general questions 
designed to be of little consequence were asked in order to relax the 
shop steward. She had been in NUPE for some years and the conmenL was 
made that, "You've seen a change in ten years I suppose?", to which 
the shop steward replied with considerable confidence and emphasis,
"Yes, we're stronger.". The forcefulness with which this was said is 
perhaps difficult to convey but the use of a personal rather than 
impersonal pronoun is additionally indicative.
The same shop steward was later asked:
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Researcher: People in this hospital, just talking generally, seem
to have great deal of faith in NUPE. Why do you think that is?
Mary: We have got a good union, you know.
Researcher: What makes it a good union then, in your eyes?
Mary: Well, it's a union you can depend on, for a start. You know, 
if anything goes wrong you've got union officers on call. I 
mean, you can just pick up a 'phone if there's anything that 
don't know, we can't handle. You can just pick up a 'phone, and 
more often than not you can get them out, which is good I suppose. 
It is interesting to note the mention of the union's on-call system 
and one wonders whether this is standard trade union practice, 
reflecting the urgent demands of a twenty-four hour service, or whether 
it is a form of imitation of the medical milieu in which the repres­
entatives find themselves.
The intensity of this shop steward's loyalty to her union was 
demonstrated during a meeting with all the shop stewards and staff 
representatives who had been involved in the research. She said
nothing during the meeting until disagreement began to show between
two NUPE shop stewards and one of them agreed that it was because of 
NUPE that the health authority had altered one of its policies 
relating to staff and this had been to the detriment of some union 
members. At this point, Mary spoke for the first time and said,
"Once you start running down your own union you might as well give in 
to them.". During an interview another shop steward almost seemed to 
imply that NUPE was one of the more moderate trade unions. The 
observation was made that, "NUPE does have a reputation for being 
probably one of the most extreme unions in the Health Service.", to 
which she replied, "But NUPE seems to get it all solved without sort
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of going as far as say the miners* union, and things like that.".
From day-to-day contact with staff it appeared that the ordinary 
members regarded the union with equally high esteem and this was 
confirmed by the shop stewards. However, this reflected rather more 
on the shop stewards than the union organisation as a whole and there 
were some shop stewards who were both surprised at the level of trust 
that was placed upon them by their members and unclear about why they 
were so highly regarded. One shop steward remarked, "It's marvellous, 
really, because I can say 99% have got faith in the shop steward.", 
and another shop steward who was asked why staff went to her with 
problems rather than their supervisors replied, "I think they must 
think that I can sort of solve things better than them because I'm 
shop steward.", although she could think of no reason why staff should 
make this judgement.
There was one obvious inference to be made from the evidence and 
statements of the strength of support for NUPE and this was put to one 
of its shop stewards:
Researcher: It is surprising how strongly people feel about their
union and I must admit that there are some people in the hospital 
who have a fantastic faith in NUPE. Doesn't that imply there's 
something radically wrong with the way the place is being run? 
Colin: No, I don't think so, not in that respect. You've got some
who've fantastic faith in NUPE because perhaps NUPE did something 




This answer is a not entirely satisfactory explanation for the 
high standing of the union amongst the staff but more positive 
responses were elicited from the shop stewards and staff representatives 
who were asked what difference it would make if there were no trade 
unions in the hospital. Only the Society of Radiographers* repres­
entative said it would be, "Possibly very little, to be quite frank, 
as we are, in this hospital.", and this was largely because she 
considered that the main purpose of the Society was to negotiate 
nationally about pay and terms and conditions of service. Other shop 
stewards and staff representatives were certain that the activities 
of their organisations were an important check on the activity of 
management and cited examples that indicated that this was of 
particular relevance at local level. In reply to the question, "Why 
do you think you need a shop steward, or a trade union for that matter?", 
one NUPE shop steward answered, "To stick up for your rights, isn't it.". 
To clarify this a little, she was asked:
Researcher: Well put it this way then. What would happen do you
think if there was no trade union, or if there were no shop 
stewards?
Mary: Well they'd just walk over you, not just here but everywhere.
She was unable to explain what she meant by this in general terms but 
gave the example of how individuals in her department were reluctant 
on their own to ask their departmental manager for time off. She 
continued by stating, "I think a lot of things would get pushed under 
the carpet if it wasn't for trade unions.", and gave the allocation of 
leave and accidents at work as further examples.
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Another NUPE shop steward felt that, "I think if there was no 
trade union the girls would have nothing to fall back on, nothing to 
help them.". She shared the worst fears of those concerned about the 
behaviour of management in the absence of unions, as these questions 
and answers show:
Researcher: Some people think that management might even actually
positively exploit the staff if there were no trade unions.
Dilys: Well I think it would come to that.
Researcher: How do you think they could?
Dilys: Well there's so many ways. There's hours, wages, anything.
Another NUPE officer initially disagreed with this opinion. 
Researcher: Some people have the attitude that if there was no trade
union management would exploit the workers as much as they could. 
Sam: No, I don't think that. I've never thought that.
For him, the primary function of a trade union appeared to be one of 
co-ordination. He was asked what would happen if there were no trade 
union:
Sam: Well you'd have each man fighting for his own good, and you'd
have chaos in my opinion.
Researcher: You mean each member of staff?
Sam: Between each meater of staff, because everybody would have a
different opinion, and they'd all be saying, 'I should be getting 
this.' and, 'I should be getting that.', whereas with a trade 
union it's laid down, you get this and that, and that's it. 
Everybody gets the same.
This was taken to mean that trade unions are responsible for establish­
ing uniform terms and conditions of service for staff but the officer
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had a second concern, which appeared to be with the other extreme, 
the interests of individual members;
Researcher: Back in 1960 I imagine people only joined the union as a
sort of insurance, didn't they, just in case anything went wrong? 
Sam: Well, that's all anybody joins a union anytime for, really.
Researcher: Even today, do you think?
Sam: Even today. It's not for what they're going to get out of it -
they know that if they join a union that if anything goes wrong, 
there's somebody there to talk for them.
Intermediaries
The ability to act as an advocate, together with being able to 
provide knowledge and practical advice, seemed to be similarly regarded 
by ASTMS members as one of the main functions of trade union repres­
entatives. One of the ASTMS representatives described how:
"The bulk of the staff, in Pathology anyway, are fairly vague 
about their conditions of service for a start. They're fairly 
vague about their rights and about their duties. And that's 
something that never ceases to surprise me, that they are as 
vague as they are about what they're supposed to do. They always 
know a bit more about their own rights, but they don't know that 
much more about their duties, what they're getting paid for. But 
I think they feel, or they seem to feel, that as long as somebody 
does and they can be sure that someone is likely to side with them 
they're happy, because if anything happened they've got somebody 
they can go to that they trust who can give them the information 
they need, give them advice or guidance, and on top of that has 
the nerve to go along to talk to people like management on their 
behalf, where as they may not have either the nerve or the 
inclination or the skills to do it themselves.".
The provision of advice was identified by one of the NUPE shop 
stewards as one of the main functions of trade union representatives, 
but she intended that it should be directed equally as much to manage­
ment as to the members. Throughout the research interview she conveyed
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a somewhat naive or possibly deliberately diplomatic approach about the
nature of staff/trade union/management relations, which included the
implication that management is usually right but occasionally makes
mistakes and trade unions exist to point these errors out and to
provide the correct solutions. Another NUPE shop steward felt that
trade unions had an important duty even when management was acting
reasonably. During a discussion about a forthcoming disciplinary
interview he remarked:
"The right is on your side. The black and white is on your side, 
put it like that. Of course, you'll meet opposition. You can't 
expect us to come in here and - you've got to be seen doing 
justice.".
Protagonists
Other representatives stressed the function of trade unions as 
the means by which staff defend themselves in the inevitable or 
assumed conflict of interests between themselves and management. One 
NUPE shop steward was asked:
Researcher: Is it that there are some people who will always be
bound to believe, or have this more traditional attitude, that 
management is always trying to get one over on the staff. Do 
you get people like that? 
to which he replied:
Colin: Well, obviously you do get that feeling, but I don't think it
is generally felt. I think it's generally a belief that it's us 
versus you in the respect that you're trying to get the best you 
can and we want the best we can. So there's always going to be 
that difference between us, you see.
A similar sentiment emerged when he clarified why the porters were so 
concerned about whether a duty was theirs or not:
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"As you know, we've had many a discussion over the duties of a 
porter and therefore they feel why should it be - like you, for 
instance - who decides each time what is our duty. It's not in 
the Whitley Council handbook what our duties are. So therefore 
it's got to be contested each time. We might win, we might lose.".
An ASTMS representative explained that trade unions become involved in
contesting management decisions because staff are far more sensitive to
threats to their jobs as a result of changes introduced by management
than management realises:
"I know there's a long distance between a real threat to job 
security and a perceived threat, and on top of that there's an even 
longer distance between a perceived threat to job insecurity and 
a minor, little detail of management decision which the employee 
instinctively feels takes him a stage closer to job insecurity.".
Lee (1982:50) confirms that the strength of opposition and 
sensitivity described by the last two representatives is found else­
where in employing enterprises:
"How is it that apparently normal and reasonable people can 
become so intransigent as to put their livelihood in danger, 
sooner than yield to what most people would regard as common 
sense measures? At the heart of each apparently unreasonable 
stand lies some kind of quite logical and justifiable fear. This 
fear fuels an anger which directs an antagonistic response, in 
much the same way as any sudden encounter with something strange 
will promote an aggressive reaction.
On the shop floor, this anger is intensified by the member of 
each previous occasion when a similar situation has led to people 
feeling 'conned' or otherwise unhappy. As a result, quite minor 
and relatively insignificant fears may produce disproportionately 
vigorous opposition, which is reinforced by the memory of each 
previous time that resistance paid off. This is a cumulative 
process, which results in the old hands becoming steadily more 
stubborn, as even the most trivial of fears becomes magnified 
and triggers intense opposition.....
Any new proposal not only has to present strong grounds for 
accepting the change, but must also overcome this backlog of 
associated experience, which promotes a bias against it.".
This was a task which many shop stewards and staff representatives 
felt they contributed to, despite their essentially adversarial role. 
One NUPE shop steward put it bluntly:
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"My main purpose is to avoid industrial action.".
The Society of Radiographers* representative explained the difficulty 
in liaising with staff about management initiatives;
Meryl: It takes an awful long time to appreciate that you can't
just do it, that you're not pulling the wool over our eyes, and 
it's very difficult to get that over to them.
The interview continued with a reference to staff representatives 
but the representative: interrupted:
Researcher: I also realise now that they spend quite a lot of time ....
Meryl: Defending you (laughing).
As a result, she stated, "We find ourselves piggy-in-the-middle.".
Nevertheless, there was also recognition that trade unions enable
the use of coercion in employees' dealings with management. One of
the ASTMS representatives explained one of the consequences of the
1974 reorganisation of the NHS:
"And all of a sudden we discovered that we were sort of miles 
away from any source of authority to get something done for 
definite. We couldn't get problems solved, without getting 
really nasty about it. So it was really a protection mechanism,
I suppose. Everbody began to expect the unions to start earning 
their money and they began to expect us to start putting up some 
sort of resistance, some sort of defence, and to provide some 
sort of channel through which they could try to prevent the 
management from doing things they didn't like.".
The necessity of attacking management was also expressed by a NUPE
shop steward:
"In the past management would make lots of promises about this - 
they still do not mind, and it's still not achieved. Well it's 
just not on, it remains as it is. And it will remain as it is 
until you get aggressive. The minute you start aggressive, 
management starts to pick up, 'Now what's up, what's the trouble?', 
and that's the only way you get it noticed. Now the form of 
aggressiveness can take a few shapes, you know that, and I'm 
more of an activist, I think, not a pacifist.".
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Defence of the Service - National and Regional Issues
This shop steward then went on to declare, "And yet, see, you've
got the hospital at heart, you've got your own members at heart." and
this raises the complex issue of the nature of the responsibility that
trade unions exercise in maintaining and improving the level of
services provided. One of the unique characteristics of Health
Service trade unions is that their members work in an enterprise with
strong emotional appeal to the general public and they can often
portray themselves as the guardians of the service, warding off attacks
on it by those who run the service but who are also bound by political
or financial constraints. Whether the claim to represent the interests
of patients as well as staff is objectively justifiable is suspect for
a number of reasons, but if it is a genuine belief of trade union
members or their representatives this issue may be yet another factor
influencing the potential for participation. For many managers an
important objective of participation is at the very least to broaden
the outlook of staff beyond a sole concern with the maintenance and
betterment of their own interests and, hopefully, to build on this to
achieve an identification with the interests of the enterprise as a
whole. This implies that participation is one means by which staff
can come to accept some of the constraints upon management and this
was certainly an opinion expressed by an NHS regional administrator
speaking at an IPM annual conference, reported in Personnel Management
(December 1981):
"This was echoed by Brian Edwards of Trent Regional Health 
Authority who wanted the concept of involvement extended to the 
local community, trade unions and other interest groups who are 
all affected by the decisions of NHS management. They could all 
be persuaded to agree to cost containment if a decision making 
framework allowed them to participate.".
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The irony is that, in the NHS, staff and trade unions can be portrayed 
as best preserving the philosophy of the NHS and its services by 
refusing to accept the managerial constraints. It may be more 
difficult, therefore, to make participation attractive if engaging in 
it might not only compromise the protection of the interests of staff 
but also those of patients.
Health Service trade unions, especially NUPE, argue very publicly
that they defend the Service at both national and local levels. Typical
of many comments by trade unionists about the Conservative government's
proposals to test NHS hotel services by competitive tendering is this
one reported by Colin Clifford in Observer Business (11.9.83.):
"A spokesman for NUPE described the circular as a 'major threat 
to the totality of the Health Service' and accused the government 
of being 'hell bent on an ideological policy of destroying the 
Health Service'.".
The same accusation has been made about the arrangements for accommo­
dating private patients in NHS premises. In the South Wales Echo 
(13.1.82.), Neil Docherty reported that twelve private patients would 
be allowed within South Glamorgan Health Authority at any one time, 
which NUPE opposed:
"As part of a protest package they are also planning a 
'Conscientious Objectors' campaign for workers who do not want to 
service the pay beds. A 'conscience clause' is to be drawn up 
for workers to sign ' so that they can indicate their opposition 
to anything that is going to undermine the National Health 
Service, ' said Regional NUPE Organiser Mr Stuart Barber.".
The announcement that the Secretary of State for Wales was looking for
managerial efficiency within the Health Service was greeted equally
vigorously. In the South Wales Echo (24.11.82.) it was reported that:
"'Unions tell public of NHS fears' Unions will try to spell out 
to the people of Cardiff this week what they see as a threat to 
the National Health Service.
Cardiff Trade Union Council have called a public meeting for 
7 o'clock on Friday night as part of their campaign against any
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run down in health provision.
A spokesman for the council said: 'We believe the citizens of
Cardiff are not generally aware of just how big is the threat to 
the National Health Service posed by the government's intention 
to "save" £52 m in Wales by 1989 and destroy a further 9,200 jobs 
in the process.'.".
In The Times (25.9.82.) it was reported that:
"The Welsh Office report containing the proposals calls for 'a 
vigorous and determined attack on costs and control of manpower 
which must be imposed without delay.' The Welsh Office said, 
however, that the document was put out merely for consultation 
with Health Authorities.
Mr Stuart Barber, the NUPE area officer for South Glamorgan said 
he had seen the report, and denied that it was a consultative 
document.
'This is a policy report and calls for the most appalling cuts, 
which, if repeated throughout Britain, will decimate the Health 
Service.'.".
The issue which generated the greatest trade union opposition
locally for several years was the Health Authority's proposal to close
an orthopaedic hospital. The South Wales Echo (17.6.82.) reported
this decision and subsequent comments from staff representatives:
"Royal College of Nursing Officer Mrs Anita Davies said: 'It's
disgusting - they have ignored the public opinion which they are 
supposed to represent.'
Sister Elsie Griffiths of the Hospital Action Committee vowed 
that the fight was not over.
' South Glamorgan Health Authority seem to think they can do what 
they want and ignore public opinion, but we are not finished yet,' 
A meeting of the Action Committee, which includes representatives 
of other unions will be meeting soon to map out the next stage 
in the campaign, she said.".
The newspaper also quoted an NUM officer:
"Mr Haydn Matthews, Social Insurance officer for the National 
Union of Miners for South Wales said he was 'absolutely disgusted' 
at the Authority's stand.
'We are sick about this because, as has been stated time and time 
again, it's the only orthopaedic hospital in Wales.'
'As miners we are very embittered and there is no doubt that we 
will use what influence we have on the coal fields - both 
industrial and political - to try and stop the closure at 
Rhydlafar, even at this late hour.".
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Another report in the South Wales Echo (24.4.84.) was about
allegations by South Glamorgan NUPE branches of poor standards in
local private nursing homes. The full-time officer explained why the
union was getting involved in such issues:
"'It is us who are now the public watchdog. Our members are the 
eyes and ears of the public interest. If we find shop practice 
we will jump on it from a great height.'.".
In many such campaigns the interests of the staff go largely
unmentioned or at least are often implied to be of secondary
importance to the prime objective of preserving the service. However,
a leaflet issued by the South Wales district of NALGO in 1983 emphasised
both and made the priority explicit. The leaflet linked two major
issues and made the combination its title - "Privatisation and Private
Medicine", subtitled "A threat to jobs and services". It described
how, 'We need to be aware that any step towards privatisation
jeopardises the future of the National Health Service and threatens
jobs" and, "Privatisation and private medicine both form part of the
government's campaign to dismantle the NHS.". It looked at the cost
of managing the Health Service and concluded:
"Looking at these figures should convince anyone that the National 
Health Service is still the most efficient and viable method of 
providing health care and must be protected at all costs.".
As a remedy:
"it is vital for anyone, who is interested in the future of the 
National Health Service, to become active in their trade union and 
to apply pressure on those politicians who make decisions affecting 
the NHS.".
At the end, priority was given to altrusim:
"The message to all NALGO members is clear, we must organise to 
defend our jobs, but more importantly we must defend the Health 
Service.
The people of this country deserve to keep the service that they 
have enjoyed since it was introduced by those more enlightened 
politicians all those years ago.
Let us show that NALGO members really do PUT PEOPLE FIRST.".
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Defence of the Service - Local Sentiment
These statements may be expressions of genuine passion, but may
also be rhetoric concealing a fight to support the members' interests
and/or a ruse to take the opportunity to reverse the hero and villain
roles usually allocated during disputes such as national pay award
campaigns. In the research at least, it appeared that there are
indeed trade union and staff representatives who have a sincere belief
that because they do not have to consider the financial restrictions
that managers do they are concerned to positively maintain and enhance
the level and quality of services to an extent that exceeds the
intentions of management. One NUPE shop steward described, for
example, how for him, "no matter what happens, the patient has always
got to come first, irrespective of anything else. Irrespective of
trade union, or anything else." and another emphasised that management
did not always appear to share this priority:
"You know as well as I do, you're under directives to cut down 
staffing, cut down time, anywhere and everywhere that you can. 
Which you have done, which is your job. But it boils down to - 
who suffers most, who's the most important in a hospital? It's 
the patients, isn't it, whether it's on the waiting lists or in 
attendance - a person waiting for a bottle.".
That this was not the unanimous opinion of the staff representat­
ives was well demonstrated by a NUPE housekeeping shop steward who 
even found it difficult to comprehend what the caring role could be 
for trade unionists:
Researcher: Some people say the staff care more about the service
than the management. Do you think that's true?
Mary: They care more about what?
Researcher: The staff care more about the service than the management,
Mary: (long pause) The Service. What do you mean by 'service'?
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Researcher: Well, I mean in your instance it would be the level of
cleanliness.
Mary : (quietly) Than the management? (very long pause) Oh I don't
know.
Researcher: Or do you see that it's any part of your job as a shop
steward to make sure that the hospital is clean?
Mary: No, it's not my job. No.
The same shop steward later confirmed, "It's not our job to see how 
the hospital is run.". The meaning that this statement had for the 
shop steward was then tested during a discussion about a negotiating 
issue that the shop steward had been personally involved in. It had 
been proposed to reduce the level of staffing provided for the cleaning 
of the operating theatres and the extent and method of doing so had 
been negotiated with the NUPE shop stewards. The shop steward was 
therefore asked:
"Assuming your members' interests are looked after, would you then 
have any concern about the level of cleanliness, or would you say, 
'No, management ordered it, it's their problem if they get 
complaints'?",
to which she replied:
"Yes , it's still their job.".
To the advocates of increased participation such candid self- 
interest is either only what is to be expected or indicates the 
absence of an important precursor, depending upon their own approach. 
The 'missionaries' would expect self-interest to be almost the sole 
goal of staff until increased involvement converts them to identifica­
tion with the goals of management. The 'prospectors' on the other 
hand, believe that the desire to participate and contribute to manage­
ment's goals exists but is not forthcoming because management fails to
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provide the means for it to do so. The ambiguity presented by this
co-existence of altruistic and self-interested trade union motivation
is not merely academically interesting but is also significant in
practice, because there are many who argue that trade unions are not,
and should not be, concerned with wider issues in the NHS. Some of
the tactics that have been used by NUPE, COHSE and the consultant
medical staff to influence government policies on private patients, for
example, are described by Macfarlane, who warns (1981:164) that:
"The unpalatable truth that needs to be asserted is that coercive 
industrial action against the government in furtherance of 
directly political objectives is a danger to the democratic 
political system.".
More specifically, a Times leader (27.4.82.) referred to a serious
reduction in the standard of patient care caused by industrial action
in support of national pay claims and identified the irony that:
"The NHS will be given another shove towards the status of a 
second class service by the very people who most vocally object 
to that possibility.".
In a letter to The Times (6.9.82.), the then General Secretary of the
Labour party detailed the objectives of trade unions and he included
that they press for good social services, but the TUG has made it
clear that this is not where its priorities lie (1983:5):
"Trade union representatives have a paramount responsibility to 
defend and advance the interests of their members.".
The history of the NHS includes many occasions when the interests of
the staff have not been the same as the interests of the service but
have been represented to be so:
"Of course, campaigns around non-reconomic issues are not always 
entirely altruistic. For example, in the late 1970s, both COHSE 
and the Ren fought virorously against a proposed re-organisation 
of mental handicap services which would have caused a shift 
towards local authority, community-based services, with a 
declining role envisaged for hospital-based nurses. COHSE and 
the Ren alike were motivated mainly by concern about the career 
prospects of their nurse members." (Carpenter 1982:86).
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It is tempting to conclude that trade unions are neither entirely 
selfish nor the true guardians of the service, and there would be some 
justification in this. There are times when they pursue their own 
interests and times when they pursue the interests of the service, 
times when the two coincide and times when the interests of one are 
sacrificed in the short term for the interests of the other in the 
long term, and vice versa. The very inconsistency and confusion of 
such a, conclusion may itself commend it as accurately reflecting the 
reality of industrial relations but it should be recognised that in 
fact it can be misleading both factually and analytically. It provokes 
the glib summary that trade unions are both in principle pragmatic and 
pragmatically principled and although some trade unionists would 
agree with this, in private even if not in public, there are others 
who would find it offensive. Furthermore, it suggests that trade 
union activity is unpredictable and almost random.
Chamberlain (1977:89) quotes a trade union representative 
espousing the pragmatic approach but then relates this to the identi­
fication of themes in trade union activity:
"'We have no plans. Unions work from particulars to general.
We are empiricists without knowing it. It is simply a matter of 
meeting problems as they arise.'
In these words a union official summarizes his views as to what 
leads a union to seek an expanding role in the management of a 
business. A handful of management people agree with his diagnosis 
The union, they say, is moved by expediency. Its demands are 
governed by what it conceives to be its needs of the moment.
There is no broader plan or purpose.
There is an element of truth in this view, but it is inadequate 
as an explanation of motivation. It is important to understand 
the factors which lead a union to appraise a situation as 
requiring its corrective action.".
The attitude of the representatives at Llandough was very similar to
that of Chamberlain's official. As has already been described, they
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felit that they merely responded to specific incidents and had neither 
a strategy that motivated or controlled their behaviour nor explicit 
perceptions of how their behaviour related to the method of exercising 
the management function. But what arguments of expediency or pragmat­
ism fail to offer an explanation for are the criteria trade unionists 
use to determine whether or not to 'adopt* an issue. Why do some 
issues appear as problems to some people and not to others? And why 
do some problems appear to be something simply to be lived with by 
some and to require the implementation of "corrective action" by others? 
If the causes of these differences of definition can be identified it 
may in turn be possible to begin to discover the nature of the implicit 
constructs that trade unionists have about workplace industrial relations 
activity.
The Issues Pursued
The research showed that in fact one of the few characteristics 
common to nearly all the shop stewards and representatives of staff 
organisations was that of acting as a filter, of exercising judgement 
about the issues to pursue. They nearly all described how if the 
individual members of staff felt strongly enough about a problem 
they would come to them, but then they would have to decide whether or 
not it was reasonable to attempt to resolve the problem. However, the 
research also revealed clear differences between the representatives 
about the types of issues they felt it was appropriate to get 
involved in. Their decision about whether or not to do so was partly 
based on the details of each issue they became aware of but was also 
partly related to their ideas about the purpose of a trade union and 
its representatives. Some were only concerned with trade union involve-
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ment in national negotiations, others with ensuring that staff at 
least obtained the terms and conditions of service they were entitled 
to, but no more, and others with the nature of working practices.
Certainly the range of issues that representatives collectively
become involved in is quite enormous. McCarthy (1966) has commented
that shop stewards:
"tend to believe that any subject which affects their members is 
a fit and proper matter for negotiation and agreement; they 
also are inclined to think that conflicts of interests can just 
as easily arise over questions such as the introduction of new 
machines or output levels as they can over wages and hours.".
Clarke (1980:10) points out that:
"Other research conducted for the Donovan Commission showed that 
the range of subjects commonly negotiated by shop stewards 
included matters such as distribution, pace and quality of work; 
safety and health; machine manning and job transfer; levels and 
distribution of overtime; reprimands, suspensions and dismissals; 
engagement of labour; number of apprentices and redundancy.".
And Clarke also reports that a later survey suggested that the range
of issues negotiated had in fact further increased. Another dimension
of the types of issues pursued by trade unionists is identified by
Armstrong et al (1981:16). They refer to subjects of workplace concern
and state that it is:
"These issues, rather than the nature of the wider society or 
the dominant characteristics of the 'system' of production and 
distribution, tend to be the day-to-day locus of struggle and 
accommodation between the differing values of workers and 
managers. The apparently smallest of issues is capable of 
generating 'matters of principle', in which questions of control 
of equity and of 'rights' are involved.".
As a means of gaining insight into how stewards and representatives
defined what was 'reasonable' to pursue, comments obtained during the
interviews were of little value. I explained to one NUPE shop steward:
"What I am trying to do is to identify what are the things which
really bother the staff and which they want to try and change and 
they do so through you.".
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but in reply she could neither generalise nor give more than one 
example:
"Well nothing really that I can say has been a big thing. It's 
just small things which when, say a supervisor will start picking 
on the girls, and after a certain time the girls can only take a 
certain amount.".
A NALGO representative was able to generalise slightly more:
Graham: I was interested in union work - from the point of view of
getting justice done, of people getting what are their rights.
Researcher: What sort of rights do you mean and do you think they are
denied if there isn't a trade union?
Graham: What I think happens is that regulations are passed that
they're entitled to certain benefits, but quite often managers
don't inform them; they don't know and they don't get them, or
the manager says, 'You can't have this, you can't have that.',
when in actual fact they can have it.
A third representative, from ASTMS, also emphasised the protective
role of trade unions:
Eric: No union member has ever complained to me, in all these years,
about an issue that doesn't threaten them. Never. I only get 
complaints when they feel threatened.
Researcher: What do they see as things that threaten them?
Eric: The threat of losing their job; the threat of significant
financial loss; or the threat of imposition of working 
conditions which they perceive as being very, very unsuitable to 
themselves. And that's about it.
What appeared to be a better method of analysing the types of 
issues of concern to shop stewards was to list every issue that they 
either raised or responded to during the interviews and to place them
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in the contexts used by the stewards and representatives themselves 
(where an issue or a context appears more than once it is because 
more than one representative discussed it):
Table One
ISSUE
A Survey of Issues Pursued 
ORGANISATION
Withdrawal of Saturday 
morning on-call payment 
for MLSOs
Redundancies
Sacking of specific 
individual
Early retirement for 
women
















Managers do not care - 
example of arbitrary 
action by management.
Trade union members 
demonstrating concern 
for the service rather 
than trade union 
allegiance.
Managers do not care - 
example of arbitrary 
action by management.
Severely critical of 
the way it was managed.
Example of issue that 
brings members to trade 
union meetings.
Lack of consultation by 
management.
Local management acting 
under instructions from 
superiors.
Differences in interpret­
ation of procedures 
between management and 
trade unions.
Example of negotiated 
agreement.
Unions could assist in 
enforcing if consulted.
Example of difficulty in 




Working areas too 
small
Requesting time off
Unequal treatment of 









Adequate changing rooms 
and more lockers
Induction


















Aware of problems in 
departments other than 
that in which the 
representative works.
Example of issues staff 
are reluctant to approach 
management about.
One of the strongest 
causes of dissatisfaction 
among staff.
Example of staff grievance
Example of issue that 
would be pursued more 
strongly by shop steward 
than staff organisation 
representative.
One of the highest 
priorities for change 
within department.
Grievance because none 
exists.
Lack of adequate training.
Staff dissatisfied with 
method of allocating 
holidays.
Example of problem that 
shop stewards have to 
explain to staff on behalf 
of management.
Example of poor management 
in Health Authority.
Over complicated in Health 
Authority.









Extreme weather payment 
policy
Ward round disrupts 
cleaning programme
Annual change of duty 
allocation
Delay in return of 
uniforms from laundry
Confusion about identity 
of Head of Department
On call payments
Staff not given copies 
of terms and conditions 
of service
Lack of job descriptions
Training of trainee ODAs
Short notice about moving 
furniture
Bad relationships between 
staff

















Example of issue that 
could be raised at 
managemen t/mul t i-uni on 
consultative meeting.
Example of problem that 
makes it difficult for 
staff to meet the 
required service 
s tandard.
Example of staff 
grievance, because of 
the effect on pay and 
annual leave.
Example of practical 
problem changing agreed 
schedules.
Heads of Department 
should discuss with shop 
stewards before staff.
Example of a main cause 
of dissatisfaction.
Example of problem 
about existing management 
structure.
Example of local manage­
ment constrained by 
national agreements.
A cause of dissatisfaction
A cause of dissatisfaction.
ODAs not involved.
Example of occasion when 
staff complain about 
lack of information.
Example of minor 
grievance that could have 
escalated.
Example of issue staff 





Free meals during bad 
weather
Introduction of bonus 
schemes






Example of problem 
causing staff dissatis­
faction.
Example of obeying 
management even when 
disagree.
Trade union negotiated 
an agreement one group 
of staff did not want.
Example of issue that 
might have caused 
industrial action.
Dissatisfaction with new 
member of staff




New appointments will 
be challenged if 
necessary.
Unsatisfactory arrange­
ment staff altered 
themselves.
Breakage of crockery NUPE
Staffing implications of NUPE
alterations to department
Timing of meal trolleys NUPE
Cleanliness of swill area NUPE
Partition across entrance ASTMS
to department
Two individuals on the same ASTMS
senior grade
Private patients




Unrecognised effect of 
installing new 
equipment.
Lack of information 
from management.
Problem resolved by 
shop steward rather 




Example of management 
indecision and desire 
to seek higher authority.
Sole dissatisfaction 
with management structure.
Disagree in principle 
but feel unable to take 
preventative action.
MLSO grievance.
Example of problem causing 



































Inaccurate annual leave 
allowed for staff trans­





Lack of consultation in 
planning.





by heads of departments.
Head of department refers 
staff enquiries to shop 
stewards.
Failure to resolve by 
management.
Inappropriate in health 
care context.
Apparently not applied 
uniformly or enforced.
Far too few available.
Cause of excessive 
expenditure.
Trade union required in 
order to protect staff 
interests during 
reorganisation.
More staff required in 
all departments.
Management select and 
interview badly.
Very inadequate, no 
management action, reason 
for resigning from health 
and safety committee.
Example of inaccurate 
management application 




Boxing Day working by 
clerical staff
Reorganisation of work 
load between laboratories 
or hospitals







Example of staff 
grievance when repres­
entative agreed with 
management.
Example of issue 
requiring greater 
consultation.
Grievance which could 
have cause industrial 
action.
Presented in this way, some general themes do begin to emerge 
about the issues that concern shop stewards and staff representatives, 
even if some of them are only of a fairly negative nature. On the 
more positive side, it is clear that the great majority of issues are 
about practical, operational problems. The issues relating to the 
longer term or to higher levels of management in the Health Authority 
are small in number and very specific and neither is there any 
indication that the issues pursued at a national level by the unions 
they represent form a framework for, or derive from, the concerns of 
these representatives at workplace level. Even on a local, tactical 
level, there was no indication of cohesion or direction among the 
problems discussed. Although the representatives were generally 
critical of management and individual representatives voiced specific 
criticisms, as a group they did not criticise management's performance 
in any major area of activity. Thus, for example, the representatives 
appeared to have no campaign to suggest that management was discrimin­
ating racially or sexually, or failing to meet its health and safety 
obligations, and neither did the specific examples indicate such 
difficulties existed.
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As the last chapter identified, the representatives appeared to 
have no general areas of concern and the examples they gave of the 
issues that they think about show a tremendous variety, but this 
itself creates a consistency amongst the shop stewards' attitudes.
Once again, it appears that the representatives were only demonstrating 
'reasonable' concern about, or presenting a 'reasonable' response to, 
'unreasonable', management action or omission. The interesting 
corollary of this is that from such a survey of representatives' 
concerns it becomes obvious that there is no intention to seriously 
challenge the existence or purpose of the management function. Some 
of the representatives even indicated that on occasions managers have 
failed to exercise their function adequately. Similarly, situations 
were described which clearly illustrated the acceptance of the use 
of 'as if' prerogatives, although there were also some•examples of 
the kind of arrangements that the representatives would defend if 
they were threatened.
Another negative theme seemed to be that there was little in 
common between the representatives and the type of issue that they 
were concerned about, and this must have implications for the methods 
of enhancing the involvement of staff and their representatives. 
Furthermore, the arrangements need to be considered in the context of 
one more general issue that does perhaps begin to emerge from some of 
the representatives of the ancillary staff. At least one representative 
from each of the three main ancillary groups - the portering, catering 
and housekeeping staff - referred to problems that seemed to indicate 
some confusion about the nature of the relationships between supervisory 
staff, shop stewards and ordinary staff. Examples were given of super­
visors referring staff problems to shop stewards, stewards resolving
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supervisory problems without supervisors being aware of them, and 
shop stewards maintaining good relationships between supervisors and 
staff. Participative arrangements should at least take account of 
this apparent confusion of responsibility but then they either have 
to clarify it or to further enhance it.
Two other features of the analysis of issues which have even 
clearer consequences for participative arrangements are the lack of 
depth and understanding either available to or appreciated by the 
representatives about the problems they raised, and the numerous 
comments made about lack of consultation. Many of the problems 
raised by the representatives constituted just one facet of far more 
complex topics, some of which had even created dissention amongst the 
trade union members and staff themselves, but this was rarely apparent 
in the comments from the representatives. This would tend to lend 
some weight to one of the managerial arguments in favour of partici­
pation, which is that it encourages staff to develop a much wider 
understanding of managerial problems and goals. There was no criticism 
of the lack of formal consultative procedures, although there was some 
dissatisfaction expressed about other formal procedures, but one of 
the main causes of dissatisfaction about a variety of issues was that 
there had been a failure by management, to consult properly, or even at 
all in some cases. The simple assumption could be made that revised 
participative arrangements might accommodate this desire for increased 
consultation but management may in fact be concerned about how 
increased consultation might affect the exercise of 'as i f  prerogatives 
and there may be concern that increased consultation will lead to 
increased negotiation, which management might not want to unnecessarily 
bring upon itself.
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One final point that must be made about the analysis of issues 
raised by shop stewards is that some caution must be exercised in the 
interpretation. The assessment of the issues is supported by and 
confirms the value of grounded theory and the list of issues appears 
to be capable of analysis, which must be attempted if information is 
to be obtained of value to workplace industrial relations in the same 
location in the future or in other locations, but the statements made 
by the representatives are not statements of 'truth*, they are state­
ments of 'perceptions'. This may sound academic, possibly even 
fatuous, or alternatively it could be countered by the argument that 
reality is only a collection of perceptions that do not even need to 
converge anyway, but a recognition needs to be made that the data 
presented is not 'objective' in a pseudo-scientific sense and is 
subject to and the result of the representatives' personal assessments. 
A sense of the accuracy of the assessments is enhanced by the more one 
is aware of the details of the situations the representatives describe.
Since this message is probably best conveyed by an example, it 
may be helpful to expand upon one of the contributary causes of the 
allegations of favouritism by supervisors among housekeeping staff.
The housekeeping shop stewards, supervisors and evening staff would 
almost certainly all confirm that there is a rift between one of the 
shop stewards and her supervisor. The shop steward contends that the 
supervisor picks on her and her associates and treats them unfairly 
compared to the other staff, and her fellow shop stewards naturally 
support her. The supervisor contends that the shop steward is an 
unsatisfactory member of staff for a number of reasons and requires 
greater supervision as do some of the members of staff who associate 
vith her, and in the past management has informally and formally
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supported the supervisor in relation to both the shop steward and her 
associates. The division between the shop steward and supervisor was 
made even more severe when the supervisor was one of those mainly 
responsible for a large number of housekeeping staff transferring 
into COHSE from NUPE. (The Head Porter was similarly alleged by NUPE 
shop stewards to be victimising their members when he and a number of 
other porters transferred from NUPE to the Transport and General 
Workers Union.) This example is described, not to indicate that the 
housekeeping shop stewards are not telling the truth when they allege 
favouritism amongst the staff and there is no doubt that they 
genuinely believe it to exist, but to indicate that the cause of this 
perception is itself a complex and long-standing issue capable of a 
number of different interpretations.
The Application of Sanctions
There is of course another dimension to the problems detailed 
above which the analysis does not consider. Given this fairly long 
list of issues that caused concern to a relatively small number of 
shop stewards and staff representatives, what methods have they used 
to remedy them? This question was answered by a separate analysis of 
all the interviews which identified any means by which the represent­
atives attempted to influence the way management exercise its 
function. A wide variety of methods was identified but as one would 
expect the great majority of these lay within, and contributed to the 
definition of, the mutually recognised and accepted means of 
accommodating conflicting or potentially conflicting opinions and 
interests. These have been subsumed into the categories of 'partici­
pative processes' and are examined in the next chapter. But the
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industrial relations history of Llandough Hospital has included 
occasions when the usual methods of accommodation have failed.
In the context of a discussion about participation this has
significance for two reasons. To begin with, one would expect that
all managers and most staff would regard a breakdown in workplace
activity caused by a conflict of interests as something to be
avoided as much as possible, and most advocates of improved
participative arrangements would consider better industrial relations
to be one of their outcomes. Some commentators go even further and
suggest that participation is not only an implement that can be used
pragmatically to enhance industrial relations but also that its
absence may be a cause of industrial action. Dimmock, for example,
suggests that (1977:125):
"In circumstances where management are reluctant to accord the 
workforce a degree of control over decision-making, the workers 
may only achieve participation through the threat or the 
application of sanctions.".
Secondly, and ultimately of much greater significance, the consequences
of a failure to reach an accommodation of conflicting interests are
themselves one of the determining factors in how the processes of
accommodation operate.
The range of sanctions open to trade unionists is quite substantial 
and has been detailed by a number of commentators, such as Macfarlane 
(1981:60) and Batstone et al (1979:59), who list activities such as 
striking, banning overtime, working to rule, sabotage, occupations 
and 'go-slows'. A particularly impressive list features in Baker and 
Caldwell (1981:136,137), who reproduce a pamphlet written by a group 
of Bristol trade unionists describing the spectrum of tactics that can
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be employed to oppose management proposals for redundancies. Even in
Japan, the country so often cited as a paragon of industrial
relations virtue, sanctions, or at least the threat of sanctions, can
feature prominently. For example, it was reported in the Observer
Business News (6.11.83.) that:
"Nissan union members will refuse to work on the proposed British 
car plant if the Nissan management give its go-ahead to the 
project without obtaining union consent, Nissan's powerful union 
leader, Ichiro Shioji, warns.".
The article later explains that :
"He does not think it possible - 'Whatever the size of the plant' -
that the project can go ahead without union consent. Nissan would 
certainly need to send a large number of employees to Britain to 
start up the project and to supervise the first stages.' If the 
union does not agree to transfer members and the company tries to 
force through its policy, it would be a legel question that would
go to court,' said Shioji.".
In Llandough, attitudes to industrial action were markedly at 
variance with each other and with the incidence of industrial action. 
The NUPE representatives had organised industrial action several times 
in support of national pay negotiations, and on one occasion in support 
of members in another hospital over a local issue, and the portering 
staff had twice gone on strike without notice about local problems.
The ASTMS members in the pathology laboratories had taken industrial 
action in support of their national pay claim and although the NALGO
members had never taken any formal industrial action a number had on
occasions demonstrated a lack of co-operation. Yet two NUPE shop 
stewards in particular emphasised how reluctant they would be to ever 
go on strike. One of them did not believe that he had an extra power 
to influence management because of his potential ability to initiate 
industrial action and he stressed the strict procedure he would want 
to follow before recommending strike action to his members, but this
shop steward was one of the small number of key workers who caused the
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severist restriction on patient throughput in the hospital during a
national pay dispute only a few months after he had spoken. The
other steward stated:
"My opinion of strikes is that there should never be a strike - 
only as a very last resort. There's simply got to be nothing 
else to be able to speak about before you go on strike.",
but this steward had been one of the porters who had supported the
lightening industrial action over local disputes that had pre-empted
any opportunity for significant consultation or negotiation.
Furthermore, when it was pointed out that there had been three strikes
in the hospital over local issues in two and a half years he described
how his trade union would always test a new administrator.
Another NUPE shop steward blatantly displayed how unscrupulous 
he was prepared to be in the tactics he would employ to support a 
case. This was revealed after it had been put to him that in the past 
NUPE shop stewards had lied, abused informal and even social contacts 
with management, and misled his members. His justification was that 
management was equally unscrupulous, as some of his comments 
illustrate:
"Well it required tactics; you've got to be hard.".
"When you're in a boxing ring, sir, you use every means at your 
disposal.".
"I know it's nothing to be proud of, but when you do a thing, 
it's like you with us, you'd employ everything that you knew to 
get your end, or what you think should happen.".
"We understand each other. You've got to, that's why you are 
paid for it.".
Once again, caution needs to be advised about whether to accept these 
arguments at face value. Allegations about managerial tactics may 
simply be a totally spurious justification during the interview for
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what the representative recognised to be pragmatic and unprincipled 
bahaviour. Alternatively, it could be that the comments indicate the 
existence of a management image sustained by the shop steward to his 
members without regard to whether it is justified or not.
However, if the shop steward's belief is genuine that management 
will use any tactics whatsoever to obtain its goals it again raises 
the dilemma that participation may possess the potential to either 
improve the situation or exacerbate it. If power-seeking and 
-denying is replaced by the sharing of power and responsibility and the 
development of trust, participation will eliminate such adversorial 
relationships if they really exist, but if the shop stewards are 
merely pursuing pragmatic industrial relations avarice, the introduction 
of new participative arrangements could simply create another arena for 
conflict. The observations of a staff organisation representative 
about the behaviour of some trade unionists provide no grounds for 
optimism:
"You find that there are about two or three, I think, that tend 
to be very, very aggressive. Aggressive in the wrong vein very 
often. To me they're just - now one particular meeting I came 
to with you. I've never seen anything like it in my life. To 
me they were just trying to pick you up on your words. There 
was nothing behind it - no reasoning, no thought. It was just, 
'We'll get you today.', you know what I mean.".
More specifically, the Society of Radiographers' representative 
referred to the ancillary staff trade unions' attitude to industrial 
action:
"When it comes to industrial action, things like that, they 
think, 'We're out. That's it, we're going to cause havoc here. 
Let's get the administrators running up the corridor.'. Let's 
face it, this is it, isn't it. I mean, nobody could do our 
job.".
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The inference seems to be that ancillary staff trade unions do not
believe that the withdrawal of their members' labour seriously affects
the ability of the hospital to maintain its services but causes more
of what might be considered to be a major inconvenience. This was a
novel understanding of the seriousness with which industrial action
by ancillary staffs might be assessed but it was actually expressed,
even more forcibly, by a NUPE shop steward. She blamed the occurrence
of industrial action upon management because it was taken when no
other means had effect (she thought that, "the management should sit
down and really listen to their grievances more.") and because
management allowed industrial action to occur and demonstrated that
it was able to cope:
"They think to themselves, 'Oh, let them go on strike, because 
they Won't get any help from outside. People will only sort of 
black them, thinking, "They're hospital workers, they shouldn't 
go on strike."'. Then you get your little helpers in to help 
you out.".
This is a rejection of the orthodox analysis of industrial action, 
which assumes that, to the management at least, it usually denotes a 
failure, since the activity of the enterprise it is responsible for 
is either reduced or ceases completely, and for many trade unionists 
it is a failure because once it is invoked, there are no other sanctions 
left against management. Macfarlane, for example, refers to an approach 
to industrial relations analysis that he terms (1981:33) 'moral realism', 
which presents:
"an analysis of industrial conflict in terms of power. Free 
collective bargaining is a process whereby unions and employers 
each seek to ascertain the other's bargaining strength and 
concession limit, with a view to determining its own negotiating 
tactics. A strike is the result of a miscalculation of the power 
position by those negotiating, with either the union or the 
employer underestimating the other's strength.".
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Influences on Effectiveness 
From the interviews with the trade union shop stewards and staff 
organisations’ representatives, it was possible to identify some of 
the criteria that they assess before deciding whether or not to 
initiate industrial action. These included the numerical strength of 
their membership, the opinion of their membership, the implications of 
any relevant Whitley Council terms and conditions of service, contract 
of employment obligations, the national industrial relations’ climate, 
their relationship with the managers involved in any potential dispute, 
the seniority of the managerial level from which a contested decision 
originated, and the nature of management’s contingency plans for 
coping with any industrial action. Although most of these issues are 
very specific, they in fact act as the litmus paper by which the staff 
representatives assess whether or not industrial action will be forth­
coming and if so with what success. Armstrong et al (1981:84) describes 
one of the difficulties shop stewards may experience:
"It is only on issues and occasions when workers reject the claims 
of managerial ideology that the intellectual means become available 
either to challenge the management rule-making process or to attempt 
to initiate it on their own account. This still does not necessarily 
mean that workers’ entry into the rulemaking process will be effect­
ive: power may be lacking even if the motivation is there.".
In other words, the shop stewards may assess the criteria they use
before deciding upon industrial action and decide that although they
believe it to be justified and their members believe it to be justified,
other factors mean that there is a strong possibility that industrial
action will have no effect and therefore they do not proceed with it.
But even if the means to be successful exist and the staff repres­
entatives wish to initiate industrial action, the motivation to do so 
may be missing among their members. An example of these circumstances
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was identified by Partridge (1976:8,9):
"Similarly, during the course of the diary exercise it was 
observed that one particular ’group’ whieh had the highest 
potential power to disrupt the whole site, never actually 
activated its power base although its earnings were amongst the 
lowest on the site. This group of drivers was aware that it had 
the power but did not use it.......This implies that group con­
sciousness is a precondition for exercising power.".
Thus for trade union power to be realised, individuals, and the groups
to which they belong, must themselves define circumstances in the
workplace as those in which they possess power, it is ’reasonable’ to
use it, and a cause or causes exist to justify its use. Because of
the difficulty of priming the pump of such consciousness and its partial
dependence upon fuelling itself, it can be argued that for any power at
all to exist it must be constantly exercised, Chamberlain (1967:103)
comments :
"A union is stamped as effective to the extent it can make good 
on its promises. It retains its vitality only to the extent it 
remains effective. The necessity of survival and growth lead to 
the marshaling of the strength of the membership around a campaign 
involving both immediate and long-range objectives. When one is 
achieved, another must take its place. To retain its power, the 
union must constantly strive to increase it. Power unused means 
a dropping away in the membership, stagnation, and possibly 
disintegration. Power when used builds upon itself. The external 
politics of their situation thus provide a compulsion to the 
union to extend the range and the depth of their authority within 
the corporation and the economy.".
The source of trade union power and the motivation of the repres­
entatives and their members to take industrial action were examined in 
the. Llandough research. Reference has already been made to statements 
from the representatives affirming that the worst manifestations of 
dictatorial managerial power had not lasted into the 1970s and this 
might de facto be taken to suggest that managerial authority had been 
diminished and increased power transferred to trade unions. The 
indication of the research data, however, was that although some of the
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shop stewards did consider themselves to be fairly powerful, particul­
arly because of their ability to initiate industrial action, a much 
stronger impression was received that the Health Service trade unions 
were weak, largely because of the enormous reluctance of their members 
to jeopardise the service by taking industrial action. An example of 
the minority view of the power of shop stewards was expressed by one 
of those in NUPE, in the context of their ability to resolve wage 
queries.
Researcher: Why do you think if you ring up Lansdowne [Health Authority’s
wages department] they should pay any attention to you? In other 
words, what do you think the power of shop stewards rests on?
It’s been talked about a lot in the press.
Colin: I hope it’s not just the fear that, ’Oh my God, I’d better sort
this out or they’ll be on strike at Llandough Hospital.’. I’ve 
got a funny feeling that might be a lot to it, you know, whereby 
a head of department rings up and they’ll shoot him any old 
story, but if it’s not the union - ’Oh gosh, let’s re-check this.* - 
type of thing. I’ve got a feeling that’s what a lot of it is, 
because what happens if we decide to have a dispute up here and 
it’s obviously Lansdowne’s fault? They’re going to get a bit of 
a telling off whereby if its a head of department, it don’t go 
any further. So I’ve got a funny feeling it’s the fear, you can 
call it fear or the apprehension, of the union taking it further, 
as far as perhaps industrial action because it’s not sorted out.
The belief that their members would not consent to take industrial 
action because of its effect on the service to patients was largely 
expressed by representatives not in NUPE, i.e. those not representing 
ancillary staff. To one of the NALGO representatives, the balance of
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power was clear. "Unfortunately, whatever people like to say, the
unions have little power and the Authority have most power.", but he
then appeared to qualify his statement:
"The only real power we've got in negotiations with our Authority, 
with the management, is industrial action. It's amazing, and 
it's surprising what things they can do. Because regulations are 
so general that quite often they can get round them.".
He was asked:
Researcher: Obviously, at the end of the day, it's going to take
something pretty serious for you to say to your members - to 
recommend industrial action of any sort, let alone a strike. 
Graham: Oh yes, yes.
Researcher: How important do you think though, is the potential to
do that when you are actually negotiating with managers?
Graham: Oh, it's a gread aid, a great aid. It makes a lot of
difference.
This NALGO representative would therefore appear to share the 
belief of the previously quoted NUPE shop steward about the power of 
trade unions and its correlation with the potential to initiate 
industrial action, but when a practical problem that the NALGO repres­
entative had been involved in was discussed a quite different picture 
emerged. The members on whose behalf the NALGO representative acted 
were in fact almost identical to those described by Partridge. They 
possessed the power to take industrial action but lacked the motivation 
to do so. The representative had described how H. had deliberately not 
consulted the trade unions about proposed redundancies. He summarised 
that, "It made it much easier for H. and he sort of forced it through. 
His acceptance of H.'s tactics was challenged and revealed the reality 
of his bargaining position:
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Researcher: If the unions really felt strongly enough, or if they felt
they were in a sufficiently strong position, they could have 
frustrated the whole redundancy process, couldn't they?
Graham: Ah yes, but this is where it always comes. We've got a lot
of muscle, but we can't use it. Because we say, 'Right,', say all 
the clerical staff, NALGO, all the NALGO members said, 'Right, we 
want more pay.', or, 'We want so and so. Out, all of us.'.
Hospital grinds to a halt. Your mother-in-law, my mother-in-law 
or somebody else, comes in, can't get the best treatment. Our 
people can't do it, so they haven't got the power. All they can 
do is make it awkward.
A similar sentiment was expressed by another staff organisation 
representative, who had been comparing her department to the same one 
in another hospital.
Researcher: You almost perhaps give the impression that you feel that
you somehow have been disadvantaged because you haven't acted the 
same way as at X.
Meryl: Yes, we have been, we have been. But there again, it's up to
our consciences isn't it.
The same absence of support also significantly curtailed the activity 
of one of the ASTMS representatives. He explained that he was often 
reluctant to make a stand about an issue because his members often 
refused to back him. He concluded, "And what happens? 'Well we've got 
a moral obligation Bob.'.".
It might therefore be tentatively suggested that a large body of 
staff at Llandough possess industrial power but do not possess the 
group consciousness referred to by Partridge to use it. More precisely.
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and using my own formulation of the components of group consciousness, 
the staff appreciate that they have industrial power and that there 
are issues which it could be used to influence but they do not believe 
that it would be reasonable to do so, certainly for local issues and 
hardly ever even for national issues. The absence of this motivation 
significantly reduces the level of activity of several shop stewards 
and representatives while others believe that they have a high level 
of power because they are perceived to be in a position to initiate 
industrial action, even if these shop stewards themselves are dubious 
about whether support from their members would be forthcoming if 
necessary or even if it was whether it would in fact make any 
significant difference. Indeed, one of the surprising discoveries of 
the data relating to the exercise of trade union initiative was that 
some representatives believe that management does not regard industrial 
action as a grave organisational failure but at worst as a serious 
inconvenience.
Some envisaged that its impact on management was insignificant in 
negotiating terms, others saw industrial action largely as a means of 
expressing how seriously a grievance was felt, and for others knowledge 
of the unwillingness of their members to participate in industrial 
action only served to define their lack of power. Nevertheless, for 
some representatives, despite even their own awareness of the lack of 
substance in the implied threat, the perceptions of others that they 
possessed the potential to initiate industrial action did generate a 
source of power and one which was used. This was especially true of 
the NUPE shop stewards.
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Conclusion
None of the Llandough stewards or representatives attempted to
claim that the consultation and bargaining activities that they
pursued were a form of participation, and it is difficult to imagine
how such a claim could justifiably have been made. Virtually all of
their activities could be classed into two groups, both of a very
negative nature. They appeared to either achieve the resolution of
grievances caused by the acts or omissions of management or to obtain
advantages for their members by exploiting managerial proposals for
change. These functions are obviously highly typical of staff
representatives and were identified, for example, in the study by
Batstone et al, which also suggested their impact upon the employing
relationship (1977:261):
"In brief, the power of the domestic organisation meant that 
management had little freedom in introducing any form of change 
in production which might have an adverse impact upon workers. 
Major changes in production methods involved possibly lengthy 
negotiations over effort and reward. The same was true of 
shorter term changes. If management required temporary variation 
or exceptional patterns of work, they were generally bound either 
by negotiations or by a network of rules which were the product 
of past negotiation.".
The researchers continue by describing such activities as effecting a 
"limitation upon managerial freedom", and this seems to be the crucial 
distinction to be made in assessing the impact of the current activi­
ties of the union representatives in promoting participation. It may 
be a little too sweeping to state that trade unions limit 'managerial 
freedom', since often management succeeds in obtaining its objectives 
but because of trade unions is compelled to exercise its function in 
doing so rather differently, but the important point is that trade 
unions only 'act upon' managerial activity. They are not part of it, 
it is not in any way responsible to them, and furthermore the
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management activity they act upon is often only a relatively small part 
of the spectrum of the management function.
This is not to suggest that trade union activity does not benefit 
its members, or even management. As Daniel and McIntosh (1972:58) 
explain:
"Conflicts of interest are inherent to hierarchical business 
organisations which have multiple interests to serve and have to 
adapt and change. It follows from this that union representation 
or employees' interests does not introduce conflict into organis­
ations. Rather it reflects the conflict that already exists, 
institutionalises it, and provides a medium through which the 
interests of those at the bottom of the hierarchy can be 
represented and the conflicts of interests between them and the 
other parties can be resolved through negotiation which, as we 
have tried to demonstrate, involves not only compromise and 
horsetrading, but also the seeking of alternative solutions that 
serve the interests of all parties.".
Trade unions thus act as a medium for both expressing and resolving 
conflicts of interest between managers and staff but they can provide 
only an ambiguous vehicle for the exercise of more positive partici­
pation. Participative arrangements with a foundation in the usual 
workplace relationships may seem to affirm that the sole means of 
interaction between management and staff are those based on the roles 
of potential adversories and these and other factors may only enhance 
or widen the largely negative function of trade union representatives. 
Participative arrangements which fail to recognise conflicts of 
interest are, however, unrealistic and are either likely to fail or 
to even further increase the scope of trade union negotiation, which 
is the very development that management might have been trying to avoid 




MODIFYING THE MANAGEMENT. FUNCTION
Lists of the forms or categories of participation abound. They 
also usually feature prominently in classifications or spectrums of 
leadership styles. The ILO has commented that (1981:21), "The 
diversity of methods is as great as the diversity of aims" and that, 
"the methods of ensuring this collective participation will depend 
upon political, economic, social and cultural conditions and also on 
the objectives envisaged by the legislator or the parties concerned.". 
But it then suggests that participation can consist of a managerial 
policy of information and consultation, collective bargaining, a works 
council or similar body, representation on a managerial body, or 
workers self-management. Another list is provided by Clarke 
(1980:7-15), who describes the present forms of participation as 
joint consultation, collective bargaining, productivity bargaining, 
disclosure of information, unilateral worker regulation, and nation­
alisation.
Some element of classification of the activities of participation 
is inevitable as a result of, and as an aid to, the analysis of 
industrial relations behaviour but categories such as those produced 
by the ILO and Clarke can also be misleading. They suggest there is 
agreement about the generic definition of participation, which has 
already been shown not to exist, that each form of participation has 
a conceptual distinctiveness, and that there are shared meanings 
attached to the different descriptions of participative arrangements. 
If one examines the categories of the ILO and Clarke, for example, it
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is possible to dispute the place of nationalisation, productivity 
bargaining, disclosure of information and managerial policies of 
information and consultation as forms of participation, or to argue 
that there is in practice no distinction between consultation and 
collective bargaining, or to suggest that joint consultation might to 
some imply joint management, with the power of veto on both sides, 
while to others it implies little more than a forum for the management 
message. Reservations such as these about the effect of classifica­
tions of participative activity may at one extreme appear obvious or 
at the other extreme seem academic, but in fact they do have practical 
significance. At worst, without them the categories can become so 
simplified that they can almost appear to be participative modules, 
or perhaps a more modern analogy would be floppy disks, available on 
a shelf for managers or workers to select and slot into their organis­
ation to achieve their required change.
Another feature of the categories is that they obviously fail to
give an indication of what the parties to industrial relations
activity may regard as desirable, feasible or permissible and so the
range of options available in practice may be severely limited. A
report by the BIM demonstrates how its members are prepared to
consider some forms of participation but not others. After explaining
the Institute's involvement in amending the EEC's Fifth Directive,
the report continues (1982:107):
"A small-scale survey among BIM member companies in 1981 had 
shown that practical developments in employee participation were 
taking place in the UK on a voluntary basis. Many companies 
which had little experience of participation were introducing it, 
and the benefits of voluntary effort had been appreciated and 
taken on board. There was considerable interest in employee 
councils and participation committees; companies were training 
both managers and employees; most companies opted to involve
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*all employees', the strong disapproval of the single-channel 
involvement through unions was marked; many respondents to the 
survey expressed their willingness to make voluntary participation 
agreements with their employees. This survey confirmed British 
industry's strong preference for voluntary developments which take 
due account of companies' varied histories in employee relations 
and communications, and indicated the kind of developments taking 
place and the context in which a modified Fifth Directive could 
be acceptable.".
The Engineering Employers' Federation (EEF) has similarly sought to 
encourage :
"'The development of voluntary employee involvement which would 
also help to pre-empt the imposition of more restrictive 
legislation' on worker participation, such as the various draft 
directives currently under consideration by the European 
Commission." (Industrial Relations Review and Report No. 302 
23 August 1983)
and in the EEF's employee involvement checklist the number of 
categories of employee involvement arrangements is reduced to just 
three - communication, consultation and joint problem-solving.
Other articles in the same publication about Vaux Breweries 
(No. 312 24 January 1984) and H P Bulmer (No. 322 19 June 1984) 
describe combinations of participative arrangements implemented by 
management. At Bulmers there is a "Very open style of management", 
an agreed statement of company objectives, an elected employee 
council, an employees' annual general meeting and a profit-sharing 
system. Vaux has multi-level consultation, again an "open style of 
management", a profit-sharing scheme, harmonised terms and conditions 
of service, and quality circles. It would appear that judged against 
managerial criteria at least, e.g. company image, profitability and 
industrial relations, such means of involving staff are successful. 
Unfortunately, what the reports do not describe are the employees' 
attitudes towards the various arrangements and how they were involved, 
if at all, in establishing them. This is not unusual and there is in
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fact very little data to indicate the methods that staff use to 
influence or to associate themselves with the exercise of the 
management function, or how they wish to make them more effective.
Clarke refers to job restructuring, job enlargement and job
enhancement but then suggests that they are inadequate as methods of
involvement (1980:16):
"Such ways of giving workers greater control over their work 
have neither impaired necessary managerial authority nor weakened 
the bargaining power of workers. As so far developed, however, 
they do not provide for participation outside the area of the 
work task.".
Yet Daniel and McIntosh (1972:58,59) assert that:
"the greatest spontaneous demand for control comes from the desire 
for more discretion and autonomy on the job. It is for this 
reason we have emphasized how the starting point for greater 
involvement of the employee lies in the tasks he does, the way 
these are organised, and his relationship with his immediate 
boss.".
Thus, even between just these commentators a difference of opinion 
exists about not only where participation of significance should be 
located but also what the effect is that giving greater control over 
their tasks to the workers who do them has upon the nature of workplace 
relations. Such issues are obviously important in any discussion about 
participation but they also bear enormously upon the nature of 
industrial relations generally and in fact Hyman (1975:12) defines 
industrial relations as, "The study of processes of control over work 
reXations", This chapter will seek to describe the attitudes of the 
representatives at Llandough Hospital to some of the methods used to 
achieve participation, with particular attention to the ways in which 
they already exercise influence or control over the performance of 
the management function.
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Management Style and Ethos
Although neither management style nor management ethos was 
specifically singled out by the Llandough representatives as a form 
of participation, it was strikingly apparent from the conversations 
with nearly all of them that they had relatively clear ideas about 
how management should exercise its function fairly and in particular 
how it should encourage its staff to feel able to contribute to the 
running of the enterprise. To place high value on management style 
as a means of promoting participation is sometimes regarded as 
paternalistic but for the Llandough representatives it has had real, 
practical value. The term is used to describe the attitudes and 
behaviour of management towards staff and their representatives that 
are apparent during the day-to-day interactions necessary to maintain 
the functioning of the enterprise. It is assessed by criteria such 
as frequency of interaction, degree of informality, causes of inter­
action, display and accommodation of personalities, and flexibility.
A management ethos of participation is a much broader concept, 
used to describe a desire to ensure that a proper appreciation of 
the worth of staff and the necessity of involving them in the operation 
of the enterprise permeates every aspect of the way in which the 
enterprise is organised, or in other words, the implementation of a 
complete 'package* of participative structures and processes, just 
one of which will be management style. The report on the arrangements 
at Vaux Breweries indicates the existence of such an ethos and it 
concludes that:
"taken as a package, its open style of management combined with 
extensive provision for consultation amount to a substantial 
investment in employee involvement.".
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There has in fact been national acclaim for the similar management 
ethos of participation described at H P Bulmer.
However, as this chapter will show, although the Llandough 
representatives valued a flexible management style, there were many 
specific forms of participation which appeared to be of no interest 
to them and apart from the obvious ones such as workers* self-management, 
nationalisation and profit-sharing, these ironically also included 
productivity bargaining, works councils, representation on managerial 
bodies, quality circles, job restructuring and shared responsibility 
for the management function.
Supervisor Liaison
Another orthodox method of participation given very little 
attention by the representatives is probably one of the most logical 
and obvious, namely the medium for staff/management liaison provided 
by supervisors and first line managers. This should be the level at 
which the cascade of information from the management hierarchy is 
made available to staff directly, in a form they can understand and 
in a manner which is part of their everyday workplace activity.
Similarly, it should be the level at which the concerns of employees 
are channelled into the management hierarchy. This approach as means 
of participation is advocated by, amongst others, the CBI (1983) but 
it believes that the potentially important role of the first line 
supervisor, both as a source of information and as a channel of 
communication, is commonly neglected. Jarratt (1982:36,37), writing 
as the chairman of Reed International, also wants to see the 
participative potential of first line managers enhanced and tries to
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explain why it is not being properly realised at present:
"I believe that when talking of employee involvement we should 
start by thinking in terms of the whole management team being the
first and most vital area in which such a policy should operate.....
In fact, we had better start with managerial democracy, making sure 
that all our management down to and including, most importantly, 
first line supervision - those who have the daily interface with 
the rest of the workforce - know what it is we are trying to 
achieve and have the chance of responding to it.
Perhaps one of the most serious mistakes has been made by senior 
British management has been to allow the authority of first line 
management to be eroded - partly by withdrawing important decision­
making functions from them; partly by diffusing their responsibility 
through the proliferation of staff functions; and partly by allowing 
a growing and powerful shop steward movement to by-pass them.".
But an awareness of the failure to capitalize on supervisory 
liaison has existed for many years. For example, Rothe (1950:240) 
reported:
"As a management consultant, I have noted that plant operating 
executives seem to like and respect the union stewards and 
officers better than they do their foremen. This supports the 
complaints of some foremen that they don't feel they are really 
a part of management.
Why? There are probably a lot of reasons. But one is most 
important, in my judgement -
Plant operating executives are more like union stewards and 
officers than they are like foremen - in intellectual level, in 
interests, and in personality traits.".
He tested members of all three groups for their abilities in word
meaning, logical relations, arithmetic and logical analysis and the
foremen consistently scored lower than the shop stewards. The results
from the vocabulary tests even indicated that:
"an executive is more likely to reach the stewards than the 
foreman when trying to get ideas across. The foreman may not 
understand, but the steward is almost sure to.".
The eclipse of the role of the supervisor has also occurred in 
the MHS and Fewtrell (1982:27) confirms, specifically in this context, 
that the, "cosy view of the supervisor as the ambassador of management 
has been undermined for a number of reasons.". He suggests that they
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are that pay differentials have been eroded and sometimes even 
reversed, organisational communications systems often by-pass super­
visors, shop stewards have increased enormously in influence and power 
and often work directly with more senior management, employees have 
enhanced the power of custom and practice, and formal procedures, such 
as those for grievances, discipline or disputes, have tended to more 
quickly involve relatively senior levels of management, and first line 
managers and supervisors are not provided with sufficient training.
Among the shop stewards in the research there was only very slight
recognition of the function that supervisors and first line managers
could play in providing liaison between staff and management and the
limited recognition that there was did not indicate that it was
successful. One NUPE shop steward was non-committal:
"The supervisor, hopefully, is working for the grade of staff 
they're supervising, and also they've got to be loyal to a certain
extent to management. Then it depends a lot on how much trust the
workers can have in their supervisor.".
To another NUPE shop steward the role of the supervisor appeared to be 
an insignificant influence upon the nature of workplace industrial 
relations unless it is aligned with the interests of the staff. In 
response to the question, "Is it inevitable that there's going to be 
conflict between staff and management?", he replied, "I shouldn't think
so. You see, to me a lot depends upon the person in between, and the
person in between you and us is A..". In seeking an elaboration of 
this answer it seemed that this shop steward envisaged that the super­
visor should have greater ability to accede to the wishes of the staff, 
as currently channelled through shop stewards, and to represent the 
wishes of the staff to higher management. The impression that this 
gave was conveyed to the shop steward:
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Researcher: Are you saying in a way then that you expect the head of
department, let's say A., to act a bit like a shop steward?
Sam: Well, I should think so, more so. That way you may not have
half the trouble that you would have, because he's taking a bigger 
responsibility.
Referring to the same supervisor, another NUPE shop steward 
identified a failing of the supervisory system not included in Fewtrell's 
list:
"They're frightened. Even A. will tell you. He gets the feeling 
he's an ogre because chaps won't go to him, they'll come to me; 
they'll go through me to him, that type of thing. They do, quite 
a few of them are frightened, to come.".
The same allegation was made about a supervisor in a different depart­
ment. A NUPE steward explained why the staff would not approach him 
with a problem:
"The usual attitude is, 'I won't get any joy there. They're not 
interested in listening.' and 'They don't care.'.",
and he stated:
"A lot of them are afraid to argue with the supervisor because 
of what they call reprisals. They feel they get picked on - 
they get intimidated - because they've dared to argue the 
situation.".
In principle, then, the supervisory structure may provide a means 
for enhancing the involvement of staff but this potential is not 
realised at the moment, either at Llandough or, it seems, more 
generally and there are serious practical problems to overcome, such 
as ensuring that individuals of sufficiently high calibre are in post 
and adequately trained. There also seemed to be some risk in Llandough 
that developing the role of the supervisor could create conflicting 
expectations, but in its present form it was not an arrangement that
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inspired confidence or enthusiasm.
Self-organisation
There was only one reference from the Llandough representatives 
to anything resembling self-organisation or autonomous work groups.
A NITPE shop steward who also had some supervisory responsibility 
described how he allowed the small group of staff he was in charge of 
to sort out its own system for allocating the duties that needed to be 
undertaken, provided it was one that met with his approval. Although 
this appeared to be good supervisor practice, it could not really be 
regarded as an example of an autonomous work group in operation and 
there was no other discussion about these sorts of arrangement.
Suggestion Schemes
Similarly, although Goodrich comments that one of the real 
factors in the demand for control is (1975:44), "interest in making 
suggestions", and in referring to suggestion schemes one NUPE shop 
steward commented that, "These are one of the finest things going.", 
no other representative spoke about systems for identifying or 
rewarding staff suggestions.
Neither did the shop steward who valued suggestion schemes 
realise that the Health Authority had only recently implemented such 
a scheme and that there had been a negligible response.
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Collaboration
An arrangement which was mentioned by only two representatives 
was that which is best described as collaboration, but in the sense 
of co-operative effort towards a common goal rather than the 
pejorative, wartime sense. A NALGO representative had expressed 
support for formal consultative systems, because he thought they 
could highlight problems:
Researcher: From the staff or from the management?
Graham: From the staff, and also from the management. For instance,
what about timekeeping, coffee breaks, and so on? That's left 
to the head of department, isn't it?
Researcher: For admin, and clerical staff, yes.
Graham: Yes, I mean if you felt that coffee breaks were being too
long, or times weren't being kept, you could perhaps get a lot 
done through the trade union, if you had good steward represent­
atives .
Researcher: How do you see the trade unions being helpful?
Graham: Of course, it's perhaps a bit idealistic, but they could say,
'Look, you're taking too long for tea break.'. They should be 
more responsible, in that if they're taking too long for tea 
break - it annoys me if anybody takes a long time for tea break, 
because they're abusing the system, aren't they, and I suppose 
you - trade unions could be more responsible and say that, 'No, 
this is not good enough.'.".
The other representative had stated, "I know for a fact that I 
can get a group of staff to do things I want them to do probably 
quicker if it’s unpleasant than management can.", to which the response
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has been, "That’s not surprising, but what is interesting is why.’’,
and he then continued:
"All right. What I am saying is, why isn’t that used? Because 
if I can trust the management, really trust the management not 
to pull a fast one on me, then there’s no reason why we should 
not be able to co-operate. Now if they’re prepared to co­
operate so as to avoid undue disturbance to the staff, or 
unnecessary disturbance to the staff, then there’s no reason 
why the trade unions shouldn’t assist the management to manage 
the thing and attain the objectives, as efficiently as possible, 
because it’s in everybody’s interests to do so. Where you’ve 
got a conflict of interest, an absolute conflict of interest, 
well fair enough, it doesn’t matter which way you dodge, you’ve 
got a problem.".
He later added:
"There is no reason why trade union representatives shouldn’t 
act as oils on wheels. I’m not suggesting for one minute that 
the trade unions should decide which wheels ought to be turned.’’.
This attitude conveys deep veins of cynicism about the nature of the 
membership, with which many of the other shop stewards and represent­
atives would probably disagree, but also argues strongly that 
managerial objectives can be more readily achieved if participative 
arrangements harness the existing trade union channels, a sentiment 
with which the other representatives would probably concur. His words 
also reiterate the trade unionists’ philosophy identified in previous 
chapters that the shop stewards have no wish to take the offensive 
against management but will fight hard if they believe their members' 
interests are at risk.
Informal control
In complete contrast, there are means by which staff can exercise 
direct influence or control either without the knowledge of management 
or in known opposition to its explicit wishes. Hyman (1977:97)
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identifies that:
"Many of the most important restrictions on managerial autonomy 
derive not from the formal institutions of trade unionism but 
from the spontaneous organisation of workers on the shop floor. 
Such informal organisation has always set some limits to the 
powers of management.".
Macfarlane describes how informal control existed many years before
trade unions were established (1981:58-9):
"But the worker was also a human being, with a will of his own,
and many rejected the market conception of the model worker as
one who devoted himself to his master's interests. The worker 
as individual might seek to alter or evade the work situation, 
rather than simply adapt himself to it and be dominated by it.",
and the three forms that he suggests this took were cutting down on
the amount of time spent working, exerting some control over the work
process and expressions of resentment and dissatisfaction. "Alongside
individual acts of self-assertion and defiance there also emerged
modes of collective action which assumed two main forms.". One of
these was the trade union movement and the other was:
"Informal action devoted to gaining control over the work process, 
especially the pace of work. Newly employed workers were made 
aware that they were expected to abide by the norms established by 
their workmates, not those called for by the employer. The new 
worker found himself a member of a workshop community which had, 
to a lesser or greater extent, succeeded in evading or wearing 
down the full force of employer power over the labour commodity.".
Although he believes it to be an exaggeration, Hyman (1977:97) states
that, "Arguably, these shop floor controls have a better claim than
orthodox collective bargaining to be considered a form of 'industrial
democracy*.".
These controls can be used deliberately to enhance the bargaining 
position of the workforce, for example by agreeing only to do certain 
types of work on overtime, but they may also consist of an accummulation 
of customs and practices which in their intention are as innocuous as 
the minor habits of any individual. Clarke comments (1980:13) that:
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"working groups also participate in management by the unilateral 
regulation of working practices. Such regulation may well be 
acceptable to management or even desired by it. It may be an 
efficient way of conducting the work of the enterprise. Sometimes 
management - particularly higher management - may not realise that 
it is going on. From a worker's point of view, the network of 
customs and rules so built up, often over many years, virtually 
forms part of his contract of employment.".
In Llandough, the exercise of informal controls was much more 
evident in observed behaviour than in the research interviews, but 
some of the shop stewards confirmed their existence. One NUPE shop 
steward explained that some staff would always take advantage of a 
'soft' manager and obtain the maximum benefit for themselves and 
another NUPE shop steward described how her members had taken 
unilateral action over an issue they were dissatisfied about:
Carol: We've got one menu which is a very heavy menu. We can cope
with it in the kitchen but you couldn't cope with it on the belt, 
and we've asked J. if she could review the menu. She said she
would eventually, but never got round to it, but we've - I
shouldn't tell you this, should I?
Researcher: I'm not going to tell J. .
Carol: We worked the menu to suit us, and the staff on the belt.
Disobedience
This is an example of informal control being exercise by staff 
without the knowledge of management but there are also occasions when 
staff contradict or fail to comply with the instructions of manage­
ment. Armstrong provides several illustrations, including (1981:62):
"Thus, on MoFoL's slipper-fettling line, the works director would 
simply move the speed control up another couple of notches when­
ever there was an urgent order. In this particular instance the 
forelady would move it back again if his vigilance was not
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maintained - 'It's a cat and mouse game we play - I know what 
they can do and what they can't' was her explanation.".
In another case, staff refused to adhere to a reduced washing up time
at the end of their shift:
"The millroom men simply reasserted their customary pattern of 
behaviour against the direct order of the managing director.
There was not the slightest doubt in their minds that the dirty 
working conditions provided ample justification and this 
immediate and shared sense of being in the right quickly expressed 
itself in spontaneous solidarity." (1981:86).
In just the same way, my own instructions were ignored when I
arranged for the door in the Porters Lodge to be cut in half and stated
that the top half had to be left open and that no porters should smoke
in the room. In fact, these arrangements have now been achieved but
only after some years of consultation and negotiation with the staff 
and their shop stewards. In another situation the staff demonstrated 
the degree of subtlety they could use to resist management's intentions. 
On the day before a four-day bank holiday weekend I had made arrange­
ments with the Acting Head Porter to move beds and furniture back into 
an empty ward during the weekend, which was expected to be quiet. The 
Acting Head Porter confirmed that he would move the beds on the Sunday 
night and the other furniture before then if possible, and would also 
approach another portering shift to do the same. The nursing staff 
on the ward were informed of these arrangements so that they could 
begin to position and clean the ward items. On the day after the long 
weekend I arrived back to find that no beds, and very little furniture, 
had been moved. In the absence of the Acting Head Porter, I interviewed 
the Head Porter and Senior Porter who said that apparently five hours' 
work had been done during one day. Nevertheless, despite my clear 
instructions to the Acting Head Porter there was a suggestion from both 
of them that there was 'confusion' about the work required, they both
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implied that the weekend was not as quiet as anticipated, and event­
ually they also confirmed that there had been a certain feeling among 
the men, supported by their trade union, that the work should only be 
done on overtime. That the lack of overtime was the main obstacle 
became blatent when the Senior Porter suggested that I should talk to 
one of the NUPE shop stewards if I was to prevent the problem from 
occurring again.
During the research interviews, a NUPE shop steward was asked
what she would do if she disagreed with something management wanted
to do, and she replied, "I might refuse to do it.". This would be
regarded by management as disobedience and the extent to which this
can be taken has been stated by the NUPE full-time officer for South
Glamorgan (quoted in South Wales Echo 17.6.82.) when the Health
Authority decided to close its orthopaedic hospital:
"This calls for an open campaign of civil disobedience to get 
them, or the Welsh Office, to reverse their position.'.".
But although informal controls are a significant feature of work­
place organisation and disobedience is one manifestation of them, 
O'Donnell places it in perspective (1952:577):
"Of course, it is generally recognised that there are many
instances of refusal to obey But to generalize from this
behaviour that the source of authority therefore rests with the 
subordinates, the ordered, the workers, the individual citizens, 
is assuredly a non sequitur. These instances merely tell us 
that sometimes (and, indeed, not very often) subordinates do 
refuse to obey. An acceptable theory of authority would have 
to include these phenomena within its framework but not to the 
exclusion of the much more important patterns of obedience.".
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Informal Discussion
However, the maintenance of the patterns of obedience is itself 
partly reliant upon informal responses from staff and their represent­
atives, but in the form of non-adversarial informal discussion with 
management initiated by the staff or their representatives about items 
causing them concern. A NALGO representative intimated that perhaps 
this did not occur:
"I was talking to a porter - they're over-worked, because of 
sickness and so forth. They do a lot of overtime, don't they. 
Well now, I don't know, if you had meetings with unions they 
could air their grievance and say, 'Look, we don't mind doing 
overtime, but of course when it gets too much....' and, 'What 
about the sickness rates and so forth.'.".
Ironically, the portering representatives demonstrated no reticence
in making precisely these points anyway.
This lack of inhibition was confirmed by a NUPE shop steward: 
Researcher: You said you thought some things weren't right. What
sort of things do you see as not being right?
Dilys: Well, I mean I can't - it's just little things that occur.
Day-to-day things really, which I go and talk with S. [head of 
department] and it's ironed out. Little things which could, if 
they weren't brought out, and I wasn't there for the girls to 
sound off to, sort of come to something bigger, I think.".
The relationship between these informal contacts and regular, formal 
departmental consultative meetings was probed:
Researcher: Are there things which are coming up now which you're
not discussing because there isn't a meeting?
Dilys: Usually if I feel it needs to be discussed I go in and see S.
and we discuss it at two o'clock or ten o'clock, when she's there, 
and it's discussed then.
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Even when discussing some specific problems she reaffirmed how she 
would respond:
"Well then I go and see S.. She's always very nice and she'll
always try and put it to rights.".
What is particularly interesting about informal discussion as a 
means of involvement is that, as the beginning of the chapter on the 
management function described, the propensity of staff and their 
representatives to approach their heads of departments varies consider­
ably. It appears to be possible to classify the facility to initiate 
informal discussion with a superior as one of Herzberg's maintenance 
or hygiene factors. In those departments where there was no impediment 
to informal discussion it meant that numerous smaller issues were 
resolved amicably, although there were still other issues that 
required more formal or adversarial solutions, but in departments 
where it did exist a much larger number of issues remained unresolved 
and the very absence of an atmosphere which encouraged informal contact 
between staff and supervisors itself generated dissatisfaction and 
further conflict.
Information - giving
One of the tenets of modern good managerial practice is that not 
only should staff and their representatives feel free to initiate 
informal discussion but also that management should exercise 
initiative in providing the information that staff and their repres­
entatives seek. ACAS (1982) has published advice on how to do this 
and Clarke (1980:15) in referring to a survey of communication 
methods in Clark et al (1972) reports that:
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"As to communication, the responses suggest that greater efforts 
are made in the public than in the private sector to keep workers 
informed,".
However, when a NALGO representative in Llandough was asked, "Do you 
think you get given enough information about what's going on in the 
Health Authority and in Llandough, as a staff representative?", she 
replied, "Probably not, because really, literally, all our information 
comes from the press, more or less.......They know it all before we do."
Some shop stewards also felt that they did not receive sufficient 
information, but not because they required the information for practical 
purposes but because its supply denoted their position as represent­
atives of the staff. One shop steward explained how her head of 
department used to meet with her and tell her about things that were 
going on but no longer did so :
Researcher: What difference does that actually make to you?
Mary: Well I thought it was sort of her thinking that, in my position,
that I should be told.
Even Dilys, the shop steward who had previously emphasised how easy it
was to resolve problems informally with her head of department, felt
deprived of information for the same reason. It was she who had
remarked, "it would be nice to be able to know what is happening before
you're told it in a meeting.", and when she was pressed to explain why,
it eventually became apparent that it was because of its effect of
reinforcing her position as a shop steward:
"I think it would be nice to see why she's put so-and-so from one 
ward to another like that and just to know the reasons why she's 
moved them all.".
"I'd just like to know why they're moved like that.".
"No, I'm not disagreeing or agreeing at all. The girls are quite 
happy. But it would just be nice to know why, not for the girls' 
sake, for my own sake then, as a shop steward.".
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The point being made by these stewards is that in effect there 
should be a two-tier system of information-giving, one for all staff 
and one at an earlier stage, in greater detail and on a personal basis, 
for staff representatives. The desire for this differentiation arises 
from the ability of a policy of information-giving to create either a 
convergence or divergence of two different means of enhancing involve­
ment. Supplying information directly to staff can develop or strengthen 
a sense of cohesion within an enterprise, possibly by projecting an 
open and receptive style of management, and perhaps by increasing the 
data base of the participative potential. But through their systems 
of representatives, staff organisations and trade unions also constit­
ute an important, and possibly antagonistic, means of providing 
participation, relying substantially upon information from management 
to do so.
Trade union representation
The ACAS guidance on workplace communications warns that (1982:3),
"It is especially important that nothing is done to undermine the
position of union representatives" and the function of trade unions
as a means of participation is well recognised. In the report of the
Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy it was noted that (1977:23):
"The trade unions have harnessed the desire of employees both to 
be protected and to have a voice in decision-making and have 
strengthened the position of employees in many large companies 
by expressing their hopes and fears collectively. The extension 
of trade union influence on the economy and on industry has been 
one of the more marked changes in the last decade, and it is 
through the trade unions that a large measure of employee 
participation has already been achieved.".
Writing just after the First World War, Goodrich indicates that such
advances have in fact been taking place over many decades (1975:10,11):
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"The shop stewards* movement was a genuine movement towards the
control of industry The full story has nowhere been put
together, and the evidence must be pieced out from the accounts 
of the shop stewards themselves and from employers* tales of 
*what they had to put up with during the war,* .... The shop 
stewards ' movement was both an expression of the demand for 
control and an incitement to further demands'\
The ILO has confirmed that (1981:169):
"When there is no special participation machinery .... the workers 
may still be in a position to exert a marked influence on decision­
making in the undertaking either directly or through their trade 
unions. Many of the early social reformers and workers * leaders, 
particularly in the United Kingdom and United States, thought that 
to achieve * industrial democracy* it was essential to organise 
this influence through official recognition of the trade unions 
active in undertakings. Direct relations between unions and 
management remain an important form of participation.".
However, exactly how trade union representation should enhance 
participation is unclear and Cuthbert and Whitaker concur that 
(1977:32):
"Even a cursory examination of the overall union approach to 
participation reveals a disturbing lack of consensus, a situation 
with obvious significance for public policy developments.
With regard to joint consultation as a mode of participation, the
TUG has seen little future for it........The TUG stance is that
increased participation must come from the extension of existing 
collective bargaining and joint regulation and, secondly, from 
the introduction of parity representation of the trade unionised 
workforce at board level.".
But, "there is ample reason to doubt whether the TUG approach reflects
the opinion of individual unions." and they conclude that:
**From the union standpoint, in general, what is important is that 
the Labour Party agrees with their view that unions are and must 
remain the single most important channel of representation in 
the workplace.'*.
Another, very practical reason for supporting this contention is
supplied by Daniel and McIntosh (1972:111):
"it is desirable that this involvement be manifested through a 
single channel to avoid a situation where management is faced 
with, on the one hand, a powerful body that can only obstruct 
and oppose and, on the other, a weak and ineffectual body
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incapable of fulfilling any creative, constructive purpose.".
This may seem to be a sensible prediction for managers but the converse
may apply instead;
"Management may also fear that adoption of a single channel will 
result in the 'antagonistic* positions consistent with collective 
bargaining being carried into areas of discussion where management 
and workers have common goals." (Clarke 1980:12).
Recognising the ambiguity of achieving participation through trade
union representation, Purcell (1979:29) identifies eight "core elements"
of a strategy for collaborating with, rather than opposing, trade
unions, while maximising the achievement of the general business
objectives. The elements are:
"1. The encouragement of union membership and support for the 
closed shop where appropriate;
2. The encouragement of membership participation in trade unions;
The encouragement of inter-union co-operation and the 
development of joint shop stewards committees ;
The institutionalisation of irreducable conflicts;
The minimisation of areas of avoidable conflict;
The maximisation of areas of common interest;
The reduction of the power of strategic groups;
The development of effective control systems."
He particularly stresses the value to management of joint shop stewards 
committees as an agent of control.
But even if management attempts to improve its participative 
arrangements through the existing trade union representative structure 
it may very well only serve to confuse and antagonise the represent­
atives because, as Hebden and Shaw (1977:195-208) summarise, it may 
change their purpose and some of their functions and introduce 
elements of complexity and contradiction that they have not previously 
had to cope with. This in turn may unsettle the representatives* 
members :
"The new role of the steward demands that he must re-educate his 
employees in their attitudes to the company. Often this move is 
so incongruous when seen through the eyes of members of formerly
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militant workgroups that the credibility of their stewards is at 
stake. From bearing the stress of an adversary situation he now 
has to take the strain of bringing workers closer to management.
In his traditional role he is a grievance processor; he takes 
explicit issues from the daily experiences by which they seek to 
obtain redress of grievance. He now has to adopt a much more 
managerial stance in interpreting company policy for his members. 
The conflicts between the roles is most pronounced in companies 
where relationships between labour and management were formerly 
most strained." (Loveridge 1976:16).
Representatives may wish to constructively contribute to the management 
function and be able to resolve or at least contain some of the concom­
itant problems but there still may be limitations in the extent to which 
they are prepared to exercise initiative in performing the management 
function. Their involvement may lie in a continuum from frequently 
proactive to entirely reactive and Hawkins (1979:161,162) notes that:
"Empirical observation, however, suggests that the role which 
shop stewards and trade union officials still find more congenial 
is that of reacting to initiatives on the part of management.".
Another feature of systems of trade union representation that may 
inhibit their potential to provide a means of participation in manage­
ment is that their own, internal participative arrangements may be 
very limited. Marchington (1979:138,139) discusses the role of the, 
"steward as the lynchpin" and mentions the significance that has been 
given to the function of shop stewards in providing a primary method 
of communication between management and staff. But he declares that, 
"For the purpose of this chapter, however, we are assuming a general 
level of consensus between steward and members in their dealings with 
management.", and he is right to make this assumption explicit. 
Commonly, it is made only implicitly, especially by those who contend 
that genuine participation can only be achieved through an effective 
system of trade union representation, but in practice such a consensus 
may not exist and even if it does it permits trade union representation
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to create a form of participation only if it is a consensus with
internal vitality. This requires that the members are kept adequately
informed by their representatives, that the representatives are
sensitive to the attitudes and opinions of the members and that the
representatives provide encouragement for the members to become
involved. The existence of these conditions cannot be taken for
granted and indeed Hyman (1975:151) divides the nature of control
arising from trade unions into three types:
"Trade unionism is the institutionalised form through which 
workers can exercise control over employment conditions and the 
work situation; or the means by which control is wielded, not 
hy but for and on behaif of them; or, because of this differ­
entiation, a source of control over them in the interests of 
officials or external parties.".
Concern about the degree to which trade unions involve their 
members in their running and are sensitive to their members wishes 
has been demonstrated on a much wider basis by the present Conserv­
ative government and in January 1983 it introduced a consultative green 
paper on union democracy that began:
"Much public concern has been voiced about the need for trade 
unions to become more democratic and responsive to the wishes of 
their members. In the case of many unions the role and influence 
of the rank and file seems to be minimal and all too often it is 
evident that the policies which are being pursued do not reflect 
the views and interests of the members." (Times 12.1.83.).
Shortly before the green paper was published the South Wales Echo
(23.9.82.) reported on an independent survey of the attitudes of the
general public and trade unionists to political and trade union issues.
The respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement,
"Many trade union leaders tend to be out of touch with their members."
and the following results were obtained:
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nor disagree 7% 8%
Disagree 6% 7%
Don't know 15% 3%
The conclusion was that, "The majority of adults and trade union
members agree that many trade union members tend to be out of touch
with their members,". Nevertheless, an element of distance is
inevitably created in any organisational system which relies upon one
individual acting on behalf of many others, and similar criticisms
could be voiced of the British parliamentary democratic system. As
Loveridge (1976:16) reminds us:
"The sheer number of employees involved will usually require a 
representative form of democracy in which general assemblies do 
no more than punctuate and reinforce a wider sense of involvement 
on the part of the individual employee.".
Almost inevitably, the attitudes of the shop stewards at Llandough 
demonstrated their belief that the system of staff representatives 
provided one of the best forms of participation. Some made the point 
described by Loveridge that no other method is practicable. The 
Society of Radiographers* representative, for example, was worried 
that :
**If everybody's saying to R. 'Well we think this, we think that.* 
and she tells them everything that's going on - well it's a real 
jumble really, isn't it. It's a real jumble.".
She was sure that her head of department :
"would prefer in many instances, if it's a generalised, a big 
sort of issue, for one person to come to her and explain it, for 
her to sort it out in her mind and get the answers and all the
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rest, and then come back on it, rather than have twenty people all 
battering at her, because you tend to find that people get very 
irate, personalities come into it, and you end up just having a 
slanging match.".
Some of the representatives found it hard to even conceptualise 
how any other form of liaison between staff and management could exist 
or gave the impression that their members would not feel comfortable 
with any other method. One NUPE shop steward regarded the trade union 
representatives as acting as a "go-between" between the staff and 
management and another shared the same opinion about the relative 
significance of shop stewards and supervisors:
Researcher: Why do you think it's more important that a shop steward
should know that information, rather than the senior porter? 
Colin: Because it's not the senior porter they go to, it's the shop
steward. So therefore it's the shop steward who would give out 
this information. I mean. I'm on round the front as a senior 
porter, they'll moan to me that they haven't got a chair to take 
a patient to a ward, and then I've got to try somehow and trace 
those chairs, and find out, 'Well, look, did you bring that 
chair from here, did you?', and so forth, but to get something 
done about it it's the shop steward they would actually to to 
to go to management.
The necessity of having shop stewards to act as intermediaries for 
the staff was similarly emphasised by a NUPE shop steward in another 
department :
Researcher: Do you often find you just have to explain things to
your members?
Dilys: Very often. You can explain quite a lot. That's what I feel,
that they can come to you and sound off and sometimes sort it
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out and it's just nothing really. It's just a storm in a teacup, 
which could grow if there wasn't somebody sort of to come and 
talk to.
Researcher: Why do you think they don't go to the supervisors?
Dilys: Maybe because I sit and have coffee with them at lunch time and
they come out - it's just, I suppose. I'm there and they come and 
tell me at break, and things like that.
But for a NUPE officer the existence of a system of trade union 
representatives went beyond meeting the wishes of the members and in 
fact he considered that it imposed an obligation upon ordinary staff 
not to relate directly to their supervisors or managers but only to 
the representatives.
Researcher: You said it might be going too far if a non-shop steward
or non-union representative starts talking to a manager and says 
what he should do, but is that being fair to the other members of 
staff? Shouldn't they have their chance to say what they ....
Sam: Oh, yes, but to me they should turn around and say it to their
representative, through their union. This is the way they should 
say it.
This statement seems to affirm that participation by staff in the 
running of the organisation should be exclusively channelled through 
the trade union structure and although it may be a reflection of the 
existing consultative mechanisms used by management it is interesting 
to note that another NUPE representative gave the impression that 
participation was only achieved by shop stewards:
Researcher: I do know that there can be great difficulty in getting
people to stand [as shop stewards]. Even if people wanted you to, 
why did you think that you'd like to?
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Dilys: I think because I like the involvement and I like to be able
to - as I say, there are some things which I don't think are right 
and I'd like to be able to try and help the girls, including 
myself, because if I get a better deal for the girls I'm getting 
one for myself, and I just feel that somebody's got to speak for 
them and I feel that if they want me to I enjoy doing it.
This shop steward appeared to genuinely wish that the participation 
provided through the trade union structure should be of a constructive 
type largely exercised in harmony with management, and together with 
another shop steward she has worried that trade unions might become 
too powerful:
"hfy own opinion of the union is that it shouldn't be as 'anti' as 
what they are now. It should be a working relationship between 
management and unions.".
Furthermore, she pointed out that co-operative arrangements already
existed for the relatively amicable resolution of grievances processed
by the staff representatives:
"You know that we can come and talk to you or we can go for a 
meeting and talk and something can be ironed out, but if it 
wasn't ironed out it could case a lot of dissatisfaction and not 
be so helpful to the hospital or to the staff. Both ways it 
works for, don't you think?".
Understandably, there was little criticism of the internal 
democracy of trade unions and staff organisations, although one of 
the NALGO representatives was a serious dissenter. When she declared,
"I mean what we know is what they want us to know.", she was not 
referring to management, but to her branch executive and she spoke 
several times of the lack of feedback and lack of information coming 
from the union branch. One of the NUPE shop stewards also complained 
that she did not receive enough information from the branch chairman
-253-
and was not even given notice of some of the union's meetings. In
contrast, the Society of Radiographers' representative stressed how
sensitive she had to be to the wishes of her members:
"We can only do what the members will do. The thing is, they can
say to me - give me a really horrible task which I didn't believe 
in at all and I'd still have to come to you and do it, as much as 
I thought it was wrong. If they instructed me to do it. I'd have 
to do it.".
Equally, one of the NUPE representatives had no doubt that trade 
unions were internally democratic and provided an effective means of 
staff participation.
Researcher: If we talk then about the staff having a say in the way
things are run, does that mean you think that's the best way of 
letting them have a say?
Sam: Well a union meeting is always the best, because you're discussed
in public amongst - you're having a public debate in the union,
in a union meeting, and everybody's view has got to be taken.
It's as simple as that.
However he subsequently talked very frankly about the poor attendance 
at trade union meetings and the lack of balanced representation.
Consultation
A category of participation that is rather more general than 
trade union representation is that of consultation. One of the ASTMS 
representatives articulated what consultation meant to him and also 
touched upon its satisfactory outcomes and its dangers:
Eric: If somebody says they're going to consult with me about
something, I take that to mean that there will be no decisions 
made about whatever's under discussion until we've had a really 
thorough debate about it and exchanged views about it and tried
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if possible to come to some sort of mutual conclusion about it.
I know that sounds like negotiation, but I don't see it that way.
I just think that's what consultation ought to be about. Now if, 
failing at that point any sort of ability to reach agreement, then 
granted the management, because it is consultation, are quite 
entitled to go away, think about what went on, and then draft or 
devise or write whatever it was they were consulting us about, in 
whatever way they see fit.
This has connotations that consultation is a management-initiated 
activity, that undertaken properly there should be genuine potential 
for the comments received to affect the subject under discussion, that 
agreement is not a necessary outcome of consultation and that consult­
ation reaffirms managerial prerogatives. The representative's summary 
therefore suggests that the characteristics of consultation are clearly 
identifiable, logical and mutually consistent but unfortunately it is 
innocently deceptive and also excludes reference to three other key 
features of consultation, namely its purpose, with whom it should take 
place, and the factors responsible for its success or failure.
Some of the advantages of consultation were described in one of
the Donovan Commission's research papers (McCarthy 1966):
"The uses commonly attributed to joint consultation are that it 
provides a means of harnessing workers' knowledge and goodwill • 
towards achieving the goals of the enterprise; that it 
increases workers' feelings of personal identification with the 
enterprise and improved industrial relations; that it provides 
a channel through which feelings of dissatisfaction may be 
ventilated; and that it enables workers to participate in areas 
of the life of the enterprise beyond the usual area of 
negotiating machinery.".
Cuthbert and Whitaker (1977:32) judge that, "The overall managerial
objectives of joint consultation have never been closely defined",
and then provide a list that is almost identical to McCarthy's. In
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an advice paper to its members about how to compile employee involvement 
statements, (in accordance with 1982 Employment Act, Section 1), the EEF 
summarises the forms of consultation as regular meetings with employee 
representatives, works committees/councils, health and safety committees/ 
liaison with health and safety representatives, employee representative 
consultative councils, suggestion schemes (and committees to operate 
the schemes), and training committees (reported in Industrial Relations 
Report and Review No. 302 23.8.83.).
If a modus operandi similar to that described by the ASTMS repres­
entative is accepted by the staff it might seem possible for consulta­
tion to fulfil a number of needs in the employing relationship and in 
forms that can be diverse although complimentary. But Cuthbert and 
Whitaker report that (1977:32):
"With certain few exceptions, it has failed to live up to the 
hopes it once inspired. Judged on its own terms as a device 
for obtaining employee involvement and increased efficiency its 
performance has been hardly successful.".
In one factory, O'Neill was even able to offer evidence that consult­
ation was responsible for a direct reduction in output. He discovered 
that output was higher at night than on day shifts, higher again at 
weekends, and even higher at bank holiday weekends (1982:41):
"Managers did 'drop in' at all hours, but they were normally 
present only during the morning and afternoons. When on site, 
though, they held many meetings. This company has a 'high 
participation' ethos, and therefore holds more meetings than 
do any others. Furthermore, most meetings involve the attendance 
of line supervisors (and, not infrequently, off shift operatives). 
Were the operatives, left unsupervised, simply slacking during 
the meetings? This suggestion was ruled out on two counts.
First, it was just not compatible with the general climate in 
the plant, nor with the output bonus schemes that operated. The 
second disproof, though, took some finding.
An analysis of delays showed that many standard delays took 
slightly longer to resolve on day shift than at weekends. The 
answer was now clear: during the day shift the line supervisors
and shift managers, frequently called away into meetings, were 
not around to deal with an emergency, or when quick production
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decisions were required. Their attendance at meetings was building 
delay into decision-making.".
Clarke (1980) confirms the declining popularity of joint consult­
ative committees and acknowledges that McCarthy predicted the demise 
of consultation with the development of workplace industrial relations 
negotiating structures. McCarthy's evidence (1966) showed that the 
usual form of plant consultative committees:
"cannot survive the development of effective shop floor organisa­
tion. Either they must change their character and become 
essentially negotiating committees carrying out functions which 
are indistinguishable from the formal processes of shop floor 
bargaining, or they are boycotted by shop stewards and, as the 
influence of the latter grows, falls into disuse.".
The stewards, he argues, would not recognise that there are issues
either of common interest or subject to managerial prerogative which
could be discussed separately from collective bargaining issues:
"Any committee on which they serve which cannot reach decisions, 
albeit informal ones, they regard as essentially an inferior or 
inadequate substitute for proper negotiating machinery.".
It was inaccurate of McCarthy to assume, however, that the develop­
ment of shop floor organisations would preclude any form of liaison 
between the staff and management of a more direct nature and consequently 
consultative schemes have functioned satisfactorily in some enterprises, 
such as ICI and Cadbury-Schweppes:
"In attempting to identify the crucial elements within any 
successful system of joint consultation one must firstly recognize 
the difficulties involved in generalizing from the particular. 
However, one prime reason for success appears to be the provision 
for effective involvement at grass roots level. At ICI, for 
example, this is achieved at shop floor level by meetings of 
weekly staff and management, based on workgroups, known as 'gen' 
sessions. Thus, if one has to hypothesize, it would be that 
whatever types of consultative devices are formulated, whether 
formal or informal, their major chance of long-term success rests 
on their ability to create genuine and effective involvement at 
a wider level than that involved in representative arrangements.
This seems to us to be a key issue in any consultative system." 
(Cuthbert and Whitaker 1977:34).
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In Llandough, one of the NALGO representatives agreed that the
best form of consultation would be a meeting between all staff and
their immediate supervisor or manager, although he had reservations
about the amount of flexibility that would be available. He was asked
what kind of new meeting might help to achieve better consultation:
"I think if it was well run, a meeting or some channel for people, 
say administrative or clerical staff, to air their grievances.
You see, some don't want to. They don't like to go to their 
head of department, I don't know why (laughs) - so they could air 
their grievances. But of course it's very difficult for the 
manager to do anything because he's supposed to be supporting 
their head of department, if it's against him. I think you should 
improve the channel from the mass of the workers to the management. ".
No other representative advocated that improved consultation should be
achieved by strengthening the direct relationship between staff and
management. Other representatives considered that consultation needed
improving but felt that this should be achieved by management co-operating
more with the shop stewards and staff representatives, some because they
regarded it as more effective than direct liaison and others because
they held it to be a reasonable expectation of their office. For one
NUPE shop steward, participation was solely about increased consultation
and he proposed how it might operate:
"I think more union participation in discussions might help, 
because I think through a union it would get back to the members.".
Research data examined earlier in this chapter has already shown that
consultation may in fact positively assist industrial relations if for
no other reason that it is seen as a management mechanism that
reinforces the status of shop stewards.
However, the EEF's guidance about consultation explicitly advises 
that employers should not limit consultation to shop stewards and it 
is true that many companies now emphasise the necessity of consulting 
directly with the workforce:
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Communications have improved a lot. Before we told the shop 
stewards and they told the men what they wanted them to hear.
Now we are introducing a piece rate system to control wage drift. 
And at the invitation of the shop stewards, we are meeting them 
and the men in groups of forty to explain it. We've got a lot 
of confidence in our future now,'" (Sunday Times Business News 
31.1.82.).
Engaging in discussion in this way, by meeting staff directly in
conjunction with shop stewards, is one alternative to consulting
exclusively through trade union channels. The Institute of Directors
has suggested another that eliminates trade union involvement almost
completely. In its advice (1983) about employee involvement it stresses
that employee representatives for consultative systems should be
obtained by an election solely for that purpose amongst the employees
and that the ballot should be available to every employee and not just
those who are members of a trade union. A more pragmatic approach, at
British Leyland, is described by Taylor (1982a:133,136). He quotes
Robinson's successor as Senior Convenor at Longbridge:
"'All kinds of changes have been accepted here that weakened the 
stewards and strengthened the management, but there never seems 
to be any let-up. You simply can't keep on treating men like 
this year after year.'.
Implicitly, BL itself seem to agree. Strenuous efforts were made 
by the company to establish a new procedure agreement that would 
give the stewards and union officials an important role in 
decision-making without any return to the veto powers of the past. 
This was signed in May, though it may take some time for the new 
approach to start healing the wounds of the last four years.".
The implication of the convenor's statement is that "the men" and the
stewards are synonymous and that by ignoring the wishes of the stewards
the management has been treating the workforce with contempt.
The concept of being able to both retain effective managerial 
prerogatives and allow union representatives a genuinely important role 
in decision-making is a challenging one. For Cuthbert and Whitaker 
(1977:31) it is not feasible because either staff or their represent-
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atives do not effectively contribute to decision-making processes or
an element of negotiation is introduced:
"If 'joint consultation' is envisaged narrowly as a forum for 
the discussion of areas of 'common interest', where management 
can inform and be informed of the opinions of those most likely 
to be affected by their decisions in areas where the 'managerial 
prerogative' apply, then the McCarthy thesis probably holds good."
Cressey et al came to the same conclusion (1981:122,123):
"We identified two main forms of consultation. The first form 
was effectively bargaining in all but name, but was not recognised 
formally by either group because this would imply a precedent in 
terms of what was a negotiable issue, or commitment to the outcome 
of the process.....
The other type of consultation existed as a forum where each group 
pursued their own incompatible views of participation: Both co­
existed but neither had any real chance of success.".
The experience of Cressey and his colleagues was that despite the 
largely futile nature of the second type of consultation, it existed 
and even expanded but essentially for reasons that were superficial or 
concerned only with the potential value of the facility. These amorphous 
and insubstantial benefits were not valued by the representatives at 
Llandough. Formal consultative machinery did not exist in the hospital 
but at Area Health Authority level and one of the ASTMS representatives 
criticised it on the grounds that the meeting was too large and that it 
was not concerned with consultation but information-giving. Consequently, 
he explained, the ASTMS representatives did not attend the meetings and 
did not feel bound by the decisions coming from it, although the Area 
Officers of the Health Authority apparently expected them to. The 
representative felt that, "if they're not going to consult with me then 
don't insult me by pretending to. I say that as me but the staff as a 
whole feel that." and the same message came from one of the NALGO 
representatives, who considered that, "Where I think joint consultative 
committees fall down is that it makes no difference to what management
—260—
decide, necessarily.". The difficulty that management might face if 
it improved consultation was put to him:
Researcher: Why should management give more information to the staff,
who, if they feel strongly enough about it, are actually going to 
start negotiating it. In other words, if you extend consultation, 
from the management point of view, might you not simply be giving 
the staff more issues about which to start negotiating, which is 
inviting trouble as a manager?
Graham: No, not really. Well you may, but not in a great proportion
of things. With most things it should just stop with the consult­
ation.
The relationship between consultation and negotiation was also highly
significant for the ASTMS representative, who was actually the same as
the one who had such clear ideas about the nature of consultation:
"If they must have an Area forum they should concentrate solely 
exclusively and only on those items that they can actually 
negotiate, because I don't believe that what is supposed to be 
consultation, and isn't, is of any value at all, and I don't think 
it should happen at all. It's better not to happen.".
Consultation/Negotiation
The sentiments of these two representatives are, in essence, 
virtually identical, although with different emphases, and reflect 
crucially upon the nature of participation. They differ slightly 
about the amount of common ground about which there may be consultation 
without incurring dissention but they agree that sincere and successful 
consultation can only occur when elements of negotiation are accepted 
into the consultative process. Yet while it is true that by the 
appropriate selection and presentation of issues for discussion 
managment can exercise as if prerogatives and have its definition of
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what is consultative rather than negotiable accepted by the staff 
side, it is also obvious and commonplace that staff and trade unions 
define many issues as negotiable and management accept the definition 
even though they may on many occasions prefer to regard the issues as 
either for consultation only or the subject of management prerogatives. 
In other words, negotiation will occur whether activities explicitly 
labelled 'consultation* exist or not.
There are clearly strong connections between the two and industrial
relations negotiating, or collective bargaining, may be an equally valid
source of participation. Daniel and McIntosh, for example, see all
participative arrangements as eventually destined to take the form of
collective bargaining through trade union representatives (1972:99,100):
"The substantial movement, then, towards the concept of the single­
channel of representation, ultimately the trade union, hinges upon 
recognition of the impracticality of distinguishing between what 
are exclusively consultative, as opposed to negotiating, issues 
and of management standing firm on any unilateral decision-making 
prerogatives. The movement also represents a recognition that 
joint consultation as a self-contained concept and purely joint 
consultative works councils have generally failed and failed 
lamentably.".
But a paradox about the relationship between consultation and 
collective bargaining is that although both conceptually and practically 
they may be indistinguishable they are also capable of distinction of 
great clarity. This may sound tortuous and unrealistic but it describes 
what became apparent during some of the research interviews, and was 
expressed most clearly in an exchange with one of the NALGO represent­
atives about the value of discussions between staff and management: 
Graham: I think there is a lot of point of sitting down but of course
there will be disagreements.
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Researcher: You want greater consultation; so we consult and manage­
ment ways, 'This is what we're going to do.'. You say, 'Well no.
We think you should do it this way.', but at the end of the day, 
management says, 'All right, we've consulted with you, we've 
listened to you, but I'm sorry but we're still going to do it this 
way.'?
Graham: Well we - the union - would have to decide whether it's a
good enough case to do something about.
Researcher: In that case, I put this question to you. Is there any
difference between consultation and negotiation?
Graham: Oh, yes, yes.
This reply was supported by evidence he supplied about what was to him 
a very obvious separation of function between the consultative and 
negotiating arrangements within the Health Authority.
Certainly not all the representatives maintained this distinction.
One NUPE shop steward demonstrated how almost imperceptibly consultation
can merge into negotiation:
"A lot of things happen you see, Mr Campbell, and we don't know 
the reason why. We're kept in the dark and you see a thing is 
brought out and we've never even heard of it. A change in the 
working conditions, say, and anything involving the working 
conditions should be negotiated. You should come to some amicable 
agreement between us and management relating to the conditions 
concerned. But there's not enough.".
This implicit blending of consultative and negotiating processes
similarly became apparent in a discussion with a second NUPE shop
steward about the planning of a major extension to the hospital. He
went to some trouble advocating the common sense and the value of
consulting with the staff about the plans and in doing so he mentioned,
"Personally, I think as a union you would aim for a higher staffing
level anyway, to expect a reduction when the final thing opens up.".
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In other words, he had an assumption that the consultative process 
would in practice contain major elements of negotiation. Another NUPE 
shop steward denied completely the existence of a distinction between 
consultative and negotiating processes:
Researcher: Is it possible to actually say, 'These things are only
for consultation, and are not for negotiation.'? Do you think it's 
ever possible to say that?
Dilys: I don't think so (laughs). No, where I'm concerned (chuckling).
Nevertheless, the ability to keep the two activities apart has 
been defended by some commentators. Warr and Wall (1975:110) define 
the difference:
"In the United Kingdom there has developed a particularly sharp 
distinction between 'negotiation' and 'consultation'. These are 
both processes through which employees influence the organisation's 
decisions, but their content and machinery are traditionally quite 
separate. Negotiation takes place over wages and conditions of 
work; and all other management-worker issues are typically 
discussed through consultation. The essence of negotiation is 
that management may not introduce changes until agreement has 
been reached; unilateral alterations to hours of work or wage 
levels are thus not acceptable. Consultative processes, on the 
other hand, leave the final decision in the hands of management.".
In his analysis of consultation and negotiation in the NHS, Dyson
(1979) initially appears to support this view but subsequently refers
to the blurring that has occurred. "Consultation and negotiation are
two distinct processes", he begins (p 73) but then admits, "It is
easier to distinguish between the two processes in theory than in
practice." (p 74). He further recognises that, "In reality, it is
possible for one practice to shape gradually into the other." (p 74)
and that, "It is in this way that issues which were once strictly
consultative come within the scope of negotiation, whilst on a
different occasion consultation might begin upon issues which were
previously regarded as exclusively a managerial prerogative.".
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Finally, he declares:
"The important point here is that this process of change makes it 
totally artificial to separate consultation and negotiation in 
considering the formal relationships between management and staff 
in the NHS." (p 75).
It is this final type of contention rather than that of Warr and
Wall that dominates the literature. Hebden and Shaw (1977:78) comment,
for example, that:
"Any attempt to institutionalise separately the areas of greater 
and lesser conflict, of greater and lesser consensus, will run 
the danger of damaging the credibility of the institutions for 
participation outside the bargaining arena.".
For Clegg, who outlines the nature of domestic bargaining requiring
neither signed agreements nor recognised procedures, "There is no clear
line between bargaining of this kind and consultation." (1976:249).
Goodrich (1975:191) states that:
"It is difficult to draw any very valid distinction between 
consultation and bargaining; yet consultation over changes in 
technique very often may mean more than a mere chance to bargain 
over terms of a change before it happens; it often means a real, 
though not always important, give-and-take of advice and opinion 
on the advisability of a change.".
This is echoed by Hawkins (1979:163):
"In well-organized workplaces, management has seldom been able to 
resist indefinitely the demand for more joint regulation^ and 
where traditional consultative arrangements have survived this 
probably reflects a simple lack of pressure for anything different."
An alternative is that where traditional consultative arrangements
survive it is in name only, as Clarke suggests (1980:12):
"The line between negotiation and consultation is often very 
difficult to draw, and even where the distinction is maintained, 
it is far from rigidly observed in practice. But a wide range of 
issues beyond the traditional fields of wages and conditions are 
now negotiated within enterprises, and it is likely that in many 
enterprises any issue raised as a consultative matter will become 
one of negotiation if the shop stewards cannot obtain the 
satisfaction they seek.".
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The use of consultative arrangements as a vehicle for negotiation is
confirmed by the ILO (1981:198);
"The fundamental importance of collective bargaining in many 
countries has been highlighted in this study, and it has been 
shown that in practice, negotiations are also conducted on works 
councils whenever it is a matter of co-decision, or even of 
extensive consultation on problems which are important for the 
workers.".
The stimulus to derive de facto collective bargaining rights from 
consultative arrangements can have its origins in one or more of 
three different processes. Staff may either ignore or reject consult­
ative arrangements and deliberately only pursue involvement by 
collective bargaining; they may participate in consultative systems 
and explicitly support their purpose but in practice maintain no 
inhibitions about negotiating if necessary; and they may support 
consultative arrangements but consciously seek to exploit every 
opportunity to extend the bounds of what is negotiable. The approach 
of the TUG (1979 para 67) is that:
"A merger between negotiating and consultative machinery is 
welcome, in that it facilitates the gradual transition of matters 
of substance from unilateral management control, through consult­
ative procedures, and eventually to become matters for negotiation."
It allows that there may be important exceptions but in general it does
not envisage that there is a major role for separate consultative
machinery. Burns and Doyle (1981:95) emphasise that:
"As far as views and opinions are concerned consultation is two 
way. But the right to take decisions stays firmly with management. 
To that extent unions will always look on consultation as a limited 
way of furthering the members* interests. For the same reason 
unions will generally aim to take consultation a stage further - 
to negotiation,".
If then, by whatever means, consultation becomes an extension of 
collective bargaining, how does this outcome relate to the management's
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intentions in introducing, maintaining or enhancing consultative
participative arrangements? The answer is of course that in most
instances it is undesirable and it is also very likely that it marks
the very opposite of management's own objectives:
"There is in fact what amounts to a growing gap between the 
managerial conception of employee participation and that of the 
trade unions. The overall union objective of greater iridustridl 
demooraoy defined as 'the achievement by workpeople collectively 
of a greater control over their work situation' contains within 
it much that runs counter to the hopes management hold for 
employee participation as a technique for increasing outstanding, 
involvement, and commitment and thereby enhancing the efficiency 
and profitability." (Cuthbert and Whitaker 1977:35).
Arrangements designed by management to promote integration may thus
mutate into mechanisms that reinforce workplace pluralism. Dimmock
(1977:124) agrees. He reminds us that this does not mean that enhanced
participation has not been achieved, since:
"if workers are provided with information by management as an 
exercise in 'good communications', it can offer the workforce a 
potential for genuine participation: they may subsequently
decide, albeit contrary to management intentions, to use the 
information as a basis for affecting the future actions of 
management.".
There is even a possibility that workplace industrial relations can 
suffer if management actually succeeds in retaining limits of consult­
ative arrangements that do not allow for negotiation. As Daniel and 
McIntosh (1972:100) report:
"Joint consultative bodies have tended to degenerate rapidly and 
quickly to become to be seen as talking shops concerned with 
trivial matters such as cold chips in the canteen, without powers 
to deal with important issues. They have thus rapidly created 
disillusionment among managers, workers and their representatives 
with ideas of increased worker involvement through such means.".
But the analysis, which has considerable support, that consultation 
either evolves into negotiation or into insignificant discussion about 
trivia fails to recognise the full subtlety of employment relationships. 
This is illustrated in the following extracts from Cuthbert and Whitaker
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(1977:35) which are intended to be statements confirming the orthodox 
analysis but which almost coincidentally reveal features of workplace 
interaction that require the analysis to be modified. The emphases are 
my own:
"Another key factor in any consultative system and one with which 
few unions would disagree is that whatever the issue under 
discussion it must be OApâblé 6f alternative solutions.".
"Given this union approach, few purely consultative structures 
conceived by management as participation devices could survive no 
matter how much management might want to retain and develop them.".
"Regardless of managerial intentions, in any consultative scheme 
utilized by management as a two-way communication process there 
will be issues raised which, given a strong union organisation, 
could become the subject of collective bargaining..
"Where a decision is taken to broaden the basis of decision-making, 
perhaps ostensibly on a consultative basis, into areas previously 
the exclusive prerogative of management, it cannot be assumed that 
management will have the authority or ability to impose a hard 
and fast cut-off point to prevent negotiation from taking place.".
To begin with, Cuthbert and Whitaker seem to assume that there 
will always be agreement about the existence of alternative solutions 
to different issues, when in fact there may even be dissension about 
the nature of the problem that should be discussed and both management 
and staff or their representatives may be able to influence the 
perceptions of the other about whether or not alternative solutions 
do exist and if so what they are. However, they then recognise that 
management's commitments to its consultative structures may vary 
substantially and indeed its desire to exclude negotiation from them 
may even vary between issues. Management may, for example, allow 
extensive negotiation in order to provide the impression or reality 
of participation whilst retaining decision-making on a consultative 
basis only for the more major items. Whether this can be achieved 
partly depends upon the degree of collective bargaining power the
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staff possess and Cuthbert and Whitaker identify that a strong union 
organisation is one prerequisite for merging consultation and negot­
iation contrary to management's wishes. Other preconditions 
identified by the authors are the nature of management's authority 
and its ability. But finally, and probably unintentially, Cuthbert 
and Whitaker are rather more accurate about the nature of the relation­
ship between consultation and negotiation. Instead of repeating that 
the two processes will almost inevitably combine they less specifically 
but more realistically conclude that management cannot automatically 
sustain the distinction in practice by simply stating that there is 
one.
Even if successful negotiation and consultation systems can be
run in parallel, which Warr and Wall (1975) suggest they can, it may
not indicate at all that management has been successful in obtaining
agreement about its definitions. Provided negotiating mechanisms
exist the staff or trade unions might be content to discuss with
management on a consultative basis those issues to which it does not
attach great significance. In such a situation, management would be
wrong to assess its participation arrangements and, more generally,
its industrial relations by the success of its consultative system.
It would be more important to consider how and why the staff side
split the management of the various workplace issues into the two
systems. Dimmock (1977:129) recognises that the metamorphosis from
consultation to negotiation is not pre-ordained but largely depends
upon subjective assessment of its context:
"The fate of joint consultation in much of British industry has 
been to suffer a general decline in proportion to the growth of 
workplace bargaining. In short, industrial workers who have 
perceived that they have an ability to control management
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decision-making have pursued informal and ad hoc forms of direct 
and indirect participation and have escaped the constrictions of 
joint consultation largely by ignoring it.".
Armstrong et al (1981:138) are a little more precise:
"The implication .... is that no negotiated rule change in shop 
floor industrial relations is an isolated event; each occurs 
within the context of the ongoing bargaining relationship between 
the parties.".
They probably intend this to refer to the collective bargaining
relationship but the statement has greater conceptual importance if it
is interpreted as referring to the nature of the forces determining
the negotiated order between the parties involved in workplace
industrial relations. After all, management has a strong vested interest
in restraining the encroachment of negotiation:
"Managements may prefer to maintain the distinction between 
bargaining and consultation, since in the one case it enters into 
specific commitments, while in the other it retains the right to 
make decisions." Clarke (1980:12).
It must also not be ignored that there are ways in which this can
be achieved, one of which is described by Loveridge (1976:19):
"Many middle and line managers may feel threatened and instead of 
'participating*, will fall back on an increased reliance and 
propagation of 'management prerogatives'. Some procedural 
measures can be taken to structure the discussion. A clearer 
division between the agenda items considered appropriate for 
collective bargaining and those about which management are only 
prepared to consult may be provided by the existence of a formal 
arbitration procedure, as in the public services.".
Such arrangements do not, however, support the contention that manage­
ment prerogatives are absolute. The prerogatives that management 
seeks to maintain and exercise in such circumstances are only as if 
prerogatives since:
"Such procedures are useful only so long as they are not needed: 
once management feel the need to claim their formal prerogatives 
or employee representatives to assert theirs, the necessary trust 
may well have been dissipated," Cp 19).
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But as if prerogatives are exercised and in some situations
negotiation does not enter into consultation. Dyson (1979:75) is
dismissive of this fact, but mistakenly:
"This shift is occurring continually in the NHS, although in the 
short and medium term local situations may remain static. Those 
managers who insist upon consultation only, can do so in relation 
only to their own local circumstances, and their views, although 
interesting, are irrelevant to managers with an extensively 
developed negotiating relationship with staff.".
Examples have already been given of entire industries with strong 
collective bargaining systems which have experienced severe altera­
tions in the nature of industrial relations because of fundamental 
changes in the definition of tolerable management behaviour, but it 
is particularly erroneous to dismiss the maintenance of consultation 
only in some locations as inconsequential. Analysing such differences 
can contribute to a better understanding of how negotiated order 
theory applied in industrial relations.
Furthermore, there is evidence at national level that it is 
possible for management to inhibit negotiation in arrangements that it 
describes as participative or consultative. This is referred to in 
the report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy 
(1977:39,40):
"Another source of concern was that board representation might 
conflict with the traditional role of trade unions, which is seen 
as one of opposing management in collective bargaining, not 
collaborating with it on the board. The objectives of board level 
representation and of collective bargaining may therefore be 
incompatible. The sharpest expression of this view came from the 
Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union 
(EETPU) , who thought that there was a fundamental and irreconcilable 
incompatibility between board representation and the collective 
bargaining function of trade unions. In their evidence to us, the 
EETPU describes two inter-related aspects of the problem:
'First, there is the institutional impossibility of separating 
the boardroom consultation from the potential negotiating implica­
tions behind the issues under discussion. Second, there is the 
irreconcilable split loyalties of the worker directors themselves.
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They will find it immensely difficult to separate their boardroom 
responsibilities dictated by business priorities from their 
representative functions derived from their relationship with 
the workforce.".
The EETPU concludes:
"Tar better in the interests of those affected by a managerial 
decision that the responsibility for that decision is firmly laid 
at the management's door; then the collective bargaining machinery 
can oppose and moderate the impact of the decision when necessary'.".
The ability of management to impose its definition of consultation, 
and perhaps even to obtain the agreement of the staff to it, should not 
be underestimated. The research data revealed that there were clearly 
workplace themes about which the representatives would want to negotiate 
rather than simply be consulted but equally there have been times when 
they have accepted, even over major issues, management's definition of 
items for consultation only, and the conceptual distinction between 
consultation and negotiation seemed to have real meaning for a number 
of them. One of the NALGO representatives, who had stated that his 
union would seek to negotiate if management did not agree with its 
proposals after involving the union in a consultative process about 
an issue, was also adamant that there was a distinction between the 
two processes. The interesting point about his distinction was that 
he seemed to relate it to the types of formal structures associated 
with each:
"But with consultation, for instance the Friday meeting every 
month with the Area officers, you could call that consultation. 
That's not negotiation because there's the plenary committees 
for negotiation. And the joint consultative committees, they're 
just consultation, aren't they. But with the plenary committees, 
which are management and trade union, that's negotiation, and
the early retirement age for women was negotiated, agreed upon.
That's negotiation.".
The conceptual difference for this representative was not strong
enough for him to agree, if required to do so, to be formally bound
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no t to negotiate about issues presented to him for consultation but, 
as with other representatives, the degree of reality of the distinction 
for him suggests several contributory factors.
It could be that the Area officers were exercising considerable 
care in selecting the issues that they would choose to raise with the 
trade unions for consultative purposes so that they could know with 
some certainty that the trade unions would not wish to negotiate 
about them. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, there may be an 
acceptance by the trade union representatives that they must adhere to 
the consultative process if that is the one under which management 
presents an issue to them, although this in turn could be related to 
the trade unions* assessment of the meaning of management declaring 
that an issue is for consultation only or presented only in a consult­
ative context. This may be a means by which management declare its 
strength of interest and which accordingly the staff may only very 
rarely be inclined to challenge.
Collective Bargaining
At hospital level, local, informal consultation initiated by 
management enabled the staff representatives, sometimes unconsciously 
and sometimes by deliberate manipulation, to enter into bargaining 
processes that provided one of the most effective means of getting 
their wishes met. An example of the subconscious relationship came 
from one of the NUPE shop stewards, who appeared to be stressing the 
need for a collaborative relationship between staff management although 
its sustenance was derived from negotiation:
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"I don't agree with bringing management down. I think you should 
work with management as far as we possibly can.".
"Instead of the union saying, 'Right, we'll do it our way.' and 
management saying, 'We'll do it our way.', if it was talked a 
lot more there could be more of a compromise, whereas neither 
would be undermined and management would still be getting what 
they want, but perhaps getting it a different way round.".
"A manager's got perhaps halfway to what she wants. Perhaps the 
manager will realise then, when it's been discussed with the trade 
union, that that decision was not quite what she could foresee at 
that particular point when she made it.".
Other NUPE shop stewards were far more blatant about exploiting 
bargaining opportunities. During a discussion about how management 
achieves change, a statement was put to one of the stewards:
Researcher: It seems nearly always a trade union will try to get
something out of it.
Carol: Oh yes, yes.
Researcher: Do you think that's right?
Carol: Oh yes, definitely. They always seem to want to get a little
bit more than the management is willing to sort of offer. Or 
they try to twist the management so that they can get a bit more 
out of management. I agree there.
Although she confirmed that the union representatives would always try 
to capitalise upon bargaining opportunities, this shop steward did not 
agree that it was right for this to occur on every occasion. Another 
NUPE shop steward was asked why this semi-adversarial relationship 
existed and again the significance of the fruits of bargaining were 
highlighted:
Colin: What we've got to do is try and get the best out of you, whilst
you're trying to hold back to get the best.
Researcher: When you say, 'You get the best you can', what do you
mean by, 'the best you can'?
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Colin: Well, the best deal. I mean, all the little things we've had
in the past, little disputes, or on the bonus, say. We go in and
we discuss something, well we'll give in on one subject as long
as we can get two back. You know what I mean, that type of
thing, that's what I mean about getting the best.
Another NUPE representative stressed the mutual benefit that could
derive from negotiation:
"No matter what changes - you might want to change something, so 
do we. So I mean, all right if you want to change your way, then 
let'¥ try changing something else our way. You've got to do that."
Coming from trade union officials such opinions may appear
predictable and unexceptional but they encompass the representative's
implicit assessment of two fundamental features of the employing
relationship. One is that there are many issues about which management
can only make decisions with the consent of its workforce, and the
other is that through trade union negotiation staff can achieve their
own objectives in the organisation, even if these are incompatible
with those of management. The nature of managerial authority is thus
substantially modified. Clarke (1980:5) notes that:
"As the volume of workplace bargaining expanded, so its scope 
slowly widened from the traditional areas of wages and working 
conditions. Shop stewards came to realise the strength that the 
new economic conditions gave them and increasingly sought to 
bargain on matters that had hitherto been regarded as within the 
management's prerogative;".
The result is that, "collective bargaining is the predominant means
whereby workers in Britain participate in decision making in the
enterprise." (p 8).
Many others have come to the same conclusion. The ILO (1981:170) 
has stated that:
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"Collective bargaining is undoubtedly a form of participation, 
even an advanced form, since it implies not only informing and 
consulting the workers but negotiating with them on matters which 
would otherwise be the subject of unilateral decisions. In a 
number of countries collective bargaining is the most important - 
or even the only - form of participation in decision-making: in the 
undertaking.".
The report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers
Associations 1965-1968 (Donovan Report) declared that (para 212);
"Properly conducted, collective bargaining is the most effective 
means of giving workers the right to representation in decisions 
affecting their working lives, a right which is or should be the 
prerogative of every worker in a democratic society.".
Consequently, the Commission argued that the scope of collective 
bargaining should be extended to include all the issues that employees 
regard as important at work. Ramsay (1976b:694) refers to circum­
stances in which the influence allowed to employees is less than that 
which they desire;
"Both wages issues and job control, the two most prominent 
factors, are essentially matters of conflict between shop floor 
and management, in contrast to the 'common interest' emphasis 
of almost all official participation schemes. For this reason, 
there seems strong support here for the argument that the crucial 
means by which employees gain some control over management 
decisions is by collective bargaining - a view promoted by 
Allan Flanders, Hug^ Clegg and a few more radical commentators 
than these, and a common view among union spokesmen themselves.".
More recently the TUG (1979) has reaffirmed that:
"the major way to extend collective control of work people over
their work situation will continue to be through the strengthening 
of trade union organisation, and the widening of the scope of 
collective bargaining." (p 25).
It elaborates that :
"The main way to extend the area of joint control and to limit 
unilateral managerial prerogatives over matters of day-to-day 
management is to use the present structure of collective bargaining 
machinery to bring into the field of negotiations matters which 
are currently outside collective agreement. Coupled with parallel 
improvements in procedures, this can lead to a substantial 
extension of joint control over the immediate work situation.
There is no logical reason why the collective bargaining process 
should only apply to the division of resources of the enterprise
in terms of money wages." (p 26).
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And one of the important conclusions of the Committee of Inquiry on
Industrial Democracy chaired by Lord Bullock was that although it
concentrated upon trade union involvement on company boards it
regarded this as inseparable from collective bargaining:
"Rather, we believe that they are similar and complimentary 
processes. Both contain elements of co-operation and conflict, 
harmony and discord. Both by their very natures involve the 
mutual dependence of union and management. Perhaps most 
important, both have the same basic objective: to enable
employees to participate in decision-making in the enterprise 
in which they work." (1977:124).
Even the CBI agrees with this view:
"Participation will not succeed if it is seen by managers and 
employees as in some way weakening or conflicting with collective 
bargaining. It is essential that where there is collective 
bargaining and trades union machinery, the shop stewards should 
be involved in the participation arguments as well. Indeed, in 
some companies, the best way to develop participation will be 
through the extension of collective bargaining and it would be 
wrong for legislation to rule out this possibility." (1977:20).
There is thus a powerful inclination to regard collective
bargaining as a form of participation but it does not attract universal
accreditation. In a consultative paper, the SDP, for example, suggested
that, "Collective bargaining has too often turned into a destructive
stalemate instead of the means to a productive partnership."
(1982:2). It is realised in the paper that (p 19), "It could be argued
that extended collective bargaining should be an appropriate option for
participation." but it continues:
"We believe that industrial democracy would not succeed if it 
were merged with collective bargaining because it is trying to 
achieve different objectives.
Collective bargaining is designed to produce an agreement between 
parties who see their interests initially as opposed. In these 
circumstances it tends to be adversarial by nature. Participation 
on the other hand is about better decision-making in the mutual 
interests of the parties involved. It is based on rights rather 
than power but of course the two systems will influence each 
other.".
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Macfarlane describes the fear that economic individualists have
about the extension of collective bargaining (1981:71);
"The institution of collective bargaining throughout industry has 
increased the incidence and severity of industrial conflict; its 
extension through industrial democracy will increase the range of 
issues over which conflict arises, while making it more difficult 
for managements, uncertain about their role and position, to 
mount a firm response. The likely outcome is industrial chaos.".
Most observers, but certainly not all politicians and practising 
managers, would consider such an assessment to be extreme but the issue 
of whether or not extended collective bargaining induces greater divis­
ion or joint responsibility is central to any discussion about whether 
it should be regarded as a form of participation. Brannen (1981:76) 
notes that :
"Most accounts of collective bargaining viewed as an approach to 
participation have seen it primarily as a system in which trade 
unions can defend the interests of their members rather than 
enter into a more positive co-operative relationship with manage­
ments, so that it becomes a method of participation through 
opposition which allows worker representatives to avoid what 
they might otherwise consider intolerable conflicts of interest.".
This argument has been espoused by the ILO but only as part of a 
more subtle analysis that indicates that forms of participation, and 
whether or not they include collective bargaining, largely rely for 
their survival on the extent to which they reflect existing employing 
relationships :
"although some participation schemes rely on areas of common 
interest between workers and their employers .... it is considered 
in some countries and occupational groups that the interests of 
the two parties, on fundamental issues at least, are naturally 
divergent. So, in the latter case, participation is regarded 
essentially as an effort to reconcile the contradictory interests 
of management and labour by frankly admitted confrontation in the 
shape of bargaining aimed at a mutually acceptable compromise.
So it is that collective bargaining at the level of the undertaking, 
which enables agreement to be reached on many matters of direct 
concern to management and labour, is often regarded as a procedure 
for participation in decisions and is in fact almost the only kind 
of participation to be accepted by both employers and workers in 
a good many countries where bargaining at that level is a current 
practice.".
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Some commentators have concentrated on the potential for collective 
bargaining to reduce conflicts of interest between staff and management, 
although for some this is a real achievement and for others it is super­
ficial. Hawkins (1979:176,177) believes that:
"As the scope of collective bargaining is extended, so the sense 
of mutuat responsibility for the enterprise as a whole may increase 
The experience of productivity bargaining proved that extended 
joint regulation can be an integrative process and that old habits 
and attitudes may be modified through institutional change.".
Collective bargaining may at least contribute to the maintenance of the
status quo:
"The corporation's ability and willingness to deal with the sort 
of issues which trade unions raise in negotiation ensures that in 
the eyes of the employee it is a 'reasonable' employer, which 
makes it unnecessary, as far as they are concerned, to ask more 
fundamental questions." (Purcell 1979:28).
Fox goes further and one of the main themes of his work has been that
(1974:208):
"for management to concede to collective bargaining and other 
means by which employees or their representative can participate 
in making of some kind of decision may well strengthen rather 
than weaken their control.".
And for Hyman a Marxist analysis of the effect of collective bargaining
on the employing relationship allocates it significance which is almost
only marginal :
"The exercise of managerial control is indeed rendered less 
arbitrary - and this is perhaps the most substantial outcome of 
trade union bargaining activity - but the oppressive consequences 
of managerial priorities are not radically altered." (1975:192).
There can be no doubt, however, that collective bargaining 
provides staff and/or trade unions with a very real power to influence 
operational décisions at least. It can be used to challenge the 
exercise of managerial prerogatives and can even be introduced into 
participative arrangements designed to.be integrative. A simple 
example of the first provoked a strike of mechanics at the largest
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distributors of Rolls Royce cars when the management wanted to change
their starting time. The Times (29,6.82.) reported that the strike
was in its sixth week and that it arose because:
"The company now wants it changed to an hour later, but the 
mechanics at the company's depot in Battersea, south London, say 
the time cannot be altered without consent.".
Chell describes how bargaining was introduced into a worker director
scheme. Seven such schemes in private companies were surveyed and
(1983:499,500):
"by and large the worker directors were responsible for very 
little effective change. The outstanding exception was company 
A. There we were given the impression that the worker director 
fought hard on behalf of his constituency, and in one difficult 
period of recession he managed to negotiate a significant 
reduction in the number of employees to be made redundant. He 
appeared to stem managerial authority and achieve a balance of 
power in which all concerned at.senior management and directorial 
levels could work.".
These examples show that the extension of collective bargaining
or negotiation is not necessarily the explicit policy of management
but something to which it gives tacit consent. Walker (1979:16)
examines the implications of substantive and procedural rule-making
in industrial relations. He concludes that:
"such a concept of industrial relations rules says nothing about 
how long the rules will remain unchanged or the extent to which 
the actors accept them.",
and that:
"when industrial relations rules are defined in this way, there 
is no reason to suppose industrial relation systems are inherently 
stable.".
Indeed, the extension of collective bargaining may so significantly 
alter the rules that both management and trade unions seek to obscure 
the degree of dynamism in the industrial relations system:
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"Management is well aware of this revolutionary aspect of 
collective bargaining, as are the unions. Both, however, have at 
times sought to obscure it for partisan purposes: management
with the hope that it might successfully assert a 'proper* 
definition of collective bargaining which would confine it within 
prescribed bounds, thereby limiting its challenge to managerial 
power; the unions with the intent of quieting the fears of those 
who resist changes in the social order." (Chamberlain 1967:105).
Contrary to the impression given by Chamberlain, dynamism in the 
industrial relations system can be generated by management as well as 
trade unions. This is one of the fundamental tenets of the Conservative 
government and the victory in the Falklands was used to promote it 
during the 1982 rail dispute. The Sunday Times reported (4.7.82.) 
that:
"Mrs Thatcher declared yesterday that 'the Falklands factor' has 
irrevocably changed British attitudes and that the leaders of 
ASLEF, the train drivers union, do not understand 'the new mood 
of the nation'.
.... The Prime Minister appealed to every train driver ' to put 
his family, his comrades and his country first' by continuing to 
work".
In an adjoining column. Fryer reported on the train strike and
specifically referred to the change that had occurred in the attitude
of the British Rail management :
"Although traditionally BR has been willing to fudge issues, the 
mood of the Board has hardened dramatically. While both managers 
and ASLEF leaders privately admit that the Scottish rosters, 
although technically on trial, would have been impossible to 
withdraw once started, BR has simply lost patience with ASLEF.".
Armstrong et al (1981:137) propose that in fact an equilibrium is
maintained in collective bargaining relationships:
"In many worker/manager relationships there appears to be an 
ongoing sense of a credit and debit balance, the state of which
may influence the settlement of any given issues.....
If the bargaining relationship is though of.as a win-some-lose- 
some affair, it then becomes possible for one of the parties to 
cite the current state of debt or credit as a legitimising 
argument. This sense of continuity applied even though the rule
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under discussion may be quite unrelated to the issue on which
the debt was originally incurred.".
It is probably unrealistic to regard the relationship as a whole in 
this manner, but what Armstrong et al are touching up on is the crucial 
realisation that what is negotiable is itself negotiable.
I had been unaware of this at the beginning of the research and 
the force of the realisation was so strong that I can even specify the 
date on which it occurred. Until then I had always assumed that there 
were certain characteristics about some issues which virtually pre­
ordained that they had to be negotiated with the trade union repres­
entatives, despite strong logical arguments that should be unnecessary 
since as a person hierarchically superior to others I should possess 
the authority to direct staff to do what their contracts of employment 
allowed. Reflection upon the source of ny sense of what issues had to 
be negotiated produced a variety of possibilities. It could be a 
personality trait to prefer to persuade rather than order; it is not 
'good* managerial practice to be dictatorial; working relationships 
rely on goodwill; a compromise might be possible which still achieves 
the main objective; the possibility of industrial action is reduced; 
appearing to be unreasonable might make the staff and shop stewards 
more disgruntled and active; issues can slot into categories of 
negotiable subjects defined by precedence; firmness can be construed 
as intellectually simplistic, politically right wing and insensitive 
to the dignity of fellow men where as negotiation is often considered 
to be intellectually sophisticated, apolitical and demonstrative of 
regard for one's workforce; and in the event of a dispute support 
might not be provided by higher management if no opportunity has been 
given for collective bargaining to take place.
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The revelation after a number of years of exercising management 
responsibility that these characteristics need not be self-determining 
may indicate naivety, particularly because of the obvious alteration 
in the national industrial relations climate under the Thatcher 
government. The economic recession, together with the Conservative 
government’s response to it, its industrial relations ideology, its 
industrial relations legislation and its determination, have radically 
altered the nature of national industrial relations. Far fewer issues 
are even brought to a negotiating forum and of those that are a much 
higher number have had to be conceded by trade unions and others have 
only been supported with substantially diminished strength. However, 
although such features have been symptomatic of the changes in national 
industrial relations they gave little idea of how the change had been 
achieved, particularly since the local industrial relations climate 
appeared to be unaffected. I therefore assumed that there was such a 
distinction between local and national industrial relations that 
although the latter might appear to be very sensitive to government 
policy the former could not be subject to similar influences. In 
other words, I understood that the climate of negotiation could be 
altered nationally, but without knowing the processes or methods 
involved I did not believe this to be possible at operational level.
I realised my error on 10 February 1982. A new consultant 
haematologist had taken up post and found that only doctors and nurses 
would collect blood from the blood bank refrigerators and without 
discussing it with me he had sent a letter to all wards and departments 
informing them that any member of staff could remove the blood from 
storage. The obvious implication was that the portering staff would 
be required to do this in future and I tried to explain to the consult­
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ant haematologist that I wanted to discuss his letter with the porters’ 
NUPE representatives. I said something to the effect that to he and I 
the job was, "just a job which porters should do", but that to the 
porters it was negotiable. I thought this would make him realise the 
necessity of consultation but his simple response was, "Why do they 
think it is negotiable". The problem was that here was a reasonable, 
intelligent man who knew that it was not necessary for doctors and 
nurses only to take blood from the fridge and that it was agreed that 
it was reasonable to expect porters to do it, so why could they not 
nust be told to do so in future? Put this way, the enquiry produces 
the same inarticulatness, confusion, frustration and uncertainty as 
that following a question from the child who has examined what it 
regards as an important feature of life, pursued its own simple logic 
and found it inexplicable e.g. why is ice cold, why does God do bad 
things, and where does the light go when you move the switch? And it 
is equally unsatisfactory to reply, "Don’t ask so many questions"!
In essence, the answer to the consultant’s question is:
"I could just tell them to do it, but the staff have their own 
implicit definition of what is negotiable, so do I, and we 
probably agree that this issue falls within the definitions of 
both of us.’’.
My definition is constructed from some or all of the considerations 
already listed, and possibly others. The staff definition, which will 
consist of a number of variations, because of the differences between 
the large number of individuals, because of the differences between 
the occupational groups, and, most significantly of all, because of 
the differences between the shop steward and members, will certainly 
be derived from other considerations, but also from some or all of 
the management criteria.
—284—
From this analysis of how issues derive their status of 
’negotiable*, it is possible to postulate the following axioms:
1. Both sides (more accurately described as coalitions of interest)
have their own definitions of what is negotiable.
2. The definitions are largely implicit.
3. Each side has its own variations in its definitions, although 
they are probably more numerous on the staff side.
4. The internal variations produce explicit and implicit reappraisal
of the collective definition, which is therefore internally 
dynamic.
5. The definitions respond to external influences, such as time, 
changes in the other side’s definition, and alterations in the 
organisation. They are therefore externally dynamic.
Any analysis of how issues become negotiable must therefore be 
multi-dimensional. The process cannot be described in terms of factors 
which may be divided into those which determine that some subjects will 
be negotiated and those which determine others will not be. Minimal 
additional dimensions are those of time and interaction. However, 
this multi-dimensionality does not prohibit elaboration of the main 
considerations the participants to negotiation might identify if asked 
to. What it does is to make it clear that such elaboration does not 
describe the relations between the various consideration, nor the way 
in which the relationships change, and therefore, most crucially, nor 
the very real but ephemeral processes by which issues occurring at the 
workplace become, or do not become, subject to negotiation. To amass 
all the items required to build a power station does not in itself 
produce a power station and, far less, explain how electricity is 
generated. Some attempt is made here to elaborate upon some of the
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factors that influence whether issues become negotiable or not but it 
should now be clear that they lie upon only two of the axes involved 
in locating negotiable issues.
Negotiations may occur when the process of negotiation itself is 
all that is required in order to obtain agreement, or when the 
concessions which it is anticipated will be required in order to 
achieve agreement are insignificant or inconsequential and therefore 
management can confidently expect to fulfil its objective.
In addition, for many years there have been strong influences 
upon management that have produced an orthodoxy of negotiatory manage^ 
ment. This is still true despite prominent use in sleeted areas of 
’macho’ management. Professional management organisations promote a 
conciliatory managerial approach and it has been applied and used by 
previous governments, who have thus set an example to managers through­
out the country. Futhermore, the entire body of modern management 
theory and teaching advocates the exercise of management through 
collective bargaining and/or a human relations approach.. The orthodoxy 
is reinforced by the enormously powerful forces of the desire to have 
the approval of one’s superiors and to compete successfully with 
comparable managers.
The maintenance of goodwill is another source of encouragement to 
manage by consent, for two reasons. In service industries in particular 
there are certainly duties which are undertaken or hours which are 
worked only because goodwill exists. Once informal work practices 
develop that are advantageous to management their maintenance becomes 
dependent upon sustained goodwill. More fundamentally, it can be argued
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that no society or any group in it can be lead except by acquiescence 
or consent. This at least requires the absence of any positive 
subversion. However, the concept of ’goodwill* again demonstrates the 
amorphous nature of industrial relations components. Acts of goodwill 
must be those which are not formally, explicitly or automatically 
expected by the person or organisation which benefits from them, and 
quite obviously expectations can oscillate immensely over a large and 
equally unstable number of items. Whilst there may be difficulties 
during a period of transition, either party to collective bargaining 
can markedly alter what can be expected to be negotiated and what the 
outcome of negotiation would be.
The prospect of industrial action if negotiation is refused or 
fails to satisfy the staff side affects managerial propensity to 
negotiate in a number of ways. Most obviously, it seriously disrupts 
the activity of the enterprise and may even prevent it completely. 
Additionally, managerial orthodoxy implies that a strike demonstrates 
managerial failure, and a strike is a clear indication of failure to 
superiors and in comparison with peers. Industrial action in itself 
does not resolve the dispute at issue, and even when it is called off 
it may be because management has had to back down. If management 
’win’ the dispute it may make the staff side even more anxious to 
create another dispute in which can win.
If the staff representatives are contemplating industrial action, 
it can be important for management to be able to display to the 
individual members of staff that is has exercised reasonableness 
before the management of the issue reached such a stage. If it had 
refused to negotiate at all it would be exceptionally difficult to do
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this and staff representatives would almost certainly exploit it in 
order to enhance their own apparent reasonableness. It used to be 
generally contended that if management refused to negotiate it forced 
members and representatives to be militant in order to achieve anything, 
and this may still be true at operational levels, but at least for a 
temporary period this no longer appears to be true nationally.
Personalities naturally affect the conduct of industrial relations 
and on the management side, for example, there may be those who find 
it unpleasant to be determined with staff, others who are afraid to 
do so, others who sympathise with trade unions, and others who feel 
that it is instinctively, religiously or intellectually right to 
discuss issues with the staff.
Refusal to negotiate or refusal to compromise may imply that 
management resents the existence of trade unions, is autocratic, old 
fashioned, inconsiderate to its staff, and politically right wing. 
Negotiation may occur therefore in order to avoid this inference.
Reference has already been made to the fact that in the past 
managers have sometimes been very anxious not to negotiate about issues 
which could then establish new categories of negotiable subjects, thus 
precipitating negotiation about other issues previously the exclusive 
concern of management. This has been the practical manifestation of 
beliefs in managerial prerogatives, although there can be no doubt 
that the scope of negotiation has increased substantially in recent 
years, but again some managements are now reasserting their ability 
to decide unilaterally.
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As a final example of a factor influencing how the categories of 
negotiable issues are defined, negotiation will inevitably be encouraged 
if it forms part of the management style of higher levels of management 
or if more senior managers will not automatically endorse their subord­
inates decisions in the event of a dispute but will assess the issue 
according to their own criteria, almost as an arbitrator, and how it 
should be resolved, quite possible in opposition to the lower manager.
The necessity of considering this final influence may have purely 
pragmatic origins, since people like to be obviously over-ruled, but it 
may also derive from the signals that such decisions represent about 
senior management's desire to implement or exercise a management style 
or ethos of participation, which is the employment construct with 




The research data presented so far has concentrated on the trade 
union shop stewards' and staff organisation representatives' percept­
ions of the existing employing relationship, particularly the one 
between management and themselves. From the data it should be fairly 
self-evident that this was an issue that they had immediate, positive 
ideas about and could discuss with some confidence. Rather strikingly, 
therefore, none of the representatives was able to respond when given 
carte-blanche to describe how they would wish to change the relation­
ship or its accompanying structures.
For example, one of the NALGO representatives was asked:
"If you were able to get anything changed which would actually 
improve either the way people feel about their jobs in this 
hospital or improve relationships between staff and management, 
between trade union representatives and management, what would 
you do?".
He was unable to answer and asked to be given time to think about the 
question. Similarly, a NUPE representative was asked how he would like 
the staff "to have more say" but he was not able to give any examples. 
Another NUPE shop steward was asked, "Are there things which you wish 
you could do something about, or that you think that you could do 
something about but you haven't been given the chance?" and again no 
response was forthcoming.
It might be pertinent to recall that virtually all of the topics 
raised as examples of the ones which the representatives had become
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involved in, or would have liked more information about, or did not 
believe management had handled correctly, or would have liked to have 
been involved in, were ad hoc problems without wider significance for 
the particular group of staff represented or for the longer-term 
organisation of the hospital. There thus seems to be both an implicit 
and explicit absence of desire for either structural or procedural 
change in the employing relationship and this outlook may derive from 
a number of largely alternative conditions. Does it, for example, 
indicate the success of the existing arrangements? Are the represent­
atives unable to hypothesise or by proactive? Do they simply lack the 
desire for more extensive or intensive participation? Does it 
represent the imposition of limitations upon shop stewards' aspirations? 
Or, more generally, does it reveal the strength of conditioning about 
the nature of the employing relationship as a whole?
The responses to these enquiries have a substantial bearing upon 
the nature of participation practised and its potential, if any, for 
development. Ramsay's "sceptical stance towards participation"
(1976b:696) is reinforced by a survey he completed which indicated 
that workers personally had no enthusiasm for participation even 
though appropriate structures existed within their workplace and 
Goodrich makes the point that reacting to the exercise of the manage­
ment function does not automatically imply a wish to contribute to it:
"It may still be pointed out that all this is merely a negative 
resentment against control and not specifically a positive
demand for control The desire to be let alone, to be free
from the irksomeness of control by others, is not identical with 
the desire to co-operate actively in the work of controlling.
.... Men might be ungovernable by authority without being thereby 
ready to govern themselves." (1975:34).
Walker (1974) has attempted to devise a comprehensive and systematic
means of determining which types of participation, if any, will manifest
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themselves in different sets of circumstances:
"The situational factors determine the participation potential of 
a particular enterprise; the human factors determine how far and 
in what ways the potential in the situation is translated into 
reality. The human factors may be termed workers^ propensity to 
participate and managements' acceptance of workers' participation,"
(p 12).
He regards workers' propensity.to participate as possessing three 
aspects :
"(a) Workers' attitudes and objectives in relation to participation;
(b) Workers' perceived power to participate;
(c) Workers' capacities to participate." (p 14).
Walker's analysis thus converges upon the same features that were 
raised for scrutiny after considering the Llandough representatives' 
unwillingness or inability to suggest how the employing relationship 
could be improved. The remainder of this chapter is mainly concerned 
with examining the potential for participation emanating from the 
nature of these characteristics amongst the representatives at Llandough.
Interest Orientations
Preliminary consideration should perhaps be given to the kinds of 
issues that staff and their representatives would like to be more 
involved in. Examples of the sorts of subjects that the representat­
ives gave their attention to were listed in Chapter 6 but is it 
possible to generalize more about their interests. For participative 
purposes they can be defined in two different ways, either as broad 
topic areas or as the activities of different levels of management in 
the enterprise. Ramsay (1976b:694) reports that:
"We asked respondents at which of these levels they wanted more 
say. In all, 53 per cent wanted more say only at job level,
31 per cent wanted more say at both levels; 6 per cent opted 
for more say only in management of the company as a whole, and
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10 per cent proved uninterested in either level. Thus, nine out 
of ten of these workers wanted more say personally. Most wanted 
this in regard to their immediate working environment - only just 
over a third wanting who1e-comp any decisions. This pattern fits 
in with H. Hoiter*s findings in Norway and with a recent Opinion 
Research Centre survey.".
One of the weaknesses of such a survey, as Ramsay admits, is that there
can be no certainty about whether the respondents comprehend the notions
about which they are required to comment, such as 'participation* and
'decisions', and if they do whether their understandings are mutually
consistent and consistent with those of the researchers. In the
Llandough research an attempt was made to identify whether there were
subjects or decision-making levels in which the representatives wished
to have greater participation by examining their responses to the
existing workplace environment.
It became overwhelmingly apparent that to the representatives the 
concerns of the staff were limited to features of their day-to-day 
organisation and their personal terms and conditions of service. A 
NUPE shop steward was asked:
Researcher: What are the other sort of things that annoy the men most
about working?
Colin: It's an accumulation of little things actually.
Another NUPE shop steward observed that, "A lot of aggravation in this 
department is trivial, stupid things.". Similarly, when the Society 
of Radiographers' representative was asked what types of issue caused 
dissatisfaction, she replied, "I think it's a group of very small 
things really, that add up together.", and another NUPE shop steward 
explained, "They moan a lot about petty little things really, but I 
suppose it can snowball.". She gave as an example differences of 
opinion between individual members of staff, which could create a more
-293-
extensive bad atmosphere.
However, issues of more specific substance or wider implication 
were raised by a few of the representatives. Some categories were 
provided by one of the NUPE shop stewards, for example:
Bernard: I just think that all grades of staff should have more say
in their place of work, in how the job is run.
Researcher: Well what do you mean by that? It's very vague isn't it.
Bernard: Staffing, equipment and possibly working relationships with
other members of staff.
When further precision was sought he gave the calculation of shift 
rotas as an example of a staffing problem. The construction of the 
menus was clearly one of the central concerns of the NUPE shop steward 
in the catering department:
Researcher: Supposing J, revised the menus?
Carol: I think I'd like to be sat in on menus. I really would.....
I'd love to sit in.
Researcher: So you would be interested in the menus because of the
effect on the workload?
Carol: No, no, not from that point of view, but from the point of
view some of these menus are too heavy.
Researcher: You mean for the patients?
Carol: Yes, I mean who'd - I wouldn't want .... ,
and she continued by describing some of the combinations of meals.
The same topic arose in another context:
Carol: When we apply for anything and they say, 'Oh you can't have 
it because money is short.' well this when they will pick up on 
the menus -.'Well surely if we're that short of money we could 
save them pounds on those menus.'.
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Researcher: So, coming back to how I started, clearly the staff have
suggestions for improving the service and they see ways of actually 
saving money on menus?
Carol: Oh yes, yes.
Researcher: Which aren't coming through at the moment?
Carol: Definitely.
This representative's department was one of those which would be most 
significantly affected by the construction of a new maternity unit 
within the next few years and she expressed the wish to know more 
about the unit, but only after her attitude towards it had been 
expressly sought. Other representatives also stated their interest 
in this development but again only after they had been prompted to 
think about it.
Two representatives described their dissatisfaction with the
management structure of their department and felt that the staff they
represented should be more formally involved. Although in different
departments, both complained about the problems of having a consultant
member of the medical staff as the ultimate head of department. This
arrangement had been specifically recommended by the DHSS for pathology
departments comparatively recently and it was to this that one of the
ASTMS shop stewards was referring when he concluded:
"To sum it all up, the major complaints are principally with DHSS 
organisational treatment of MLSOs in general. You and your local
colleagues can't do anything about it.".
The other representative believed that because a doctor ran the
department the professional/technical staff were inadequately
consulted, which gave the impression of being a professional slight
and a failure to exploit the knowledge and expertise of other staff in
the department. The representative also felt that the non-medical
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staff would be able to contribute constructively to the shaping of 
clinical policies but were given little opportunity to do so.
Interest in decision-making beyond departmental level was 
extremely restricted. One NÜPE shop steward spoke of how her members 
felt :
"They *re interested in the decisions of the Health Authority as 
far as they affect them, yes, but they are also interested in 
the liaison on wards. That's to them a prime thing in the 
working conditions.",
and she gave as an example the degree to which staff got on with the
people they worked with and in particular the personality of the
sister of the ward on which individual housekeepers worked. The same
representative demonstrated very well just how clearly delineated the
interest of the staff is between decision-making processes generally
and the possible personal consequences of individual decisions. The
decision to require one hundred posts to be lost, if necessary
through redundancies, had emerged after a number of health authority
members and senior managers had either agreed or not disagreed that a
certain sum of money had to be saved, that it should be saved by losing
staff, that the number of staff to be lost should be one hundred, and
that the Health Authority should rescind its policy of no redundancies.
The way that the staff reacted to the decision to lose posts in this
way was discussed with the representative:
Researcher: Were they concerned about how that decision had been made?
Dilys: Yes. Well, I don't know - they were more concerned about who
was going to go and how many redundancies there were going to be.
I don't thing they were concerned who made it so much as just 
what was going to happen.
Researcher: Did they discuss, or did you yourself think at all about,
whether it was justified or not?
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Dilys: No.
One of the ASTMS shop stewards confirmed that this attitude was not
confined to just one group of staff;
"The members of the group are not really very interested in Area 
policy, only when that Area policy has a noticeable impact on 
their own personal pay and conditions of service, and then, and 
only then, do they seem to have any interest in the issue.".
One of the NALGO representatives was enthusiastic to extend 
consultation but again the desire seemed to be for more involvement in 
workplace issues rather than wider policy-making:
Researcher: You seem to give the impression you think there's greater
scope for consultation?
Graham: Oh yes, there is, definitely.
Researcher: About what sort of things? What sort of subjects do you
think that there should be greater consultation about?
Graham: Well shifting of work and shifting of personnel, for instance.
In many commercial companies the provision of financial information
to staff and their representatives is regarded as one of the key
elements of any policy to involve staff but although the Health Authority
distributed budgetary information to trade union representatives, in
Llandough one of them at least regarded it as futile:
"Financial presentation's a waste of time. Most trade union 
representatives don't want to know. They don't do anything with 
it anyway, except when it is part of a specific issue that they 
have to deal with. They really don't want to know otherwise. 
Frankly, the AHA waste an awful lot of paper on trade union 
representatives. What they need is information when they ask for 
it.".
This opinion could have three alternative derivations. It could be 
that the good intentions of senior officers are not being appreciated; 
or that there is a deliberate policy to manage information, by giving
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the impression that information is being released when in reality it 
is only the inconsequential or incomprehensible; or that either the 
Health Authority or trade union movement has failed to provide the 
representatives with adequate training to know how to interpret 
management data in a way that they could use to promote their members* 
interests. Indeed, this last possibility has implications that 
permeate nearly all the discussion in this chapter. It raises the 
dilemma of whether improvements in participation should merely be 
those that respond to the wishes of the staff or those which others 
seek to achieve and which require that staff and their representatives 
must be given training to know how to use.
Shop Steward Inclination
The range of participative arrangements that are achievable (and 
whether or not training in participation, if it is decided that it is 
a prerequisite for success, is accepted and/or successful) will 
substantially depend upon the attitudes of staff to participation and, 
in those enterprises where there is a well-developed collective 
bargaining structure, upon the inclination of trade unions and their 
representatives. Two of the trade unions most active in the NHS are 
specified by Cuthbert and Whitaker as amongst those which are the 
keenest to obtain greater involvement. They observe (1977:32) that 
there are:
"those unions which, whilst adhering to the notion of expanding 
the scope of collective bargaining as the primary means of 
developing employee participation, are not ready to dismiss 
peremptorily the prospects of an additional element of 
'revitalized* consultation machinery in the shape of works 
councils and committees. The assumption is that any such 
machinery would be union dominated and that through it unions 
would have an opportunity to influence fundamental company policy 
decisions outside the established parameters of collective
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bargaining. Unions looking in this direction include NALGO,
NUPE, the GMWU and, more surprisingly, the NUM.".
This was certainly not obvious amongst the Llandough representatives. 
The kind of participation they were concerned about has already been 
described and it was difficult to elicit any proposals for improving 
the participative arrangements or to generate responses to hypo­
thetical alterations. A suggestion was put to one of the NUPE repres­
entatives, for example:
Researcher: Supposing we had a meeting and I gave you budgetary
information about how the hospital was doing and how the house­
keeping department was doing. Would there be any benefit in 
doing that?
Mary: I don't think it would be of any interest to me. I'm sorry.
There was really only one representative who was eager for 
significantly greater formal liaison, but it appeared that this was 
on the basis that as a NUPE shop steward she had little to lose 
rather than because she had envisaged what could be achieved. When 
asked if she felt that she had enough say in the way things were run, 
she answered, "Not at the moment, no, very little.". Nevertheless, 
the housekeepers she represented worried a lot about the standard of 
cleanliness and personally she sympathised with managers for the job 
they had to do. She suggested that there should be regular, formal 
meetings between the head of department, shop stewards and supervisors 
and considered that there was scope to improve the liaison between the 
departmental head and her staff. Discussion about the departmental 
budget would be of interest to her but she would not pass on budgetary 
information to her members. She wished to have regular meetings 
between all the NUPE representatives and myself but could not describe
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what sort of things might be discussed. She was able, however, to
summarise her interest:
"I just think the Health Authority should feed as much information 
back as they can to the unions, because it gives them a very 
different view, doesn't it. It you've got a lot of information you 
can see things from different angles than if you've only got a 
certain amount.".
The inference is that more information and involvement may lead to
greater trade union identification with the problems of management.
Another representative thought that there could be greater co-operation
but also confirmed this was unlikely to be a majority view:
Researcher: But are you saying then that approached the right way,
trade unions will actually co-operate in cost-cutting exercises?
Graham: I think they should and I think it should be natural wastage.
What you've got to say to people is they've got to work harder,
and I think in some places they could work harder.
Researcher: But wouldn't other trade unions, or possibly even other
representatives in NALGO, say, 'No, that's not our job. We're
going to defend our members, the interests of our members to the
last?
Graham: That's right. Yes, yes, they would.
Thus the fate of any new participative arrangements will partly
depend upon the degree to which the staff pursue a unitary or pluralist
approach. Tannenbaum captures this point, initially rather over-
zealously (1966:100):
"A number of authors have raised serious questions about the 
generality and practicality of participation. For one thing, 
the logic of participation hinges on the very crucial assumption 
of a substantial commonality of interest between employer and 
employee.".
Less precisely but more accurately, he subsequently advises that
(p 100):
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"The expectations and ideology of the workforce may represent 
further limitations on the applicability of the participative 
approach.".
Fox (1971:41) also relates the prospects of participation to the nature
of workers* orientations to the employment relationship:
"As with all the other possible sources of legitimacy, subordin­
ates may or may not share the relevant values. If they do not, 
management will gain nothing by such a change. If they do, they 
may, as we have already noted, value procedural participation 
for terminal or instrumental reasons or both. A terminal 
preference reflects ideological or cultural values which may or 
may not be adequately met by the procedural changes. If the 
preference is an instrumental one, subordinates will value the 
new procedural norms - and reward management with the sought-for 
legitimacy - only insofar as they prove effective for the 
pursuit of substantive aspirations.".
For Normal Tebbit, as Secretary of State for Employment, quoted
in the South Wales Echo, the position was straight-forward:
"I see no distinction of interest between workers on the shop floor 
or the office floor or on the boardroom floor. Their mutual 
interest is the success of their firms." (21.7.82.).
None of the Llandough representatives perceived the unity of manage­
ment and staff as unreservedly as this but a small number showed some 
inclination towards it. One NUPE shop steward, speaking of her 
members, declared:
"I mean, they're earning a good wage. This is what I try to get 
through to them first of all. 'We expect a fair day's work for 
a fair day's pay, and I think you're earning a fair pay up here.
You wouldn't get it anywhere else. You go outside and you try 
and get it.'
She disagreed with other NUPE shop stewards who would on principle
support any member, regardless of the circumstances:
"If I think they are in the wrong, they are in the wrong.".
One of the NALGO representatives disagreed with trade unions being too
avaricious but admitted that he was being idealistic:
"They shouldn't try to get the most. They should just try to 
get what is fair.".
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Even one of the NUPE shop stewards who was one of the most active
negotiators was enthusiastic that increased information and involvement
would reduce the amount of staff-management conflict:
"Cost-effectiveness for instance - bring the union in on a 
discussion, say, 'Look we want to do this but the cost
and show why, not just say it and then expect us to believe you,
but really bring a union in on the discussions so that they can 
see for themselves, 'Well that's fair enough, we can't possibly 
do that because the cost would be too high, so we've got to do it 
another way, not so good but it's a bit cheaper and still giving 
a fairly good service.'. That's non-existent really, isn't it, 
in this hospital. I don't know what the policy is actually on 
that, generally. I don't suppose the Health Authority would like 
it.".
Towards the end of a long discussion about a specific problem he 
confirmed:
"Well this is what I'm saying. Until you put the management's
problems over then how am I to know how to think. I mean, at the
moment I've given you my answer about what I thought, but in just 
the short discussion now of you saying to me these little things 
about what have happened, and it's enough to sway me. So 
therefore if there were fuller discussion, even if it wasn't to 
disclose that - discussions more on the line - as a shop steward, 
and he brought into what's happening around us, then I'd be more 
aware myself perhaps. But the moment I've only got the feelings 
of the members and my own feelings to accumulate together and 
arrive at a conclusion.".
When some of the complexities of budgetary control were examined with
him he displayed the frankness and honesty with which he was prepared
to concur with the management view. A point was made regarding
releasing budgetry information about one department:
Researcher: It might not be in my interests to let the staff know,
particularly if they are underspent, because all those staff will
do is put pressure on to get more money spent, whereas across the
hospital I know it's only just balancing out.",
to which the NUPE shop steward responded, "True, true, yes, that
argument does stand up.".
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However, when another issue was considered, the planning of the
new maternity unit, this shop steward also demonstrated just how
easily and surreptitiously the enhancement of information-distribution
and consultation could develop into negotiation:
"If we were brought in on it I'm sure we could give assistance, 
because there are certain things that are going to crop up that's 
going to cause, perhaps, disputes, which if they are dealt with 
at an early stage we could give answers to now and say, 'Look, 
we suggest that so-and-so be done this way. Would you look at 
it and see if that's possible?'.".
What, one wonders, would happen if the suggestion was not possible or
if the shop stewards disagree with the criteria that management used
to come to this decision?
In his conclusion to his survey, Ramsay (1976b:695) reports that:
"All too often the managements have tried to represent an offer 
of participation to workers as an act of benevolence, deserving 
response in terms of greater employee loyalty, co-operation and 
effort. But the opinions I cite imply that workers consider 
participation is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. 
On the face of it this is entirely reasonable: industrial
democracy should involve a redistribution of power, which enables 
those whose power increases to assert their own interests more 
effectively. Yet this point is passed over by all but a few 
outside the commentators in the union's own ranks.
This conclusion, with its blasphemous suggestion that management 
and worker interests may conflict, also implies that far from 
resolving conflict, the idea and expectations from participation 
may themselves turn out to cause dispute.".
And Cuthbert and Whitaker (1977:32) remind us that:
"there are those unions which emphasize that they are in business 
to represent their members' interests and in consequence should 
not seek to influence management other than through the develop­
ment and extension of collective bargaining. Thus works councils 
or worker directors, whether trade union based or not, are seen 
as unnecessary distractions,".
Although possibly not the policy of their unions nationally, 
this was the response largely received from the Llandough representatives 
The majority had little sympathy with the problems of exercising the
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management function or those who did it and some displayed an intense 
aversion to any proposals which might be interpreted as portraying 
them in co-operation with management. One of the NUPE shop stewards 
possessed this attitude almost instinctively:
Researcher: You know the TUC is in favour of industrial democracy,
and extending industrial democracy. Well the sort of thing 
they've got in mind is instead of a manager saying, 'This is where
you work.', you sit down and jointly arrange it.
Mary: Oh no. I don't agree with that.
When it was mentioned to her that trade unions such as the EETPU 
disagreed with the TUC's policy on the grounds that the involvement 
of trade unions in participative systems could confuse collective 
bargaining and negotiating arrangements, she explained that she felt 
the same way. She had no concern for the level or quality of service 
in her department and nothing could be allowed to jeopardise her 
responsibility for her members. Even in the context of a specific 
example of management activity about which she had previously expressed 
dissatisfaction, namely the annual reallocation of staff to duties, she
was adamant that she did not want to be a party to the process:
Researcher: But supposing S. said to you, now she won't, I know, but
let's suppose she said, 'I'm going to change in two weeks time, 
Mary. Let's run through the list. We'll have a list of jobs 
and a list of people ...
Mary: Oh, no.
Researcher: ... 'You and I agree who's going where.'.
Mary : Oh, no.
Researcher: Let's supposing she did it.
Mary: That's not my job though, is it.




Mary: Well I wouldn't, would I. I mean, how can I say, 'Oh yes, we'll
put so-and-so there.', when I'm there to defend my members. It's 
not my job to tell them where I think they should go.
She later added:
"No, because you're doing management's job then, aren't you.".
This resistance to participating in a process that she was very 
critical of when left entirely to management to organise was pursued 
further:
Researcher: But that's interesting, you see, because it goes against
what most people would say about industrial democracy and 
participation. They say that the staff would welcome the chance 
to have a say in things like that.
Mary: The staff, yes, ask them all together, but not just the
Researcher: Would you get agreement?
Mary: (pause) I don't know.
This shop steward was similarly unhappy about the way that annual leave 
was allocated so again one way of improving the system was put to her: 
Researcher: Why not then get the trade union representatives to
agree with what dates people are going to have?
Mary: Oh no, can't do that.
Researcher: Why not?
Mary: Well you can't really, can you. They'd only turn back and
say, 'Oh you worked it all out with management. '.
The assessment that there is an inevitable incompatibility between 
the function and interests of management and those of the staff was
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displayed with equal clarity by other representatives:
Researcher: It's fair enough to say you've got to have the hospital
to a certain standard of cleanliness, and you're right, but on 
the other hand you're only given a limited amount of money to do 
it, and that may mean that you've either got to change the 
standards, or the pattern of cleaning, or alter staffing levels, 
or whatever, and I just wondered whether you as a shop steward 
had any sympathy for that problem, or whether you would just say, 
'No, that's management's problem to consider the budged. All I'm 
interested in is my members' interests and the standard of 
cleaning in the hospital.'?
Dilys: Well no, I can see it's very, very difficult for management
to manage a budget, to put it into the budget, but there again I 
think my first thought would be for my girls. I mean, everybody 
knows that there's cutbacks, and it is difficult to manage, but 
I still think that my first thought would be for my girls, to get 
the best conditions I can for them.
Another NUPE shop steward would not even be drawn into considering 
how he would cope with a management problem hypothetically:
Researcher: But if that problem was yours then, what would you do?
Colin: Well it's not, it's a management problem, so I mean I ....
(silence).
It was suggested that these attitudes were a reflection of the
members' outlook. One comment passed was that:
"As a representative, union representative, you realise that 
people are really only concerned about themselves, and how things 
affect them, not for the overall pattern.".
A NUPE shop steward gave the same impression:
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Paul: Problems have been the same - man's problems. You'll always
have a higher grade and a lower grade; you'll never get them to 
meet.
Researcher: Why not?
Paul: Because you wouldn't like it.
Researcher: How do you know I wouldn't like it?
Paul: To put it in other words - the working man is the biggest
conservative you can have, even though he votes Labour every 
election time.
Researcher: In what way 'conservative'?
Paul: Conservative. He'll get every penny that he can.
The Society of Radiographers' representative indicated that
another obstacle to enhanced involvement by trade unions in management
might be that it would jeopardise their function of providing an
independent check upon management's actions:
"I think that perhaps it is the function of the Society or a 
union, that when you do, so to speak, decide on the staffing of 
our department I think that there ought to be a staffing done by 
the Society as well.".
Other representatives emphasised the degree of consensus that should
exist between staff and management but observed that issues of
damaging conflict would still inevitably arise. Thus, one of the
NALGO representatives thought:
"if there is trust, in lots of things you will have agreement 
between staff, and between trade unions and management. But in 
some things, on the action management have taken, then you won't, 
because it's a matter of interpretation.",
and he gave as an example the suspension of a member of staff that had
lead to a strike amongst the porters. The need for trust was stressed
by one of the ASTMS representatives:
"So there is an inherent distrust and it's got to be got rid of.
I don't think managers trust unions and I don't think they trust 
trade union representatives. I know a lot of unions don't trust
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managers and a lot of trade union representatives don't trust 
managers either. But I think that's because there's a lack of 
contact. There's a lack of personal relationship, in the sense 
that it's much more difficult to deceive somebody if you know 
them very well.".
He was a very idealistic advocate for how staff-management
relationships could be improved but still acknowledged that conflict
would not be eliminated:
"I would take the view that if a manager and a trade union repres­
entative could sit down and talk about the problem, whatever it is, 
and they could be absolutely, totally truthful, and not hide 
anything, and abandon the usual tactical warfare-type negotiating 
tactics, and simply say, straight out, quite bluntly, quite 
honestly, what is it that the management are trying to achieve, 
why they want it, how they intend to get it, or would like to get 
it, and the trade unions responded in exactly the same way, so 
that everybody knew where they were and then if there is a debate 
about it and everybody's able to go away in agreement, fine. If 
they are unable to agree, well all right, it's too bad.".
However, he was still optimistic:
"There are bound to be occasionally things where the management 
objective is so opposite to staff side wishes that you're going 
to get confrontation. I can't conceive that that would never ever 
happen, but it should be very rare.".
Â small number of representatives wished to encourage an increased 
exchange of information and more consultation and decision-sharing but 
would still not commit themselves about whether or not they would 
accept any enhanced responsibility for the management of the enterprise. 
Again, the annual reallocation of staff to duties provided an example: 
Researcher: Might there be one way of overcoming problems like that,
which would be for S. again to sit down with you and the other 
shop stewards and say, 'Right, the time's coming up to allocate 
the staff. You agree it with me.'?
Dilys: That would be nice.
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Researcher: But supposing then, if she'd agreed with you and the
other shop stewards and the list goes out, and then you get staff 
saying, 'That's unfair.'?
Dilys: Well then you'd find out from that certain person the reason
why she thought it was unfair, and perhaps there would be a 
reason that you wouldn't know about, and then you could take that 
to S. and she could ...
Researcher: But you've agreed it with her in the first place?
Dilys: Yes, but if she's got a reason, perhaps a different reason that
what we're thinking of at the time of the move, and she can explain 
that to you and then to S., perhaps S. will be able to see it as 
well.
Researcher: So in other words, the fact that you had agreed the list
yourself in the beginning still wouldn't stop you acting as a shop
steward and even disagreeing with your own decision?
Dilys: Well there again, it depends on the circumstances.
Even in worker co-operatives, Eccles (1979:172) warns, shop stewards,
"may revert, under stress, to a traditional form of representing the 
workers to 'management'.".
Shop Steward Ability
Reference has already been made to the fact that in some circum­
stances it is appropriate for staff and their representatives to be 
provided with training about how to enhance their involvement in 
participative systems. There was certainly evidence in Llandough 
that some representatives, regardless of their inclinations towards 
greater participation, were unlikely to be adequately able at present 
to contribute to more complex, detailed or formal participative
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arrangements. One NUPE shop steward, for example, was quite incapable 
of articulating how he would improve the management of the Health 
Authority:
Researcher: How would you change things? How would you improve things?
Paul: Well from the Authority's point of view, H. - and I say H.because
he's the tool in this particular case, it could be anyone - he's 
got to do as he's told, he's controlled by a committee. He may, 
like a clerk to a court, advise the Authority. There again, an 
honorary member of an authority seeing as they know nothing 
they've got to be guided all along the lines. They've got to be
guided in such a way that they'll say, 'Yes', like a lot of sheep.
They know nothing at all about the things that they're discussing. 
They've got to be told. They're told that if a man or a person 
explaining to them a particular point about - and especially a 
technical term - they've got to be explained. Now if (interrupted) 
However, at one stage this shop steward had mentioned that he thought 
that budgets were inappropriately allocated and an attempt was made to 
examine this issue in greater detail:
Researcher: But getting back to the point, you said you'd alter the
balance, so what would you spend less on?
Paul: I'd have people that understood figures for a start. You've
got to pay a man, like British Ley land paid that man that amount 
of wages - he's no fool.
Later, the same question was repeated:
Researcher: So what would you spend less on?
Paul: Well I'd definitely cut down by management a lot.
Another NUPE shop steward was asked what she would change if she 
had the job of her head of department or a supervisor. She responded
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with, "I think I'd find out if the staff were happy where she put them 
in their jobs.", and by doing so she thought, "you'd get a lot more 
out of them.". She was not able to say how, if she was in the super­
visor's or departmental head's job, she would obtain an accurate 
impression of staff satisfaction and although she confirmed emphatic­
ally that she was not happy with the way things were organised at 
present she could not recall any single item that she would wish to 
change and she commented, "Your mind goes blank.".
These extracts from interviews with just two NUPE shop stewards
supply only fairly superficial indications that some representatives
may find it difficult to be proactive or to comprehend the full
complexity of organisations, but another representative referred to
the existence of such limitations more generally:
"I've been to meetings, joint shop steward meetings, where there's 
no management at all, and there are times when the level of 
ability of shop stewards is such that in my view, both in terms 
of communication and in knowledge, they are at risk of disadvant­
aging their members, because they're not in fact competent to do 
the things that they are trying to do.".
The lack of adequate appropriate knowledge led to a lack of confidence
in another NUPE shop steward about her ability to participate more:
Researcher: How would you want to change it to have more say in the
way things are run?
Dilys: Well no, because I mean I - I couldn't say the way things are
run. I don't know enough about it.
An additional source of reticence, identified by the Society of
Radiographers' representative, was submission to perceptions of lack
of power:
Researcher: I just wondered what you'd improve if you could in the way
that decisions are made by the clinical staff. You can't see any 
way you can improve it?
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Meryl: The point is we're not in a position to. Not at the moment -
we've got no clout.
Staff Inclination
The assessment of the extent to which staff possess the desire to 
participate and their preferences for the ways in which they can do so 
have proved attractive to attempt to quantify (e.g. Wall and Lischeron 
1977) but this approach is fraught with severe methodological and 
conceptual difficulties and the data produced is ultimately of limited 
applicable value. It is more worth-while to look at some of the 
factors that contribute towards the shaping of attitudes to participa­
tion and to examine the response of staff to the existing decision­
making structures and processes concerning their workplace.
Wall and Lischeron identify that one of the causes of alterations
in attitudes towards participation over time is, "the prevailing social,
political and industrial climate." (p 144) but some other more specific
considerations are supplied by Fox (1971) and Walker (1974) . Fox
cautions that inclinations towards participation can be strongly
influenced by personality and orientation to work. Clearly, the
benefits of participation are likely to be valued more highly and
identified according to different criteria by workers with an intrinsic
orientation rather than an instrumental one. And:
"Those whose life experience and cultural values have created 
neither the expectation of, nor the aspiration for, self- 
actualization may prove remarkably resistant to this treatment, 
as may also those whose authoritarian personality structure 
disposes them to prefer a situation of dependence on, and 
domination by, others." (pp 11,12).
Fox also emphasises the significance of considering both the impact
of broad cultural values and ideologies ("All values and attitudes
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capable of being expressed in the work situation, in fact, are 
potential influences upon orientations to work and upon the social 
patterns that result." p 15) and the values of subcultures, particul­
arly those of different working groups. The amalgam of the orientations 
of the subculture;
"may be sufficiently strong in some situations to take on autono­
mous life of its own which makes it, in the short and perhaps 
medium term, independent of the nature of job design." (p 16).
Walker (1974) refers to similar influences upon inclinations to
participate but in addition recognises that workers' own perceptions
of their ability to participate will affect their attitudes towards it:
"Yet another factor in the case of indirect participation may be 
lack of capacity for operating effectively in such bodies.
.... the capacity to understand the issues involved, to use
language commonly employed, and to speak persuasively is necessary 
in order to participate effectively in such bodies. Workers who 
lack this capacity (perhaps through lack of education and training) 
may be realistic in not taking much interest in such bodies in the 
belief that they could not effectively participate in them in any 
case." (p 23).
The evidence from the Llandough representatives was, although it 
did not appear to be related to perceived ability, that the hospital 
staff were indeed extremely apathetic about the activities of the organ­
isation around them. One NUPE shop steward was asked if she thought
that the staff were involved enough in the Area Health Authority and
in her reply she included the assessment, "I don't think the staff as 
such would be interested really.". One of the ASTMS representatives 
implied that the orientation of most staff was purely instrumental:
"Most members of staff are quite happy to just come to work 
and stick their good day's work in for a good day's pay, and that's 
all they want to do. And the rest is all hassle as far as they're 
concerned. They don't want to know about it.".
Another explanation for the lack of interest amongst the staff seemed
to be, from the comments of one of the NALGO representatives, that
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they did not appreciate the ability they possessed to achieve change:
"Unfortunately, they don't always see the importance of the union 
until it's too late. And secondly, really their main interest on 
the whole is the wage increase. They don't always realise that 
there's a lot they can do to exert influence on local conditions.".
Another representative, a NUPE shop steward, assumed that the staff
had so much confidence in the trade union structure that they were
prepared to delegate their involvement entirely. His view was that,
"they would be convinced, if the union was convinced.". The ASTMS
members also appeared to delegate their involvement but would not so
automatically follow the union line and this created a problem if a
conflict arose, as one of the representatives described:
"If you do a reasonable job it's easier for the bulk of people to 
sit back and let somebody else do it, rather than they themselves 
bother. The only problem with that, and it's a problem for both 
management and people like myself, because when things ^  happen 
both sides have to try and rapidly educate the staff generally as 
to what is going on, and it is very difficult to get across the 
finer points of the situation when they don't really know, or are 
not familiar with, the basic information involved.".
There was some evidence that the staff might with to contribute to 
enhanced participation, but it was rather meagre. The other ASTMS 
representative demonstrated that whilst there was some interest amongst 
these members about the way they were organised, it was not forceful 
enough to be obvious :
Researcher: Do the staff ever feel they would like some sort of say
in the sort of policies of the laboratory and what work's going 
to be undertaken and how it's going to be done, and so on?
Bob: (silence)
Researcher: Don't you get people saying, 'What on earth have we been
asked to do this for? What's he think we're doing?'?
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Bob: Yes, that concept does crop up in particular. Similar sort of
questions do come up.
When asked to provide an example he mentioned concern about the
provision of pathology tests for private patients. A NUPE shop
steward believed that the amount of information her members had was
limited but that this was due to practical causes. When asked if her
members knew or understood as much as she did about what was going on 
she replied, "No, I don't think they do, half the time." and went on 
to explain that it was not her fault since "the meetings", presumably 
trade union branch meetings, are held outside work time, "and a lot 
of them can't get here then, which is a shame really.".
However, only one representative, the NUPE catering shop steward, 
was confident that the staff would respond to a proposed new form of 
participation:
Researcher: If there was, say, a meeting of all the staff in the
kitchen - let's say there were no management present - perhaps 
you held a meeting of all the staff in the kitchen, and just 
invited them, one, to complain, if they had any complaints, and 
two, to make any suggestions about how things could be improved, 
if they thought there were any. Do you think they'd be very 
forthcoming?
Carol: (Quick and emphatic) Yes, I would, yes, if it was just me,
if I got them in a room on my own and asked them if they had any 
complaints, or anything, that they wanted brought up. Yes, I 
think then they would, but they wouldn't do it in front of 
management, and they wouldn't let me put their name to it.
It was her opinion that the staff were afraid of management and did 
not wish to be singled out, and yet she admitted that she knew of no
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instance when staff have been subject to repercussions as a result of 
such activity.
Staff Ability
In his explanation of why many managers do not promote increased
participation, Clarke (1980:16) suggests that:
"Many too are probably doubtful as to the ability of workers and 
their representatives to improve decision-making, except perhaps 
in the immediate area of the work task.".
Ironically, in Llandough this was the same view that the representat­
ives held about the workers. One NUPE shop steward stated that, "They 
honestly don't know their conditions of employment.". If the staff 
are ignorant of such basic, immediately personally relevant information, 
are they able or interested to learn about more complex, esoteric or 
diverse issues involved in general management? The same shop steward 
proposed that their lack of knowledge was certainly one of two factors 
inhibiting their involvement:
"But there are other people who can't do that. They are 
frustrated with certain things that are going on, but either they 
are scared to voice an opinion, or they don't know how because 
they are ignorant of possibly the conditions of employment, or 
what-have-you.".
The shop stewards' belief in the timidity of the staff was reinforced 
several times :
Researcher: What do you think the power of a shop steward is? Why
does a shop steward get things that an ordinary member of staff 
doesn't?
Mary: Basically, because they are afraid to go in themselves.
Another NUPE shop steward was extremely critical of the staff in her
department because of their failure to voice their opinion:
"You get them, they say, 'Oh yes, we'll come to that meeting and 
we'll say so-and-so and we'll say so-and-so.'. They don't say a 
thing.".
—316—
It was probably inevitable that this assessment would emerge
because one of the fundamental purposes of shop stewards is presumably
to represent staff who are unable to support themselves in dealings
with management. A lack of initiative displayed by staff was often
linked with a justification for the existence of shop stewards:
"And they say, 'No, we're not entitled to a lieu night because
so-and-so said we're not.'. Well I said, 'Of course you are. Go
and ask first.'. And they won't. They've got to have somebody 
to push them. Them need somebody to go and sort of fight for 
them.".
There also seemed to be an anxiety that in fact the inability of staff
to stand up for themselves was so extreme that it would enable them to
be manipulated by management in systems of direct participation unless
the stewards acted upon their behalf:
"Not every individual, especially the working man anyway, under­
stands a lot of what goes on so therefore they could be talked 
into anything and I think it needs someone like a shop steward to
learn about it so that he can go in there and at least fight for
what the union believes and the men want.".
It is interesting to note that this shop steward is explicit that 
he may have two separate objectives, although he seems to assume that 
they are complimentary. This was certainly not always the case.
There were obviously occasions when representatives made judgements 
about what was best for the staff and then persuaded the staff to 
accept them:
"To be honest with you, you've got to look around and see what 
you're dealing with, and a lot of them have got to be led.".
There also seemed to be situations in which the union had a belief
around which it then had to generate the support of the staff and the
risk of manipulation by the union organisation becomes apparent:
"The ordinary man is like a sheep; you can lead him anywhere 
with just a few fluent words. I've done it myself, and preyed 
on sympathies.".
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The assessment of the representatives about their members was 
conveyed back to them at the feedback meeting:
Researcher: Most of you gave the impression that in fact they would
not be able to take part in any discussions or consultation. In 
a way it was predictable, I suppose, that you nearly all felt 
that if there was any further involvement it should be through 
trade unions.
Paul: Well that's obvious, isn't it.
He reiterated that trade unions exist to prevent management from 
exploiting individual employees. When I pointed out that this 
suggested that individual members of staff are not capable of looking 
after themselves, the same NUPE shop steward accused me of being 
divisive.
Proposals for Participation
Although the Llandough representatives largely displayed a lack 
of interest about discussing participation in general, some of them 
had very clear ideas about ways in which they would like to modify 
the existing structure and some also had very definite thoughts about 
which participative arrangements would not attract interest or might 
even be positively undesirable.
There was a call for more direct involvement by ordinary staff,
but it came from just one NUPE shop steward who was responsible for
only a small number of members :
"At the moment, if things want to get altered, the supervisor 
will discuss it with management and then come back to the workers 
and say, 'We want to implement this.', and I sometimes feel the 
workers don't get enough say in that, even if you have the 
overall say in the end, and the workers give way to what's been 
said. Wouldn't it be better sometimes for discussions to take 
place in front of those workers?".
He also proposed that this involvement should be formalised:
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"The improvement that could be made is that we - I have asked, 
and a lot of the other boys have asked, for more regular meetings 
of, in our case, of our supervisors, regular discussion meetings 
with the working force, to discuss any underlying problems that 
should be brought to notice.".
Another representative warned against exactly this sort of direct 
participation:
"What happens usually is that very little gets done and it's only 
a sort of info-session for management, who will then decide what 
to do. It's not much in the way of participation. It's very 
difficult when you have a group of workers to influence management 
very much at all, because they haven't got any power themselves 
and they just say, 'We think so-and-so ought to be done, and so-
and-so.'. If the management think so, yes they'll do it, but if
they don't it never gets done.".
The risk that direct participation might enable management to deliber­
ately manipulate or exploit the staff has already been referred to as 
a theme amongst the representatives but this NALGO representative's 
criticism of direct participation emphasises other weaknesses which 
reveal components of his definition of genuine participation. The 
impression is that participation, especially consultation, is
ineffective unless the staff involved have the facility to support
their opinion by negotiation, and the negotiation by the potential 
use of sanctions.
Perversely, it was some of the NUPE shop stewards who most 
strongly held that participation should be through trade union repres­
entatives who also wanted the role of the supervisor to be developed, 
especially so that they could convey more information to the staff, 
could be more accessible by the staff, and could more forcefully 
represent the staff to management. This support for supervisors by 
shop stewards is inconsistent with the common view that the position 
attained by one group is partly at the expense of the other. The
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explanation seems to be that if more information was made available 
to supervisors who passed it on in turn to the staff there would be 
greater potential for the shop stewards to negotiate; that the shop 
stewards would prefer to negotiate with supervisors who had increased 
delegation of authority rather than with management; and that, since 
nearly all the representatives sincerely believed that their arguments 
were reasonable and would be supported by the supervisors, the wishes 
of the staff and shop stewards would be presented with more respect­
ability and possibly more effectiveness.
There was certainly no worry that the position of the shop
stewards might be undermined, but virtually all of them pressed for
more information to be made available and channelled through the trade
union representative. One of the NUPE shop stewards who was also a
supervisor and wished to see the position of supervisors enhanced
still regarded that his function as a shop steward should take priority
in any participative system. One reason was that there were practical
advantages to all concerned, since he could be at work:
"and somebody comes up and says, 'Well look, why can't we do this, 
why can't you do that?', you'd have an answer which you've already 
accepted.".
The shop steward gave the impression that his responsibilities were 
greater as a shop steward rather than as a supervisor :
Colin: As a shop steward, it doesn't involve the issuing out of work.
It more or less involves in what work is issued. So, in other 
words. I'm only there really, in a sense, to come in on a dispute 
as to, as we've discussed before, as to what is the job description 
and so forth.
Researcher: But you were saying that it would probably be a good idea
if there were meetings with the shop stewards to explain, for
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example, the budgetary position, but you're saying as a shop 
steward, not as a supervisor?
Colin: Oh definitely. As a shop steward, not as a supervisor.
Formal regular meetings between management and all the shop 
stewards and staff organisation representatives were proposed by several 
of them as a significant means of enhancing their involvement and there­
by that of the staff. However, a few who supported the idea were 
actually quite vague about how it might be implemented. One NUPE shop 
steward simply sought greater trade union/management liaison and was 
unable to indicate at what level this should be, about what subjects, 
and in what forms. Another NUPE shop steward mildly supported the 
idea of multi-union, regular meetings with local management but could 
not imagine what would be discussed:
Researcher: What's going to be on the agenda?
Bernard: I don't know. It's something new isn't it and I think what
would happen is the shop stewards would be there and wait for the 
management to start with the questions, more than the shop 
stewards asking the management. That's how I think it would start 
off first of all.
When he was asked how such a meeting would avoid the problems that 
have so widely beset joint consultative committees he changed his mind 
and declared that a multi-union meeting would not be feasible.
But it was an innovation that attracted keen interest from a 
number of representatives. One NUPE shop steward saw significant 
value in a formal, multi-union, consultative meeting with management 
and when asked for suggestions for the agenda he said it would consist 
of "grievances of members" and believed that there were issues common
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to all the unions and staff organisations. The Society of Radiographers* 
representative supported this type of consultation but drew attention 
to its existing connotation:
Researcher: It may be, for example, that most of the staff represent­
atives say, *It would be a good idea to have a meeting like the 
health and safety committee but to discuss general issues, with 
all the staff representatives.*.
Meryl: Yes, I would have brought that up, because that was muted. But 
of course these things only ever come up when you've got industrial 
action, that's the thing.
She mentioned that one of the benefits of regular, multi-union consult­
ation would be to provide a forum for generating goodwill between the 
different staff groups. She could not be precise about what would be 
discussed and seemed to imagine that it would consist of something 
like inter-departmental problem-solving sessions. This image was 
shared by a NUPE shop steward, who described how inter-departmental 
problem-solving and harmony could be obtained by multi-union meetings 
with management. An ASTMS representative also saw the merit in this 
type of consultation. When he was asked for examples of subjects that 
would be discussed he gave those of a new staff recreational centre, 
improved staff facilities generally and new Health Authority policies.
He, too, considered that such consultation would achieve inter­
departmental co-operation, but in stating this he demonstrated the 
unwitting naivety of all those who shared this belief. . The broad 
assumption was that the other workgroups would only have to listen 
to the case of one workgroup that was dissatisfied because of an inter­
departmental problem to appreciate the reasonableness of their case 
and concur. Just one specific problem that was current during the
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research interviews illustrates that in practice this may very well 
not be the case and indeed that a multi-union meeting perceived to be 
for this purpose might compound conflicting interests with conflicting 
expectations. The issue in dispute was that of who should take 
pathology specimens from the hospital's admission room to the pathology 
laboratories outside normal working hours. The porters, represented by 
NUPE, and the pathology laboratory technicians, represented by ASTMS, 
each judged that it should be the other's duty. During the research 
interviews representatives from both unions confidently asserted that 
if only there was a multi-union meeting the other side would appreciate 
their point of view and accept responsibility for the task.
Other representatives believed that they did not possess homo­
geneity as a group and assessed that its absence was so marked that 
there would be no purpose in convening the group. A NALGO represent­
ative commented, "We've got such wide interests." and an ASTMS 
representative saw an even broader distinction:
Researcher: What would you think about a meeting, say, of shop
stewards in this hospital? Would there be any value in that?
Eric: No, because - well it's my experience anyway - that shop
stewards widely differ, more so than management.
There was virtually negligible regard for consultative procedures 
outside the hospital. One NUPE shop steward regarded staff represent­
atives on the Health Authority as pointless and another NUPE shop 
steward believed that the decisions of the Health Authority were 
irrelevant since they were "too above" himself and the staff, but one 
of the NALGO representatives did suggest that members of the Health 
Authority should meet staff and management as part of the routine in
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which their monthly meetings were rotated around the hospitals.
Another lone supporter was a NUPE shop steward who advocated a 
degree of workers' control, and did so with great enthusiasm:
Paul: It all boils down to a workers' committee, and management, in
administering discipline. Men will take it from us whereas they 
take umbrage if you said the same things as we did. We could 
manage our members to a point - before you ever went into a 
meeting he's already been told, by us, and given a ticking off if 
it's needed, 'Now, you're on your own, we can only ask for so-and- 
so,'. You know what you can ask for - leniency, or a few days' 
suspension, or stop bonus, anything like that. But he's already 
told that before you go in. Now, he'd accept it better if there 
was a workers' committee before it ever came to management. 
Researcher: What do you mean, 'a workers' committee'?
Paul: Tried by his peers. Tried by people doing exactly the same job
as himself, who can see if he is shamming, or know that he is 
shamming, whereas we've got to stick up for our members, knowing 
full well that the person we're representing has been doing 
exactly what you've been saying.
This was a radical proposal that attracted fundamental questions 
about the nature of the employing relationship and the role of trade 
unions but the shop steward could not be drawn into facing up to these. 
The reaction of staff disciplined by a workers' committee was probed: 
Researcher: Supposing they don't follow the procedure. Now you've
got a member of staff who's been disciplined - let's say they've 
been sacked - by a workers' committee ...
Paul: Yes. They'd accept it.
He was particularly attracted by the power the workers' committee 
could exercise to ensure that all sick leave was genuine:
-324-
Researcher: Aren't you being more extreme perhaps than management in
looking at people like that?
Paul: No, I don't think so, because you also owe an obligation and a
duty to the members that are working, and if you think that you've 
got a slacker, you've got other members apart from the one that's 
sick that you're going to defend, as you say. You've got twenty 
or thirty others that are working constantly, and are having to 
work themselves into the ground to cover people if they're on the 
sick. Genuine sickness, yes, you know the individual. This is 
where a workers' committee - we know them, because we live with 
them, we work with them, have social and recreation with them.
You know them, and through knowing them - you know the type of 
individual, if he's a genuine person.
The involvement of trade unions in disciplinary affairs, particularly 
in monitoring sickness levels, is not unknown but unfortunately this 
shop steward left completely unanswered the questions about crucial 
issues such as how the union would reconcile the conflicting 
interests of its members, whether it would accept the criteria that 
not only management but independent bodies require to be considered 
when undertaking activities such as disciplining, and to what extent 
the trade union would share with management the responsibility and 
accountability for the actions taken.
The research data has already shown that the nature of the 
management function and the way in which it is exercised have a 
substantial bearing upon perceptions of involvement, and some attempt 
was made to discover whether the representatives had ideas about 
whether there should be any alterations in the management structure. 
Despite the data reported in Chapter Five the representatives largely
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no t only accepted the existing arrangements but also actually 
positively supported them. One of the ASTMS representatives found the 
existing management structure satisfactory, was content to accept a 
medical consultant as his head of department, regarded the hospital as 
the most important decision-making level and identified with the 
hospital rather than with the pathology laboratories throughout the 
Health Authority. Other representatives were not so convinced that 
it was desirable to have medical staff as heads of departments, but 
with this exception agreed with the ASTMS representative's sentiments. 
It was even suggested to a NUPE shop steward that perhaps management 
in Llandough was too autocratic and his response was, "With everybody 
working together you get a better service.". He would have liked to 
have seen managerial power exclusively in the hands of the hospital 
administrator and no involvement from managers at higher levels. The 
Society of Radiographers' representative felt that it was right that 
the hospital administrators were involved in the management of her 
department, although this is a sensitive issue in other X-ray 
departments in other hospitals, which was a difference she recognised: 
Researcher: Are you happy with the way that you can actually have a
say in things?
Meryl: I think in the department, yes, definitely. But that depends
to a great deal, having trained in another hospital, on the 
managers of the department.
Only one representative, the other ASTMS steward, expressed 
serious dissent about the adequacy of the existing management structure, 
One of his concerns was that it was even impossible to describe what 
the structure was:
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"I remember - it's still going on, sort of - we had a difficulty 
about moving specimens at night, on call. The number of different 
people who could say that they were the managers who ought to be 
sorting that out is almost endless.... We can't sort it out in 
this hospital because to make agreements with you is not possible, 
because other people say that they are the managers, like the 
pathologists.".
Taken to its extreme, confusion such as this raises the daunting
difficulty of how to discuss staff participation when it is not possible
to identify who staff might participate with. However, a specific
problem was raised as an example with the representative and he was
able to make his preference clear:
"From my point of view, I would say that the obvious person who, 
from the management side, who should be dealing with that sort of 
issue, is yourself. But it's not so. We have to deal with the 
pathologists; we have to deal with their representative bodies, 
like the Section of Haematology and then the Division of Pathology; 
we have to deal with Personnel; we have to deal with the MLSO 
management structure; and so on, and so on, and so on.
More generally, his attitude to the management structure was
identical to that of the other representatives:
"As far as Area level is concerned, there is very little that can 
be done, because it's far too far removed from what's actually 
happening. Most trade union activity is at the workplace level. 
By far the most. So consequently that's where trade union/ 
management relationships ought to be concentrated.".
This was his recommendation not just for logistical ease but also
because it could enhance industrial relations:
"It would be much better for the management at Area level, on 
their own, to decide the sort of policy they want, if you must 
have an Area level, pass that dpwn to the workplace level, the 
Unit level, and then leave it to the Unit manager to try to put 
that policy into operation with the staff in that Unit. People 
have loyalty to a Unit. They don't have loyalty to an Area.
They will do things - they have loyalty to a trade union, they 




It is accepted by Chanberlain (1967) that the very existence of
trade unions generates participation and that attention should therefore
be given to how to accommodate their concerns:
"If boundaries of subject matter cannot be set to confine union 
activity, and if unions are to be allowed to continue their vital 
existence, there remains only the possibility of a functional
integration of the union within the business enterprise...... This
does not mean that competing interests will not arise within the 
corporation. It does mean that organisational procedures must be 
provided to resolve differences which threaten the integrity of 
the business unit." (p 195).
Unfortunately, the procedures he suggests are essentially formal and
idealistic. They rely upon certain absolute standards of behaviour by
all the parties involved and acceptance by the trade unions of the
management-defined broad organisational constraints. The data in this
chapter about attitudes to participation does not indicate that such
crisp criteria can be applied in the analysis of workplace industrial
relations.
However, the data does suggest that the propositions propounded 
by Walker (1970:451-5) are more realistic, albeit more indeterminate.
He emphasises that different forms of participation may perform 
different functions; different forms are mutually interactive; 
success depends upon subjects being important to staff and capable of 
their influence; management/worker communication is not automatically 
improved; expectations and performance can seriously diverge; self- 
actualisation is not necessarily enhanced; the effects upon 
efficiency may be indeterminate; and the power effects are complex 
and may be difficult to establish.
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Finally, elsewhere (1974:30) Walker has predicted:
"It seems likely that workers* participation in management will 
continue to extend in three forms:
(a) Collective bargaining;
(b) Integrative participative institutions (e.g. works councils, 
workers' representatives on the board, etc.);
(c) Descending participation through more meaningful job design 
and modified work organisation.".
Of these three main categories clearly the only one that held any real




It may be assertive anecdote but is it analysis? In page one of 
this thesis it was contended that little of value could be discovered 
about participation without simultaneous regard for the other features 
of industrial relations character and activity and that, reciprocally, 
pursuit of the empirical research into participation inevitably 
revealed more about the nature of the components of industrial 
relations behaviour and their interrelation and interaction. This 
chapter will seek to support that contention.
The Llandough Data
The data derived from the interviews and events at Llandough 
Hospital contains not merely an accumulation of anecdotes but also 
readily identifiable themes about the nature of the employing relation­
ship and the place of participation in it. Most fundamentally, the 
hospital contained active trade union representatives who had 
demonstrated, and went on to demonstrate, a willingness to use 
sanctions, including strike action, to support their claims about 
local and national issues but yet had no design at all upon altering 
the nature of the employing relationship and at times they even 
reaffirmed a managerial right to control the enterprise. This went 
to the extent of expressing the desire for stronger local management 
and implying that the management hierarchy, which they accepted the 
local management was subject to, was virtually unassailable. The 
manner in which the management function was exercised was predictably
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important to the staff but more unexpectedly there were strong 
indications that the authority of managers who are willing to negotiate 
and compromise was actually enhanced by doing so. There were occasions 
when management very obviously did not do this and acted as if the 
issues involved justified the use of managerial prerogative, and the 
staff demonstrated that these as if prerogatives had real power. 
Nevertheless, there were aspects of the organisation in which the staff 
and their representatives exercised equally unilateral control, but 
informally.
The representatives had a well-developed, almost instinctive 
sense of those issues about which management should be sensitive to 
the attitudes and opinions of the staff as expressed by the represent­
atives. They felt entitled to exercise influence over these issues 
and ultimately to negotiate them with management and obtain an agreed 
solution. Concepts of forms of participation were little understood 
by the representatives and the prime consequence of any new partici­
pative arrangements would be to enhance the opportunities for 
negotiation. Participation would therefore largely reflect the 
existing industrial relations processes but also affect their emphasis, 
although participation was far from one of the major influences upon 
the nature of industrial relations. Indeed, one of the most complex 
features revealed by the data was the inconsistency and dynamism of 
the industrial relations processes. They altered significantly and 
quickly over time and within them responses varied in accordance with 
a wide variety of factors, such as issues, personality and precedence.
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Secondary Research Data
The bulk of the data in the thesis has been generated in Llandough 
Hospital but cognizance has also been taken of other academic research 
and commentaries on activity in other enterprises. The simple 
comparison of the original and secondary data reveals considerable 
differences. In the latter, one is made frequently aware of enter­
prises in which staff and trade union control over the organisation of 
the enterprise has permeated almost all of what would otherwise be 
regarded as the management function. In a number of enterprises 
management has manifested its concern that the range of trade union 
control has extended to the point where the minimal powers are 
threatened:, that management considers it must retain in order for the 
continued existence of the enterprise to be justified. In most enter­
prises this is the ultimate power, and sanction, of management. The 
issues over which management must minimally maintain control if it is 
to sustain the enterprise vary between organisations but may be drawn 
from examples such as working practices, number of staff employed, and 
industrial relations. In defending these controls management does not 
exercise as if prerogatives but real prerogatives and there can be no 
scope for negotiation and compromise.
That this message, apparently with earnestness, has been proclaimed 
in at least some of the largest national enterprises and has been 
unheeded in other enterprises that have since closed must demonstrate 
the degree to which trade unions can gain control in management 
functions. While most such situations are of historical or pragmatic 
origin they can also be derived from overtly political onslaughts 
against managerial control. Whatever the origin may be, for enterprises
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in which staff/trade union power threatens real managerial prerogatives, 
a unitary analysis, or analyses suggesting the suspension of judgements 
about the employing relationship, are unrealistic. A pluralistic 
analysis must prevail and is accurate. Such situations also provide a 
justification for the conclusion of Flanders (1970) and others that 
management can only retain control by sharing it, through collective 
bargaining. Participation may assist in this purpose and may also 
serve to camouflage loss of managerial control and provide a means of 
further enhancing trade union power.
The converse relativities apply now in some of those national 
enterprises where management has sought to defend its real prerogatives 
and exercised initiative in reversing the trade union advances in the 
achievement of unilateral or negotiated control. In these circumstances, 
where management has been successful there will still be some element 
of informal control but probably much reduced as a result of the 
stricter supervision that usually accompanies this strategy. There 
will be a residual but greatly diminished mutually recognised arena for 
collective bargaining but if management is genuine, or perceived to be 
genuine, about its will to close the enterprise if trade union power 
once again seeks to extend beyond the tolerated arena, everything else 
will be under management's control, subject to the exercise of real 
prerogatives. If the negotiating relationship is of this kind it may 
be valid to apply a unitary framework, with staff and trade unions 




Although the employing relationships evident in the secondary 
data may demonstrate two extremes, the disparity with the relationship 
perceived in Llandough Hospital is considerable and it has already been 
suggested that different elements of some of the orthodox alternative 
theories of industrial relations behaviour will be appropriate in 
different types of employing relationships. The research in Llandough 
showed that distinctions between participation and negotiation or 
consultation and negotiation were at least in some part unreal, unless 
countered by the employer's negotiating strength. The pattern of 
collective bargaining is clearly one of the most fundamental influences 
upon the nature of the employing relationship but whether one is 
looking at the object or the image in the mirror is not clear because 
so too is negotiating behaviour a manifestation of the employing 
relationship. Consequently, it is difficult to imagine how one can 
assess the potential for participation without first assessing the 
nature of the employing relationship and in particular the role of 
negotiation in it. If this is true, an 'It all depends' conclusion 
appears inexorable: it is impossible to generalise about the nature
of the employing relationship and therefore one can only analyse each 
local situation and within those unique parameters obtain a unique 
derivation of participatary potential.
Such pessimism is unfounded. It is proposed that within the 
Llandough data there is an analytical structure that not only combines 
a method of describing the employing relationship with a means of 
analysing it but also contains the germination of ideas about how new 
participative arrangements may develop in different circumstances.
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The structure is the progeny of the natural fusion between the original 
and secondary research data. It provides a means of postulating the 
relationships between control, negotiation, participation, the exercise 
of both real and as if prerogatives and the dynamism between them and 
acting upon them. However, a hasty proviso should be made that the 
analysis is termed a 'structure* only because in its most simplistic 
form it is capable of diagramatic representation. It is certainly not
to suggest any degree of formality, rigidity or even clarity about the
employing relationship. It should not be compared to the beautifully 
layered coloured sands of the Isle of Wight but to the mucky gradation 
of the composition of woodland soil.
The structure of influence in the employing relationship has the
following, largely self-explanatory components:





Components of Influence in the Employing Relationship
Absolute management control refers to management's ultimately uni­
lateral ability to decide whether the enterprise should continue or be
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tenninated. The amount of absolute management control required will 
not be restricted solely to this decision but will relate to any other 
issues which if management lost control of it would have to consider 
the ultimate decision. These areas over which management wishes to 
retain absolute control mi^t never be challenged but if they are it will 
lead to management using real prerogatives, on the basis that its wishes 
must be obeyed or the enterprise will be closed. Beyond this core of 
absolute management control is the area subject to the greatest 
fluctuation. This is because it represents the control that management 
would like to possess, and will defend, but which it may concede it has 
to share with the staff if the balance of negotiation is against it.
One means by which management may retain control over this negotiating 
potential is by using as if prerogatives i.e. acting as if the area is 
inevitably and ultimately totally under its control when in fact if 
this is seriously pragmatically disadvantageous it may capitulate to 
share control. If this occurs it increases the cope of orthodox 
negotiation, which is the area in which management may not like to 
relinquish total control but passively or even formally does so 
because of the staff's bargaining strength and/or because of a moral 
inclination to encourage expression and achievement of staff wishes. 
Finally, there is almost inevitably an area in which staff exercise 
their own absolute control. This will very largely be informal, 
although not necessarily unknown to management, but can also formally 






^  ^ As if prerogatives
T Orthodox Negotiation T Pragmatic collective bargaining
Workers * Control
Some of the Internal Dynamism in the Employing Relationship
Where the two meet delineates the existing limit of management 
control, which will at least match that of the limit of the negotiating 
potential but is more likely to run through the stratum of orthodox 
negotiation.
Such a representation obviously has grave limitations. It is just 
one structure describing degrees of influence in the employing relation­
ship but it may be applied to widely different features of the enter­
prise. The framework may relate to just one issue or activity with 
different aspects of it falling into different strata, for example. 
Alternatively, each stratum may represent a collection of entire issues 
or activities. Or the framework may represent a summary of influence 
and control in the enterprise as a whole, and so on. Neither is there 
necessarily agreement about the location of the limits of the different 
strata. They are subjectively defined and represent perceptions which 
may be explicit but which are usually implicit. They may even be 
unknown to any of the parties in the industrial relations processes
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and only when tested may it become apparent that they conflict. And 
although the framework incorporates the most important forces creating 
internal dynamism the absence of representation of external agents of 
change is not an inadequacy of the framework or a dismissal of their 
significance. They are accommodated in the way in which the proportions 
of the different strata will vary over time.
Finally, it needs to be reiterated that there are no clear lines
between the strata. The ignorance of their existence and the potential 
or actual conflict of definition already referred to would alone make 
such clarity of differentiation unrealistic. But more fundamentally 
it is patently absurd to imagine that industrial relations activity 
can be divided into absolute categories of influence and control. The
analogy of stratification is derived from the study of a sample of top
soil, particularly when it is allowed to settle in a jar of water, but 
more poetically perhaps a structure containing both gradation and 
strata can be compared to that of a rainbow.
Characteristics of the Employing Relationship
The nebulous nature of these provisos and their association with 
a simple and structured diagram may seem incongruous and of only very 
restricted illustrative or analytic value but it is actually rather 
fertile. The proviso acknowledge the real world. Decisions, for 
example, are often not made in a rational, deliberated manner, 
especially at operational levels where time constraints are much 
tighter. Managers may also be unable to predict, or inaccurately 
predict, the results of their decisions so consequently they may be 
surprised at the strength of staff response to even the simplest of
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communications, such as memos and off the cuff comments. An element
of haphazardness may be present. Walton (1981:14) observes that:
"Few of us are immune from encountering managerial situations
where - being honest - we don't really know what to do we
may decide to 'carry on regardless', and fall back on luck.".
Such hit and miss conduct of affairs applies not only to
management or to just the participants in industrial relations, but to
all social interaction. Hyman (1977:106) summarises that:
"human beings possess goals, define situations, assign meanings 
to the actions of others, develop expectations, frame intentions, 
and act in accordance with their interpretations of the choices 
open to them."
and then warns that :
"Men's actions do not always have the intended result, and often 
the unintended consequences of human activity are patterned by 
unrecognised structural determinants. Meanings and motives are 
themselves typically socially generated and sustained, in ways 
of which the actors themselves may be unaware.".
He continues by describing a complexity of social reality that
acknowledges, amongst others, the place of the irrational, the
inaccurate, the rational according to criteria that are not recognised
as rational by others, and the spontaneous.
The research framework accommodates this confusing reality and in 
doing so provides insight into it. It reveals some of the "unrecog­
nised structural determinants" that govern both initiative and the 
responses to it. The significance of assessing and interpreting the 
subjective meanings the parties in industrial relations put to their 
actions is rarely given sufficient prominence in industrial relations 
analysis, but this fault should not be rectified at the expense of 
structural analysis; the two are complimentary. The subjectivity of
individuals is shaped by implicit frames of reference and the proposed
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research framework provides an aid to their identification. And 
although the analytic tool is largely structural it does not mean that 
it is also exclusively formal. The inevitability, extent and value of 
informality and informal control in industrial relations have been 
emphasised elsewhere (Terry 1977; also Batstone et al 1977:264) and 
the framework specifies informal control as one of the strata and 
incorporates informality in the description of the processes active 
when the strata are being tested or displaying dynamism.
The facility to convey movement in industrial relations relation­
ships, influence and control is one of the central purposes of the 
analytic framework. At its most general, for instance, it is neither 
exclusively pluralistic or unitaristic, although it can be either. It 
tends to imply, however, that there are elements of both present in all 
aspects of industrial relations. One of the chief features of a 
participatory enterprise, as described by Walker (1977:1), is that it 
is, "A coalition of conflicting and co-operative interests.". Bate 
and Mangham (1981) believe that these characteristics exist in any 
organisation, which consequently, "may be depicted as cohering on the 
basis of 'antagonistic co-operation'." (p 172). The potential 
volatility of any organisation can therefore be well understood:
"We believe that organisations are essentially political arenas 
wherein individuals and groups struggle to have what they consider 
right and proper prevail. In some circumstances, perhaps even 
many, interests overlap and perceptions of that which is right 
and proper coincide; thus co-operation is possible and desirable. 
In other circumstances, interests do not overlap and perceptions 
do not coincide; thus antagonism is possible and inevitable. 
Behaviour in organisations - from either perspective - may be 
seen as a matter of tolerance and tension, conflict and co­
operation, integration and division." (p 175).
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The analytic framework provides expression for both co-operation
and conflict of interest and it is the process of establishing at the
workplace which applies in any specific context that generates some of
the substantial dynamism in employing relationships, although many other
influences militate against stability. The representation of this
dynamism by the analytic framework may appear sound but uncontrov-
ersial but it was an aspect of industrial relations behaviour that was
neglected for some time. Somers (1969:41 , quoted in Bain and Clegg
1974:107) complained that :
"industrial relations research needs a longer time dimension, a 
dynamic theory. Too often, studies in this field have been of 
a static, cross-sectional variety, even in problem areas charact­
erised by rapid change. This consideration is especially 
pertinent in relating environmental forces to internal plant 
relations and worker behaviour. Both the environment and the 
internal relationships are in constant flux, and analyses based 
on a point in time are likely to provide only limited or misleading 
results.".
That such outcomes could occur was demonstrated by Bats one et al 
in one of the very few studies over time of the organisation of trade 
unions. They concluded that there had been continual and considerable 
changes in the nature of the trade union organisations and consequently 
did not concur with the then current understandings of organisational 
development :
"This perspective contrasts with the one implicit in a thesis of 
organisational maturity. For such a developmental theory assumes 
either stability or predictable and steady change within the 
context on which the domestic organization is located." (1977:230).
The research by Bate and Mangham into participation shows that this was
another area of study that had suffered from inadequate consideration
of organisational movement :
"The cross-sectional nature of most research has obviously had the 
effect of ignoring the question of whether attitudes to partici­
pation change over time: in the overwhelming majority of cases, a
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'snapshot' had been taken of employee attitudes in one or more 
companies, followed by processing and rapid display of the picture 
Perhaps a longitudinal view of the same subject, particularly over 
a period of time when the extent of participation was being 
increased, would reveal - as in our case - great changes," 
(1981:202).
The relationship between participation and the analytic framework
will be considered later but its potential dynamism is encapsulated in
the potential dynamism of the whole structure. In other words, the
analytic framework meets the requirement of Strauss that:
"rather than seeing a relatively inflexible structure with a 
limited and determinable list of structural properties, we have to 
conceive of a ward, hospital, or any other institution as a 
structure in process." (1978:258).
He continues:
"the point that most requires underlining is that structural 
process has consequences that themselves enter into the emergence 
of a new structural process."
and a crucial feature of the analytic framework is that it does not
just accommodate dynamism of any type but in fact focusses on what
might almost be called the ordering of dynamism and the shifting
structures it creates.
The strata of the analytic framework are defined by the parties 
involved and an important element of the source of their definition 
will be the definitions of others and since these are not merely 
academic distinctions but summaries of perceptions concerning the 
disposition of self-interest, the process of accommodating the various 
definitions must be one of negotiation. One of the innovations of the 
analytic structure is that it encompasses both the negotiation of the 
order of control and influence and the negotiation of specific 
industrial relations issues and activities. It is suggested that 
there may be considerable areas of control that management may tolerate
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(p 73), "the degree of obduracy to be contended with" ( p 73), "the 
conviction of adamancy" ( p 73), "Strength and vigor in a party and a 
ring of conviction about its presentation" (p 74) and, "an impression 
of intractability" (p 74). She illustrates very convincingly the 
contention that there can be no absolute limits about what is 
negotiable:
"In the peculiar pattern of communications which obtains in 
bargaining, what is done is vastly more revealing than what is 
said. Any public show of change from one position to another 
becomes a source of cues to the opposing side about what it can 
rightfully expect and hopfully push for. Thus, if a management 
team does have real, solid outer limits beyond which it cannot 
(or fervently hope not to have to) go, it will need to stay at 
some distance from these, in order to get across to the other 
side what is the vicinity of that precise point. Should it make 
the grave error of stating explicitly what its limits are, it 
would be stating instead, in the language of bargaining, 'We offer 
this now, and you may legitimately figure that there is more to 
be had where this came from.'." (p 78,79).
Walker (1977:2,3) confirms that in practice even when limits have been
declared it has been possible to breach them:
"It cannot be denied that in the absence of collective bargaining 
management would make decisions unilaterally. Each widening of 
the range of issues subject to collective bargaining has been 
contested by management as invasion of managerial functions, and 
the historical trend has clearly been toward greater and greater 
penetration of areas of decision which should otherwise be taken 
unilaterally by management.".
Mangham suggests that:
"Change is nearly always confronted by strong forces holding it 
in check and sharply circumscribing the potential rewriting of 
the situational scripts." (1978:78)
but in the context of a negotiated order there is another alternative,
which is that the change may be accommodated if the change itself or
the process of accepting it enables other parties to strengthen their
own situational scripts. In fact Mangham himself and Bate have
reported how in a practical context the subjects of change were able
to almost reverse the advantages in the situational scripts:
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"Some of the representatives, in adopting a persistent, question­
ing but no less 'responsible* behaviour, effectively forced the 
managers to respond. They refused to be 'put o f f  by management's 
expressions of good intent, they were not deflected by the 
presentations of various managers which implied that 'they, the 
representatives' should defer. Some have gradually built 
identities that are resistant to the flattery and vague threat. 
Their 'situated identities' as representatives have radically 
effected initial notions of participation and involvement. As 
they have elaborated their situated identities, so the management 
has seen the need to change its identity within the group." 
(1981:181).
In highlighting the exploitation of opportunities to enhance self- 
interest in the face of the postulation of abstract concepts of rights, 
Flanders (1967) appears to have injected some realism into industrial 
relations study. He describes the combination of maintaining notional 
managerial prerogatives while yielding to bargaining power on the shop 
floor as, "the most fundamental cause of the weakening of managerial 
control and the growing anarchy in workplace relations" (p 32) and his 
solution is to combine the two unilateral systems of control into one 
of joint control achieved by compromise. But some reservations need to 
be expressed. It is unclear whether the establishment of joint control 
will itself eliminate serious conflict or whether it will only formalise 
the nature and scope of negotiation. The latter is more likely and, as 
Douglas (1957) has identified, attempts to formalise the parameters 
of negotiation may only encourage them to be tested and further extended. 
Secondly, managerial prerogatives, both real and notional, exist and 
can impact so forcefully upon the employing relationship as to become 
one of the main determinants of its character.
The fundamental distinction is that Flanders' thesis assumes that 
all employing enterprises exhibit a pluralist structure whereas, as the 
Llandough research shows, this is not necessarily the case. The analytic
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structure explains how both pluralist and unitary frames of reference 
may be valid in different circumstances and even how elements of both 
may exist at the same time. The dominant ideology is usually the 
management ideology and if this prevails the negotiating potential in 
the analytic framework will remain large and probably mainly unseeii by 
the staff and their local representatives. If management is unable to 
sustain its ideology the negotiating potential will be largely or 
entirely absorbed within orthodox negotiation and there will be an 
expanded stratum of informal staff control. In these circumstances 
the employing relationship is one of pluralism and Flanders is right 
to declare the futility of management that expects staff to conform 
to the exercise of its prerogatives simply because it declares that 
they exist.
In the first situation, however, a unitary frame is more 
appropriate, without denying that there may be significant areas of 
conflict. This paradox has permeated the Llandough data and is 
described precisely by Armstrong et al (1981:17,18). The law and 
formal collective bargaining agreements are very inadequate for alloca­
ting control at the workplace and consequently:
"control rests upon the efficacy of other means. Of these, 
perhaps the most important is the général acceptance hy workers 
of ^management's right to manage* which^ howeoer^ is not 
incompatible with the resistance to specific usages of that 
right. The claim of legitimacy of managerial authority is 
general, whereas acts of authority are specific.".
Similar distinctions have been made between systems of that order that
are industrial and normative and concrete, interpersonal interpretation
(Cousins 1972), and between dominant value systems and subordinate
value systems (Parkin 1972). But at the time of the field research
the two elements of the paradox seemed irreconcilable. Despite their
apparently firm conviction that the authority used to exercise the
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management function was right and should be upheld, the Llandough 
representatives’ equal regard for expressing concern and conflict 
about specific issues if necessary seemed quickly destined to throw the 
employing relationship into anarchy. If, as many of them confirmed, 
there was nothing that they would not challenge if they felt strongly 
enough about it it seemed despondently predictable that management, 
and the enterprise, would rapidly stagnate because of the failure to 
achieve change and movement. This fear is now assuaged, since it has 
become obvious that the representatives’ affiliation to the existing 
employing relationship is sincere and is in fact sustained in a variety 
of ways.
To begin with, there is enormous internalisation of the management 
ethos amongst the staff, to the extent that the exercise of the manage­
ment function becomes so inevitable and natural that its validity is 
only very rarely questioned. One of the outcomes of the research by 
Armstrong et al (1981) was the confirmation of workers’ acquiescence 
in management’s rule-making. One of their conclusions is that:
"The point is that major elements of managerial ideology are
broadly accepted by most workers and their representatives and
consequently many of the latter assume ’helper’ functions" (p 82).
This implicit acquiescence was also conveyed forceably by the Llandough 
data - no-one had any designs upon the authority structure. Indeed, 
another feature sustaining the management ideology amongst the staff 
that is found in both the Llandough and Armstrong et al research is 
that, much more explicitly, the staff set limits on what is acceptable 
by way of challenge to management. Armstrong et al provide examples 
of a staff representative clearly reaffirming managerial prerogative 
to a member of staff and of another representative who displayed 
anxiety to disclaim decision-making ambitions. Identical deference
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to management and self-imposed restrictions upon the challenge to its 
authority were obvious from the Llandough representatives and it is 
interesting to note that in both research contexts representatives 
criticised other unions for going too far.
Hyman (1977:122-125) summarises an attractive argument that even
the nature of collective bargaining is distorted in order to conform
with the management ideology. There may be discontent about the nature
of the employing relationship but since collective bargaining and
industrial action can only be stimulated by issues about which it is
appropriate to be aggrieved they therefore may be about issues not
stated to be their cause and the agreements reached are unlikely to
resolve the original problems. This demonstrates the force of the
dominant ideology:
"Since managerial control is legitimised in our culture, it is 
not surprising that acceptance of a wide area of managerial 
prerogative is one of the foundations of collective bargaining. 
Workers, too, cannot formulate explicitly those grievances which 
stem from the exercise of managerial control without questioning 
their very subjection to this control. The basic necessity that 
every strike must be settled means, moreover, that workers are 
obliged to specity their grievance in a form which permits 
resolution in negotiation with employers. Where workers’ 
deprivations derive from their very status as employees, the 
requirements of the strike situation prevent this grievance from 
receiving articulation. Collective bargaining is the art of the 
possible - within a narrowly-defined framework of possibilities."
(p 124).
Chamberlain (1967) is conscious of this tension but unlike Hyman
acticipates that its containment is only temporary:
"There is thus no desire to challenge managerial authority as 
suohy but a firm insistence that where the interests of the 
workers are bound up in the exercise of authority in a given area 
of business operations, the unions must be granted a voice.
.... It is at this point, however, that the paradox is reintroduced 
For there is a growing consciousness on the part of the increasing 
number of labor leaders that there is scarcely an area of business
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operations in which managerial decisions do not affect these 
interests of the workers." (p 145).
He continues:
"It is perhaps fair to say that with few exceptions the union 
leaders have not fully thought through the implications of their 
stated position. It is a safe prediction that as the issues are 
formed more concretely they would be led irresistibly to the 
conviction that the preservation of management’s undivided 
authority and responsibility is incompatible with the logic of 
their objectives." (p 145,146).
In fact, not only is Chamberlain underestimating the intensity of the
internalisation of the management ethos and the desire to avoid
perceived extremes of staff opposition, he is also ignoring the means
by which management may be able to retain or regain its total control
of the negotiating potential.
The methods are so numerous, interrelated and detailed that they
will not be elaborated upon here. A few examples will suffice to
defend the contention that they exist. Writing as the Chairman of
British Rail, Sir Peter Parker implied the use of propaganda and
cultural manipulation:
"The social dimension to successful enterprise is ignored at our 
peril.
I looked to personnel management to help managers - and unions - 
to understand the interdependence of the different cultures of 
enterprise and of the community;" (1983:17).
Hyman (1975:109) emphasises manipulation of a different sort:
"The policy of rewarding ’reasonable’ stewards (and their memebers) 
and punishing ’militants’ is pursued, with greater or lesser 
sophistication, by many managements; and it clearly subjects 
those affected to intense pressure to conform to accommodate 
relationships. This is increasingly true the more the steward’s 
preoccupations centre around the routine problems and day-to-day 
issues of industrial relations; for it is in this context that 
the personal relationship between management and union represent­
atives can exert a major influence on the outcome of negotiations.".
At Inmos, the formerly state-owned microchip company, a highly proactive
and rational approach to the inception of formalised industrial relations
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meant that manipulation far exceeded that which is normally possible 
with shop stewards on a day-to-day basis. In devising an employee 
relations policy for its new plant in South Wales four major priorities 
were identified and implemented. This included an awareness from the 
outset that:
"union involvement was almost inevitable. So, rather than to face 
the prospect of haphazard and potentially damaging multi-union 
development, it was decided to seek recognition of a single union 
to represent office, technician and operative staff."
and the company then virtually interviewed five different unions who
had expressed an interest in gaining recognition at the new plant:
"In the end Inmos chose the EETPU, in part because its general 
approach to industrial relations corresponded most closely with 
that of the company." (Industrial Relations Review and Report 299, 
12.7.83.).
Another mechanism that some commentators have purported serves 
enhance management control is participation itself, which is an argument 
that will be returned to. Ramsay (1976b:696), for example, believes 
that:
"When employees are offered a say in return for adopting a 
’responsible’ attitude, they are likely to discover that 
’responsible’ means safeguarding profits at the workers’ expense. 
The decisions are made by the preconditioned frame of reference, 
not by the workers.".
Lastly, sight should not be lost of the aspect of management that 
seem to most consciously affect the attitudes of the Llandough repres­
entatives towards it, and this was the style used in exercising its 
function. They valued highly and seemed to have more respect for 
managers who were sensitive to the sentiments of their staff and this 
seemed to substantially ameliorate what could otherwise be the most 
antagonistic features of the structure of control and influence.
This is a reiteration of the paradox that by giving the impression of 
relinquishing some of its absolute control to joint control with staff
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management in essence consolidates its control. But this will only be 
true if the management function being exercised is one perceived by 
the staff to be of some substance i.e. a management style that is 
sensitive to the staff because management itself is weak or laissez faire 
may be held in little regard by the staff because even real concessions, 
let alone superficial ones, will be of little worth. In other words, 
and this was the other key characteristic of management style identi­
fied by the Llandough representatives, management needs significant 
control over negotiating potential if its style is to be regarded as 
important and this in turn means that it must act as if the entire 
negotiating potential under its control. And numerous examples have 
been provided in the Llandough context of such prerogatives being 
exercised and being accepted as legitimate by the staff. In Blumer’s 
words (1965:538):
"Established patterns of group life exist and persist only through 
the continued use of the same schemes of interpretation; and such 
schemes of interpretation are maintained only through their 
continued confirmation by the defining acts of others.".
Perhaps rather tortously, the attainment of this understanding 
can satisfy one of the sources of enquiry described in Chapter One. 
Feelings of confusion, inadequacy and class alienation were being 
generated because what was being defined as reasonable appeared 
inexplicably unreasonable to the staff, who persisted in demanding that 
furniture be removed on overtime, for example, even where spare time 
was available during normal working hours, and strained industrial 
relations and actual industrial action were the consequences. What 
becomes obvious is that ’reasonableness’ is either irrelevant in 
industrial relations or can only be defined in terms of negotiation.
It is futile for a relatively new manager to decide that moving
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furniture only on overtime is unreasonable. What is required is an 
assessment of where that activity falls in the analytic structure of 
influence and control. By seeking to move furniture during normal 
working hours an attempt was being made to relocate the activity from 
the orthodox negotiation stratum into the negotiating potential 
stratum, subject to a managerial as if prerogative. It was being 
asserted that the allocation of overtime was an absolute function of 
management and not one to be shared with staff. As far as the staff 
were concerned, previous managements had permitted the arrangement to 
continue for some years and consequently to them if was a reasonable 
one.
To conclude this elaboration of the value and accuracy of the 
analytic framework it is interesting to note just how tellingly it 
describes the actual confusion and potential resourcefulness of super­
visory staff, which is an issue that emerged from the Llandough data 
and has been examined in other research and by other commentators 
(e.g. Fewtrell 1982, Child and Partridge 1982). While supervisors 
will possess their own definitions of the strata and these may vary 
from those of the other parties involved, their awareness of the 
definitions of others will fall between, and commonly at, two extremes. 
At one they will be floundering in a mire of conflicting, perplexing, 
undiscernable definitions, probably seeking support from staff or their 
representatives, because they appear confident about where the limits 
lie, rather than management, for fear that it may proclaim inadequacy. 
At the other extreme, supervisors can be those participants in 
industrial relations at operational level who have the most keenly 
developed command of the web of definitions and depending upon which 
affiliation is most encouraged this depth of knowledge and sensitivity
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may be used by either staff and their representatives or by management. 
The analytic structure thus explains why in Llandough some supervisors 
were regarded as irrelevant, while some were reported to turn to shop 
stewards for help and advice, and why some shop stewards wished that 
the supervisors had more authority.
The Analytic Framework Applied
Before proceeding to consider how one specific feature of the 
employing relationship, namely participation, relates to the whole it 
may be helpful to restate the value of the proposed analytic framework 
by using examples. National industries with high and controversial 
public profiles have been chosen as the first two of three examples 
because their more extreme nature makes their analysis easier but it 
must be declared that there is awareness that these examples are also 
simplistic. There has been no attempt to actively research the enter­
prises concerned and there will undoubtedly be large elements of 
subjectivity and bias in the media sources utilised for background 
information purposes, but the value of the analytic structure is 
unaltered.
For many years until the beginning of this decade, in a number of 
enterprises, such as British Rail, the National Coal Board, British Steel, 
printing and car manufacture, it was well recognised that trade unions 
had prominent authority in the management function. This partly 
derived from collective bargaining successes but there were also some 
positive management policies to encourage joint regulation. The 
authority extended well beyond day-to-day operational concerns and far 
into many strategic decisions. The staff and trade unions, and probably
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the management as well, could not envisage that the enterprises would 
cease to function, or even diminish to any great extent. Supervisors 
had uncertain standing and their performance was unconvincing. Large 
sections of operational control were determined solely by staff and 
their representatives, on both an informal and formal basis. There 
was no shared sense of purpose about the enterprises and the employing 
relationships justified a pluralistic description. These circumstances 
can be described in the analytic framework as follows :








Maximum Trade Union Authority
Compared with the ’standard* framework (Diagram Four), it is 
obvious that in this situation the area of absolute management control 
is very small and management exercises neither real nor as if prero­
gatives . All of the negotiating potential has been placed or brought 
into the orthodox negotiation arena but there are still pressures to 
expand it.
The response was for new management to declare that they were 
prepared to see the enterprise, or large parts of it, cease to function
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unless absolute and wide-ranging control was returned to management.
Much tighter supervision was introduced which considerably reduced but 
not totally eliminated absolute control previously exercised by workers 
and their representatives. Orthodox negotiation still exists but about 
a much smaller range of issues than previously and within a range 
dictated by management. This it achieves by exercising real prerogat­
ives i.e. it is perceived to be genuine when it threatens to close the 
enterprise or important locations of the enterprise unless substantial 
restrictions are adhered to. Workers have largely conformed with these 
expectations and in doing so they implicitly state that they have a 
common purpose with the management, which is the existence and success 
of the enterprise, and are prepared to tolerate, and possibly even 
co-operate with, management * s endeavours to attain it. During periods 
of transition the nature of the employing relationship will be extremely 
confused but in periods of stability this acceptance of the management 
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Absolute management control is small, but does exist and takes 
different forms at different levels of the enterprise. Ultimately, 
the government could decide to finance and manage health services 
privately; the health authority could close the hospital or allow it 
to stagnate or run down; and the work of certain departments could 
be considered for privatisation. The degree of informal control by 
the staff will vary a lot but is generally small. Orthodox negotiation 
exists across a fairly wide range of issues but these are mainly 
restricted to certain aspects of operational management, although the 
largely unstructured nature of the collective bargaining means that 
there are pragmatic pressures to enlarge the orthodox negotiation 
arena. By far the greatest part of control in the enterprise could 
become subject to orthodox negotiation if the staff and their repres­
entatives wanted it to and the management allowed it to, without the 
viability of the enterprise being eliminated, but in practice it
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remains within the orb of management. One way in which this control 
is maintained is by the exercise of as if prerogatives but since both 
these prerogatives and the pressures of pragmatic collective bargain­
ing exist and are in opposite directions there will be industrial 
relations tensions when either or both are tested, either deliberately 
or by miscalculation.
Participation and the Industrial Relations System
Reference has been made to some of the ambitious aspirations for 
participation expounded by those for whom it is a central preoccupation, 
Some indication of the degree to which such participatory evangelism is 
justified may have already been conveyed by the research data and the 
presentation of the proposed industrial relations analytic framework, 
but the relationship of participation to the industrial relations 
system generally and its place in contributing to the dynamic of the 
system can be further elaborated.
One of the greatest inadequacies of participatory exaltation is 
that it may encourage assessment of existing participatory practices 
as one of the first stages of enhancing participation (e.g. Industrial 
Participation Association 1979) but rarely, if ever, prompts intro­
spection of the character of the industrial relations system or 
employing relationship. This area of enquiry has been included in the 
research and will be shown to be crucial in attempting to predict the 
potential for participation. Indeed, another theme of the evidence 
in the Llandough data was the almost peripheral location allocated to 
participation in the industrial relations system. The representatives 
had either no awareness of the concept or the little knowledge that
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they had did not lead them to expect that it would have much impact 
on the way that industrial relations operated in the hospital.
This disparity with participation specialists is backed by 
commentators on industrial relations generally and industrial relations 
in the NHS in particular. In one major textbook (Clegg 1979), for 
example, only thirteen pages out of eleven chapters and four hundred 
and fifty six pages refer to participation in any detail and six of 
these relate almost exclusively to a review of the Bullock Report. 
Macfarlane (1981:138-40) considers the incidence and causes of strikes 
in the Health Service but inadequate participatory arrangements are 
not mentioned at all and neither do they feature in his tentative 
recommendations for improving NHS industrial relations. A report of 
over two hundred and fifty pages on precisely this topic, by the TUG 
Health Services Committee (1981), refers to arrangements that might 
be generously interpreted to be participation in only four pages. In 
a lengthy article in The Health Services (23.7.82.) the secretary of 
the TUC Health Services Committee, a former industrial relations 
adviser to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, and 
the Secretary General of the Ren discussed the faults and remedies of 
NHS industrial relations but participation is not mentioned at all.
Even ACAS in its evidence to the NHS Royal Commission (1978) devoted 
only two paragraphs to participation, one on informal departmental 
meetings and another on information bulletins to staff.
And if placing participation in perspective by considering the 
attention it receives within industrial relations systems is not 
salutary enough, comparison of its significance with examples of 
other industrial relations issues is overwhelming. There are all the
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aspects of pay negotiation, such as incremental increases, relativities 
and bonuses; closed shop facilities; compulsory trade union ballots; 
redundancies; closure of employing locations; grievances; disciplinary 
action; and so on. In addition to most of the feature that apply 
generally the NHS experiences industrial relations trauma because of 
characteristics peculiar to itself. These include competitive tender­
ing; central directives to reduce staffing levels; requirements to 
fund developments by cost improvements elsewhere in the service; 
extremely complicated terms and conditions of service; the emotional 
involvement of the community; and sensitivities to manifestations of 
hierarchical and class structures.
It also needs to be recognised that if the existing industrial 
relations character is inadequately considered there will be a failure 
to properly contemplate the consequences that increased participation 
might have upon the existing arrangements. Even when regard is shown 
for the wider industrial relations implications it is often by 
anticipating that improved industrial relations and greater harmony 
and unity of effort will be achieved. Participation may thus be 
regarded as a means of manipulation but what is often forgotten is 
that it can also be a thing to be manipulated. In essence, participa­
tion cannot be immune from the influences of the existing patterns of 
power.
Purcell and Smith (1979:23) believe that there is a stability in 
this pattern:
"it is clear that workers and managers are capable of recognising 
a balance of power on industrial relations issues within organis­
ations, and of achieving systems of reciprocal influence to share 
control.".
-358-
but reports in the media clearly show that this is not true and Clarke
(1980:11) is more realistic.
"From a practival viewpoint, it seems likely that disclosure of 
more information will add to the bargaining strength of the 
unions, thereby changing to some extent the balance of power in 
negotiations. There may be some loss of managerial authority in 
the sense that the element of mystique in possession of information 
has hitherto favoured compliance.".
Hawkins (1979:161) confirms that :
"In other words, any change in the scope and style of collective 
bargaining may involve a change in the balance of power between 
the parties concerned.".
The practical consequences are identified by Clarke (1980:12):
"The arguments in favour of a single channel for labour-management 
relations, the extension of the area of collective bargaining and 
the erosion of traditional managerial prerogatives all raise 
questions about the extent of participation by workers in the wide 
range of decisions which have to be taken in the enterprise, 
outside the customary area of negotiation, both in relation to 
production and daily life of the enterprise and in respect of its 
longer-term policies. When management considers that a certain 
course of action is necessary for the good of the business, and 
workers object, whose will is to prevail?".
Even relatively minor manifestations of participation can involved
procedural changes, any of which may disturb the existing pattern of
industrial relations:
'^Whether it is a matter of establishing joint procedures where 
none previously existed, or of formalising custom and practice, 
management must recognise that in some way the structure of power 
and authority will change." (Hawkins 1979:173).
A number of the Llandough representatives were quite blatant 
about their intentions to exploit any management-initiated change, 
whether procedural or not, to their own advantage and in some cirtmmr 
stances, therefore, participation may be a very attractive vehicle for 
this purpose. However, there still seems to be a prominent vein of 
thought that management can contain negotiation within its collective
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bargaining arrangements and then declare that the issues to be 
discussed under the participative arrangements will still lie within 
management's control but in exercising that control management will 
attempt to be more sensitive to the views of the staff. In effect, 
this is doing exactly what Douglas (1957:79) warned against because 
not only might management have difficulty in sustaining the distinction 
between negotiation and participation but also staff will not perceive 
formally-declared limits to negotiation to be the real ones and will 
interpret them as cues in negotiating what is negotiable.
Neither is the extension of collective bargaining necessarily an 
extension of participation. A report in the Sunday Times (27.6.82.) 
referred to the frustration and impatience of the Government and the 
management of British Rail caused by the inability to achieve important 
management objectives through the elaborate procedures for obtaining 
agreement with staff. "Every issue, even minor ones, has to be agreed 
jointly with the unions at three different levels." (p 13). Joint 
regulation was deeply entrenched and had possibly worked to the benefit 
of both parties for some years but the point had been reached where the 
absence of agreement threatened to inflict serious mutual damage. The 
railwayman were determined to strike, despite the knowledge that some 
of them would lose their jobs as a consequence and that a very substan­
tial part of the railway system could even be closed down permanently. 
The extension of collective bargaining into joint regulation may there­
fore be incompatible with the viability of the enterprise and Hyman 
(1977:96) highlights that it may also be incompatible with workers* 
objectives :
"The idea that collective bargaining replaces managerial control
by industrial democracy must .... be rejected. Management still
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commands; workers are still obliged to obey. Trade unionism 
permits debate around the terms of workers' obedience; it does 
not challenge the fact of their subordination. 'Joint 
regulation' is not joint management" (1977:96).
This is true to the extent that management can ultimately decide whether
or not the enterprise continues but up to the point of being forced to
consider this decision management may have very little ability to
impose its own agenda.
There can be agreement, however, that :
"The bitterness which can result when interests diverge like this 
shows that participation, far from being a means for burying 
conflict, may even exacerbate it." (Ramsay 1976b:696).
The ILO (1981:199) has recognised this possibility and advises
modifying participation accordingly :
"There is now some movement away from the idea of participation 
seen as collaboration between workers' and management represent­
ât ai ves on non-controversial subjects towards the idea of 
participation in dealing with conflict situations, most often 
involving bargaining in the broad sense of the term, whether 
formal or informal.".
Failure to do this and perpetuation of the participating crusade
designed to increase harmony of purpose may be both unproductive and
counter-productive:
"Efforts to suppress specific manifestations of conflict, without 
removing the underlying causes of unrest y may merely divert 
disorder into different channels." (Hyman 1975:188,1$9).
The ILO concludes (1981:201):
"A growing number of writers are indeed tending to advocate the 
establishment of an integrated network of participation bodies 
to correspond to the various processes and levels of decision, 
since a single type of institutional machinery can no longer, on 
its own, meet the whole range of participation needs. In addition, 
it seems that the practical application of participation in its 
different forms benefits from clear recognition of the existence 
not only of common interests, but also of divergent interests which 
must be satisfied as fully as possible, always bearing in mind 
that in the medium and long terms the parties are in many respects 
interdependent in the undertaking.".
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This guidance is properly sensitive to the true complexity of the 
interrelation between participation and industrial relations generally 
but it could be argued that it merely states that participation should 
be all things to all men. This is not the case, as the analytic 
framework can demonstrate.
The Potential for Participation
Participatory potential can be included as another stratum in the 
structural analysis and in a way that clearly shows how it can be 
successful for both management and staff, or either one or the other, 
how it can be unsuccessful, and how it can either diminish or magnify 
conflict. The strata must inevitably sit between orthodox negotiation 
and negotiating potential or absolute management control. Again, the 
extreme situations provide the simplest examples. If participation 
is introduced when all or most of the negotiating potential has been 
absorbed into orthodox negotiation it can be expected that management 
will attempt to introduce the participatory potential into the top of 
the orthodox negotiation stratum. Since management is virtually at the 
point of exercising real prerogatives it has negligible ability to 
concede the element of negotiation that will undoubtedly accompany any 
participative arrangements. Such participation is likely to be unsuccess­
ful and provides the explanation for the typical situation where trade 
unions prefer to continue to use collective bargaining rather than 
participation to advance their members* interests. The composition 
of the framework will therefore be as follows:
—362—
Diagram Nine




The Potential for Participation with Maximum Trade Union Authority
At another extreme, management may be successfully maintaining 
control over a substantial area of negotiating potential and be 
unwilling, rather than unable, to concede any of its authority, in 
which case management is again seeking to obtain participatory 
potential from the orthodox negotiation stratum and once again this 
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The only participation that be of genuine value to both management
and staff and which can accommodate both common and conflicting
interests is that which derives from a stratum which is either entirely
within the negotiating potential but adjacent to orthodox negotiation
or straddles the distinction between the two and has different aspects
in both strata. This analysis derives from, and is particularly
appropriate for, the employing relationship at Llandough Hospital and
the following diagram illustrates the straddling stratum of participatory
potential in that context.






 —  _
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The Location of Genuine Potential for Participâtion
Much of this thesis has concentrated on the relationship between 
participation and negotiation, partly because it has received inadequate 
attention in previous research and largely because it was an association 
of real vitality to the Llandough representatives, but it would be 
erroneous to give the impression that all participation is inevitably 
transformed into negotiation. The point being made is that it is 
unrealistic to believe that none of the content of participation will
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become subject to negotiation. Attempts to implement arrangements 
founded on such a belief will be unsuccessful and may only enhance the 
frustration of staff and their desire for extended negotiated control. 
Much of participation may not affect the structure of control and 
influence but for it to be successful management must accept that 
ultimately some of the negotiating potential over which it exercises 
control may become subject to joint control. Conversely, however, if 
the staff see that this advantage may be obtained they may be willing 
to procedurally redefine the processes by which they exercise influence 
over the subjects already governed by orthodox negotiation.
The research data emphasised the importance of the management 
style in maintaining the limits of the negotiating potential vrtiile 
making management's absolute control tolerable to staff and that 
similarly the staff wished management to accommodate their attitudes 
and opinions but had no intention of challenging the system of control. 
They are essentially concerned with the defence of their interests 
operationally and not the attrition of control in principle. Their 
attention is therefore at the margin of management control only, or, 
in terms of the analytic framework, is concerned with the interface of 
the negotiating potential and orthodox negotiation strata. This is 
why participation may be one of the most sensitive indicators of the 
nature of the industrial relations processes that are active or even 
just latent. But if the negotiating potential is large, management can 
tolerate and even encourage expansion of orthodox negotiation, which 
both gives the impression of increasing the power and involvement of 
the staff and also reaffirms its prerogative, since it is clear that 
it is its control to dispense with. In the same way, by obtaining 
increased participation in these circumstances, trade unions can
\
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increase the size of the negotiating stratum while not appearing to 
challenge management control. Participation is thus identified as one 
of the most crucial tools of negotiation of the employment relationship.
Conclusion
Management can seek to establish that it is the sole source of 
control, that it exercises absolute management prerogatives, by simply 
stating its claim or even by attempting to act in accordance with it, 
but this does not necessarily ensure acceptance of the claim by the 
staff. The staff may ignore it and the management may then be unable 
to cope with the challenges to its authority and amid highly traumatic 
conflict some will be lost, in part or even almost entirely. Even if 
management's claim to control absolutely is tolerated, there maybe 
little rapport between the management and staff, staff may keep know­
ledge and advice useful to management to themselves, there will be 
little loyalty to the enterprise or to management, and there will be 
little goodwill, which may be operationally essential at times.
Similarly, uncertain or pragmatic management may constantly 
compromise with staff about issues they raise or often concede completely 
and they thus allow the trade unions to take the initiative until the 
point is reached where the future of the employing enterprise is in 
jeopardy. It may be too late by then to reverse the relationship, 
because the expectations of the staff have become understandably fixed 
by the way that they have been allowed to be sustained over many years, 
or once again alteration in the relationship may be sought but only 
at the cost of fundamental and enormously damaging confrontation.
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However, if management retains a sense of purpose and a sense of 
proportion about the identity of the key features of the employing 
relationship, it can exercise freedom in its day-to-day contact with 
staff, both in the types of issues concerned and the way in which they 
are handled. This implies that the meaning of the word participation 
can operate at two quite distinct levels. It has a broader sense that 
refers to a type of management outlook, one which is prepared to take 
chances, to allow flexibility and some negotiation and compromise, to 
learn from staff, and to manifest this in both process and structure, 
such as by informal contact, joint consultative committees, quality 
circles and collective bargaining. The second meaning of participation 
is to describe the specific methods used and the important distinction 
is that even when participation in the second sense exists it does not 
necessarily follow that participation exists in the first sense. But 
possessing a management outlook that encompasses the more broadly 
defined participation is more demanding upon management since it may 
reflect abdication of its function unless it retains an awareness of 
the parameters within which enhanced freedom will not jeopardise the 
purpose of the organisation, and to do this it must exercise as if 
prerogatives.
It therefore becomes possible to analyse employing organisations 
as consisting of a mass of management objectives, intentions and 
activities, the great majority of which staff are not concerned with 
(either because they are not allowed to or because they are not 
sufficiently interested or aware) and which staff have no desire to 
challenge. If this is the case, in dimensions of both time and 
activity there is de facto a unitary framework and as if prerogatives 
can be exercised. Nevertheless, within the parameters established by
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management both pluralist and unitary analyses can apply but even the 
pluralist activities are rarely intended to use up management authority 
and will not, provided that management does not allow them to. This 
analysis does not seek to confirm or refute either the power-seeking 
and -denying or power-expanding models. Power remains the same but 
the concern is for the way it is manifest.
Participation becomes a considerable test of management's ability 
to handle ambiguity - to be in control and yet to appear to be willing 
to share some of it. This hints of paternalism but it can be contended 
that this is unfounded as such an approach encourages questioning, 
informality, common activities and recognition from management that it 
is prepared to be flexible and does not always have the correct, or any, 
answer.
The research design was true to this understanding of participation 
as a management philosophy. Since I was a manager inviting shop stewards 
and others to criticise management as irrationally, emotionally or 
fundamentally as they wished, it was possible that the research 
process would encourage an antagonism, not only within the research 
process but in the employing relationship generally, and that this might 
have had a traumatic and, to management at least, damaging effect upon 
industrial relations. Although this could have occurred I still had 
little hesitation in initiating the research, in perhaps what might be 
described as an action of faith regarding the honour ability of nty 
intentions, but which more realistically can be described as a demon­
stration of the confidence that I possessed as a representative of 
management about the ability to retain control. This should not
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denigrate the integrity of the enquiry and it is surely apparent that 
the staff were encouraged to be as open and frank as possible about 
their perceptions of the pattern of industrial relations in the hospital 
and the place of participation in it. The quality of the data hopefully 
demonstrates this was successfully achieved but it also shows that 
although many criticisms, grievance and suggestions were forthcoming, 
the confidence in the authority of management was not only justified 
but also reaffirmed and reinforced. This was partly because the 
research process conveyed to the staff that a member of management had 
a genuine desire to perceive the world of industrial relations as they 
did and to consider how best their perceptions could be accommodated. 
There was thus an element of shared problem-solving about the exercise.
In addition, the research process was a practical catalyst and it 
contained elements of action research. Three years after the field 
research commenced, the nature of industrial relations in the hospital 
had experienced considerable metamorphosis. Relatively serious local 
disputes still occur but are resolved without recourse to industrial 
action. There are no impediments to informal consultation and there 
is frequent liaison initiated by both management and trade union 
representatives about an exceptionally wide range of issues, some of 
which are contentious or potentially contentious but are still largely 
resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all parties, by a process of 
bargaining or negotiation. There have clearly been other influences 
upon the industrial relations climate, such as government policy, 
unemployment, competitive tendering, supervisory training and changes 
in personality among the staff and managers, but the impact of the 
research itself should not be underestimated.
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It is impossible to prove, but I would advance that it had three 
major effects. It certainly altered my own understanding of industrial 
relations processes and the perceptions of staff and their representat­
ives and probably, although largely unconsciously, accordingly changed 
the manner of exercising the management function. Secondly, the 
research process added new characteristics to the staff's image of 
management. I believe that it introduced an appreciation that manage­
ment was sincere in its desire to achieve an improvement in industrial 
relations and there was also a sharing of pride in the research task. 
The staff seemed to feel they had become significant in a wider context 
and were very directly contributing to insight that would have value to 
industrial relations generally. Finally, the research provided the 
opportunity to make a co-operative endeavour out of analysing conflict. 
At the same time as discussing some of the most sensitive and powerful 
distinctions between management and staff a unity of purpose was 
developed that was a form of participation and which undoubtedly 
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